貨幣金融學(xué)（第十三版）課件 英文第15章 貨幣政策工具

TheEconomicsofMoney,Banking,andFinancialMarketsThirteenthEditionChapter15ToolsofMonetaryPolicyCopyright?2022,2019,2016PearsonEducation,Inc.AllRightsReservedPreviewThischapterexaminesthetoolsusedbytheFederalReserveSystemtocontrolthemoneysupplyandinterestratesLearningObjectives15.1Illustratethemarketforreservesanddemonstratehowchangesinmonetarypolicycanaffectthefederalfundsrate.15.2Summarizehowconventionalmonetarypolicytoolsareimplementedandtheadvantagesandlimitationsofeachtool.15.3Explainthekeymonetarypolicytoolsthatareusedwhenconventionalpolicyisnolongereffective.15.4IdentifythedistinctionsandsimilaritiesbetweenthemonetarypolicytoolsoftheFederalReserveandthoseoftheEuropeanCentralBank.TheMarketforReservesandtheFederalFundsRateDemandandSupplyintheMarketforReservesWhathappenstothequantityofreservesdemandedbybanks,holdingeverythingelseconstant,asthefederalfundsratechanges?ExcessreservesareinsuranceagainstdepositoutflowsThecostofholdingtheseistheinterestratethatcouldhavebeenearnedminustheinterestratethatispaidonthesereserves,DemandintheMarketforReservesSincethefallof2008,theFedhaspaidinterestonreservesatalevelthatissetatafixedamountbelowthefederalfundsratetarget.Whenthefederalfundsrateisabovetheratepaidonexcessreserves,asthefederalfundsratedecreases,theopportunitycostofholdingexcessreservesfalls,andthequantityofreservesdemandedrises.Downwardslopingdemandcurvethatbecomesflat(infinitelyelastic)atSupplyintheMarketforReservesTwocomponents:nonborrowedandborrowedreservesCostofborrowingfromtheFedisthediscountrateBorrowingfromtheFedisasubstituteforborrowingfromotherbanksIfthenbankswillnotborrowfromtheFedandborrowedreservesarezeroThesupplycurvewillbeverticalAsrisesabovebankswillborrowmoreandmoreatandrelendatThesupplycurveishorizontal(perfectlyelastic)atFigure1EquilibriumintheMarketforReservesHowChangesintheToolsofMonetaryPolicyAffecttheFederalFundsRate(1of2)Effectsofopenanmarketoperationdependsonwhetherthesupplycurveinitiallyintersectsthedemandcurveinitsdownwardslopedsectionversusitsflatsection.Anopenmarketpurchasecausesthefederalfundsratetofallwhereasanopenmarketsalecausesthefederalfundsratetorise(whenintersectionoccursatthedownwardslopedsection).Openmarketoperationshavenoeffectonthefederalfundsratewhenintersectionoccursattheflatsectionofthedemandcurve.HowChangesintheToolsofMonetaryPolicyAffecttheFederalFundsRate(2of2)Iftheintersectionofsupplyanddemandoccursontheverticalsectionofthesupplycurve,achangeinthediscountratewillhavenoeffectonthefederalfundsrate.Iftheintersectionofsupplyanddemandoccursonthehorizontalsectionofthesupplycurve,achangeinthediscountrateshiftsthatportionofthesupplycurveandthefederalfundsratemayeitherriseorfalldependingonthechangeinthediscountrate.WhentheFedraisesreserverequirement,thefederalfundsraterisesandwhentheFeddecreasesreserverequirement,thefederalfundsratefalls.Figure2ResponsetoanOpenMarketOperationFigure3ResponsetoaChangeintheDiscountRateFigure4ResponsetoaChangeinRequiredReservesFigure5ResponsetoaChangeintheInterestRateonReservesApplication:HowtheFederalReserve’sOperatingProceduresLimitFluctuationsintheFederalFundsRateSupplyanddemandanalysisofthemarketforreservesillustrateshowanimportantadvantageoftheFed’scurrentproceduresforoperatingthediscountwindowandpayinginterestonreservesisthattheylimitfluctuationsinthefederalfundsrate.Figure6HowtheFederalReserve’sOperatingProceduresLimitFluctuationsintheFederalFundsRateConventionalMonetaryPolicyToolsDuringnormaltimes,theFederalReserveusesthreetoolsofmonetarypolicy—openmarketoperations,discountlending,andreserverequirements—tocontrolthemoneysupplyandinterestrates,andthesearereferredtoasconventionalmonetarypolicytools.OpenMarketOperationsDynamicopenmarketoperationsDefensiveopenmarketoperationsPrimarydealersT

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S(TradingRoomAutomatedProcessingSystem)RepurchaseagreementsMatchedsale–purchaseagreementsInsidetheFed:ADayattheTradingDeskThemanagerofdomesticopenmarketoperationssupervisestheanalystsandtraderswhoexecutethepurchasesandsalesofsecuritiesinthedrivetohitthefederalfundsratetarget.DiscountPolicyandtheLenderofLastResortDiscountwindowPrimarycredit:standinglendingfacilityLombardfacilitySecondarycreditSeasonalcreditLenderoflastresorttopreventfinancialpanicsCreatesmoralhazardproblemInsidetheFed:UsingDiscountPolicytoPreventaFinancialPanicTopreventthecollapseofthefinancialsector,theChairmanoftheBoardofGovernorsannouncedbeforethemarketopenedonTuesday,October20,theFederalReserveSystem’s“readinesstoserveasasourceofliquiditytosupporttheeconomicandfinancialsystem.”Inadditiontothisextraordinaryannouncement,theFedmadeitclearthatitwouldprovidediscountloanstoanybankthatwouldmakeloanstothesecuritiesindustry.TheoutcomeoftheFed’stimelyactionwasthatafinancialpanicwasavertedReserveRequirementsDepositoryInstitutionsDeregulationandMonetaryControlActof1980setsthereserverequirementthesameforalldepositoryinstitutions.Reserverequirementsareequaltozeroforthefirst$15.5millionofabank’scheckabledeposits,3%oncheckabledepositsfrom$15.5to$115.1million,and10%oncheckabledepositsover$115.1million.TheFedcanvarythe10%requirementbetween8%and14%.InterestonExcessReservesTheFedstartedpayinginterestonexcessreservesonlyin2008Theinterest-on-excess-reservestoolcametotherescueduringthecrashasbankswereaccumulatinghugequantitiesofexcessbecauseitcanbeusedtoraisethefederalfundsrateRelativeAdvantagesoftheDifferentConventionalMonetaryPolicyToolsOpenmarketoperationsarethedominantpolicytooloftheFedsinceithascompletecontroloverthevolumeoftransactions,theseoperationsareflexibleandprecise,easilyreversed,andcanbequicklyimplemented.Thediscountrateislesswellusedsinceitisnolongerbindingformostbanks,cancauseliquidityproblems,andincreasesuncertaintyforbanks.ThediscountwindowremainsoftremendousvaluegivenitsabilitytoallowtheFedtoactasalenderoflastresort.OntheFailureofConventionalMonetaryPolicyToolsinaFinancialPanicWhentheeconomyexperiencesafull-scalefinancialcrisis,conventionalmonetarypolicytoolscannotdothejob,fortworeasons.First,thefinancialsystemseizesuptosuchanextentthatitbecomesunabletoallocatecapitaltoproductiveuses,andsoinvestmentspendingandtheeconomycollapse.Second,thenegativeshocktotheeconomycanleadtothezero-lower-boundproblem.NonconventionalMonetaryPolicyToolsDuringtheGlobalFinancialCrisisLiquidityprovision:TheFederalReserveimplementedunprecedentedincreasesinitslendingfacilitiestoprovideliquiditytothefinancialmarketsDiscountWindowExpansionTermAuctionFacilityNewLendingProgramsLarge-scaleassetpurchases:

Duringthecrisis,theFedstartedthreenewassetpurchaseprogramstolowerinterestratesforparticulartypesofcredit:GovernmentSponsoredEntitiesPurchaseProgramQ

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E3Figure7TheExpansionoftheFederalReserve’sBalanceSheet,2007–2020NonconventionalMonetaryPolicyToolsDuringtheGlobalFinancialCrisis(1of2)QuantitativeEasingVersusCreditEasingDuringtheglobalfinancialcrisis,theFederalReservebecameverycreativeinassemblingahostofnewlendingfacilitiestohelprestoreliquiditytodifferentpartsofthefinancialsystem.ForwardGuidanceBycommittingtothefuturepolicyactionofkeepingthefederalfundsrateatzeroforanextendedperiod,theFedcouldlowerthemarket’sexpectationsoffutureshort-terminterestrates,therebycausingthelong-terminterestratetofall.NonconventionalMonetaryPolicyToolsDuringtheGlobalFinancialCrisis(2of2)NegativeInterestRatesonBanks’DepositsSettingnegativeinterestratesonbanks’depositsissupposedtoworktostimulatetheeconomybyencouragingbankstolendoutthedepositstheywerekeepingatthecentralbank,therebyencouraginghouseholdsandbusinessestospendmore.However,therearedoubtsthatnegativeinterestratesondepositswillhavetheintended,expansionaryeffect.InsidetheFed:FedLendingFacilitiesDuringtheGlobalFinancialandCoronavirusCrisesDuringtheglobalfinancialandcoronaviruscrises,theFederalReservebecameverycreativeinassemblingahostofnewlendingfacilitiestohelprestoreliquiditytodifferentpartsofthefinancialsystem.LoanstoA

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