日內瓦安全部門治理中心-通往穩(wěn)定之路：反思沖突后利比亞的SSR（英）-2021.11-76正式版

TheRoadtoStability:

RethinkingSecuritySectorReforminPost-ConflictLibya

DCAF–GenevaCentreforSecuritySectorGovernance

TheGenevaCentreforSecuritySectorGovernance–DCAFisaninternationalfoundationwhosemissionistoassisttheinternationalcommunityinpursuinggoodgovernanceandreformofthesecuritysector.DCAFdevelopsandpromotesnormsandstandards,conductstailoredpolicyresearch,identifiesgoodpracticesandrecommendationstopromotedemocraticsecuritysectorgovernance,andprovidesin-countryadvisorysupportandpracticalassistanceprogrammes.

PublishedinSwitzerlandin2021byDCAF–GenevaCentreforSecuritySectorGovernance

DCAFGeneva

P.O.Box1360

CH-1211Geneva1

Switzerland

DCAFencouragestheuse,translation,anddisseminationofthispublication.Wedo,however,askthatyouacknowledgeandcitematerialsanddonotalterthecontent.

Citeas:Badi,Emadeddin,Gallet,Archibald,Maggi,Roberta,editors.

TheRoadtoStability:RethinkingSecuritySectorReforminPost-ConflictLibya

(Geneva:DCAF,2021).

ISBN:978-92-9222-625-1

Disclaimer

Theopinionsexpressedinthispublicationarethoseoftheauthorsaloneanddonotnecessarilyreflectthepositionoftheinstitutionsreferredtoorrepresentedwithinthispublication.

Editors:EmadeddinBadi,ArchibaldGallet,RobertaMaggi

Internalpeerreview:EmadeddinBadi,AndreaCellino,ArchibaldGallet,andRobertaMaggi

Layout:PitchBlackGraphicDesign

Copy-editing:AlessandraAllen

Coverphoto:WomenpartakeinanartisticactivityinanoutdoorpubliceventorganisedforInternationalWomen'sDayonMarch8,2021inTripoli,Libya.?NadaHaribforDCAF

TheRoadtoStability:

RethinkingSecuritySectorReforminPost-ConflictLibya

Editedby

EmadeddinBadi,ArchibaldGallet,RobertaMaggi

TheRoadtoStability:RethinkingSecuritySectorReforminPost-ConflictLibya

TableofContents

Introduction 5

Chapter1:

SecuritySectorStabilization:DefiningaPathin

theLibyanContext 7

TheBurdenofLibya’sSecuritySector 9

FromSecuritySectorStabilizationtoSecuritySector

Reform 10

SecuritySectorStabilizationinLibya 13

Conclusion 14

Chapter2:

TheLostDecade:DDRandSSRLessonsinLibya

since2011 15

Introduction 15

EmbeddingPoliticalLegitimacyinDDR/SSR 16

AvoidingthePitfallsofParallelismandCo-option

ofArmedGroupsinSSR 18

AvoidingtheTemptationtoPrioritizeTrain-and-Equip

SSRProgrammes 20

FocusingonInstitutionalandGovernanceReforms

inSSR 24

AdaptingSSRandDDRProgrammingtoLocalism

andHybridity 26

Conclusion 27

Chapter3:

SSRandElections:WhatRolefortheSecuritySector

in2021? 29

Introduction 29

Elections,SSR,andTheirRelevanceforaStable

Libya 30

2021Elections:TheCountryandtheSecuritySector

ataCrossroads 32

Conclusion 38

Chapter4:

AHolisticApproach:RestoringElectricityand

WaterServicesinPost-conflictLibya 39

Introduction 39

InstitutionalSolutions 41

TechnicalSolutions 44

SecuritySolutions 47

Conclusion 48

Chapter5:

ExtractiveResourceProtectioninLibya:

TheChallengeofReformingandSupportingthe

PetroleumFacilitiesGuard 49

Introduction 49

EvolutionintoDysfunction 50

PFGStructureandOperations 54

ReformofthePFGandKeyChallenges 59

Conclusion 62

ConcludingRemarks:

TowardsReform? 63

Bibliography 66

Biographies 73

55

Introduction

Authoredby

AndreaCellino(DCAF–GenevaCentreforSecuritySectorGovernance)

Tenyearsofturmoil,conflict,internalfragmentation,andforeignmeddlinghaveexactedaheavytollonLibya’ssocialandpoliticalfabric,aswellasseverelyimpacteditssystemofgovernance.BothLibya’sauthoritarianpoliticalpastandtheimmediateaftermathofthe2011violentoverthrowoftheGaddafiregimecontributedtothehybridizationandfragmentationofthesecuritysectorandalackofpoliticallegitimacy,whichisnormallyakeycomponentofsuccessfuldisarmament,demobilization,andreintegration(DDR)andsecuritysectorreform(SSR)efforts.Inaddition,asoneofourauthors,FredericWehrey,highlightsinhischapter,the“continuedattenuationofthestatesince2011,throughwarandneglect,hashastenedthisprocessofhybridizationandsecuritypluralismacrossthecountry”.

ThepresentpublicationrespondstotheurgentneedtosupporteffortstostabilizethecountrygiventhepartialsuccessinestablishingaunifiedexecutiveauthorityinTripoliin2021.Buildingonrecentpublications,aswellasitsownoperationalexperienceinLibya,DCAFseekstoofferuniqueexpertiseandinsightsonSSRinLibyaandincontextsoffragility,conflict,andviolence.Inlinewithitsoperationalobjectives,DCAFaimstoidentifysolutionstoenablethedevelopmentofSSRplansforLibya.Thiseditedvolumeonsecuritysectorgovernanceandreform(SSG/R)inLibyafeaturescontributionsfromkeyexpertsonLibyaandconsidersthevariousfacetsofhybridityinconflictenvironmentsandthecontinuumbetweenSSRandDDR.ThepublicationcomplementsandsupportspreviousoutputsandresearchbyDCAFonSSG/Rinhybridandconflict-affectedcontexts.

Intheopeningchapter,DCAF’sArchibaldGalletandEmadeddinBadiexaminethepossibleprospectsforSSRplansandtheimplicationsoftheceasefireagreementinLibyaandtheformationofaunifiedexecutiveauthorityinTripoli,theGovernmentofNationalUnity(GNU).Bylookingatsecuritysectorstabilization(SSS)asasub-setofSSR,thechapteraimstospellouttheprimaryaimofSSSinLibya,whichistocreatetheconditionsnecessaryforsecurityandstabilitybyenablingthepeaceprocesstotakeroot.Bycreatingsynergiesbetweenstabilization-centredpolicyandSSR,SSScan“simultaneouslylaythefoundationforSSR,reconstruction,anddevelopment,andencouragethebuy-inofmanydomesticandinternationalstakeholders,whohavedivergingpolicyprioritiesandincentives”.

Inhisanalysis,FredericWehreyremindsusofhowprospectsforsuccessfulDDRandSSRremain“cloudedbythemassivenumbersofforeignmercenariesandmilitaryforcesinthecountry”.SowhilethecurrentsituationinLibyaallowsforcautiousoptimism,Wehreywarnsthata“decadeofinternecineconflict,foreignproxy

TheRoadtoStability:RethinkingSecuritySectorReforminPost-ConflictLibya

meddling,andforeignmisstepsonDDR/SSRwilllikelytakeyears,ifnotdecades,toovercome”.Hestresses,however,howthelessonsofthepastmayhelp,providedthat“Libya’shybridizedsecuritysectoratthelocallevel”isfullytakenintoaccountandthatreformsarestructured“aroundidentifiableandrealisticsecurityneeds”.

WhilenationalelectionshavebeenplannedforthethirdtimesincetheousterofGaddafi,uncertaintiespersistaboutthedateofthevote,originallyscheduledfor24December2021.IngaKristinaTrauthig’schapterconsidersthepotentialconse-quencesofnationalelectionsin2021forLibya’ssecuritysector,andthechallengesthatLibya’snewlyelectedauthoritiesmayfaceregardingthesecuritysector.

AdecadeofinstabilityandconflicthavecausedsignificantdamagetoLibya’sinfra-structure.TarekMegerisi’scontributionexamineshowthechallengesofprovidingservicessuchaswaterandelectricity“offerinsightintobroaderLibyanculturalandpoliticaldynamics”.Megerisiconcedesthatthe“endtothecivilwarandtheascensionofanewGovernmentofNationalUnityhascreatedanopportunitytostabilizethesemostvitalsectors”,butstressesthat“recognizingthehybridandlocalrealityofLibya’ssecuritysector”isvitaltocreate“strongincentivesaroundthestabilizationofvitalservices”.

Theconcludingchapterfocusesonaspecificsecuritysectorchallenge–supportingandreformingthePetroleumFacilitiesGuard.MattHerbertdetailstheemergenceandevolutionoftheforce,aswellasitscurrentstructureanddeploymentpattern,andanalyses“reforminitiativesunderway,andobstaclestoreform”.Inthiscase,theweaknessoftheforce,whichplaysafundamentalroleinprotectingavitaleconomicsector,appearstobe“adirectresultofthehybridizedrecruitmentstrategiesemployedbythegovernmentintheyearsimmediatelyafter2011”.Hence,whilehybriditymayoffersomesolutionsforSSG/R,thereisstillaneedforstate-centredgovernanceinspecificsectorsofnationalimportance,suchastheoilsector.

ThispublicationstrivestocontributetothecurrentdebatesaroundSSR/Ginconflict-affectedandfragileenvironments.Assuch,itsobjectiveistostimulateaholisticreflectiononhowworkonSSRandSSGcanbetterincorporatehybridizationaswellasstabilizationimperatives,puttingpeople-centredapproachestosecuritybackattheheartoftheconversation.Wehopeyouenjoyreadingthiseditedvolume.

SecuritySectorStabilization:DefiningaPathintheLibyanContext

77

SecuritySectorStabilization:

DefiningaPathintheLibyanContext

Authoredby1EmadeddinBadiandArchibaldGallet

(DCAF–GenevaCentreforSecuritySectorGovernance)

Sincetheceasefireagreementsignedon23October2020,aprecariouspeacehasprevailedinLibya,whichhadwitnesseditsworstandmostinternationalizedconflictinrecentyearswiththelaunchofKhalifaHaftar’soffensiveonTripoliinApril2019.Despitesporadicrecurringoutburstsoflocalizedviolenceacrossthecountrysincetheendofthewar,theperiodoffragilestabilitybroughtaboutbythecessationofhostilitiesalsousheredinarenewedinterestinsecuritysectorreform(SSR)programming.TheimportanceofreformingLibya’ssecuritysectorcametotheforenotsolelyduetotheconflict’saftermathanditsdireimplicationsfortheNorthAfricancountry’snationalsecurity,butalsoduetotheimportanceofharmonizingthesequencingofLibya’spoliticalandeconomictrackswithitsmilitarytrackaspartofathree-prongedapproachtotransition,allthreeofwhichwerekickstartedaftercessationofhostilities.

OneoftheobjectivesoftheJointMilitaryCommission–thecommitteethatsignedtheceasefireafterappointingfivecareermilitaryofficerstorepresenttheGovernmentofNationalAccord(GNA)andfivefromtheLibyanArabArmedForces’(LAAF)formerlywarringcoalitions–wastodevelopawide-spanningsetofimplementablemeasurestobuildontheceasefireagreementandculminateintheunificationofLibya’smilitaryinstitutions.Thesemeasuresencompassed,amongotherthings,devisingthemodalitiesoftheceasefire,engagingintrust-buildingmeasuressuchastheexchangeofprisoners,establishingademilitarizedzoneincentralLibya,developingablueprintforreformingkeyapparatusessuchasLibya’sPetroleumFacilitiesGuard,andexpellingallforeignforcesandmercenariesfromthecountry.Theoverarchingaimwastocurbtheextenttowhichforeigninfluencecouldaffectthecourseofthecountry’spoliticaltransition,avertarelapseintowar,andoffsetthecountry’sde-factodivisionbycreatingabasisuponwhichtounifyLibya’smilitaryinstitutions.

Onlymonthsafterthesigningoftheceasefire,Libya’spoliticalprocesscareenedoverasthe74membersoftheUN-ledLibyanPoliticalDialogueForum(LPDF)replacedtheformerUN-recognizedauthority,theGNA,byelectingathree-memberPresidencyCouncilandaPrimeMinister,AbdelhamidDabeiba.ThenewPrimeMinisterformedanewGovernmentofNationalUnity(GNU),whichwasswiftlyendorsedbytheHouseofRepresentatives.Inadditiontobeingformallytaskedwithlayingthegroundworkforthegeneralparliamentaryandpresidentialelectionsslatedfor24December2021,bothdomesticandinternationalstakeholdersexpectedtheGNUtodeliveranotherhighlysought-afterprize:thestabilizationofLibya.

TheRoadtoStability:RethinkingSecuritySectorReforminPost-ConflictLibya

However,theshort-livedconvergenceofpoliticalforcesthatbroughtabouttheGNU–aswellastheinternationalandnationalendorsementoftheGNU–didnotleadtoanytangiblebreakthroughsorsignificantprogressinthemilitarytrackofLibya’stransition.Infact,thealterationofthepoliticalandinstitutionalstatusquoinstigatedbytheLDPFwasachievedinpartattheexpenseofacompartmentalizationoftheJointMilitaryCommittee(JMC)andbyavoidingthesalientissuesofmilitaryunificationandcivilianoversight.Inturn,thesedynamicsdashedtheinitialmomentumforSSRthathadsurfacedimmediatelyaftertheconflict.Instead,alaissez-fairepolicyprevailed,whichledtoafragmentationacrossbothformerwarringcoalitions:theGNA-alignedforcesandtheLAAF.Riftsthathadbeencastasidebylocalarmedgroupsandcommunitiesastheymobilizedtofightoneithersideofthewar–aswellasnewdividescreatedbythefalloutofHaftar’soffensiveandjockeyingovertheimpendingsuffrageprocess–(re)surfacedassecurityactorssoughttoentrenchtheirinfluenceaftertheUN-convenedLPDFvote.ThisfragmentationwasalsoreflectedintheinternationalarenaastheinitialcollectiveimpetustobrokeramultilateralagreementunderUNauspicesattheLPDFrecededaftertheGNU’sendorsement,withindividualforeignpowersrevertingtotheirpreviouspracticeofpursuingtheirindividualpolicyagendasinLibya.

Thenetresultofthisconfluenceoffactorsistheprevalenceofastateofnegativepeacewhosemaintenancehingesonthesustentionofanuntenablestatusquo.Indeed,oneoftheshortcomingsoftheJMC’sceasefireagreementisthatwhileitiscompre-hensiveinnature,itlacksconcretemodalitiesthatallowitsclausestobetranslatedintosecurityarrangementsthatenableatransitiontowardspositivepeace.Infailingtotangiblybuildonthisagreement,theinitialmomentumforSSRhasnotbeeneffectivelycapitalizedonbecauseoffearsofcompromisingthepoliticaltransition.Likewise,hopesthattheGNUwoulddeliverthestabilitysoughtafterbylocalandinternationalstakeholdershavenottranspired–arealityinpartcausedbytheGNU’s“do-nothing”strategyinthesecurityrealm.Thisdilemmareflectsabroaderproblemintheinternationalpeaceandstate-buildingcontinuum,namelywhetherconventionaleffortstostrengthensecurity–adoptingastate-centric,top-downapproachtoSSRandDDRthattraditionallyemphasizesthemonopolizationofviolencethroughtheruleoflaw–canbereconciledwiththeimmediate“stabilization”needsofpost-conflictsettings,particularlyinhybridsecuritysettingswhereceasefiresorthecessationofhostilitieshavebeennegotiated.

Thischapterwillseektoexamine–fromthestandpointofLibya–thenexusbetweenstabilization,SSR,andpost-ceasefireinterimsecurityarrangements.Specifically,thechapterfocusesonbridgingthegapsbetweenthesedifferentpolicyprioritiesanddevelopingadoctrinalapproachcentredaround“securitysectorstabilization”

thatamalgamatesinformalinterimstabilizationmeasureswithpost-ceasefiresecurityarrangements–anapproachthatwouldpavethewayforlonger-termSSR.Withoutaconsiderationofthisnexus,tailoringapproachestoharmonizethesethreepolicyprioritiesandexaminingtheimperativesandperceivedgapsbetweenstabi-lization,conventionalSSR,andpost-ceasefiresecurityarrangementswillleadtoapolicyparalysisthatwillincreasethelikelihoodofpartition,arelapseintoconflict,ordirectionlessorcosmeticmeasuresthatimpedetangiblesecuritysectorgovernancereformsinthelongrun–ifnotacombinationofallthree.

SecuritySectorStabilization:DefiningaPathintheLibyanContext

9

TocontextualizetheLibyansecuritysectorgovernanceandthedoctrinalshifttowardsreform–alongwithaffiliatedinstruments–thechapterbeginswithabriefoverviewofthemodalitiesuponwhichLibya’ssecuritysectorcurrentlyoperates.Byconsideringthecurrentconditionofthecountry’ssecuritysectoraswellasitsdesiredend-state,itispossibletodetermineboththesequenceandbreadthofreformsneededtoenableSSR.Adoptingaconflict-sensitiveapproachthattailorsinterventionsbasedonananalysisofwidercircumstancesandlessonslearnedenablesthedevelopmentofaLibyan-basedSSG/Rblueprintthatsetsthestabilizationofthesecuritysectorasapreconditionforitseventualreform.WhilenotcompletelyalignedwithconventionalSSRapproaches,thispragmatic,demand-driven,andlocallyownedapproachtoengagingLibya’spost-conflictenvironment(notablythroughtheprovisionofsupportforinterimstabilizationmeasuresandSSS)isdeemedasuitableapproachtofacilitatesecuritysectortransformation.

TheBurdenofLibya’sSecuritySector

Intoday’sLibya,securityisprimarilyhandledbyhybridarmedgroupsofvarioussizes,legitimacy,andaffiliations,underthetentativeauthorityoflineministriesthatstruggletoestablisheffectivecommandandcontroloverthem.Despiteconsistentnarrativesdeployedbyarmedgroupstotouttheirsecurityprovisionefforts,mostarmedactorsdonotviewthisserviceastheirraisond’être.Instead,theseeffortsarepredominantlyseenasameanstoanend,whethertoshoreuplegitimacy,controlterritory,deriveforeignsupport,orsecureeconomicincentives.Thisdynamicmaypartlyexplainwhy,despitetheflurryofarmedactorspresentinLibya,insecurityhaspersisted–ifnotspread–acrossthecountrysincethestate’smonopolyonviolencefragmentedfollowingtherevolution.Today,theinflationofsecuritypersonnelhasbecomeonethemainfactorsofinstabilityplaguingtheLibyanterritory.State-affiliatedaswellasnon-statearmedgroupsperpetuateviolenceagainstlocalcommunities,adynamicthathasfurtherdislocatedstate-societyrelationsasimpunitybecamethedefiningfeatureoftherelationshipofcitizensandconstituencieswiththestakeholdersandinstitutionsmeanttoprotectthem.

TheoversizednatureofLibya’ssecurityapparatusisinimicaltoeffectivesecuritysectorgovernanceorattemptstoreformit,andmanyofthegroupscomprisingthisoverstaffedapparatusarealsoinvolvedinorganizedcrime.Stateandnon-stateaffiliatedarmedactorsaredeeplyintertwinedwithnetworksthatuseillegalmeanstogeneraterevenue,suchasmoneylaundering,migrantsmuggling,narcotics,orarmstrafficking,aswellasmaritimecrime.GivenLibya’spositionasagatewayforAfricaintoEurope,aswellasitsadjacencetothevolatilecrescentstretchingwestthroughtheMaghrebandsouthintotheSahel,thesecuritythreatsthatemanatefromthecountry,whetherrelatedtotransnationalorganizedcrimeorviolentextremism,affectitswiderneighbourhood.Theimpulsetoresolve(orcontain)thesechallengesthroughsecuritizedor“quick-fix”solutionshasoftenledtoconfoundingreformingLibya’ssecuritysectorwithcreating“new”securityactorsto–intheory–“operatewithorthroughthem”toaddressthesechallenges.

TheRoadtoStability:RethinkingSecuritySectorReforminPost-ConflictLibya

TheseapproacheshaveoftenbeendevisedwithnoassessmentofLibya’sactualsecuritygovernanceneeds.Moreover,theyhavefrequentlybeenarchitectedwithlittletonofocusonenhancingthenewforces’accountabilitytolocalcommunities,orthe“state’s”abilitytoexerciseoversightoverthem.Whileestimatesvary,thenetresultisthat,asof2021,morethan400,000securitypersonnelareoperatingonthepayrollofvariousLibyanauthorities,forapopulationofjustover6.5million.Thisisanexcessivelyhighratio,withsomesixpercentofthepopulationeffectivelybeingenrolledinthesecuritysector.Inmostadvanceddemocracies,whichpossessfarmoresecureenvironmentsandwhosepolicingandmilitaryeffortsarefarmoreconsistent,aroundonepercentoftheworkforceisgenerallyassignedtosecuritytasks.ThisdisparityinratiosreflectsthewayinwhichLibya’spublicsector–includingitssecuritysector–isbeingusedtodistributestatefunds,arentier-basedeconomiclegacyfromtheGaddafiera.WhileitisinconceivabletocompareLibya’scontemporarysecuritysectortothoseofdevelopedstates,itisimportanttonotethatmostsecurity-centredeffortssponsoredbyinternationalstakeholdersinthepastyearshavecontributedtooversizing–ratherthandownsizing–Libya’ssecurityapparatus.

Inotherwords,Libyaiscreakingundertheweightofitssecurityapparatus,whichisoversizedandconducivetoinstabilityandinsecurityandofteneludesstateoversight

–orworse,subduesstateauthorities.ForLibyatostabilizeinthemediumtolongterm,thesecuritygovernanceframeworkmustmovetowardsgoverningarmedgroupsratherthanbeinggovernedbyarmedgroups.ThehybridityoftheLibyansecurityforces–asitisoftendescribed–shouldbeunderstoodasadefactostateratherthanadefinitivemodel.Assuch,hybridity,beingintrinsicallytransactionalandunstable,reliesonaschemeforserviceprovisionthatisbasedonimmediateremuneration,intheformofmoney,favours,oraccesstosymbolicresources.Itisacontempo-raryversionofapatronagesystemthatultimatelyrelatestoafeudalsocietywhererelationsbetweenindividualsandentitiesaredefinedbysubjectivefactorsbasedongoodwill,whichmaybesubjecttounilateralinterpretationorcoercion,insteadoftheobjectiveruleoflawguaranteedbyindependentjudicialauthorities.

Theserealities,aswellaschallengesandprevioustransactionalrelationships,mustbeacknowledgedinordertocarveapathtowardsoverhaulingLibya’ssecuritysectorgovernance.Inaddition,atailoredapproachtoSSG/Reffortsshouldbebasedonhowthingsare,ratherthanhowtheyoughttobe.InLibya’scase,thisisoneofthemaincausesofthe“gap”betweentheformalendoffightingandthere-establishmentandconsolidationofthestate’scapacitytoprovideeffectivesecurityandjustice.

FromSecuritySectorStabilizationtoSecuritySectorReform

TorelievetheburdenofLibya’ssecuritysectoronthestateandsociety,itisimportanttoexpandthescopeofconventionalsecuritypromotionandadoptabroaderconcep-tualizationofSSR.Conventionalsecuritypromotionispremisedontheideaoftranslatingsecurityandjusticeprovisionintokeypolicyissuesandparticularpublicgoods;however,theestablishmentofatransparent,effectivelyoverseen,accountable,andwell-managedsecuritysectorisadauntingtaskinmostwell-developedcountries,letaloneinstatesandsocietiesrecentlygrippedbyconflict,orworse,overwhichtheshadowofwarstilllooms.Assuch,blueprintsforreformingLibya’ssecuritysector

SecuritySectorStabilization:DefiningaPathintheLibyanContext

11

needtomoveawayfromconventionalapproachestowardslessgeneric–butmorechallengingandmulti-faceted–approachesconducivetothere-engineeringofpowerrelationsamongeliteswhilestrengtheningtheroleandbargainingcapacityofcivilsociety.Focusingontrain-and-equipprogrammes–oranexclusivelytop-downandsecurity-centricapproachthatonlyseekstoenhancetheoperationaleffectivenessofsecurityforcessuchasmilitary,police,orotherstakeholders–wouldultimatelyfurtherencumberthestateratherthanaidthereformofitssecurityandjusticesectors.

Allinall,inLibya’sdynamiclandscape,traditionalSSRismoreofagoalthanamethodinsofarasthepresentphaseisexplicitlyatransitoryone.Currently,SSRstillformspartofthedialogueonthe“nexus”betweentheceasefireandthepeaceagreement.AcknowledgingtheneedforashiftindoctrinethatisconducivetocreatinganenvironmentwhereLibya’ssecuritysectorcaneventuallybeoverhauled,thecurrent“earlydialogue”onsecuritygovernancereform,ifitistobeeffective,shouldhaveitsownsetofobjectives.ThesewillbegearedtowardsSSSratherthaninformedbythetraditionalambitiousgoalsofSSRgiventhecontemporarycontext.

Asasub-setofSSR,SSScanbedefinedasaholisticapproachtopoliticalsecurity,incorporatingstateandnon-stateelementstoimprovesecurityandjusticeprovisioninordertoincreaseconfidence,facilitatepoliticaldialogue,andultimatelyenableapoliticalsettlement.1IntheLibyancase,theprimaryaimofSSSwouldbetocreatetheconditionsnecessaryforsecurityandstability,whileenablingthepeaceprocesstotakeroot.Moreover,havingpreviouslyshownhowcontemporarypolicytowardsLibyahasveeredfromaninitialimpetustowardsasecuritizedapproachtoSSRtoarhetoricthatemphasizesstabilizationbutcompletelyneglectsthesecuritysector,SSS’soverarchingmeritisitsabilitytocreatesynergiesbetweenstabilization-centredpolicyandthemuch-neededmomentumtoreformthesecuritysector.ThisapproachwouldsimultaneouslylaythefoundationforSSR,reconstruction,anddevelopment,andencouragethebuy-inofmanydomesticandinternationalstakeholders,whohavedivergingpolicyprioritiesandincentives.

SSS,asadoctrine,wouldnonethelesshaveitsownsetofdesiredoutcomes.Itwouldfirstseektoestablishframeworksandprocessesforimmediateandeffectiveviolencereduction,withthebroadergoalofenforcingminimumsecurityandjustice.Atthesametime,itwouldprovidethetimeandspacetodirectprocessestowardsamorelong-termpoliticalresolution.ThelackofasustainablepoliticalsettlementandafullylegitimatepoliticalauthoritythatcanassertcontrolovertheentiretyofLibya’sterritorynotonlyleadstopersistinginstabilityandfurtherfragmentationofthenationalidentity,butalsomeanstheapproachtoestablishingastrategicdirectionforthetransformationofthesecuritysectorisnotpragmatic.SSSwouldthereforelaythefoundationforalonger-termholisticapproachtoSSRbycontributingtothepreventionofviolenceandthetransitionfromanegativepeacetoapositivepeace,andbylayingthegroundworkfordefiningthe“nationalinterests”ofthestate.

StabilisationUnitoftheUKGovernment.2014.IssuesNote:SecuritySectorStabilisation,March,

https://

.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/765429/

security-sector-stabilisation.pdf

.

TheRoadtoStability:RethinkingSecuritySectorReforminPost-ConflictLibya

TheaddedvalueofmainstreamingSSSasapolicyapproachtothesecuritysectorisitsadaptability.Bydesign,theoperationalizationofthispolicyiscontextspecificanddeterminedbythebroadersocio-politicalsituationanddynamicssurroundingthepost-conflictpoliticalsettlemen