意大利國(guó)際關(guān)系學(xué)會(huì)（IAI）：北極在俄羅斯能源戰(zhàn)略中的角色

TheRole

oftheArctic

inRussia's

Energy

Strategy

byPierPaoloRaimondi

IAI-IstitutoAffariInternazionali

PaperpreparedintheframeworkoftheIAI-EniStrategicPartnership.

PierPaoloRaimondiisResearchFellowintheEnergy,Climateand

ResourcesProgrammeattheIstitutoAffariInternazionali(IAI)andPhDcandidateattheUniversitàCattolicadelSacroCuore,Milan.

Copyright?2024IstitutoAffariInternazionali(IAI)

ViadeiMontecatini,17–I-00186Rome

Tel.+39066976831

iai@iai.it

www.iai.it

ISBN978-88-9368-314-2

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TheRoleoftheArcticinRussia’sEnergyStrategy:

Features,ObjectivesandPerspectives

followingRussia’sWarinUkraine

byPierPaoloRaimondi

Executivesummary

?Russia,whichisheavilydependentonthehydrocarbonsectorandrevenues,isfacingnumerouschallengesbothinternallyandexternally.

?TheArctichasgainedever-growingenergy,politicalandstrategicrelevance.Russiahasdevelopedandreleasedseveraldocumentsoutliningtargetsandvisionsforthedevelopmentofthisregion.

?ThedevelopmentofArcticresourcesisdeeplyintertwinedwithothernationalinterests,suchasdevelopmentoftheNorthernSeaRouteandtheshipbuildingindustry.

?TheArctichasbecomethepowerhouseforRussia’sLNGambitions,underpinnedbyNovatek.

?RussiahasanevenstrongerurgencytodevelopLNGsincethelossofitsmaingasmarket,Europe.

?ToboostLNGproductionandexports(100Mtby2030),RussiahasdecidedtoliberaliseLNGexports,highlightingtheshiftinpreferentialtreatmentbetween

GazpromandNovatek.

?Tofullyachieveitstargets,Russiafacesseverechallengesnamelythelackofgascargoesandthegrowinginternationalsanctions,whichcansubstantiallyundermineRussianambitions.

?Russia’senergyindustryneedstoadapttothenewinternationalcontextwhichischaracterisedbytheendoftheenergybridgewithEuropeandheavyinternationalsanctions.

?TheArcticcouldcontributetoenergytransitionmainlyintheformofbluehydrogen/ammoniaandcriticalminerals;however,thecurrentinternationaldevelopmentshavehaltedRussia’shydrogenplans.

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Introduction

Overthepastdecades,theArctichasattractednewfoundinterestattheinternationallevel.TheerosionofArcticicehascontributedtorisingtensionsandcompetitionbetweengreatpowers,alsobystrengtheningtheirmilitarypresenceinthearea.1Furthermore,geopoliticaldevelopmentshavealsoyieldednewrelevancetotheregion,althoughthepeculiarcontextoftheHighNorthrequirescooperationbetweentheArcticcountriesandbeyond.2InJune2023,theArcticCouncil,theleadingintergovernmentalforumintheregion,resumeditsworkafterayearsuspension3followingRussia’swarinUkraine.Furthermore,thegrowingconfrontationbetweenNATOandRussiahasfuelledpotentialcompetitionintheHighNorth,resultingintheupdateofnationalstrategies.TheUSforexampleupdateditsNationalStrategyfortheArcticRegioninOctober2022andelevatedtheArcticasapriorityareainits2022NationalSecurityStrategy.4TheArctichasincreasinglybecomerelevantalsototheEuropeanUnionforclimateandsecurityreasons.5

Furthermore,theregionalhydrocarbonendowmenthascontributedtogeneratingagreaterinternationalinteresttowardtheregion.Inparticular,twofactorshaveignitedsuchanewfoundrelevance:thedecliningArcticicedrivenbyglobalwarmingandthe2008USGeologicalSurvey(USGS)assessmentthatestimatedhydrocarbonreservesintheArctic.AstheArcticiceismeltingduetoclimatechange,abundanthydrocarbonreservesintheArctichavecomeunderthespotlight.Forcenturies,theArctichasbeenalmostinaccessibleduetoitsextremeclimaticandenvironmentalconditions.In2008,theUSGSreinforcedthegeneralinterestinhydrocarbonresourcesintheArctic,affirmingthatthe

1BradleyBowmanandScottAdamson,“GreatPowerCompetitionHeatsUpintheThawingArctic,andtheUSMustRespond”,inDefenseNews,23September2020,/opinion/commentary/2020/09/23/great-power-competition-heats-up-in-the-thawing-arctic-and-the-us-must-respond.

2ArcticcountriesareconsideredtobeCanada,Denmark(withGreenland),Finland,Iceland,Norway,Russia,SwedenandtheUSA.ThesecountriesaremembersoftheArcticCouncil.Non-Arcticcountries,chieflyChina,haveexpressedtheirinterestinbeinginvolvedinthedevelopmentoftheregion.

3Canadaetal.,JointStatementonArcticCouncilCooperationfollowingRussia’sInvasionofUkraine,3March2022,/?p=320209.

4JeremyGreenwood,“GreatPowerCompetitionandOverseasBasingintheArctic”,inBrookingsPolicyBriefs,February2023,/?p=1666699.

5LucaCinciripini,“TheArcticwithinEUStrategies:ARenewedCentrality”,inIAICommentaries,No.23|37(July2023),https://www.iai.it/en/node/17346.

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“extensiveArcticcontinentalshelvesmayconstitutethegeographicallylargestunexploredprospectiveareaforpetroleumremainingonEarthThe2008USGSassessmentestimatedthatundiscoveredtechnicallyrecoverablereservesintheArcticamountto90billionbarrelsofoil,47trillioncubicmetersofnaturalgasand44billionbarrelsofnaturalgasliquids.6TheUSGSassessedthataround84percentoftheseresourcesareexpectedtooccuroffshore.

Theseresourcesarewidespreadintheentireregion,butthebulkofnaturalgasisinWestSiberiaandintheeasternpartoftheBarentsSea,whilemostoftheoilislocatedintheArcticpartofAlaskaandCanadaaswellasEastGreenland.AmongArcticcountries,Russiaholdsthelion’sshareofthehydrocarbonreserves,especiallygas,witha58percentshareofthetotal412billionbarrelsofoilequivalent(bnboe)ofArcticresources.7Despitethegreatpotential,theactualdevelopmentandexploitationofthesereserveshasmovedslowlybecauseofseveralobstaclesfacedbyeachArcticcountry.Theseobstaclesaremostlyrelatedtohighinvestmentneedsandoperationalcosts,technologicalcomplexity,extremeenvironmentalconditions,politicalsupportaswellassocialacceptabilityduetoenvironmentalconcerns.

IcelandandGreenlandhavealwayshadgreatambitionsfortheirestimatedreserves,buttheyhaveneverbeenabletotranslatetheseexpectationsintoreality.Canadahasalonghistoryofexplorationactivities,butin2016itsignedamoratoriumthatbansallexplorationandproduction(E&P)activitiesoffshoreinitsArcticregionswiththegoalofprotectingthefragileecosystemofthearea.TheUnitedStatesholdssignificantreservesinAlaskaalthoughpoliticalchangesandmarketdevelopmentshavehinderedtheirexploitation.WhiletheTrumpAdministrationwascommittedtoexploitingthesereservesinlinewithits“energyindependence”rhetoric,theBidenAdministrationhasundertakenmeasuresforenvironmentalprotection,puttingthebrakesontheoilandgasindustryinAlaska.8Furthermore,thepetroleumindustryintheUShasbeenmorefocusedontheLower48withthedevelopmentofshalegasandtightoil.

6KennethJ.Birdetal.,“Circum-ArcticResourceAppraisal:EstimatesofUndiscoveredOilandGasNorthoftheArcticCircle”,inUSGSFactSheets,No.2008-3049(2008),/10.3133/fs20083049.

7JamesHendersonandJuliaLoe,“TheProspectsandChallengesforArcticOilDevelopment”,inOIESPapers,No.WPM54(October2014),/10.26889/9781784670153.

8USDepartmentoftheInterior,Biden-HarrisAdministrationTakesMajorStepstoProtectArcticLandsandWildlifeinAlaska,6September2023,/node/53491.

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Lastly,NorwayneedstodevelopresourceslocatedintheBarentsSeatooffsetdecliningproductioninthemoretraditionalareas,suchastheNorthSea.

AmongtheArcticcountries,Russiahasthemostpronouncedfootprintinthisregionandhasexpressedthegreatestcommitmenttofurtherdevelopit.Thiscommitmenthasbeenarticulatedthroughseveralofficialstrategiesanddocuments.BackintheUSSRperiod,Moscow’sArcticpolicywasmotivatedbygeopoliticalconsiderations:theArcticcoastisthelongestborderforRussia.Giventhisgeographicalfeature,Russiahasalwayswantedtobuild,enhanceandconsolidateitspresence,developingassetsintheregion–especiallyrecentlyduetothemeltingice.TheRussianstrategicvisionfortheregionwasdrivenalsobyeconomicconsiderations.Arctichydrocarbonresourceexploitationanddevelopmentisconsideredessentialto:i)offsetdecliningenergyproduction,especiallyintraditionalproducingregionssuchasWestSiberia,ii)maintainhighexportvolumes,vitalforgovernmentrevenuesandiii)expandRussia’sstrategicroleintheArctic.

ThispaperseekstoanalysetheRussianenergypoliciesandstrategiesfollowingtheconflictinUkraine,withaspecificfocusontheArcticregion.Todoso,itpresentstheevolutionofthegeneralpoliticalandstrategicframeworkhighlightingthefactthatRussia’swarinUkrainehasnotcooledthepoliticalcommitmenttodevelopthisregion.Then,theresearchprovidesanoverviewofthechallengingconditionforRussia’senergysector,giventhedecliningproductionrateinthetraditionalfields,whichpushestheneedforArcticenergydevelopment,andthegrowinginternationalpressure,giventhegrowingandtighterinternationalsanctionsespeciallyfollowingRussia’swarinUkraine.Section3analysestheroleoftheArcticinRussianenergypolicyregardingbothpipelinesandLNG.Section4providesanoverviewofthedifferentstrategiesandmeasuresofthemainRussianenergycompanies(Rosneft,Gazprom,Novatek)toreachtheirspecificgoalsfortheiractivitiesintheArctic.ThepapertheninvestigatestheinterconnectionsbetweendevelopmentofhydrocarbonreservesintheArcticandtheNorthernSeaRoute.Notwithstandingsuchambitionandtarget,Russiaanditscompaniesfaceenormouschallenges,notablysanctionsandlogistics,asaddressedinSection6.

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1.TheevolutionofRussia’sArcticregulatoryandpoliticalframework

RussiahasalonghistoryintheArcticthatdatesbackseveralhundredyears.ThediscoveryanddevelopmentofhydrocarbonresourcesinSiberiaprovidedtheSovietUnionwithhardcurrencytosupportitseconomyandforeignpolicy.TheexploitationofArcticresourcesintensifiedinthepost-Sovietperiodinparticularafter2000,underpinnedbyhighoilpricesandincomingforeigncapital.SinceVladimirPutinbecamepresidentintheearly2000s,theArctichasincreasinglybecomeakeyareaforRussia’smilitary,foreign,energyandeconomicinterestsandpolicies.

Giventhisrelevance,Russiahasdevelopedseveralofficialstrategiesandpoliciesoutliningitskeyinterestsinthearea.InSeptember2008,PresidentDmitryMedvedevsignedthemainofficialRussianpolicydocumentontheArctic,“PrinciplesofStatePolicyoftheRussianFederationintheArcticto2020andBeyondThedocument,issuedbyRussia’sSecurityCouncilinMarch2009,9outlinedRussia’s“nationalinterests”intheArctic,usingsimilarlanguageandcontentasWesterndiscoursesontheArctic.NaturalresourcesareintroducedearlyinthetextasthefirstofRussia’s“nationalinterests”intheArctic,withthepreservationofpeaceandcooperationintheareaasthesecondandthepromotionoftheNorthernSeaRoute(NSR)asaninternationalwaterwaywithintheRussianjurisdictionlistedfourth.10

Between2020andearly2021,Russiareleasedthreedocuments,whichcollectivelyoutlinekeygoalsfortheArcticregionandaplanfortheir implementation.11On6March2020,PresidentVladimirPutinapprovedthe“BasicPrinciplesofRussianFederationStatePolicyintheArcticto2035”(alsocalledBasicPrinciples2035),whichupdatedthe2008version.Althoughthe internationalenvironmenthasdeeplychanged,the2020documentdoes

9Indra?verland,“Russia’sArcticEnergyPolicy”,inInternationalJournal,Vol.65,No.4(Autumn2010),p.865-878atp.867,/10.1177/002070201006500416.

10Ibid.

11Hilde-GunnBye,“Russia’sUpdatedArcticStrategy:NewStrategicPlanningDocumentApproved”,inHighNorthNews,28October2020,/en/node/51760.

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notindicateanydrasticshiftsinRussia’sArcticpolicy.12Russiaoutlinesitsinterestincooperationonseveralmatters,butitiscommittedtoenhancingandstrengtheningitsregionalleadership.BasedonBasicPrinciples2035,inOctober2020PutinapprovedthestrategyfordevelopingRussia’sArcticzoneandensuringnationalsecurityupto2035(2020ArcticStrategy).Inthisstrategy,Russiaacknowledgesthespeedofrisingtemperaturesintheregionabovetheglobalaverage(2–2.5timesfaster),statingthatthesecircumstancesposebothopportunitiesandrisksfortheeconomyandtheenvironment.13Inevitably,furtherdevelopmentofhydrocarbonreservesintheregionrepresentsoneofthemainopportunities,accordingtothedocument.

ThenewgeopoliticalcompetitionbetweentheWestandRussiademandedarevisionofsomeofficialdocuments,butithasnotreducedeithertheambitionorthecommitmenttofullydeveloptheregion.PresidentPutinaffirmedthattheRussianArcticzoneisofstrategicimportanceandisdirectlyconnectedtoRussia’senergypotential,itslogisticscapabilitiesandthecountry’snationalsecurityanddefence.14InFebruary2023,Russiaamendedits2020Arcticpolicyeliminatingthereferencetoregionalcooperationandstressingthefocusonthecountry’snationalinterest.15Theamendeddocumentalsohighlightedtherelevanceofimportindependenceinkeysectors,suchasshipbuilding,whicharecrucialforthedevelopmentandexploitationofArcticresourcesandareas.Furthermore,inMarch2023,RussiareleaseditsForeignPolicyConcept,replacingthepreviousversionof2016,andtheArctichasgainedanewfoundsignificanceasoneofthetopregionsofpriority.16ForRussia,thedevelopmentoftheArcticiscrucial,elevatingexpansionoftheNSRasastatepriority.Moreover,inthenewgeopoliticalcontext,Russiaismuchmoremotivatedtoworkwithforeigncountries,includingthoseoutsidetheArcticregion,to

12EkaterinaKlimenko,“Russia’sNewArcticPolicyDocumentSignalsContinuityRatherthanChange”,inSIPRICommentaries,6April2020,/node/5096.

13RosemaryGriffin,“RussiaApprovesArcticStrategyupto2035”,inS&PGlobalCommodityInsights,27October2020,/platts/en/market-insights/latest-news/coal/102720-russia-approves-arctic-strategy-up-to-2035.

14“PutinSaysDevelopmentofArcticRegionKeyPriorityforRussia”,inXinhua,12December2023,/20231212/e80e0846435444bda6b4c599de212f24/c.html.

15MalteHumpert,“RussiaAmendsArcticPolicyPrioritizing‘NationalInterest’andRemovingCompetitionwithinArcticCouncil”,inHighNorthNews,15March2023,https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/node/55453.

16NikitaLipunovandPavelDevyatkin,“TheArcticinthe2023RussianForeignPolicyConcept”,inArcticInstituteArticles,30May2023,/?p=28725.

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achieveitsnationaltargets.Particularly,ChinahasbeenexpandingitspresenceandpartnershipwithRussiaintheArctic(seeBox2).

2.ChallengingcontextforRussia’senergysuperpowerstatus:Decliningproductionandinternationalsanctions

Russiaisendowedwithlargehydrocarbonreservesandranksasoneoftopexportingcountriesforfossilfuels(coal,oilandgas)intheworld.TheRussianeconomyheavilydependsontheenergysectorandfossilfuelexportrevenues.In2019hydrocarbonrevenuesprovided39percentofthefederalbudgetrevenuesandtheenergysectormadeupmorethan65percentoftotalexportrevenuesaswellas25percentofthecountry’sGDP.Suchdependenceonthehydrocarbonsectorandrevenuesledtoanexposuretooilpricevolatility.Forexample,from2000to2005exportssoareddrasticallyprovidinganincredibleboosttothenationaleconomyandenhancingRussia’spositionontheworldstageasanenergysuperpower.17Withtheemergenceofseveralcrisesaffectingenergydemandandprices,Russia’shydrocarbonindustry,andconsequentlyitseconomicconditions,havebeenputunderstress.Aftersomechallengesemergedfollowingthe2008financialcrisis,thefirstmajorcrisisoccurredin2014withthecombinationofanoilpricedrop,internationalsanctionsfollowingRussia’sannexationofCrimea,andastagnatingeconomy.18In2020,theCovid-19pandemicdisruptedglobalenergyconsumptioncausingthecollapseofoilprices.Aseconomiesrestartedinmid-2021,energypricesbegantosoar.Despitesomemarketreasonsbehindpricespikes,Russiasubstantiallycontributedtotheextremepricevolatilityin2021/22asitdramaticallyreduceditsgassupplytoEuropecausingdrasticandprofoundchangesintheglobalgasmarkets.

17TatianaMitrova,“Russia’sEnergyStrategy”,inAtlanticCouncilEurasiaCenterIssueBriefs,July2019,https://css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/resources/docs/AtlanticCouncil_Russias_Energy_Strategy.pdf.

18TatianaMitrovaandVitalyYermakov,“Russia’sEnergyStrategy-2035.StrugglingtoRemainRelevant”,inRussie.Nei.Reports,No.28(December2019),/en/node/16701.

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Inresponsetothewar,WesterncountrieshavetightenedsanctionspreventingandlimitingfinancialandtechnologicalcooperationwiththeRussianenergysector.Furthermore,WesterncountrieshaverespondedtoPutin’swarwithseveralmeasuresthataimtocurbMoscow’srevenues,henceitsabilitytofundtheconflictinUkraine.Therefore,theEUestablishedanembargoonRussiancrudeimportsfromDecember2022andpetroleumproductsfromFebruary2023.Additionally,G7countries,togetherwiththeEUandAustralia,setapricecaponRussianseabornecrudeoilexportat60dollars/barrel,andat100dollars/barreland45dollars/barrelforhigh-valuepetroleumproducts(diesel,gasoline,kerosene)andlow-valuepetroleumproducts(naphtha,fueloil)respectively.ThesemeasuresaffectRussia’soilandoilproductsexportviaseaasWesterncountrieshavedecidedtonotgrantmaritimeservicesforthetradeofRussianoil/productstothirdcountriesincludingshippinginsuranceforcargoespricedoverthethreshold.Allthesedevelopmentshaveledtoadrasticreconfigurationofenergyflows,withRussiaexportingitsoilnowtoIndiaandChina.Moreover,internationalsanctionsarelikelytoaffectseveralRussianenergyprojects.

Alongsidetheseexternalchallenges,theRussianenergysectorandeconomyarealsofacingsomedomesticchallenges.Russia’soilandgasproductioninthetraditionalareas(i.e.,WesternSiberia)isexpectedtodeclineinthemediumterm,stressingtheneedfordevelopmentofnewoilandgasfields.ThesechallengesareacknowledgedalreadyintheRussia’sEnergyStrategy2035,releasedinJune2020(Russia’sES-2035).Thisvisionwaspartiallycounterintuitivesinceoilandgasproductionhasincreasedinthepastdecade–despitethepresenceofinternationalsanctionssince2014.Indeed,oilproductioninRussiagrewfrom501.4milliontons(Mt)in2009to573.4Mtin2019.19However,thisgrowthwaspossiblebecausecompaniesmanagedtobringonlinenewfieldsthatmorethancompensatedforthedropfromtheexistingfields.ThegrowingtrendinthepastyearsshowsthatRussiahasbeenabletoreducetheeffectofsanctionsonproductionintheshortterm.Russiamanagedtoavoidreductioninproductionand,atthesametime,toensureitsrecordgrowth,mainlybecauseofsignificantpastinvestments,numeroustaxbreaksanddevaluationintheRuble.Nonetheless,therehasbeenarelatively

19EnergyInstitute,StatisticalReviewofWorldEnergyData,2023,/statistical-review/resources-and-data-downloads.

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decliningrelevanceofproductioninWesternSiberiafrom62percentto56percentover2012–2016.20Inthiscontext,theArcticcouldcometotherescueoftheRussianoilindustry.

TheStrategysetstheupperlimitofproductionatarelativelyflatlevelof560Mtperannumfrom2024to2035initsoptimisticscenario.Butinitspessimisticscenario,Russia’soiloutputfacesasteadydeclineto490Mtby2035.Ineithercase,companiesinRussiawillincreasinglystruggletomaintainthesamelevelofoilproductionafter2025,primarilyduetothedecreaseinreservequality.21Russiareviseditsoilstrategyin2021,anditforeseesthatitscrudeoutputcouldpeakat504–590Mtin2027–2029beforedecreasingto414–494Mtin2035,underfourscenarios.22TheriskisthatRussia’soilproductionwillneveragainhittherecordlevelsof2019.23

Naturalgasoutputhasexpandedfrom536.2bcmin2009to679bcmin2019.Thegrowthwasmainlydrivenbyexports.Overthisperiod,amajortransformationoccurredintheRussiangassector.GazpromhasseenitsroleinRussianproductiondecliningasitbecametheswingproducer(meaningitborethehighestshareofproductionreduction)intheaftermathoftheEuropeangasdemanddropin2012–14andespeciallyduringthe2022energycrisis.Russia’sES-2035declaresthatnaturalgasoutput(727.8bcmin2018)isexpectedtoincreaseupto907bcmor983bcmby2035.However,thecurrentcrisishasdrasticallyalteredthepicture,demandingtherevisionoftheenergystrategy.MoscowaimstoreplacesomelostEuropeansalesbyboostingdomesticgasconsumptionbyatleast18.6bcmby2025throughtheexpansionofthegasgridtoremoteareasinFarEastandNorthwestRussia.ForothervolumesofgasRussiaisleftwithessentiallytwooptions,namelyadditionalpipelineandLNGexportcapacity.

20TatianaMitrova,EkaterinaGrushevenkoandArtyomMalov,TheFutureofOilProductioninRussia:LifeUnderSanctions,Moscow,MoscowSchoolofManagementSkolkovo,May2018,https://energy.skolkovo.ru/downloads/documents/SEneC/research04-en.pdf.

21TatianaMitrovaandVitalyYermakov,“Russia’sEnergyStrategy-2035”,cit.

22Ibid.

23“RussiaMayHavePassedPeakOilOutput:Government”,inTheMoscowTimes,12April2021,https:///2021/04/12/a73558.

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Giventhiscontext,thedevelopmentoftheArcticresourceshasbeenpartofthe“businessasusual”strategypursuedbyMoscow.24However,thesedevelopmentsrequiremassiveinvestmentsandupdatedtechnologies.Ifthegovernmentdoesnotensureenoughfiscalsupport,someofthenewprojectsthatareinstrumentaltomaintainhighoutputandexportsmaynotseethelight.ThenewcontexthasalsoaffectedtheRussianenergytransitionpathway(seeBox1).

3.TheroleoftheArctic

fortheRussianenergysector

Inlightofthischallengingcontext,RussiahasbeenlookingattheArcticresourcesasapotentialsolutiontooffsetthedeclineofdomesticoilandgasproductionevenbeforetheconflictwithUkraine.RussiaseestheArcticshelfasapromisingareaforE&Pactivitiestooffsetdecliningproductioninitsmaturefields.Moreover,theArcticgainsnewfoundrelevanceasakeypillarofexportstrategyanddiversification.TheRussia’sES-2035envisagestheexpansionoftheArctic’sroleinoverallRussiancrudeandcondensateproductionfrom17.3percentin2018to20percentin2024,23percentin2030and26percentin2035.25Regardingnaturalgas,theStrategyforecastsadiminishingroleofArcticproductioninnationalgasoutput,fallingfrom82.7percentin2018to82percentin2024,81percentin2030and79percentin2035.26Besidesitsrelevancefortheshareoftotalproduction,theArcticisexpectedtobecomepivotalforfutureelementsofRussia’senergystrategy,namelytheexpansionofLNGproductionandexportdiversificationstrategy.ThesetwoelementshavebecomeevenmorepressingissuesforMoscowasitdecoupleswithEurope–itsmaingasmarket.Therefore,theArcticprojectsarecrucialtogainaccesstotheAsiaPacificregion,whichrepresentsafast-growingenergymarket.Toreachit,RussiaisworkingonseveraloptionsincludingbothpipelinesandLNG,whichisexpectedtoexploittheNorthernSeaRoute–alsoanationalinterest.

24TatianaMitrova,“EnergyandtheEconomyinRussia”,inManfredHafnerandGiacomoLuciani(eds),ThePalgraveHandbookofEnergyEconomics,Cham,PalgraveMacMillan,p.649-666,https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-86884-0_32.

25RosemaryGriffin,“RussiaApprovesArcticStrategyupto2035”,cit.

26Ibid.

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13

3.1FrompipelinestoLNG

…

TheRussiangasexportstrategyhashistoricallyreliedonrigidlong-distancepipelines.Russiaisthelargestpipelineexporterintheworld.UntilRussia'swarinUkraine,RussiangasexportswerealmostentirelydirectedtotheEuropeanmarket,withalmostallitspipelineslinkedtoEurope(Figure1).ThisconditioncontributedtoacertaindelayintheemergenceofRussiaasanLNGexporter.

Figure1|Russiangaspipelinesystem

mn:

h*

中

n

atnkye

Source:Gazpromwebsite:Transmission,

/f/posts/15/301731/map-develop-2019-enjpg.

WellbeforeRussia'swarinUkraine,MoscowhadstartedtolookforalternativeexportmarketsaimedatensuringstableandfuturefossilfuelrevenueswhilereducingitsoverdependenceonEurope,whichhadinthemeantimecommittedtoclimate-neutrality.Indeed,theachievementoftheEuropeanGreenDealimpliesadrasticreductioninfossilfueldemandandimports,affectingtheEU's

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relationswithkeyproducers,includingRussia.27Dependingonthescenario,thevolumeoffossilfuelimportsfallsby27percentbetween2015and2030,withcoaldownby71–77percent,naturalgasby13–19percentandoilby23–25percent.28Beyond2030,fossilfuelimportsshrinkdramatically,virtuallydisappearingforcoal,decreas