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文檔簡介

Shaping

Cooperationina

Fragmenting

WorldW

H

I

T

E

P

A

PE

RJA

N

U

A

RY

20

2

4Images:GettyImagesContentsPreface34ExecutivesummaryIntroduction:Newapproachestoglobalcooperation1

Globalsecurity:“Cooperation”inanageofdistrustandinsecurity2

Climate:Rethinkingclimategovernance3

Technology:

Taming

–andunleashing–technologytogether4

Trade:

ExpandingandrebalancingglobaltradeAppendix:MembersoftheGlobalFutureCouncilontheFutureofGeopoliticsContributors57111518212223EndnotesDisclaimerThisdocumentispublishedbytheWorldEconomicForumasacontributiontoaproject,insightareaorinteraction.The?ndings,interpretationsandconclusionsexpressedhereinarearesultofacollaborativeprocessfacilitatedandendorsedbytheWorldEconomicForumbutwhoseresultsdonotnecessarilyrepresenttheviewsoftheWorldEconomicForum,northeentiretyofitsMembers,Partnersorotherstakeholders.?2024WorldEconomicForum.Allrightsreserved.Nopartofthispublicationmaybereproducedortransmittedinanyformorbyanymeans,includingphotocopyingandrecording,orbyanyinformationstorageandretrievalsystem.ShapingCooperationinaFragmentingWorld2January2024ShapingCooperationinaFragmentingWorldPrefaceTheWorldEconomicForum’s

networkofGlobalFutureCouncilsisamultistakeholderandinterdisciplinaryknowledgecommunitydedicatedtopromotinginnovativethinkingtoshapeamoreresilient,inclusiveandsustainablefuture.Theideaspresentedinthefollowingreportdrawondiscussionsthattookplaceamongthecouncilmembers–bothinpersonandvirtually–overthecourseof2023.Whileeachchapterofthisreportisinformedbytheinsightsgeneratedduringcouncildiscussions,thechaptersrepresenttheviewsoftherespectiveauthorsaloneandshouldbeunderstoodandattributedassuch.ThemandateoftheGlobalFutureCouncilontheFutureofGeopoliticsistoofferinsightintothecurrent,turbulentgeopoliticalcontextandtoidentifyopportunitiesforrevitalizingorrebuildingmechanismsofcooperationtoadvancesharedinterestwithinthiscontext.ShapingCooperationinaFragmentingWorld3Executive

summaryOngoingglobalchallengesdemandcollaborativesolutions.Strengtheningglobalcooperationisessentialforasafer,

healthierandmoreprosperousworld.Yet,

thecurrent,turbulentgeopoliticalcontextinwhichcon?ictandcompetitionare

increasinghaspulledstakeholdersapartattheverymomentthatacuteandongoingglobalchallengesdemandcollaborativesolutions.change,theinternationalcommunityshouldreframeinvestmentsinrenewablesandclimate-smarttechnologiesasopportunitiesandensuretheGlobalSouthandGlobalNorthbene?tequallyfromtheseinvestments.Climate-forwardlendingpoliciesfrommultilateraldevelopmentbanks,thediffusionofclimatetechnologytotheGlobalSouth,andlinkingtheclimateandhealthagendascanimprovetrustinglobalclimategovernanceandspurmoreimmediateactionagainstthisexistentialthreat.Againstthisbackdrop,theWorldEconomicForumconvenedtheGlobalFutureCouncilontheFutureofGeopoliticstoidentifyhowglobalstakeholderscancooperateinaddressingcriticalissues.Thoughbuildingcooperativepathwayswillbechallengingwithinthecurrentclimate,thecouncilmembersarguethatinnovative,inclusiveapproachestocooperationare

notonlynecessarybutpossibleinthefollowingareas:–Technology:

Frontiertechnologiescanfuelgeopoliticaltension,butdevelopingprotocolsandmechanismsforregulatingthegrowingrisksaroundthemrequirescollaboration.Recentpartnershipsattheminilaterallevelofferpromisingmodelsforcooperationandforpromotingattendanttrust.Frameworksdevelopedwithinputfromstakeholdersacrossthepublicandprivatesectors,aswellasacrosstheGlobalNorthandSouth,canfurtherstrengthennecessarytrust.–Globalsecurity:Followingdecadesofrelativeglobalstability,insecurityisrisingamidheighteneddistrust.Still,thereare

waystomanagethedistrustsothatitdoesnotpreventcollaborationorescalatetocon?ict–here,lessonsfrompreviousperiodsoftension,mostnotablytheColdWar,

offerinsightintohowmechanismscanbeestablishedtoadvancejointinterests.Thirdpartiesandmiddle-powerdiplomacycanalsobecrucialformitigatingandmediatingdisputes.Atthesametime,new,issue-speci?c,functionalbodiesthatincluderelevantstakeholderscanbeestablishedad-hocasneeded.–Trade:

Byexpandingtheglobaltradeagenda,theinternationalcommunitycancreateamorestabilizingsystemthatworkstowardsre-globalization.Leadersmustconsidertherami?cationsofsocialinclusionandclimatepolicyinmakingtradedecisionsandensurethattheeconomicbene?tsofglobaltradeare

feltmoreequallyacrosssocialclasses.Theglobaltradesystemandtheeconomicinterdependenceitcreatesofferavitalavenueforreconstructingtrustamongtheinternationalcommunity.–Climatechange:Financingforclimatechangemitigationandadaptationisdrasticallybehindglobalcommitments.To

addressclimateShapingCooperationinaFragmentingWorld4IntroductionNewapproaches

toglobalcooperationTheworldisatageopoliticalin?ectionpoint.BySamirSaranandJaneHarmanWar

israginginEurope,Africa,theMiddleEastandelsewhere.Theglobaleconomyrisksfracturingintoblocs,andtheplanetracestowardsaclimatecatastrophe.Atthesametime,breakthroughsinfrontiertechnologiesare

poisedtoreshapeindustriesandsocietieswhileraisingfundamentalquestionsaboutsafetyandprivacy.Towards

innovative,inclusivecooperationInmanyinstances,theshapeofcooperationwillneedtoberethoughtto?ttoday’s

morecontentiousgeopoliticalcontextandthecomplexityofchallenges.Leaderswillthereforeneedtobeinnovativebyidentifyingandembracingnewformsofcooperationthat,inmanycases,willnecessitatemoreinclusiveapproachesthantheyhavebeenusedtoinrecentyears.Thelatestdevelopmentsare

sobering.Thispastyearmarksthelargesteversingle-yearincreaseinforciblydisplacedpeople.hottestonrecord.

Globaleconomicrecoveryremainsbelowhistoricalaverages.

Lookingahead,just12%oftheSustainableDevelopmentGoals(SDGs)are

currentlyontrack.1Theyearwasthe2This

will

require

newways

of

thinking,

and

theWorld

Economic

Forum

askeditsGlobal

FutureCouncil

on

theFuture

of

Geopoliticstoexaminewhat

cooperation

can

looklike

in

four

critical

areas:security,

climatechange,

technology

and

globaltrade.

Theaim

wastobe

“practically

optimistic”–namely,

forward-thinking,

creative

and

solution-oriented,

but

alsodoable.Inpresenting

speci?c

newideas

forhow

to

manageglobaldistrust,an

importantoperatingpremise

wasto

drawon

theinsights

ofadiversegroup

of

experts

so

that

theideas

presentedwould

be

representative

and

realistic.

The

followingchapters

offer

theviews

of

members

of

thecouncil.34Noneoftheissuesfacingtheworldtoday–ontheeconomy,environment,securityortechnology–are

con?nedbybordersorlimitedtospeci?cregions.Theworldissointerconnected;addressingthechallengescanonlytakeplacethroughmechanismsofglobalcooperation.Yet,existingstructureshavestrainedundergeopoliticalpressureorhaveshownthemselvestobeill-suitedforthechallengesconfrontingus.Thequestion,then,iswhatcancooperationlooklikeintoday’scomplexgeopoliticalcontext?AtatimewhenUNSecretary-GeneralAntónioGuterreshassaida“maladyofmistrust”isplaguingtheworld,actorswillneedtocooperateevenifBroadly,cooperationwillneedtobemission-focusedandpurpose-driven,constructedtowardsaddressingspeci?cchallenges.Inthisway,partieswillneedto–andhistoryhasshown,can–lookpastdifferencesinpursuitofcommonbene?t.theydon’talwaystrustoneanother.

Chapterone5authors,BruceJones,RaviAgrawal,AntoniodeAguiarPatriota,KarinvonHippel,Lynn

KuokandSusanaMalcorraarguethat“distrustis,intheshortandmediumtermatleast,abaked-infeatureofgeopoliticalreality”,butthatinacknowledgingthisitisalsopossibleto?ndinnovativeapproachestodiplomacy,securitycooperationandmultilateralism.Astheauthorsremindus,evenattheheightoftheColdWar,

theUnitedStatesandtheSovietUnionwereabletocooperateonglobalhealthcampaignstoeradicatesmallpox.Themultilateralcommunitymustnowdevelopcreativestrategiestomanagedistrust,suchasbydevelopinganew“M-10”groupthatenhancestheparticipationofrisingmiddlepowersinthemultilateralprocess.Identifyingcooperativeapproachesandputtingthemintopracticewon’tbeeasybutwillbenecessary.Withoutapracticalapproachtostrengtheningcooperation,con?ictswillgrowdeadlier,

theplanetwarmerandtheeconomyweaker.

Theworldwouldbelesssecure,prosperousandhealthyforyearstocome.Withoutapractical

approachto

strengtheningcooperation,con?icts

will

growdeadlier,

theplanetwarmer

and

theeconomy

weaker.ShapingCooperationinaFragmentingWorld5Arguably,theareainmostneedofimprovedcooperationandwiththehighestlevelofdistrustisglobalsecurity.There

were

moredeathsin2022fromstate-basedcon?ictsthananyyearsinceforstateandnon-stateactorsalike.Theauthorsencourageanapproachthatbringstogetherdiversestakeholdersinaglobalregulatoryprocess,suchasthroughastandingConferenceofthePartiesonthefutureoftechnology,toresponsiblyregulatecurrenttechnologiesandprepareforthefuture.1994.

Within

thiscontextofincreasedglobal6insecurity,chapteroneauthorsargueformorenimble,inclusiveapproachestocon?ictresolutionandcon?ictmanagement.Indeed,thismayrequirebothreformofcurrentmultilateralentitiesor“moreadhoc,functionalbodiesthatdealwithanissueasandwhenitarises…

andincludesthosecountriesmostaffected”.Similarly,globaltradehasemergedasadomainofincreasinggeopoliticalfrictionbutalsoanareainwhichexpansivecooperationisnotjustpossiblebutdesirable.Inchapter4,NicolaiRugeandDannyQuaharguethat“geopoliticalrivalryhaserodedthetrustthatholdstheglobaltradesystemtogether”,butexpandingthetradeagendabyhavingitaddressglobalgoals,suchasclimatechangetargets,wouldinfuseitwithasenseofcommonpurpose.Critically,ensuringleast-developedcountriesareincludedindevelopmentpathwayscreatedbytheglobaltradesystemwillbuildtrust.Onclimateaction,the2022UNClimateChangeAnnualReportsaidtheonlywaytomeetcurrentclimateobjectivesis“ifandonlyifwetakeaquantumleapinclimateaction,now.

Thatrequirestheworldtoworktogether”.

Yet,

inchapter2,7SamirSaranandDannyQuaharguethat,sofar,“theglobalclimategovernance

frameworkhasfailedtodeliver”largelybecausedevelopedcountrieshavenotfollowedthroughoncommitments,notablysteeringmuch-needed?nancingtodevelopingnations.AdaptiveapproacheswillbekeySecurity,economicandtechnologicalchallengeswilltesttheinternationalcommunity.Eachoftheseareascouldfuelgeopoliticalconfrontation,buttheyalsopresentopportunitiesforcooperation.To

capturetheseopportunitiesforcooperation,however,

stakeholderswillneedtobeinnovativebyestablishingnewprocessesormouldingexistingframeworkstomeetthecurrentmoment.Mostimportantly,theNorthStarwillneedtobetheinclusionofdiverseactors,includingthosefromrisingpowers,thosefromgeographiestoo-oftenshutoutofthemultilateralprocess,andthosefromtheprivatesectorandcivilsociety.Thisiswhy,theauthorsargue,theGlobalNorthneedstoincreasetheamountofcapitalitdeploys,andmultilateraldevelopmentbanksneedtoadjustlendingpracticesbyassumingsomeoftherisksthatpreventprivatecapitalfrom?owingtotheGlobalSouth.Atthesametime,technologiesthatadvanceclimateactioneffortsneedtobemorewidelyshared.Onewaytodothisisforgovernmentstooverridepatentprotectionsastheydointhefaceofotheremergencies.To

captureopportunity

forcooperation,however,stakeholderswill

needtobeinnovative

byestablishingnewprocesses

ormouldingexistingframeworks

tomeet

thecurrentmoment.Onemajordisrupterofthegeopoliticallandscapeistherapidadvancementoffrontiertechnologies.Chapter3authorsSamirSaran,FlaviaAlvesandVera

Songweunderscorehowthesetechnologiesare“transformingcommonlyheldnotionsofpower”Theseapproacheswillbedependenton?exibilityandagility–anecessityforpartiestoworktogethertopreventcurrenttensionsfromboilingoverintofurthergeopoliticalcrises.ShapingCooperationinaFragmentingWorld6Globalsecurity1“Cooperation”in

an

ageof

distrustand

insecurityManagingdistrustandforgingresponsesdespiteitnecessitatesnewapproachesthatincludeestablishingnewpartnershipmechanisms.ByBruceJones,RaviAgrawal,AntoniodeAguiarPatriota,KarinvonHippel,Lynn

KuokandSusanaMalcorraTheinternationalsystemhasneverbeenfreeofviolenceandinequity.Yet

today,asviolenceisrising,orderiserodingandthespectreofnuclearwariscastingitsmenacingshadow,

greaterurgency–andcreativity–isneededtoreducetheriskofcon?ict.countriesoftheGlobalSouthformore

voiceandmore

votingweightinthemanagementoftheglobaleconomicorder.

Theissueofclimateadaptationbecamea

focalpointfortensionasthedevelopingworldbeganexperiencingthecostandconsequenceofclimatechangetheydidnotcause.ThenCOVID-19hit,andthemassiveeconomicandsocialdamage,thenationalistturninBeijingandWashington

(andlater,

Europe),andthegross

inequitiesrevealed

inthevaccineresponseturnedthesesentimentsfrom

resentmenttoanger.Thechallenge:tworisingsetsoftensionsTheColdWar

sawexistentialrisk,occupation,warsofaggressionandbrutalproxycon?ictsthatkilledmillionsinAfrica,Asia,LatinAmericaandtheMiddleEast.WhenthestrategicdangersoftheColdWar

receded,civilwars?ared,asdidattendanthumanitariancrises.Thesecondsetoftensionshasarisenfrom

a

shiftinthebalanceofrelative

powerandthe(whollyworrying)re-militarizationofregionalsecurityinpartsoftheworld.Russia’s

invasionsofGeorgiaandCrimeasignalleda

returntoaggressioninEurope.MilitarytensionsintheSouthChinaSeaare

triggeringconcernofpotentialconfrontationbetweenpowers.ThisisoccurringastheaftermathofthewarsinAfghanistanandIraqandthewider“waronterrorism”campaigneroded

thecredibilityoftheWestinmuchofthebroaderMiddleEastand,tosomeextent,inotherregionsaswell.However,

then,foraquartercentury,intheabsenceofgreatpowertensions,thelevelandintensityofwardiminished–nevertotally,alwaysunevenly,butmateriallyandsigni?cantly.Theglobaleconomygrew.

Cooperation?ourished.Duringthisperiod,divisionsoverdevelopmentssuchasthewarinKosovoandtheUSwarinIraqreducedbutdidnotderailoverallcooperation.Astensionsescalated,cooperationaroundissuesofinternationalpeaceandsecurityunsurprisinglydeclined.Forinstance,America’s

withdrawalfromtheIrannucleardealremovedacriticalmechanismforsecuritymanagementintheMiddleEast.AgreementsdesignedtolimittheviolenceinSyriafailedalmostassoonastheywerenegotiated,andmajorpowerinterventionsinSyriatooktheformof(limited)proxywarwhileeffortsatjointcon?ictmanagement?zzledout.Atthesametime,compliancewitharmscontrolmechanismshaserodedamongpowerstothepointofnearcollapse,andnegotiationsovernewmechanismstobringinnewactorsare

moribund.Greatpowertensionshaveblockedeffectivediplomacyandcon?ictmanagementthroughtheUN.Cooperationheldevenunderthepressureoftheglobal?nancialcrisis,whichwasmetbythecombinedresourcesofthenewlyelevatedG20.Thatcrisis,though,exacerbatedinternaltensionswithinWesterneconomiesandbetweentheWest,emergingAsiaandthestill-developingSouth.Countriesbegantoturninwards,andcooperationbegantofray.Sincethen,twosetsofgeopoliticaltensionshavecontinuedtogrow–andtocompoundoneanother.The?rstsetoftensionshasarisenfrom

therecalcitranceoftheWest’s

responsetoa

growing(whollyjusti?ed)demandfrom

thedevelopingShapingCooperationinaFragmentingWorld7Mostrecently,therising,searingviolenceintocontributetothemanagementofregionalcon?ictandthepreventionofgreatpowerwar–recognizingthatthemultilateraldomainhasitselfbecomecompetitive.Ethiopia,Ukraine,Nagorno-Karabakh,IsraelandGazahascausedimmenseciviliancasualties.Thesecon?ictsalsohavehadenormousglobalspillovereffects,heighteningtensionsandimpedingattemptsto?ndcommongroundoncriticalglobalchallenges.EffortstorespondthroughtheUNhaveachievedlittlebuttoshowcasegeopoliticaldivisions.Addressingthisslateofchallenges?rstrequireseschewingvaguehopesthatsharedglobalthreatswilldecisivelyoutweighnationaltensions;thereislittleevidencethattheydo,andtheworldhasjustlivedthroughseveralepisodesthatAnewapproachtomultilateralcooperationsuggesttheopposite.Thenotionthateconomicinterdependenceandrationalitywillforestallwarmustalsobeabandoned.Rather,

thestartingpointmustbetorecognizethatdistrustis,intheshortandmediumtermatleast,abaked-infeatureofgeopoliticalreality.Then,designapproachespremisedondistrustratherthanhopingitwillfade.Theserealitiesrequireresolveandinnovationintherealmsofdiplomacy,investmentsindeterrenceandcooperationinresponsetoaggression.(ItisessentialthatsuchcooperationisundertakenindefenceofthecorepurposesoftheUNCharter,evenifprimarilythroughChapterVIIIinstitutionsratherthanthroughtheUNitself.)Managingdistrustandforgingresponsesdespiteitrequiresthreeconceptualshifts:–Recognizingthatcollaborationispossibleevenunderconditionsofintensedistrust:TheUSandtheSovietUnionrepeatedlyMostimportantisreneweddiplomacybetweentheworld’s

twolargestpowers,theUnitedStatesandChina.Thiswouldhelp–oratleaststophindering–theresolutionofinternationalcon?ictsandglobalchallenges.Progressonmilitary-to-militarychannelsformanagingcrisesandavoidingunintendedescalationisvital.Asisaneventualreturntoarmscontrolnegotiations.provedthisduringtheColdWar.

LessonsfromepisodesliketheWashington-Moscowcollaborationoneradicatingsmallpoxneedtobere-learned.(Thoughanotherlessonthoseepisodesrevealmustalsoberecognized:issue-speci?ccollaborationdoesnotbleedintowidercomityofrelations.Afterall,justafterMoscowandWashingtoncollaboratedonsmallpoxeradication,theCubanMissileCrisisoccured,themostdangerousmomentoftheColdWar.)The

startingpoint

mustbetorecognize

thatdistrust

is,in

theshortand

mediumtermat

least,

abaked-in

feature

ofgeopolitical

reality.Themultilateralrealmmustalsobereconceptualizedandretooled–revitalizingthecapacityofkeymultilateralmechanismsShapingCooperationinaFragmentingWorld8–Usingthirdparties:Everythingthatwaslearntfromfourdecadesofpost-ColdWar

innovationincrisismanagementindicatesthatthirdpartiesarekeytomanagingtheproblemofdistrust.ThereisalsoampleevidencefromtheColdWarofthevalueofthirdpartiesandquietdiplomacy(oftenatorthroughtheUN)inbrokeringoff-ramps,de-escalationandcrisisavoidance.thecombinedgeopoliticalclouttochangethetermsofdebatearound

viablepathwaystowarterminationanda

stablepeace.Sucha

group

couldalsoagitatefora

returntoarmscontrol

negotiations–

byusingitsbilateralrelationswiththegreat

powerstourgea

focusonstability,byinvestinginthediplomacyofnewnegotiations,and,where

relevant,bysupportingmultilateralarmscontrol

arrangements.–Investinginmiddle-powerdiplomacy:Throughoutthehistoryofmultilateralinstitutions,so-called“middlepowers”

havebeenthe8Createnewadhocinternationalforumsdrivingsourceofinnovationandhaveplayedakeyroleingreatpowercon?ictpreventionandde-escalation.Althoughthetermhasuntilrecentlybeencon?nedtoWesterncountries,shiftsintheglobalbalanceofpowermeanthatthisfunctionextendsbeyondtheWestto“rising”powerselsewhere.There

shouldalsobemore

adhoc,functionalbodiesthatdealwithanissue,countryorregionasandwhennecessaryandinvolvethosecountriesmostaffected.Suchforumsshouldnotrequire

bricksandmortarheadquarterswithpermanentstaff

butratherenhancedmodalitiesforcollaborationbetweencountriesinvolvedforaslongastheissueremains

inplay.Operationalizingtheseconceptscouldbeachievedthroughavarietyofmechanisms.USPresidentBidenhasbecomethe?rstAmericanPresidentsincetheendoftheColdWar

toadvocateforUNSecurityCouncilexpansion.AsplansgetunderwayfortheUN’s

“SummitoftheFuture”in2024,theUSshouldintensifyitsdiplomacyhere;buttherearefurtheropportunitiesaswell.Currently,therisktograinandfertilizershippingoutofBlackSeaportsshouldbemitigatedthroughthecreationofaneutralnationsnavaltaskforcethatcouldescortshipstransitingtheBlackSeatohelpsecurestabilityinglobalfoodmarkets.Thiscouldalsoserveasatestinggroupforthenotionofmorerobustmultilateralcooperationatsea,whichwouldhaveimportantusesinothercontestedwaters.Thefollowingcouldserveasotherstartingpointsforanewapproachtomanagingcompetitivemultilateralism.Establisha“middle/majorpowers”grouping–anM-10(orsimilar)Practicesafety-netdiplomacyAsdevastatingasaretheconsequencesofRussia’sinvasionofUkraine,theconsequencesofdirectcon?ictbetweentheUnitedStatesandChinacouldbeevengraver–butthatoutcomeisgrowingmoreandmorelikely.Avoidingitwillrequire,aboveall,restraintandcalibrationonthepartofBeijingandWashington.Thehistoryofcrisismanagementindicatestheneedforsafetynetsorguardrails,mechanismsthatbothpowerscanturnto,totriggerde-escalation.Atthismomentofintenseneed,astandingmechanismthatlinksthewesternmajorandmiddlepowerswiththenon-Westernones(Brazil,India,SouthAfrica,theUnitedArabEmirates,etc.)wouldcreateadiplomaticmechanismthatcouldstraddletheincreasinglybifurcatedworldsoftheG7,QuadrilateralSecurityDialogue(theQuad)andtheexpandedBRICS(Brazil,Russia,India,ChinaandSouthAfrica,plusnewlyadmittedEgypt,Ethiopia,Iran,SaudiArabiaandtheUnitedArabEmirates).TheG20,consistingoftheEuropeanUnion,theAfricanUnionand19countries,includingChina,RussiaandtheUnitedStates,isboundupinthegeopoliticaltensionsoftheday.Theproposedgrouping–akindof“coalitionofthecapable”–wouldhavethediplomatic?exibilityandhefttoraisethecoststothegreatpowersforactionsorbehaviourthatseriouslyunderminedthemultilateralorderandthequietdiplomaticchannelstohelp?ndde-escalatoryoff-rampsandsimilarmechanisms.For

instance,

after

the

Cuban

MissileCrisis,

the

SovietUnion

launched

a

major

naval

build-upto

attempt

tomatch

American

strength

at

sea.

This

resulted

in

adynamic

of

frequent

near-misses

and

near-accidentsin

theAtlantic.

In

1968,

the

US

called

for

negotiationsover

an

agreement

to

limit

this

risk,

and

after

twoyears,

the

Soviets

agreed

to

start

talks.

Two

yearslater

despite

relations

being

near

the

nadir–

the1972

US-Soviet

Incidents

at

Sea

agreement

wassigned,

creating

a

tool

that

helped

avoidescalationduring

the

tensest

years

of

the

Cold

War.Withinthis,there

shouldbea

“middlepowersmediationgroup”

onissueslikeRussia/Ukraine.Unlikethevariousunilateralpeaceinitiativesattemptedtodate,a

middle-powersgroupingwithcross-regional

representation

wouldhavethediplomaticweight,therangeofperspectivesandTheforeignanddefenceministriesofthecapablepowers,aswellastheUN,shouldre-examineandpublicizelessonssuchasthisandinvestintheneededdiplomaticandanalyticalcapacityforsimilarresponses.ShapingCooperationinaFragmentingWorld9Establishamulti-nationalreferencegrouponthelawsofarmedcon?ictandinternationalhumanitarianlawMultilateralmechanismsinternationalhumanitarianlaw;engageinquietdiplomacydesignedtosupportcompliancewiththoselaws;andinvestinmonitoringanddocumentationmechanismsthatcouldbeusedtosupportposthocaccountability.remain

essentialtoavoidingwars,saving

livesandpromoting

stability,even

if,

inthepast,they

maymainlyhave

mattered

inselective

moments.CorrectingthecoursetocollisionBoththeUNandtheInternationalCommitteeoftheRedCross(ICRC)arestewardsofthekeyinternationalinstrumentsdesignedtolimitwarandregulateitsprosecution,butatpresent,neitherbodycarriesthenecessarydiplomaticweighttoin?uencebehaviourbyleadingmilitarypowers.TheSecretary-GeneralandthePresidentoftheICRCcouldcreateadiplomaticmechanismcomprisedofdiplomatsandinternationallegalexpertsfromadozenorsoleadingcountriesfromeveryregion.ThiscouldserveasanadhocreferencegrouptospeakoutindefenceofthekeyprovisionsoftheUNCharter,

thelawsofarmedcon?ictandTheworldisona

collisioncourse,andboththeglobaleconomyandcapacitytomanageglobalchallengesarelikelytobecollateraldamage–indeed,theyalreadyare.Avoidingacutecriseswillrequirecourageandcreativity.Muchofthismustli

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