版權(quán)說明:本文檔由用戶提供并上傳,收益歸屬內(nèi)容提供方,若內(nèi)容存在侵權(quán),請(qǐng)進(jìn)行舉報(bào)或認(rèn)領(lǐng)
文檔簡(jiǎn)介
IDBWORKINGPAPERSERIESN°IDB-WP-01576
TheInteractionofEconomicandPoliticalInequalityinLatinAmerica
LeopoldoFergusson
JamesA.Robinson
SantiagoTorres
Inter-AmericanDevelopmentBank
February,2024
DevelopmentBank
TheInteractionofEconomicandPoliticalInequality
inLatinAmerica
LeopoldoFergusson
JamesA.Robinson
SantiagoTorres
Inter-AmericanDevelopmentBank
February,2024
Cataloging-in-Publicationdataprovidedbythe
Inter-AmericanDevelopmentBank
FelipeHerreraLibrary
Fergusson,Leopoldo.
TheinteractionofeconomicandpoliticalinequalityinLatinAmerica/LeopoldoFergusson,JamesA.Robinson,SantiagoTorres.
p.cm.-(IDBWorkingPaperSeries;1576)
nyb-piahcrences.distribution-Colombia.3.Democratization-
Colombia.I.Robinson,JamesA.,1960-.II.Torres,Santiago.III.Inter-AmericanDevelopmentBank.SocialProtectionandHealthDivision.VI.Series.
IDB-WP-1576
JEL:D72,D78,H4,H5,P0
Keywords:politicalentry,publicpolicy,development.
Copyright◎2024Inter-AmericanDevelopmentBank.ThisworkislicensedunderaCreativeCommonsIGO3.0Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives(CC-IGOBY-NC-ND3.0IGO)license(
/licenses/by-nc
-
nd/3.0/iqo/legalcode)andmaybereproducedwithattributiontotheIDBandforanynon-commercialpurpose,asprovidedbelow.Noderivativeworkisallowed.
AnydisputerelatedtotheuseoftheworksoftheIDBthatcannotbesettledamicablyshallbesubmittedtoarbitrationpursuanttotheUNCITRALrules.TheuseoftheIDB'snameforanypurposeotherthanforattribution,andtheuseofIDB'slogoshallbe
subjecttoaseparatewrittenlicenseagreementbetweentheIDBandtheuserandisnotauthorizedaspartofthisCC-IGOlicense.
Followingapeerreviewprocess,andwithpreviouswrittenconsentbytheInter-AmericanDevelopmentBank(IDB),arevised
versionofthisworkmayalsobereproducedinanyacademicjournal,includingthoseindexedbytheAmericanEconomic
Association'sEconLit,providedthattheIDBiscreditedandthattheauthor(s)receivenoincomefromthepublication.Therefore,therestrictiontoreceiveincomefromsuchpublicationshallonlyextendtothepublication'sauthor(s).Withregardtosuch
restriction,incaseofanyinconsistencybetweentheCreativeCommonsIGO3.0Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivativeslicenseandthesestatements,thelattershallprevail.
Notethatlinkprovidedaboveincludesadditionaltermsandconditionsofthelicense.
TheopinionsexpressedinthispublicationarethoseoftheauthorsanddonotnecessarilyreflecttheviewsoftheInter-AmericanDevelopmentBank,itsBoardofDirectors,orthecountriestheyrepresent.
TheInteractionofEconomicandPoliticalInequalityin
LatinAmerica.*
LeopoldoFergusson?JamesA.Robinson?SantiagoTorres§
Abstract
WeinvestigatehoweconomicinequalitycanpersistinLatinAmericainthecontextofradicalfallsinpoliticalinequalityinthelastdecades.UsingdatafromColombia,wefocusonacriticalfacetofdemocratization-theentryofnewpoliticians.Weshowthatinitiallevelsofinequalityplayasignificantroleindeterminingtheimpactofpoliticalentryonlocalinstitutions,policy,anddevelopmentoutcomes,whichcanimpactfutureinequality.Aviciouscircleemergeswherebypoliciesthatreduceinequalityarelesslikelytobeadoptedandimplementedinplaceswithrelativelyhighinequality.Wepresentevidencethatthisiscausedbothbythecaptureofnewpoliticiansandbarrierstoinstitutionandstatecapacitybuilding,andalsobythefactthatpoliticianscommittedtoredistributionarelesslikelytowininrelativelyunequalplaces.Ourresults,therefore,helptoreconcilethepersistenceofeconomicinequalitywiththenewpoliticalcontext.
Keywords:politicalentry,publicpolicy,development.
JELClassification:D72,D78,H4,H5,P0
*WewouldliketothankAndrsVelasco,AnaMaraIbez,OrazioAttanasio,AnadelaO,MarcelaMelndez,Ju-
lianMessina,thesteeringcommitteeandconferenceparticipantsatIADBLACIRconferencesinWashingtonDCandCartagena.ThisisabackgroundchapterpreparedfortheLatinAmericaandCaribbeanInequalityReview(
LACIR)
.
?UniversidaddelosAndes,FacultaddeEconoma,Cra1No18A-12,Bogot,Colombia.
lfergus-
son@.co.
Website:
?UniversityofChicago,HarrisSchoolofPublicPolicyandDepartmentofPoliticalScience,andUniversityofNigeriaatNsukka,InstituteforAfricanStudies,1307East60thStreet,Chicago,IL60637.Email:jamesrobin-son@.Website:
/jamesrobinson.
§UniversityofChicago,HarrisSchoolofPublicPolicy,1307East60thStreet,Chicago,IL60637.Email:
stor-
resp@
1
1Introduction
Overthepast200years,LatinAmericahasdivergedeconomicallyfromNorthAmerica.Atthetimeofindependence,somepartsofthesub-continent,likeArgentinaandCuba,hadincomeper-capitalevelsclosetothoseoftheU.S.(Coatsworth,1993;Engerman&Sokoloff,1997).Today,onaverage,LatinAmericancountrieshavearound15%ofU.S.levelsofprosperity.
However,whilehistoriclevelsofdevelopmentmighthavebeensimilarinsomedimensions,
thedifferentpartsoftheAmericasdifferedquiteradicallyinatleasttwokeyothers.Thefirstisinequalityofincomesandassets.Thesecondisthedistributionofpoliticalpower.ThoughthereisanintensehistoricaldebateontheextentofcomparableeconomicinequalityintheAmericas200yearsago,1agreatdealofevidencesuggeststhatitwashigh.Forexample,theevidenceforgreaterinequalityinhumancapitalinLatinAmericaisincontrovertible.Theevidenceontheinequalityofpoliticalrightsissimilarlyclear(EngermanandSokoloff(2005)andAcemogluandRobinson(2008a)onbothofthese).Thepreponderanceofresearchsuggeststhesearecausallyrelated,withtheinequalityofpoliticalpoweroftenseenasthekeyforcingvariablecreatinginstitutionsandpoliciesthatleadtoeconomicinequality.Forexample,Garc?′a-JimenoandRobinson(2011)ar-guethatthegreaterpoliticalpowerinequalityinnineteenth-centuryLatinAmericaledtotheveryskeweddistributionoflandinfrontierexpansion.Thiseconomicinequalityfeedsbackandrein-forcestheinitialpoliticalinequalitythatcreatedit(seeAcemoglu,Johnson,andRobinson(2005)foratheoreticalframeworkthatcapturesthisfeedback).Inthismodel,policiesaredeliberatelychosentosustainpoliticalandeconomicinequality,leadingtounder-provisionofpublicgoods,suchaseducation,andconsequentiallylowratesofeconomicgrowthandeconomicdivergence(seeEngermanandSokoloff(1997),BourguignonandVerdier(2000),AcemogluandRobinson(2012)andAcemoglu,Bautista,Querub?′n,andRobinson(2008),Dell(2010)andFerraz,Finan,andMartinez-Bravo(2020)foreconometricevidence).2
TheseobservationsgenerateasignificantpuzzleincontemporaryLatinAmerica.Whileeco-nomicinequalityisstillhighandexceedinglyinertial,thesecondfactorabove,inequalityofpo-liticalpower,haschangeddramatically.ThistransformationismanifestedmostobviouslyinthedemocratizationofLatinAmerica.Figure1plotssomestandardmeasuresoftheextentofdemoc-racyfromtheVDEMproject.Nomatterthedefinition,therehavebeendramaticimprovementsin
1Thisliteraturehasfocusedonseveralthemes.OneiswhetherornotinequalityinLatinAmericawashigherinthecolonialperiod.Somestudieshaveusedprobatedatatoarguethiswasnotthecase,e.g.,JohnsonandFrank(2006).Consistentwiththis,othershavearguedthatLatinAmericabecamerelativelyunequalmuchlater,possiblyduringthewaveofglobalizationafter1850(seeCoatsworth(2008)orWilliamson(2010)),oreveninthetwentiethcentury(Bleynat,Challu′,&Segal,2021).
2Onecan,ofcourse,thinkofpurelyeconomicmechanismsviawhichinequalitycanpersist(Banerjee&Newman,1993;Galor&Zeira,1993).Nevertheless,webelievethatthepuzzleweidentifyremainsbecausetheadventofdemocracyoughttomakepolicymoreredistributive,whichshouldrelaxthetypesofliquidityconstraintsonwhichthesetheoriesrest.
2
democracysincethecollapseofmilitarydictatorshipsinthe1980sandthearrivalofdemocracyin
CentralAmericaforalmostthefirsttime.Comparedtootherworldregions,onlyEasternEuropehasexperiencedacomparablylargeandfastimprovementindemocracy(Figure2)3.Thisdemoc-ratizationalsoseemstohaveledtoagenuineentryofnewpartiesandpeoplesintothepoliticalsystem.AprominentexampleistheWorkers’PartyofBrazil,whosefirstpresident,LuizIncioLuladaSilva,wasaworking-classformermetalworkerandtradeunionist.AnotherexampleistheMovementTowardsSocialisminBolivia,whosefirstPresident,EvoMorales,wasofindige-nousorigins,aformercocafarmer,andex-headoftheCocalerostradeunion.Peoplefromclearly
non-elitebackgroundshavebeenorarepresidentsofChile,Mexico,andPer,andthepresidentof
Venezuela,NicolsMaduro,wasaformerbusdriver.Thesepeopleandthepartiestheyrepresentseemtohavegenuinelydifferentinterests,ideologies,andpolicypreferencesfromthepeopleandpartiestheyreplaced.4ThesechangesareparticularlyrelevantinaworldwherepoliticianscannotcommittopolicyasinthecitizencandidatemodelofpoliticalcompetitiondevelopedbyBesleyandCoate(1997).
IfpoliticalinequalityhasbeenthedrivingforcebehindeconomicinequalityandpovertyinLatinAmerica,whyhasthisdramaticincreaseinpoliticalequalitynotmanifestedinnewinequalityanddevelopmentdynamics?5
Whilethispuzzlehasnotbeenclearlyarticulatedbefore,thereareseveralargumentsastowhygreaterpoliticalinequalitymightnothavereducedinequalityinLatinAmerica.6Mostargumentsemphasizethatthoughpoliticalpowerhasbecomemoreequalinsomedimensions,thistransfor-mationhasbeenimperfectandinsufficientlycomprehensive,oritsconsequencescanbeoffsetviaothermechanisms.7Therefore,powerrelationshavenotchangedsubstantially;thus,neitherhave
3AppendixFiguresC-1andC-2showthatLatinAmericaisalsouniquewhenexaminingothermeasures,inpar-ticulartheincreaseintheeffectivenumberofpartiesforCongressandtherateofExecutiveturnovers.
4Theserecentchangeswereanticipatedbyprevious“populist”andanti-elitepoliticalprojects.Forexample,under
JuanDomingoPerninArgentinainthe1940s,JuanFranciscoVelascoinPerinthe1960s,andOmarTorrijosin
Panamainthe1970s.
5Thisdatarulesoutamechanismrelatedtothedirectpersistenceofthesameelites,e.g.,Stone(1992).EveninCentralAmerica,newelitesemerged,forexample,withthenineteenth-centurytake-offofthecoffeeeconomyandthetwentieth-centuryindustrializationoftheeconomy(Dosal,1995;Paige,1998).
6Undoubtedly,thesemechanismsmayapplyelsewheresincethecross-nationalevidencedoesnotsuggestthat,onaverage,democratizationleadstofallsinincomeinequality,seeAcemoglu,Naidu,Restrepo,andRobinson(2015).
7ThefirstpersontoidentifythatdemocratizationinLatinAmericawasnotcreatinganewtransformationalpoliticsbutratheratypeofperverseformofdemocracy,whathecalled“delegative”(ratherthanrepresentative)wasO’Donnell(1994).SeeAcemogluandRobinson(2008b)foramodelwheredemocratizationcanhavenoeffectontheeconomicequilibriumbecauseelitescanoffsetit.
3
policies,economicinstitutions,opportunities,and,ultimately,economicinequality.8
Weemphasizeseveralmechanismsexplainingwhydemocratizationmayfailtofosterinequality-amelioratingpolicies.Allmechanismsemergefromthefactthatasmallsubsetofpeoplecontrolsthemassofeconomicresourceswheninequalityishigh.Theyalsoundoubtedlymonopolizecul-turalcapitalandaccesstohigh-statusactivitiesandpositions.Thiscontrolallowselitestoinflu-enceandcapturenewpoliticiansandcitizens.Thiscapturemaybevoluntaryasnewelitesadapttoexistingvalues,hierarchy,andstatussystems.
Itishelpfultodistinguishbetweentwobroadclassesofmechanisms:incentivesandselection.
Concerningincentives,afirstsubsetofmechanismsstemsfromthefactthatthehigherisinequality,themorethreateningdemocracyistoelites(asintheanalysisofAcemogluandRobinson(2006)),andthegreatertheirrelativeabilitytoinfluencepolicy(seeBe′nabou(1996)).Thisinfluencemaymanifestitselfindifferentways.Thefirstandmostobviousisoutrightcorruption.Corruptinginfluencecanoccureitheratthelevelofthepoliticianoratthelevelofthevoter.Intheformercase,elitescanbribepoliticiansnottoadoptparticularpoliciesor,iftheyareadopted,nottoimplementthem.Inthelattercase,inequalitymaymakeclientelismandvotebuyingmoreattractiveandeffective,asinRobinsonandVerdier(2013)andStokes,Dunning,Nazareno,andBrusco(2013).9Second,supposeelitescaptureorcontrollocalinstitutions,forexample,statebureaucracies.Inthatcase,theymayblocktheimplementationofpoliciesdesignedtocounterinequality(seeZamosc(1986)foraColombianexampleinthecontextofagrarianreform).Third,elitesmayalsohaveanincentivetodirectlyunderminelocalstateinstitutionsthatareathreattothem(asinthemodelsofBesleyandPersson(2009)orAcemoglu,Ticchi,andVindigni(2011))sincethiswillguaranteethatpotentiallythreateningpoliciesgounimplemented.
Anothersubsetofincentivemechanismscomesfromthefactthatinequalitymaynotjustim-pactpoliticsthroughtheactionsofpre-existingelites.Itmayalsomakerent-seekingbypoliticians
8OnepossiblereasonfortheabsenceofchangeisthatinequalityinLatinAmericaissociologicalinwaysinwhichpoliticaltransitiondoesnotimpactordoessoonlyveryslowly.Manynon-politicalmechanismsmayleadtothereproductionofinequalityeveninpoliticallytransformedsocieties.Forexample,Ferna′ndez,Guner,andKnowles(2015)findthatLatinAmericancountrieshavethehighestratesofassortativematchinginthemarriagemarketsothatrichpeoplearemorelikelytomarryotherrichpeople.TheresearchofBourdieu(1984)emphasizedtheprofoundanddeeplyrootedwayshierarchyreproducesitself,extendingeventotasteinmusicandart.HisbookwillresonatewithanyonefamiliarwithLatinAmerica.HealsopointedoutthecriticalroleofschoolsinreproducinginequalityBourdieuandPasseron(1990),andrecentworkbyZimmerman(2019)hasshownhowtheschoolsysteminChileinteractswithelitestatustoreproduceinequalitypowerfully.ForColombia,Fergusson,,Ca′rdenas,andVillegas(2021)discusstheculturalimplicationsofstudyinginaprivateorpublicschoolanddemonstrateinanexperimentthatthelabormarketpenalizespublicschoolgraduates,especiallyinjobsrequiringsocialinteractionswheretheirsocialnetworks,culturalcapital,andsocialprestigemaybevaluable.Unfortunately,theapplicationoftheseideasinLatinAmericaisinitsinfancy(seeAuyero(2012)forsomeideas).
9ThereisanextensiveliteratureonpoliticalclientelisminLatinAmerica.SeealsoNichter(2018)andCalvoandMurillo(2019).
4
highlyattractive.Insteadofbeingmanipulatedbyoldelites,politicianspreyonthem.10Itisalsoplausiblethatamunicipalitywithhighlevelsofinequalitywillresultinhighlevelsofinequalityofresourcesamongstthecandidates.Ifincumbentshavefarmoreresourcesthanentrants,newcom-ersmayhavetousecertainelectoralstrategies,likeclientelism,toaccesspower.Onceinpower,thesestrategieslimittheirabilitytotransformlocalsociety.
Concerningselection,highlevelsofinequalitymayinfluencewhodecidestorunforpoliticaloffice.Forexample,supposeelite-dominatedlocalsocietiesdissuademoreeducatedorreformistpoliticiansfromrunninginthefirstplace.Thismayoccurbecausetheexistingelitecanbetterconcealcorruptpracticesinmoreunequalplaces.Interestingly,Garbiras-D?′az(2022)shows,usingrandomauditsinBrazil,thatincreasingthevisibilityofcorruptioncanhelpovercomebarrierstoentryforoutsidercandidates.Morebroadly,inequalitymayreducethepoolofcandidateswiththeresourcestocompeteagainstthoseinpower.Eitherway,selectionbecomesachannelforreproducingthestatusquoandinequality.11
Toinvestigatethesechannels,wefollowFergusson,Robinson,andTorres(2023)whofocusonmayoralelectionsinamunicipality.Theseelectionsgiveasamplesizelargeenoughforaneconometricanalysis.Tomeasureincreaseddemocracyatthislevel,theyexaminetheentryofpeoplewithoutpreviouspoliticalexperienceintopolitics.Presumably,thisisacrucialpartofthemechanismviawhichdemocratizationissupposedtochangepolicy,enablingnewvoicestoaccesspoliticalinstitutionsandshapesuchpolicies.Theycompareplaceselecting(byasmallmargin)anewpoliticiantothosewheresomeonewhoisnotnewnarrowlywinsthemayoralelection.12
Theprimewaydemocracyimpactsinequalityisviachangesinpolicies,particularlyredistribu-tivepoliciesandtheprovisionofpublicgoods.Weexaminethreesetsofdependentvariables.Thefirstcaptureslocalpoliciesthatmayorsandthemunicipalgovernmentcontrolandimplement.
MunicipalgovernmentsinColombiashareacrucialresponsibilityineducation,healthcare,andotherlocalpublicservices.WeusethedatasetcompiledbyFergussonetal.(2023)onvariouseducationalandhealthoutcomesmeasures.ThesearealllistedinAppendixA.Forexample,weuseinformationonprimaryandsecondaryschoolenrollment,theteacher/pupilratio,andnationaltestscoresforeducation.Forhealth,weexamineinfantmortality,thepercentageofunderweightbabies,thegovernment’ssubsidizedhealthinsurancecoverage,andthenumberofhealthfacilitiespercapita.Publicservicesincludethecoverageofaqueducts,electricity,sewage,naturalgas,andinternetpenetration.InColombia,perhapsthemostbasicpublicgoodissecurity.Wemeasurethis
10IntheColombiancase,asalientexampleofthismightbetheCarruseldelacontratacinorganizedbySamuelMorenoafterhebecamemayorofBogotin2010(seeRomero(2013)).
11SeveralauthorshaveexamineddirectfinancialincentivesasasourceofpoliticalselectioninLatinAmerica(e.g.,
FerrazandFinan(2009)andPique′(2019)forBrazilandPer).
12Technically,theyconductaregressiondiscontinuityanalysis.Thehypothesisisthatbyfocusingoncloseelec-tions,thefactthatamunicipalityelectedanewpersonratherthananoldoneisidiosyncraticandunrelatedtoothermunicipalfeaturesthatmightimpacttheadoptionorimplementationofpolicies.
5
usingdataonthefts,kidnappings,murders,andforceddisplacement,allnormalized.Finally,inthissetofoutcomes,weexamineeconomicdevelopmentmeasures.Weusemeannighttimelight,municipalvalue-addedpercapita,andthelocalemploymentrate.
OursecondsetofoutcomescomesfrominformationcollectedbytheDANE,theColombian
NationalStatisticsInstitute(DepartamentoAdministrativoNacionaldeEstadstica),onfourin-
dicesofthefunctioningoflocalstateinstitutions.TheDANEcompiledinformationontheeffi-ciencyandefficacyoflocalstateinstitutions.Efficiencyapproximatesthelocalpublicsector’s‘totalfactorproductivity,’capturingtherelationshipbetweenservicesprovidedandtheinputsused.Efficacymeasurestheextenttowhichaparticularactiongeneratesthedesiredoutcome.TheDANEalsomeasuredmanagementpractices,whichcapturestheextentofbureaucratizationandprofessionalizationofthelocalstate.Finally,theycollectedinformationonfiscalperfor-mance,whichcaptureshoweffectivelyfiscalinstitutionswork(whetherthelocalbudgetisbal-anced,whetherlawsrelatingtoexpenditurelimitsareobeyed,andwhetherthedebtisproperlyserviced).Additionally,weexaminemeasuresofcorruptionaccusationsandprosecutions.
TheDANE’sindicesoffiscalperformanceandmanagementpractices,introducedabove,areparticularlyinterestingbecausetheyallowustodiscussthedifferencebetweenpolicychangesandpolicyimplementationdirectly.Mostofourdataareonpolicyoutcomes(thepupil-teacherratioinschools,forexample),soitisdifficulttodistinguishbetweentheconceptuallydistinctsituationswhereapolicyisadoptedandnotimplementedandthosewhereapolicyisnotadoptedinthefirstplace.Tosomeextent,fiscalperformanceandmanagementpracticescapturepolicychangesunderamayor’scontrol.Thus,ifoneseestheseindicesimprovingbutnochangeinotherpolicyoutcomes,thissuggestsapolicychangewhoseimplementationfailsorisblocked.Thispatternwouldnotsupportsomeofthehypothesesabove,forexample,theideathatnewcomersbehavelikeincumbentstowinandretainpoweroradaptthemselvestosomestatusquosystemsofvaluesorhierarchies.
Finally,thethirdsetofoutcomescoversdifferentdimensionsofcorruption.Weexaminethenumberofformalcomplaintsandsanctionsissuedagainstmayors,usinginformationgathered
fromtheSIRIplatformofthe“ProcuraduraGeneraldelaNacin”,thenationalwatchdogagency.
Thebasicpredictionoftheabovemechanismsisthatgreaterdemocracyandpoliticalequalitymayaccompanyunchangedredistributivepolicyandinstitutionsand,ultimately,unchangedeco-nomicinequalityonaverage.Nevertheless,themechanismsarealsoconsiderablyheterogeneous,whichweexploittotesttheirrelevance.First,inplaceswithgreaterinitiallevelsofinequality,theaboveargumentssuggestthateliteshavemoresubstantialincentivesandtheabilitytoinfluencepolicychoices.Hence,suchplacesshouldhavemorepoliticalcorruptionandclientelismaselitesmakegreatereffortstoguaranteetheirinterestsarenotthreatened.Second,elitesshouldhavestrongerincentivestoblockpolicyimplementationinhighlyunequalplacesthroughtheirlinksto
6
thelocalstate.Third,weexpectthatinplaceswithhighinequality,elitesattempttounderminelocalinstitutionstoensuretheydonotimplementpoliciesagainsttheirinterests.Finally,throughtheselectionchannel,highinequalityshouldalsoimpactwhorunsforpoliticaloffice.Forexam-ple,onemightconjecturethatthiswouldleadtomoremoderatecandidatessinceradicalswouldhavelittlechanceofwinninginthefaceofentrenchedeliteinterestsandpower.
Wefocushereonheterogeneityconcerninginitiallevelsofinequalitybecauseofthepaper’sfo-cusonthereproductionofinequalityinthefaceofdemocratizationandfallingpoliticalinequality.Fergussonetal.(2023)investigatemuchmorebroadlytheconditionaleffectsofdemocratizationandwhattheycallthe“ConditionalIronLawofOligarchy”.Theydeveloptheideathatincreaseddemocracywhileleadingtotheentryofnewpoliticalforcesandpeople,haspotentiallydivergingimpactsdependingonthecontext.Intheirpaper,theyshowinparticularthatinitiallevelsofor-derandstatecapacityinfluencewhetherornotdemocracyistransformative.Thefactthatitmaynotbeisdue,asinthesociologicaltheoriesfromwhichtheirtitlecomes,tothereproductionofelites:newdemocraticentrantsbecomenewelites,replacingoldoneswithlittlechangeinpolicyoroutcomes.Ratherthanatoolofpoliticalinclusion,democracybecomesmoreofamechanismforelitecirculation.Ourmaincontributionistousetheirframeworktostudyinitiallevelsofeconomicinequalityasacontextualfactorandshowthattheirresultsapplytherealso.
Ourevidenceshowspatternsconsistentwithmanyofthehypotheseswesketchabove.First,littlehappensonaverageintheshortruntomostpolicyoutcomeswhenanewpoliticiancomestopower.Thereisnoimprovementineconomicdevelopmentandcorruptionoutcomes,andtheonlyimprovementinpolicyisforeducation.Healthpolicyoutcomesevendeteriorateonaverage,whileotherpublicservicesarenodifferentinmunicipalitieswhereanewcomerwins,asopposedtoonewhereanewcomerloses.
Second,concerninginstitutionalperformance,wefindminorpositiveeffectsofnewcomersonanindexthataggregatesallthemeasuresfromDANE,drivenbyanimpactonitscomponentsoffiscalperformance,efficacy,andmanagementpractices.Theseresultsareconsistentwithde-mocratizationandgreaterpoliticalequalityhavinglittle,oronlyamodest,effectonpolicyandinequality.Thesefindingsareinterestingsince,aswestressed,onecanthinkoffiscalperformanceandmanagementpracticesasdirectlymeasuringpolicyadoption,independentofimplementation.Totheextentthatefficacyalsoincreases,thereissomeevidencethatbetterpoliciesarebothchosenandapplied.
Third,thereislittleevidencefordecreasesincorruptiononaveragewhenanewpoliticiancomestooffice.Thereisnodecreaseinthelikelihoodthatamayorwillbewarned,sanctioned,suspended,removed,disqualifiedfromoffice,orimprisoned.
Moreinterestingly,however,thereisconsiderableheterogeneityintheimpactofnewcomersdependingontheinitiallevelsofinequality.WemeasurethislevelofinequalityviatheGinicoef-
7
ficientcalculatedatthemunicipalitylevelfromthe1993ColombiannationalcensusandEncuestadeCalidaddeVida.Municipalitieswithbelow-medianinequalitycompletelydrivethepositiveeffectoneducation.Thenegativeimpactonhealthpolicygoesawayintheserelativelymoreequalmunicipalities.Thedifferencesbetweenhigh-andlow-inequalitymunicipalitiesalsodrivethemeasuresofinstitutionalperformance.Municipalitieswithrelativelylowlevelsofinequalityac-countforalloftheaverageshort-runimprovementswementionedabove.Finally,forcorruption,mayorsoflow-inequalitymunicipalitiesarelesslikelytobedisqualifiedforpublicoffice.Atthesametime,thoseinhighlyunequalplacesaremorelikelytobesanctionedandimprisonedforcorruption.
Theseresultssuggestthatnewcomershavedifferentpolicypreferencesfromexistingpoliticalelites,butwhetherornottheychooseormanagetoimplementdifferentpoliciesdependsontheinitiallevelofinequality.Indeed,ifweconsiderfiscalperformanceandmanagementpracticesasmeasuresofpolicyadoption,thesedonotchangein
溫馨提示
- 1. 本站所有資源如無特殊說明,都需要本地電腦安裝OFFICE2007和PDF閱讀器。圖紙軟件為CAD,CAXA,PROE,UG,SolidWorks等.壓縮文件請(qǐng)下載最新的WinRAR軟件解壓。
- 2. 本站的文檔不包含任何第三方提供的附件圖紙等,如果需要附件,請(qǐng)聯(lián)系上傳者。文件的所有權(quán)益歸上傳用戶所有。
- 3. 本站RAR壓縮包中若帶圖紙,網(wǎng)頁(yè)內(nèi)容里面會(huì)有圖紙預(yù)覽,若沒有圖紙預(yù)覽就沒有圖紙。
- 4. 未經(jīng)權(quán)益所有人同意不得將文件中的內(nèi)容挪作商業(yè)或盈利用途。
- 5. 人人文庫(kù)網(wǎng)僅提供信息存儲(chǔ)空間,僅對(duì)用戶上傳內(nèi)容的表現(xiàn)方式做保護(hù)處理,對(duì)用戶上傳分享的文檔內(nèi)容本身不做任何修改或編輯,并不能對(duì)任何下載內(nèi)容負(fù)責(zé)。
- 6. 下載文件中如有侵權(quán)或不適當(dāng)內(nèi)容,請(qǐng)與我們聯(lián)系,我們立即糾正。
- 7. 本站不保證下載資源的準(zhǔn)確性、安全性和完整性, 同時(shí)也不承擔(dān)用戶因使用這些下載資源對(duì)自己和他人造成任何形式的傷害或損失。
最新文檔
- 人教版數(shù)學(xué)初一七年級(jí)上冊(cè)教案全冊(cè)
- 《攀西高寒地區(qū)一年生豆科牧草與馬鈴薯輪作技術(shù)規(guī)程》征求意見稿
- 北京現(xiàn)代中級(jí)技術(shù)培訓(xùn)課件:自動(dòng)變速器(A6MF1/2、A6GF1 /A6LF1)
- DB21T-紅托竹蓀液體菌種生產(chǎn)技術(shù)規(guī)程
- 衛(wèi)生保健培訓(xùn)記錄材料
- 石油天然氣會(huì)計(jì)核算問題分析
- 高三化學(xué)一輪復(fù)習(xí)-化學(xué)鍵與物質(zhì)的性質(zhì)
- 高一上學(xué)期英語作文(1)建議類+導(dǎo)學(xué)案
- 學(xué)校教師培訓(xùn)工作總結(jié)匯報(bào)范文(23篇)
- 經(jīng)濟(jì)數(shù)學(xué)基礎(chǔ)(第六版)(上冊(cè))課件 第13講3.4函數(shù)的極值
- 《夢(mèng)游天姥吟留別》《登高》《琵琶行》比較閱讀課件 統(tǒng)編版高中語文必修上冊(cè)
- 三方合作研發(fā)協(xié)議合同范本
- 《平行四邊形》復(fù)習(xí)課
- 天然氣安全使用管理規(guī)定
- 建設(shè)工程管理安全生產(chǎn)責(zé)任制
- 教科版二年級(jí)下冊(cè)第一單元磁鐵7磁鐵和我們的生活(教學(xué)設(shè)計(jì))教案
- 矩形水池設(shè)計(jì)計(jì)算書
- 中國(guó)木版年畫課件
- 2021年中儲(chǔ)糧質(zhì)檢員考試題庫(kù)及答案
- 胰腺導(dǎo)管內(nèi)乳頭狀黏液性腫瘤
- 中學(xué)體育場(chǎng)改造項(xiàng)目可行性研究報(bào)告
評(píng)論
0/150
提交評(píng)論