戰(zhàn)略管理流程講義(英文版10)

Chapter10CorporateGovernanceCompetitivenessChapter3InternalEnvironmentChapter2ExternalEnvironmentTheStrategicManagementProcessStrategicIntentStrategicMissionStrategicCompetitivenessAboveAverageReturnsFeedbackStrategyFormulationChapter4Business-LevelStrategyChapter5CompetitiveDynamicsChapter6Corporate-LevelStrategyChapter8InternationalStrategyChapter9CooperativeStrategiesChapter7Acquisitions&RestructuringStrategicInputsStrategicActionsStrategicOutcomesChapter10CorporateGovernanceChapter11Structure&ControlChapter12StrategicLeadershipChapter13Entrepreneurship&InnovationUsedincorporationstoestablishorderbetweenthefirm’sownersanditstop-levelmanagersCorporateGovernanceisarelationshipamongstakeholdersthatisusedtodetermineandcontrolthestrategicdirectionandperformanceoforganizationsConcernedwithidentifyingwaystoensurethatstrategicdecisionsaremadeeffectivelyCorporateGovernanceSeparationofOwnershipandManagerialControlBasisofthemoderncorporationShareholderspurchasestock,becomingResidualClaimantsProfessionalmanagerscontracttoprovidedecision-makingModernpubliccorporationformleadstoefficientspecializationoftasks-Shareholdersreduceriskefficientlybyholdingdiversifiedportfolios-Riskbearingbyshareholders-Strategydevelopmentanddecision-makingbymanagersAnagencyrelationshipexistswhen:Shareholders(Principals)FirmOwnersManagers(Agents)DecisionMakerswhichcreatesAgencyRelationshipRiskBearingSpecialist(Principal)ManagerialDecision-MakingSpecialist(Agent)HireAgencyTheoryTheAgencyproblemoccurswhen:-ThedesiresorgoalsoftheprincipalandagentconflictanditisdifficultorexpensivefortheprincipaltoverifythattheagenthasbehavedappropriatelySolution:Principalsengageinincentive-basedperformancecontracts,monitoringmechanismssuchastheboardofdirectorsandenforcementmechanismssuchasthemanageriallabormarkettomitigatetheagencyproblemExample:

OverdiversificationbecauseincreasedproductdiversificationleadstoloweremploymentriskformanagersandgreatercompensationAgencyTheoryRiskLevelofDiversificationManagerandShareholderRiskandDiversificationDominantBusinessUnrelatedBusinessesRelatedConstrainedRelatedLinkedABManagerial(Employment)RiskProfileMShareholder(Business)RiskProfileSExample:

BoardsofDirectorshaveafiduciarydutytoshareholderstomonitormanagementAgencyTheoryPrincipalsmayengageinmonitoringbehaviortoassesstheactivitiesanddecisionsofmanagersHowever,BoardsofDirectorsareoftenaccusedofbeinglaxinperformingthisfunctionHowever,dispersedshareholdingmakesitdifficultandandinefficienttomonitormanagement’sbehaviorGovernanceMechanismsOwnershipConcentrationBoardsofDirectorsExecutiveCompensationMultidivisionalOrganizationalStructureMarketforCorporateControlGovernanceMechanismsOwnershipConcentrationLargeblockshareholdershaveastrongincentivetomonitormanagementcloselyTheirlargestakesmakeitworththeirwhiletospendtime,effortandexpensetomonitorcloselyTheymayalsoobtainBoardseatswhichenhancestheirabilitytomonitoreffectively(althoughfinancialinstitutionsarelegallyforbiddenfromdirectlyholdingboardseats)GovernanceMechanismsBoardofDirectorsInsidersThefirm’sCEOandothertop-levelmanagersRelatedOutsidersIndividualsnotinvolvedwithday-to-dayoperations,butwhohavearelationshipwiththecompanyOutsidersIndividualswhoareindependentofthefirm’sday-to-dayoperationsandotherrelationshipsRecommendationsformoreeffectiveBoardGovernance:GovernanceMechanismsBoardofDirectorsIncreasediversityofboardmembersbackgroundsStrengtheninternalmanagementandaccountingcontrolsystemsEstablishformalprocessesforevaluationoftheboard’sperformanceGovernanceMechanismsExecutiveCompensationSalary,Bonuses,LongtermincentivecompensationExecutivedecisionsarecomplexandnon-routineManyfactorsintervenemakingitdifficulttoestablishhowmanagerialdecisionsaredirectlyresponsibleforoutcomesInaddition,stockownership(long-termincentivecompensation)makesmanagersmoresusceptibletomarketchangeswhicharepartiallybeyondtheircontrolIncentivesystemsdonotguaranteethatmanagersmakethe“right”decisions,buttheydoincreasethelikelihoodthatmanagerswilldothethingsforwhichtheyarerewardedGovernanceMechanismsMultidivisionalOrganizationalStructureDesignedtocontrolmanagerialopportunismM-formstructuredoesnotnecessarilylimitcorporate-levelmanagers’self-servingactionsBroadlydiversifiedproductlinesmakesitdifficultfortop-levelmanagerstoevaluatethestrategicdecisionsofdivisionalmanagersCorporateofficeandBoardmonitormanagers’strategicdecisionsIncreasedmanagerialinterestinwealthmaximizationMayleadtogreaterratherthanlessdiversificationGovernanceMechanismsMarketforCorporateControlOperateswhenfirmsfacetheriskoftakeoverwhentheyareoperatedinefficientlyActsasanimportantsourceofdisciplineovermanagerialincompetenceandwasteChangesinregulationshavemadehostiletakeoversdifficultManyfirmsbegantooperatemoreefficientlyasaresultofthe“threat”oftakeover,eventhoughtheactualincidenceofhostiletakeoverswasrelativelysmallThe1980ssawactivemarketforcorporatecontrol,largelyasaresultofavailablepoolsofcapital(junkbonds)GermanyInternationalCorporateGovernanceVorstandmonitorsandcontrolsmanagerialdecisionsAufsichtsratselectstheVorstandEmployees,unionmembersandshareholdersappointmemberstotheAufsichtsrat.不銹鋼電解拋光液不銹鋼電解拋光設(shè)備.OwnerandmanagerareoftenthesameinprivatefirmsPublicfirmsoftenhaveadominantshareholdertoo,frequentlyabankMediumtolargefirmshaveatwo-tieredboardFrequentlythereislessemphasisonshareholdervaluethaninU.S.firms,althoughthismaybechangingJapanInternationalCorporateGovernanceObligation,“family”andconsensusareimportantfactorsBanks(especially“mainbank”)arehighlyinfluentialwithfirm’smanagersKeiretsusarestronglyinterrelatedgroupsoffirmstiedtogetherbycross-shareholdingsOthercharacteristics:Powerfulgovernmenti