UNDP-貧困與緬甸家庭經濟:一個正在消失的中產階級 POVERTY AND THE HOUSEHOLD ECONOMY OF MYANMAR a Disappearing Middle Class_第1頁
UNDP-貧困與緬甸家庭經濟:一個正在消失的中產階級 POVERTY AND THE HOUSEHOLD ECONOMY OF MYANMAR a Disappearing Middle Class_第2頁
UNDP-貧困與緬甸家庭經濟:一個正在消失的中產階級 POVERTY AND THE HOUSEHOLD ECONOMY OF MYANMAR a Disappearing Middle Class_第3頁
UNDP-貧困與緬甸家庭經濟:一個正在消失的中產階級 POVERTY AND THE HOUSEHOLD ECONOMY OF MYANMAR a Disappearing Middle Class_第4頁
UNDP-貧困與緬甸家庭經濟:一個正在消失的中產階級 POVERTY AND THE HOUSEHOLD ECONOMY OF MYANMAR a Disappearing Middle Class_第5頁
已閱讀5頁,還剩87頁未讀, 繼續(xù)免費閱讀

下載本文檔

版權說明:本文檔由用戶提供并上傳,收益歸屬內容提供方,若內容存在侵權,請進行舉報或認領

文檔簡介

POVERTYANDTHEHOUSEHOLD

ECONOMYOFMYANMAR:

aDisappearingMiddleClass

APRIL2024

Copyright?UNDP2024

UnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramme

OneUnitedNationsPlazaNewYork,NY10017,USA

Allrightsreserved.Nopartofthispublicationmay

bereproduced,storedinaretrievalsystem,or

transmitted,inanyformorbymeans,electronic,

mechanical,photocopying,recordingorotherwise,

withoutpriorpermission.

Generaldisclaimers

Thedesignationsemployedandthe

presentationofthematerialinthispublicationdo

notimplytheexpressionofanyopinion

whatsoeveroftheUnitedNationsDevelopment

Programme(UNDP)concerningthelegalstatusof

anycountry,territory,cityorareaorofits

authorities,orconcerningthedelimitationofits

frontiersorboundaries.Dottedanddashed

linesonmapsrepresentapproximateborder

linesforwhichtheremaynotyetbefull

agreement.

Thefindings,analysis,andrecommendationsofthis

Reportdonotrepresenttheofficialpositionofthe

UNDPorofanyoftheUNMemberStatesthatare

partofitsExecutiveBoard.Theyarealsonot

necessarilyendorsedbythosementionedin

theacknowledgmentsorcited.

Someofthefiguresincludedintheanalyticalpart

ofthereportwhereindicatedhavebeen

estimatedbytheUNDPorothercontributorstothe

Reportandarenotnecessarilytheofficial

statisticsoftheconcernedcountry,areaor

territory,whichmayusealternativemethods.All

reasonableprecautionshavebeentakentoverify

theinformationcontainedinthispublication.

However,thepublishedmaterialisbeing

distributedwithoutwarrantyofanykind,either

expressedorimplied.

Theresponsibilityfortheinterpretationanduseof

themateriallieswiththereader.Innoeventshall

theUNDPbeliablefordamagesarisingfromits

use.

Tanintharyi

Map1:

TheStatesandRegionsofMyanmar

Kachin

Sagaing

Chin

Shan

Mandalay

Magway

Rakhine

NayPyiTaw

Kayah

Bago

AyeyarwadyYangonKayin

Mon

Pakistan

Nepal

Bhutan

India

Bangladesh

India

Myanmar

China

Vietnam

Laos

Thailand

Philippines

Cambodia

SriLanka

Malaysia

Indonesia

1

Contents

Abbreviations 3

Executive

Summary 4

ThePeople’sPulseSurvey2023 7

DataandMethodology 8

TheStatusoftheHouseholdEconomy 10

1.Sustainedeconomichardship 10

2.Adisappearingmiddleclass 17

3.Budgetbites:Crowdingoutofhouseholdhuman

developmentexpenditures 21

4.Intensifyingsocialconsequences:exhaustingcoping

mechanismsandalternatives 23

5.Poverty 26

6.Conclusion 34

AppendixTables 36

POVERTYANDTHEHOUSEHOLDECONOMYOFMYANMAR:ADISAPPEARINGMIDDLECLASS

2

Tables

Table1:Summaryofrespondents’information 9

Table2:Povertyheadcountanddepthatthenationalpovertyline

bystate/region(%) 30

Table3:Childpovertyheadcountatthenationalpovertylinebystate/region(%) 31

Figures

Figure1:Nominalincomechangesoversurveys(%) 12

Figure2:State/regionhouseholdincomechangecomparison,PPS2023andHWS-5(%) 14

Figure3:Sourcesofincomebynational,urban/ruralandassetquintiles 16

Figure4:Monthlyincomepercapitabynational,rural/urbanandsocio-economicstatus 17

Figure5:Monthlyincomepercapitabystate/region 18

Figure6:Reasonswhyhouseholdincomehasgonedown(%) 19

Figure7:Dailypercapitatotalexpenditureinkyatsanditscompositionin%:

bynational,urban/rural,state/regionandassetquintiles

22

Figure8:Householdcopingstrategiesbysocio-economicstatus(%) 24

Figure9:Householdcopingstrategiesbystate/region(%) 25

Figure10:Povertyheadcountanddepthovertimeatthenationalpovertyline(%) 27

Figure11:Vulnerabilitytopovertyatthenationalpovertyline(%) 28

Figure12:Povertyheadcountovertimebyagegroupatthenationalpovertyline(%) 31

Figure13:Change(2017-2023)inpovertyheadcountandpovertydepth

atthenationalpovertylineinrelationtoconflictvulnerability(%)

33

Maps

Map1:TheStatesandRegionsofMyanmar II

Map2:2023Povertyheadcountbystate/region 29

POVERTYANDTHEHOUSEHOLDECONOMYOFMYANMAR:ADISAPPEARINGMIDDLECLASS

3

Abbreviations

CATI

ComputerAssistedTelephoneInterviewing

CBM

CentralBankofMyanmar

EAO

EthnicArmedOrganization

ETP

Employment-to-population

FDI

ForeignDirectInvestment

GDP

GrossDomesticProduct

HWS

HouseholdWelfareSurvey

IFPRI

InternationalFoodPolicyResearchInstitute

ILO

InternationalLabourOrganization

MFI

MicrofinanceInstitutions

MLCS

MyanmarLivingConditionSurvey

MMK

MyanmarKyat

MSMEs

Micro,small,andmediumenterprises

MSR

MyanmarSurveyResearch

FPCA

Principalcomponentanalysis

PDFs

PeoplesDefenceForces

PPS

People’sPulseSurvey

SMEB

SurvivalMinimumExpenditureBasket

UNDP

UnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramme

VCI

VulnerabilitytoConflictIndex

POVERTYANDTHEHOUSEHOLDECONOMYOFMYANMAR:ADISAPPEARINGMIDDLECLASS

4

Executive

Summary

T

hecontractionofhouseholdincomessincetheonsetofthepandemicandthepoliticalcrisisshowsnosignofrecovery.RespondentsofthePeople’sPulseSurvey2023(PPS),conductedbetweenJuneand

October2023bytheUnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramme(UNDP),wereaskedhowtheirhouseholdincomehadchangedsinceJanuary2023;57percentreportedthattheirincomehadremainedthesame,while30percentreportedadecline.Ratherthansignallingapotentialrecovery,however,themoreplausibleexplanationisthatincomeshavenearlyhitthebottom.Inaddition,despitestableincomes,theprevailingeconomicconditionssuggestthatmaintainingthestatusquoisbecomingmoredifficult.Increasingmoneysupply,depreciationofthekyat,andglobalcommoditypricerisesareallcontributingtotherapidlyrisinginflation,erodingrealincomes.

POVERTYANDTHEHOUSEHOLDECONOMYOFMYANMAR:ADISAPPEARINGMIDDLECLASS

5

ThemiddleclassinMyanmarisdisappearing.Throughoutthenation,medianincomewasextremelylow,closetotheSurvivalMinimumExpenditureBasket(SMEB)1.Onlythemedianofthehighestassetquintile(Q5)reportedahigherincomepercapita(116,667MMK2permonth),albeitwellbelowwhatwouldberequiredforamiddle-classstandardofliving.3Medianincomevariessignificantlyacrossthestatesandregions.

Thedatasuggestsanexceptionallyweaklabourmarketwithpersistentwagestagnation,reducedincomefromjoblossescompoundedwithapproximatelyhalfofallhouseholdslackingasecondaryincomesource.Householdswithoutsecondincomesarevulnerabletoincomeinstabilityifanyshockshittheironlysourceofincome.Thestates/regionswithhighestratesofhouseholdslackingasecondaryincomewereKayah(67percent),Chin(63percent)andSagaing(57percent),whichalsohavethelowestincomepercapitaandexperiencedpersistentlyhighconflictthroughout2023.Monthlyincomepercapitawasnotsurprisinglyfoundtobenotablylowerinconflict-proneareas.

Thedeclineinincomesandlimitedincome-generatingcapacityarepushinghouseholdstoadoptnegativecopingmechanisms.Foreverystateandregion4andforeveryassetquintile,cuttingnon-foodexpenditurewastheprimarycopingstrategy.Theresultingcrowdingoutofhumancapitalinvestmentinhealthandeducationthreatenstounderminethefuturere-emergenceofamiddleclass.

ThePPSpaintsaparticularlyworryingeconomicpictureofKayahState,whichhasthelowestincomepercapita,steepestincomereduction(50percentsinceJanuary2023),andlargestreportedjoblosses(58percent).Kayahalsohadthehighestconcentrationofhouseholdswithoutsecondaryincome(67percent)andthewidestarrayofcopingmechanisms(onaverage3),includingdirestrategiessuchascuttingfoodexpenditure(52percent).Despitealsograpplingwithsignificanthouseholdpressures,themorepeacefulstatesandregionsexhibitrelativelybetterperformance,asevidencedbydatafromAyeyarwady,Naypyidaw,andYangon.

NearlyhalfofMyanmar’spopulation(49.7percent)waslivingbelowthenationalpovertylineof1590Kyatsadaybytheendof2023.Thiscomparesto46.3percentin2022and24.8percentin2017.Thus,overthelastsixyears,theshareofMyanmar’spopulationlivinginpovertyhasdoubled.

Moreover,notonlyaretheremorepoorpeopletoday,buttheyarealsomoredeeplypoor.Thepovertygap-ameasureoftheaverageincomeshortfallofallthosewhoarepoor–standsat24.4percent.Thiscomparesto18.5percentin2022and5.2percentin2017,anincreaseofover6percentagepointssince2022.Povertyisdeepeningfaster.

1

2

3

4

TheSMEBforMyanmarwas320,000kyatspermonthforahouseholdwithfivemembers,or,64,000kyatsperindividual,prescribedby

theInter-agencyCashWorkingGroupinthecountryasofDecember2023.TheSMEBisupdatedeverysixmonthsandvariesbystate/

region.

ApproximatelyUSD55permonth,or,USD1.85aday,onthebasisoftheofficialexchangerateof2,100kyatstothedollar.

TheBostonConsultingGroupdefinesthemiddleandaffluentclassasthosewithamonthlypercapitaincomeofmorethanUSD120.

ergroup.asia/blog/the-rising-middle-class-in-myanmar

Myanmarcomprisessevenstates(Chin,Kachin,Kayin(Karen),Kayah,Mon,Rakhine,andShan)andeightregions(Ayeyarwady,Bago,

Magway,Mandalay,Sagaing,Tanintharyi,YangonandNaypitaw).

POVERTYANDTHEHOUSEHOLDECONOMYOFMYANMAR:ADISAPPEARINGMIDDLECLASS

6

NearlyhalfofMyanmar’spopulation(49.7

percent)waslivingbelowthenationalpoverty

lineof1590Kyatsadaybytheendof2023.

Thiscomparesto46.3percentin2022and24.8percentin2017.Thus,overthelastsixyears,the

oanmar’spopulationlivinginpoverty99

Thesituationislikelytohavedeterioratedfurtherbythetimeofthisreport’srelease.Anadditional25percentofthepopulationwerehangingbyathreadasofOctober2023,justabovethepovertyline.Sincethattime,theintensifiedconflicthasledtomoredisplacedpeoplelosingtheirlivelihoods,businessesshuttingdown,andsupplychainsdisruptedinseveralpartsofthecountry.

Thecrisisdisproportionatelyaffectswomen-headedhouseholds,whosemembersare1.2timesmorelikelythanthoseinmale-headedonestobepoor.Over50percentofchildreninMyanmararepoor,andinhigh-conflictzoneshouseholdsarebeingpusheddeeperintopoverty,reflectingbothhardshipandinequality.

Thoughtheyhaveallbutdisappearedfromglobalheadlines,thepeopleofMyanmarcontinuetofacedeepandpersistentsuffering.ItiscrucialformultilateralandbilateraldevelopmentpartnerstorefocusattentionontheplightofthevulnerableinMyanmar.Thiscallsforclosecollaborationwithlocalorganizations,civilsocietyactors,thelocalprivatesector,andnon-governmentalorganizationstorespondeffectivelytothecomplexchallengesfacedbypeopleacrossallpartsofMyanmar.Rebuildinginthehardesthitlocationswillnotbeeasyinaperiodofongoingconflict,sonegotiatingwithallpartiestoallowforaccessandsupporttothemostvulnerablecommunities,irrespectiveoflocation,ethnicityorideology,willbecriticaltohaltthebackslideandreinstateareturntohumandevelopmentprogress,howeverlimitedatthistime.Intheabsenceofthis,thehumanitariancaseloadwillincreaseexponentiallyandtheimpactonhumandevelopmentwillbeinter-generational.

POVERTYANDTHEHOUSEHOLDECONOMYOFMYANMAR:ADISAPPEARINGMIDDLECLASS

7

Introduction:

ThePeople’sPulseSurvey2023

T

hisreportisoneofasetofanalyticalreportsproducedbyUNDPusingthedatacollectedinthe2023People’sPulseSurvey(PPS).Thesurveysoughttoprovideathoroughassessmentofpublicperceptionsacrossa

spectrumofissuesandsectors.Theseincludedcriticalaspectssuchassecurity,economicconditions,publicservicedelivery,governance,mediaaccessibility,theroleofwomen,andmigration.Theobjectiveofthisreportistoprovideananalysisofthe“householdeconomy”moduleofthesurvey,basedonwhichthepovertyheadcountanddepthwerealsoestimatedusingmicrosimulation.

POVERTYANDTHEHOUSEHOLDECONOMYOFMYANMAR:ADISAPPEARINGMIDDLECLASS

8

ThePPStrackedtheoutlookandperceptionsofvariouspopulationsegmentsinMyanmarwithamixofqualitativeandquantitativeindicatorsaimedatconstructinganevidence-basedunderstandingofthecurrentsocialandeconomicdynamicswithinthecountry.Itishopedthatthisinformationwillassistinimprovingservicesanddevelopingrelevantandfeasibleinterventionstoreducehardship.Asthedatawascollectedonthehouseholdandnottheindividuallevel,itisnotpossibletoinferdifferencesbetweenwomenandmeninthesample.However,thedatahasbeendisaggregatedbymale-vsfemale-headedhouseholds.

DataandMethodology

ThePPSisasampleof12,684households.ThesurveywasconductedusingComputerAssistedTelephoneInterviewing(CATI)andwascarriedoutoverthreeandahalfmonths,fromtheJune15toOctober1,2023.ThesurveycoveredeverystateandregionwithinMyanmar,ensuringacompleterepresentationofperspectivesandsentimentsacrossthenation.Thesamplequestionswerecarefullydesignedtoensurerobustness,allowingforindividualanalysisofeachstate/region,therebyfosteringmeaningfulcomparisons.Incraftingthesampleforeachstate/region,theaimwastoobtainstatisticallyreliabledata,characterizedbya99percentconfidenceintervalandamarginoferrorofplusorminus4percentagepoints.Asubsequentstepinvolveddistributingthesampleforeachstate/regionbetweenurbanandruralareas.

ItmaybenotedthatthelastrigorousbudgetsurveyavailableinMyanmaristheMyanmarLivingStandardSurvey(MLCS)2017.AlthoughPPSwasadministeredviatelephoneduetoprevailingconstraints,itssizeandscopecomeclosertoMLCS2017thananyothersurveyssincethatdate.Nevertheless,thePPSisnotafull-scalebudgetsurvey,whichwouldrequireanevenmoreelaboratesetofquestionsandin-persondatacollection.

Table1providesasummaryofthemaincharacteristicsoftherespondents.Thetableincludestheurban/ruraldivide,thestate/regionoftherespondents,gender,maritalstatus,educationstatus,andage.

Householdsweresubsequentlyclassifiedbyassetquintiles.Anassetindexservesasacommonlyemployedmethodforcategorizinghouseholdsintowealth/prosperityquintiles.Theassetapproachoffersamoreresilientandenduringcategorization,particularlyinMyanmar,whereincomeandexpenditureexhibithighvolatilityduetovariousshocks.Theassetindexiscalculatedbyapplyingtheprincipalcomponentanalysis(PCA)todurableassets/itemssuchashousingquality,appliances,vehicles,landownership,etc.

Theresultingassetquintiles(Q1-Q5)demonstratearobustcorrelationwithincomeandexpenditurepatterns,highlightingthathouseholdspositionedatthelowerendoftheassetindex(Q1)tendtohavethelowestincomeandexpenditurelevels.Thiscorrelationunderscoresthereliabilityandeffectivenessoftheassetindexasatoolforcapturingthedisparitiesineconomicwell-beingwithinapopulation.Aswouldbecomeclearerinthesubsequentanalyses,mappingseveralofthesurveyindicatorstoassetquintilesoffersmoremeaningfulinferencesthansimpleincomeorconsumptionquintiles.

POVERTYANDTHEHOUSEHOLDECONOMYOFMYANMAR:ADISAPPEARINGMIDDLECLASS

9

Table1:

Summaryofrespondents’information

Sample

%

National

12,684

100.0%

Urban/Rural

Urban

4,556

35.9%

Rural

8,128

64.1%

State/Region

Kachin

924

7.3%

Kayah

410

3.2%

Kayin

521

4.1%

Chin

407

3.2%

Sagaing

935

7.4%

Tanintharyi

612

4.8%

Bago

1,102

8.7%

Magway

1,026

8.1%

Mandalay

1,149

9.1%

Mon

674

5.3%

Rakhine

907

7.2%

Yangon

1,207

9.5%

Shan

889

7.0%

Ayeyarwady

1,161

9.2%

Naypyitaw

760

6.0%

Gender

Male

6,298

49.7%

Female

6,372

50.3%

Maritalstatus

Single

4,315

34.0%

Married

7,742

61.0%

Other

627

4.9%

Educationstatus

Noformaleducation

340

2.7%

Belowprimaryeducation

2,580

20.3%

Completedprimaryschool

3,271

25.8%

Completedmiddleschool

4,492

35.4%

Completedhighschool

142

1.1%

Completedhighereducation

1859

14.7%

Agegroup

18-20years

1,119

8.8%

21-30years

4,165

32.8%

31-40years

3,233

25.5%

41-50years

2,304

18.2%

51-60years

1,358

10.7%

60+years

505

4.0%

Householdtype

Male-headedhouseholds

6,893

88.4%

Female-headedhouseholds

905

11.6%

POVERTYANDTHEHOUSEHOLDECONOMYOFMYANMAR:ADISAPPEARINGMIDDLECLASS

10

TheStatusofthe

HouseholdEconomy

1.

Sustainedeconomichardship

Myanmarhasexperiencednonoteworthyeconomicreboundfromitscontractiontominus17.9percentinrealgrossdomesticproduct(GDP)in20215duetothepandemicandthepoliticalcrisis.ThisplacesthecountryfirmlyintheL-shaped6recessioncategory,byfartheworstrecessionpath.NominalGDPin2022hoveredaroundthe2013level.

Theeconomyhassufferedapermanentlossinoutputandisexpectedtogrowatapersistentlylowerratethanpriortothecrisis.TheWorldBankDecember2023MyanmarEconomicMonitorstatesthat“GDPisprojectedtogrowbyjust1percentinthefiscalyearendingMarch2024.Evenassumingnofurtherescalationinconflict,growthisexpectedtoremainsubduedthefollowingyear.”7TheIMFprovidedasomewhathigherestimateof2.6percentgrowthin2024.

5

6

7

“WorldEconomicOutlook,October2023:NavigatingGlobalDivergences”,IMF,October2023.

AnL-shapedrecessionoccurswhenaneconomyhasasevererecessionanddoesnotreturntotrendlinegrowthformanyyears,ifever.Thesteepdecline,followedbyaflatlinemakestheshapeofanL.Thisisthemostseveretypeofrecession.

Edwards,KimAlan;Mansaray,Kemoh;Myint,ThiDa;Hayati,Fayavar;Maw,AkaKyawMin.

MyanmarEconomicMonitor:ChallengesAmidConflict(English).Washington,D.C.:WorldBankGroup./curated/en/099121123082084971/P5006631739fd70a01a66c1e15bf7b34917

POVERTYANDTHEHOUSEHOLDECONOMYOFMYANMAR:ADISAPPEARINGMIDDLECLASS

Despitethemajorityreportingstableincomes,prevailing

economicconditionssuggestthatmaintainingthestatus

quoataverylowincomelevelisbecomingmoredifficult.

Increaseinmoneysupply,

depreciationofthekyat,andglobalcommoditypricerises,

risinginflation.99

haveallcontributedtorapidly

11

Theeconomicturmoilsince2021hasinflictedenduringstructuraldamageontheeconomy'ssupplyside.8

.CapitalprovidedbyinternationallendershasbeenconstrainedduetoforeignexchangerestrictionsimposedbytheCentralBankofMyanmar(CBM),coupledwiththerisksassociatedwithcurrencyfluctuations.9Concurrently,domesticbankshavelimitedcapacityandinclinationtoexpandlending.

.Thelaboursectorhaswitnessedasignificantshift,withunemployedindividualsdisengagingfromthelabourmarketandoptingformigration.AsofApril2023,oftheestimated2.5millionmigrantsresidinginThailand,75percentarefromMyanmar.10

.AccordingtoanILOreportonMyanmar,therehasbeenasignificantdecreaseintheemployment-to-populationrate(ETP),withadeclineofover7percentagepointscomparedtothepre-crisisperiod.Thereportalsohighlightsthatthereductionintheemploymentratewasmorepronouncedinregionsandstatespronetoconflict,andthatthedecreaseinthefemaleemploymentratewastwicethatformen.11

.Anenvironmentofpoliticaluncertaintycompoundedbyeconomicconcernsinhibitsinnovationandinvestment,notablybusinessdevelopmentandforeigndirectinvestment(FDI).Sincethemilitarytakeover,MyanmarhasexperiencedasharpdropinFDIcommitments,whichfailedtoreachUSD2billionin2021(comparedtoUSD2.2billionin2020,downfromahighofnearlyUSD5billionin2017).Despiteapartialrecoveryin2022-23,averageannualFDIcommitmentsinthecurrentperiodhavedroppedtowellbelowthelevelsseenduringthepreviousmilitaryrule.12

TheL-shapedrecessionandthelastingstructural

damagetotheeconomyhavedeeplyimpacted

households,asreflectedinthePPSdata.As

furtherdiscussedinSection5ofthispaper,

povertyhasincreased.Halfthepopulationof

Myanmarislivingbelowthenationalpovertyline

in2023,andthepovertygapisincreasingata

fasterratethanthepovertyheadcount.

ThePPSdatashowsacontinuedcontraction

ofhouseholdincomessincetheonsetofthe

COVID-19pandemicandthemilitarytakeover

(seeFigure1).Respondentswereaskedhow

theirhouseholdincomehadchangedbetween

January2023andtheperiodoftheinterview,

whichspannedSeptemberandOctober

2023(AppendixTable3).About30percent

8

9

10

11

12

13

InternationalMonetaryFund,WorldEconomicOutlookDatabase,October2023

Edwards,KimAlan;Mansaray,Kemoh;Myint,ThiDa;Hayati,Fayavar;Maw,AkaKyawMin.

MyanmarEconomicMonitor:AFragileRecovery-SpecialFocusonEmployment,IncomesandCopingMechanisms

(English).Washington,D.C.:WorldBankGroup.

/curated/en/099062823041522943/

P1791060533bdb01b0ae0a0c82f34c1c320

MigrantWorkingGroup(MWG).CoalitionfortheRightsofRefugeesandStatelessPersons(CRSP),andBurmaConcernForum,The

SituationofMigrantWorkersandRefugeesinThailand:PolicyRecommendationsandReformofConcernedLaws,June8,2023.

ILOBriefJuly2023wcms_888644.pdf()

Foreigninvestmentbycountry|DirectorateofInvestmentandCompanyAdministration(.mm)

Myanmar_Survival_Minimum_Expenditure_Basket_SMEB_Technical_Note_CWG_Jun2023.docx

POVERTYANDTHEHOUSEHOLDECONOMYOFMYANMAR:ADISAPPEARINGMIDDLECLASS

80

60

40

20

0

12

reportedtheirincomehaddropped;13percentreportedthatithadincreased;andthemajorityreportedthattheirincomehadremainedthesame(57percent).Ratherthansignallingapotentialrecovery,however,themoreplausibleexplanationisthatincomeshavehitthebottom,confirmingtheL-shapedrecession,asevidencedbyincomepercapitafigureshoveringaroundtheSurvivalMinimumExpenditureBasket(SMEB)amount.13

Despitethemajorityreportingstableincomes,prevailingeconomicconditionssuggestthatmaintainingthestatusquoataverylowincomelevelisbecomingmoredifficult.Increaseinmoneysupply,depreciationofthekyat,andglobalcommoditypricerises,haveallcontributedtorapidlyrisinginflation.Thepriceofrice,whichaccountsfor51and62percent,respectively,ofurbanandruralcaloriesconsumed,14increasedby45percentin2022.15Withinthiscontext,the57percentwhohavemaintainedastablehouseholdincomewouldbefeelingsignificantlypoorerinrealterms.

KayahStatereportedthehighestpercentageofhouseholds(50percent)withadeclineinincome(Kayahalsorecordedthelowestincomepercapitaandthehighestconcentrationofhouseholdswithoutsecondaryincome).OtherareasreportinglargedeclineswereSagaing(40percent),Tanintharyi(37percent),andRakhine(36percent).

Figure1:

Nominalincomechangesoversurveys(%)

HVS,Oct2020

PP,June2021WomenSurvey,Dec2021PP,Oct2023

GoneupGonedownThesame

Source:UNDP

Note:HVS,Oct2020–HouseholdVulnerabilitySurvey(September–October2020)16;PP,June2021–PeoplePulseSurvey(May–June2021)17;WomenSurvey,Dec2021–RegressinggenderequalityinMyanmar(November–December2021)18;PP,Oct2023–PeoplePulseSurvey(September–October2023)

13

Myanmar_Survival_Minimum_Expenditure_Basket_SMEB_Technical_Note_CWG_Jun2023.docx

14

RiceProductivityinMyanmar:Assessmentofthe2023DrySeason()

15

SoaringFoodandFuelCostsThreatenMillionsinMyanmar()

16

/myanmar/publications/household-vulnerability-survey-2020

17

/analytical

_product/myanmar_peoples_pulse/

18

/analytical

_product/regressing-gender-equality-in-myanmar/

POVERTYANDTHEHOUSEHOLDECONOMYOFMYANMAR:ADISAPPEARINGMIDDLECLASS

13

AcomparabledatasourceonrecentincomechangeisfromtheInternationalFoodPolicyResearchInstitute’s(IFPRI)HouseholdWelfareSurvey(HWS)Round5,19conductedbetweenMarchandJune2023,justbeforeUNDP’sPPS.OneimportantdistinctionisthattheIFPRIquestioncomparingincomechangereferredtoalongerperiod,i.e.,overthepast12monthsfromthemomentofthesurvey(hencelookingbacktomid-2022),whilethePPShadashorterrecallperiod(afewmonths).ThismayexplainwhythePPShadalargerpercentagerespondingthathouseholdincomehadremainedthesame.Irrespectiveofthisdifference,itisinterestingtonotesimilarpatternsintheareasreportingdeclineandincreases.Forinstance,IFPRIreportedKayahStateashavingthedeepestdecline,withRakhineandSagainginthetopfour,asalsoseeninthePPSresults.

Thereis,however,ananomalybetweenthetwodatasetswithrespecttoChinState.TheIFPRIdatashowsamuchlargerdeclinethanthePPSforChinStateincomparisontotheotherstatesandregions(seeFigure2).Whilebothdatasetsarerepresentativeatthestate/regionlevel,thereweresignificantdifferencesatthetownshipleveldatacollectionwhichcouldexplainthisdiscrepancy.IFPRI’sdatawasconcentratedintownshipssuchasFalam,Hakha,andTedim,whileinthePPS,themorepeacefulTonzangtownshiphadthemostrespondents.20Bothdatasetsclearlyconveythatmorepeacefulareasexperiencelessseveredeclinesinincome,withNaypyitaw,Yangon,Ayeyarwady,andShanrecordingthelowestdeclines.WiththeseverelychangedconflictdynamicsinNorthernShanStatesubsequenttothesedatacollections,onecanexpecttoseeasignificantworseninginincomeandrelatedimplicationsinanyupcomingsurveys.

AsthePPSsurveyisconductedatthehouseholdlevelratherthantheindividuallevel,deducingvariationsinincomechangesbetweenwomenandmenisnotpossible.Nevertheless,itispossibletoinvestigatedifferencesbetweenfemale-vsmale-headedhouseholds.

溫馨提示

  • 1. 本站所有資源如無特殊說明,都需要本地電腦安裝OFFICE2007和PDF閱讀器。圖紙軟件為CAD,CAXA,PROE,UG,SolidWorks等.壓縮文件請下載最新的WinRAR軟件解壓。
  • 2. 本站的文檔不包含任何第三方提供的附件圖紙等,如果需要附件,請聯系上傳者。文件的所有權益歸上傳用戶所有。
  • 3. 本站RAR壓縮包中若帶圖紙,網頁內容里面會有圖紙預覽,若沒有圖紙預覽就沒有圖紙。
  • 4. 未經權益所有人同意不得將文件中的內容挪作商業(yè)或盈利用途。
  • 5. 人人文庫網僅提供信息存儲空間,僅對用戶上傳內容的表現方式做保護處理,對用戶上傳分享的文檔內容本身不做任何修改或編輯,并不能對任何下載內容負責。
  • 6. 下載文件中如有侵權或不適當內容,請與我們聯系,我們立即糾正。
  • 7. 本站不保證下載資源的準確性、安全性和完整性, 同時也不承擔用戶因使用這些下載資源對自己和他人造成任何形式的傷害或損失。

評論

0/150

提交評論