法律概念分析霍菲爾德

法律概念分析

霍菲爾德

楊智傑老師生平WesleyNewcombHohfeld(1879-1918)wasanAmericanjurist.HewastheauthoroftheseminalFundamentalLegalConceptions,AsAppliedinJudicialReasoningandOtherLegalEssays,publishedin1919.Duringhislife,hepublishedonlyahandfuloflawjournalarticles.Athisdeath,thematerialformingthebasisofFundamentalLegalConceptionswasderivedfromtwoarticlesintheYaleLawJournal(1913)and(1917)thathadbeenpartiallyrevisedwithaviewtopublication.權(quán)利的性質(zhì)EditorialworkwasundertakentocompletetherevisionsandthebookwaspublishedwiththeinclusionofthemanuscriptnotesthatHohfeldhadleft,plussevenotheressays.Theworkremainsapowerfulcontributiontomodernunderstandingofthenatureofrightsandtheimplicationsofliberty.Toreflectthiscontinuingimportance,achairatYaleUniversityisnamedafterhim,whichiscurrentlyheldbyJulesColeman.「權(quán)利」一詞的混用Hohfeldnoticedthatevenrespectedjuristsconflatevariousmeaningsofthetermright,sometimesswitchingsensesofthewordseveraltimesinasinglesentence.Hewrotethatsuchimprecisionoflanguageindicatedaconcomitantimprecisionofthought,andthusalsooftheresultinglegalconclusions.Inordertobothfacilitatereasoningandclarifyrulings,heattemptedtodisambiguatethetermrightsbybreakingitintoeightdistinctconcepts.Toeliminateambiguity,hedefinedthesetermsrelativetooneanother,groupingthemintofourpairsofJuralOppositesandfourpairsofJuralCorrelatives.八個概念JuralOpposites:1.Right/No-Right2.Privilege/Duty3.Power/Disability4.Immunity/LiabilityJural

Corelatives:1.Right/Duty2.Privilege/No-Right3.Power/Liability4.Immunity/Disability表：法律概念澄清上下相反Right（請求權(quán)）Privilege（豁免或自由）Power（形成權(quán)或權(quán)力）Immunity（不受拘束）No-right（無請求權(quán)）Duty（義務(wù)）Disability（無形成權(quán)）Liability（受拘束）甲有上，乙有下Right（請求權(quán)）Privilege（豁免或自由）Power（形成權(quán)或權(quán)力）Immunity（不受拘束）Duty（義務(wù)）No-right（無請求權(quán)）Liability（受拘束）Disability（無權(quán)力）請求權(quán)和自由Somephilosophersandpoliticalscientistsmakeadistinctionbetweenclaimrightsandlibertyrights.Aclaimrightisarightwhichentailsresponsibilities,duties,orobligationsonotherpartiesregardingtheright-holder.Incontrast,alibertyrightisarightwhichdoesnotentailobligationsonotherparties,butratheronlyfreedomorpermissionfortheright-holder.權(quán)力和豁免TheothertwotermsofHohfeld'sanalysis,powersandimmunities,refertosecond-orderlibertiesandclaims,respectively.Powersarelibertyrightsregardingthemodificationoffirst-orderrights,e.g.theU.S.CongresshascertainpositivepowerstomodifysomeofU.S.citizens'legalrights,inasmuchasitcanimposeorremovelegalduties.Immunities,conversely,areclaimrightsregardingthemodificationoffirst-orderrights,e.g.U.S.citizenshave,pertheirConstitution,certainnegativeimmunitieslimitingthepositivepowersoftheU.S.Congresstomodifytheirlegalrights.Assuch,immunitiesandpowersareoftensubsumedwithinclaimsandlibertiesbylaterauthors.我國對權(quán)利的分類權(quán)利：請求權(quán)債權(quán)特權(quán)：自由（支配權(quán)）所有權(quán)權(quán)力：形成權(quán)（包括形成權(quán)和交易權(quán)）一方意思表示發(fā)生一定法律效果經(jīng)濟部允許公司成立豁免：抗辯權(quán)未還押金、不還屋舉例Hohfeldarguedthatrightanddutyarecorelativeconcepts,i.e.theonemustalwaysbematchedbytheother.IfAhasarightagainstB,thisisequivalenttoBhavingadutytohonourA'sright.IfBhasnoduty,thatmeansthatBhasliberty,i.e.BcandowhateverheorshepleasesbecauseBhasnodutytorefrainfromdoingit,andAhasnorighttoprohibitBfromdoingso.Eachindividualislocatedwithinamatrixofrelationshipswithotherindividuals.自由的內(nèi)涵有多大Bysummingtherightsheldanddutiesowedacrossalltheserelationships,theanalystcanidentifyboththedegreeofliberty—anindividualwouldbeconsideredtohaveperfectlibertyifitisshownthatno-onehasarighttopreventthegivenact—andwhethertheconceptoflibertyiscomprisedbycommonlyfollowedpractices,therebyestablishinggeneralmoralprinciplesandcivilrights.物權(quán)和債權(quán)區(qū)分是假的Hohfelddefinesthecorelativesintermsoftherelationshipsbetweentwoindividuals.Inthetheoryof"inremrights",thereisadirectrelationshipbetweenapersonandathing.Realrightsareinthisrespectunlikeclaimrightsor"rightsinpersonam",whichbynaturemustbeexercisedagainstaperson;thebestexamplebeingwhensomeoneisowedmoneybyanother.沒有所謂的物權(quán)Hohfelddemonstratesthatthiswayofunderstandingrightsingeneraliswrong.Inparticular,Hohfelddemonstratesthatthereisnosuchthingasalegalrelationbetweenapersonandathing,sincealegalrelationalwaysoperatesbetweentwopeople.Asthelegalrelationsbetweenanytwopeoplearecomplex,itishelpfultobreakthemdownintotheirsimplestforms.應(yīng)該是有無對世效力的區(qū)分Hohfeldreplacestheconceptof“rightinpersonam”by“paucitalright”and"rightinrem"byacompoundoraggregateof"multitalrights".Rightsheldbyapersonagainstoneorafewdefinitepersonsarepaucital(or“inpersonam”),andrightsheldbyapersonagainstalargeindefiniteclassofpeoplearemultital(or“inrem”).Acontractrightispaucital(or"inpersonam")becauseitcanonlybeenforcedagainstthespecificpartiestothecontract.Apropertyrightismultital(or"inrem")becausealandownerhastherighttoexcludenotonlyspecificpeoplefromhislandbutthe“wholeworld.”物權(quán)是很多權(quán)利的集合Thelandownerhasmanyrights,privileges,powers,andimmunities;hismultitalrightsarecomposedofmanypaucitalrights.Forexample,theownerhasarightthatothersdonotsteponhislandbutthereisnotjustonesuchrightagainstamassofpersons(thecommunity),butmanyseparatealthoughusuallyidenticalpaucitalrightswiththiscontent(asmanyinstancesastherearepeopleinthecommunity).ThisiswhatHohfeldcalls"multital”rights.自由的概念Consideralsothedefinitionofliberty.InHohfeldiananalysis,libertyisdefinedbyanabsencebothofadutyandofaright.BisfreebecausehehasnoobligationtorecogniseanyofA'srights.ThatdoesnotdenythatBmightdecidetodowhatAwantsbecausethatistheessenceofliberty.NordoesitdenythepossibilitythatBmightacceptadutytoAtogiveabenefittoC.Inthatsituation,CwouldhavenorightandwouldhavetorelyonAtoenforcetheduty.自由的概念是選擇Thetruthisthatlibertyissignificantfrombothalegalandamoralpointofviewbecauseonlylibertyensuresthatanindividual