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HowCarbonBorder
AdjustmentsMightDriveGlobalClimatePolicy
Momentum
KimberlyClausing,MilanElkerbout,KatarinaNehrkorn,andCatherineWolfram
Report24-20October2024
AbouttheAuthors
KimberlyClausingistheEricM.ZoltChairinTaxLawandPolicyattheUCLA
SchoolofLaw,anonresidentseniorfellowatthePetersonInstituteforInternational
Economics,amemberoftheCouncilonForeignRelations,andaresearchassociateattheNationalBureauofEconomicResearch.In2021and2022,sheservedastheDeputyAssistantSecretaryforTaxAnalysisattheUSTreasury.
MilanElkerboutisafellowatResourcesfortheFuture(RFF)andthedirectorofRFF’sInternationalClimatePolicyInitiative.Heisparticularlyinterestedintheintersectionofclimateandtradepolicy,greenindustrialpolicy,andcarbonpricingandmarkets
aroundtheworld.PriortojoiningRFFin2023,hewasaresearchfellowandheadof
climatepolicyattheCentreforEuropeanPolicyStudies(CEPS),aBrusselsthinktank,workingonEUclimatepolicy,emissionstrading,andindustrialdecarbonization.In
2019–2020,hespentayearasaMistraFellowatIVLSwedishEnvironmentalResearchInstituteinStockholm.HisacademicbackgroundisinEuropeanpoliticaleconomy.
KatarinaNehrkornisaseniorresearchanalystatRFF.Shegraduatedfromthe
UniversityofMichiganin2020withaBAinEconomics.Aftergraduating,sheworkedatDeloittefortwoyearsinitsRiskandFinancialAdvisorysector.In2023,Nehrkorncompletedhermaster’sinEnvironmentalEconomicsandClimateChangefrom
theLondonSchoolofEconomicswhereherdissertationwasfocusedonenergycommunitieswithintheInflationReductionAct.
CatherineWolframistheWilliamBartonRogersProfessorofEnergyEconomicsat
theMITSloanSchoolofManagementandamemberofRFF’sBoardofDirectors.ShepreviouslyservedastheCoraJaneFloodProfessorofBusinessAdministrationat
theHaasSchoolofBusinessatUCBerkeley.FromMarch2021toOctober2022,she
servedastheDeputyAssistantSecretaryforClimateandEnergyEconomicsattheUSTreasury.
Acknowledgments
TheauthorswouldliketothankBillyPizerandKevinRennertforusefulcommentsanddiscussionsandAnnieMcDarrisfordataassistance.
ResourcesfortheFuturei
AboutRFF
ResourcesfortheFuture(RFF)isanindependent,nonprofitresearchinstitutionin
Washington,DC.Itsmissionistoimproveenvironmental,energy,andnaturalresourcedecisionsthroughimpartialeconomicresearchandpolicyengagement.RFFis
committedtobeingthemostwidelytrustedsourceofresearchinsightsandpolicysolutionsleadingtoahealthyenvironmentandathrivingeconomy.
TheviewsexpressedherearethoseoftheindividualauthorsandmaydifferfromthoseofotherRFFexperts,itsofficers,oritsdirectors.
SharingOurWork
OurworkisavailableforsharingandadaptationunderanAttribution-
NonCommercial-NoDerivatives4.0International(CCBY-NC-ND4.0)license.Youcancopyandredistributeourmaterialinanymediumorformat;youmustgive
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HowCarbonBorderAdjustmentsMightDriveGlobalClimatePolicyMomentumii
Abstract
TheintroductionoftheEuropeanUnioncarbonborderadjustmentmechanism(CBAM)createsanimportantincentiveforothercountriestoadoptcarbonpricing.Theauthorsexaminethispolicyspillovereffect,findingthatcountriesthroughouttheworldhave
increasedtheiruseofcarbonpricingregimesaswellastheirinterestinbothcarbonpricinganddecarbonization,especiallyintheperiodsincetheEUfocusedonthis
policytool.Ifmorecountries,includingtheUnitedStates,considerborderadjustmentregimes,thiscanstrengthensuchpolicyspillovereffects.However,careshould
betakentoaddresstheneedsoflower-incomeeconomiesandtoavoiddisguisedprotectionism.
ResourcesfortheFutureiii
Contents
1.Introduction1
2.HowtheEUandUKCBAMswillworkinpractice2
3.HowCBAMsCreatePolicySpillovers4
4.CBAMSpilloversinPractice8
5.PolicyRecommendations13
5.1.ImplementingCountries13
5.2.ReceivingCountries13
5.3.Multilateralism14
5.4.UnitedStatesClimatePolicy14
6.References15
7.Appendix17
7.1.CarbonPricingDevelopments17
7.2.MediaSearchTermsandMethodology19
HowCarbonBorderAdjustmentsMightDriveGlobalClimatePolicyMomentumiv
1.Introduction
Theworldhasapowerfulnewclimatepolicytool–thecarbonborderadjustment
mechanism(CBAM)—butitsmostimpactfulaspectisalsoitsmostoverlooked.Climatechangeistheworld’slargestglobalcollectiveactionproblem.Butwithoutcoordination,countriesmayfreerideoneachother’seffortssincethecostsofpolicyactionare
borneathome,whilethebenefitsaresharedworldwide.BeforeCBAM,globalclimate
effortsfocusedonvoluntarycommitments,whichinvitefreeriding.TheCBAM
encouragescoordination,inpartbyofferinganimportantmechanismforovercomingthefree-riderproblem.
TheCBAMisanewpolicydevice,firstintroducedintolawintheEuropeanUnioninOctober2023.Beginningin2026,theCBAMwillimposealevyonselectimported
non-EUindustrialgoodsthatadjustsforthedifferencesbetweentheEUEmission
TradingSystem(EUETS)carbonpriceandthecarbonpricepaidintheproducing
countries.TheUnitedKingdomhasfollowedsuitwithaCBAMthatisscheduledtobeimplementedin2027.Governmentsaroundtheworldaretryingtounderstandhow
aCBAMwillimpacttheirexportsandwhatpolicyresponsestheyshouldtakebefore2026tomitigatepotentialnegativeeffects.
WhilemuchofthediscussionofCBAMfocusesonitsabilitytopreventproduction
andtheassociatedemissionsfrommigratingtocountriesthatdonotpricecarbon(aphenomenoncalled“l(fā)eakage”)1,thepotentialpolicyspilloversareanunderappreciatedcomponentofthediscussion.2Mostdirectly,becausetheEUandUKCBAMscredit
importsforcarbonpricesalreadypaid,theyprovideincentivesforothergovernmentstoimposecarbonprices.Theycanalsoencouragegovernmentstotakeotherstepstohelptheirindustryreduceemissions,includingsubsidiesordirectinvestment
indecarbonization.Theseconsiderationsarespurringdiscussionsaboutlinkages
acrossthemultiplecomponentsofcountries’climatepolicies,includingmeasurement,innovation,andindustrialpolicies.
ThispolicybriefoutlinesthepossiblepolicyspilloversfromCBAMsandoffers
evidenceoftheirimpactstodate.OurfindingssuggestthattheEUCBAMhashad
importantspilloverimpacts,encouraginggovernmentsaroundtheworldtoconsider
carbonpricingandinstigatingconversationsaboutbroadercoordinatedclimatepolicyaction.Wewilldiscussexamplesofpolicyspillovers,includingcountriesthathave
expandedexistingemissionstradingschemes(ETSs),othersthathaveintroducednewcarbontaxesorETSs,andseveralthathaveconsideredtheirownCBAM-likepolicies.
1SeeElkerbout(2024).
2SeeClausingandWolfram(2023).
HowCarbonBorderAdjustmentsMightDriveGlobalClimatePolicyMomentum1
2.HowtheEUandUKCBAMswillworkinpractice
TheEU’sCBAMisinitsimplementationphase,followingthelaw’sadoptionin2023.
ThedesignoftheEUCBAMcanbebestunderstoodwithreferencetothedomestic
climatepolicythatitcomplements—theEUemissionstradingsystem(ETS).The
EUETSisacap-and-tradesysteminplacesince2005,whichcoverstheelectric
powerandindustrial–sectorgreenhousegas(GHG)emissionsintheEuropeanUnion.Manyenergy-intensiveindustriesproduceinternationallytradedcommodities.The
combinationofenergy(andfornow,GHGintensity)withtradeintensitycreatesariskofcarbonleakage:ifforeigncompetitorsdonotfacesimilarcarboncoststoproducersinEurope,importsmaydisplacedomesticproductionand/orproductionmaymove
offshore.ConcernsaboutindustrialcompetitivenesshavehistoricallybeenaddressedbygivingproducersfreeETSallowances,butthisapproachhaslimitations.Witha
rapidlydecliningcap,onlyalimitednumberofallowancesareavailable.Further,freeallocationdampensthecarbonpricesignalandreducesauctionrevenues.Such
considerationspromptedEUlegislatorstomovetotheCBAMasanalternative.TheCBAMdesigncanthusbeseenasanextensionoftheEUETStoimportedindustrialgoodsinETSsectors.
Atitsinception,theCBAMwillapplyonlytosomeofthelargestindustrialEUETS
emitters,suchassteelandcementproduction.Duetothecomplexitiesof,andlackofexperiencewith,implementingaCBAM,manyindustrialsectorsarenotyetincludedintheCBAMscope.However,theincludedsectorsaccountforamajorityofEUindustrialemissions.3
Practically,importersofCBAM-coveredgoodsareaskedtosubmitdataonthecarbonembeddedinthegoods(basedonactualdata,althoughdefaultvaluescanbeused
asafallback).Foreverytonofembeddedemissions,aCBAMcertificateneedstobepurchasedandsurrendered(onceayear).TheCBAMcertificatesactastheequivalenttoanEUETSallowance.Theyaresoldonacontinuousbasis,trackingtherecentEUETSprice.AswithETSallowances,importerscanstrategicallybuycertificatesbasedonmarketcircumstances.
ThechargesundertheCBAMcanbeadjustedfortworeasons(EuropeanCommission2023).First,freeallowancesarephasedoutonlygradually,between2026(whentheimplementationphaseendsandchargesbegin)and2033.Totheextentthatfree
allocationcontinues,theCBAMchargeswillbereducedcommensuratelysothatEUproducersdonotreceiveapreferencerelativetoimports.CBAMchargeswillalsobereducedwhen“acarbonpricehasalreadybeenpaidinthecountryoforigin.”
3AnanalysisoftheproposedCBAMin2021showedthatfourindustriesaccountforabout55percentofEUindustrialcarbonequivalentemissions,whichthemselvesareabout25percentofEUcarbonequivalentemissions.SeeFigure7ofEuropeanCommission2021.
ResourcesfortheFuture2
Thecreditingprovisionhasthepotentialtocreatepowerfulpolicyspillovereffects,
asjurisdictionshaveanincentivetoapplycarbonpricingtomitigateCBAMcharges.Questionsremainabouthowthisprovisionwillbeappliedinpracticesincethe
EuropeanCommissionstillneedstodevelopguidance.Whiletheprincipleofthis
so-calledArticle9provisionisstraightforward—toavoidchargingthesameGHG
emissionstwice—severalimportantimplementationdetailsarenotyetfinalized.Therearemanywaystodesigncarbonpricingpolicies.Forexample,theEuropeanUnionwillnotcreditfreeallocationmethods,suchasfulloutput-basedallocation.Butwhatifthecarbonpriceonlyappliestoexports—orevenonlytoEU-boundexports?Also,shouldenergytaxesbecreditedbasedonthecarboncontentoftaxedfuels?
BythetimetheCBAMchargesstartbindingin2026,theanswerstothesequestionsshouldbeclear.However,incraftingananswer,theEuropeanCommissionwillhave
tobalancestrictinterpretationsthatmightprotectitsownproducersmore(bynot
crediting)versusbeingperceivedasforcingitsownpolicydesignontoothercountries.
TheUnitedKingdomisontracktobethesecondcountryimplementingaCBAM,for
reasonssimilartotheEuropeanUnion.TheUnitedKingdomhasanETSthat,despitesomepost-Brexitdivergence,stillverymuchresemblestheEUETS.However,insomecases,theUnitedKingdommightchooseslightlydifferentpolicydesignoptions.TheUKCBAMintendstocoverthealuminum,cement,ceramics,fertilizer,glass,hydrogen,iron,andsteelsectors.ThisdiffersslightlyfromtheEUCBAM,asitaddsglassand
ceramicsandexcludeselectricity.TheUnitedKingdomsimilarlyintendstolimitthe
introductionofCBAMchargestosectorsmostatriskofleakagebutacknowledges
sectoralcoveragewillcontinuetobereviewedasnewinformationcomestolight.
Chargeswillincludedirect,indirect,andcertainprecursoremissionsandwillbebasedontheeffectivecarbonprice,whichisdefinedas“thepricepaidbyproducersafter
accountingfortheimpactoffreeallowancesandothersupportmechanisms”(UK
Government2024).Inkeepingwithanondiscriminatoryapproach,chargeswillbe
significantlylowerthantheUKETSprice,toreflectfreeallowancesprovidedwithintheUnitedKingdom.
HowCarbonBorderAdjustmentsMightDriveGlobalClimatePolicyMomentum3
3.HowCBAMsCreatePolicySpillovers
TheEUCBAMwillstartwithsmallfeesin2026,increasingmoresteeplystartingin
2030asfreeallowancesarephasedout.AsCBAMleviesincrease,CBAMswillcreateincentivesforgovernmentstoconsideradoptingcarbonpricing,andthoseincentivesareparticularlystrongforsomecountries.Forinstance,whencountriesexport
substantialenergy-intensiveproductstoEurope,carbonpricingcanconvertEuropeantariffrevenueintodomesticrevenue.SincetheEuropeanUnionandtheUnited
Kingdomboth“credit”existingcarbonpricingregimes,countriesthatlevyequivalentcarbonpricescan“turnoff”theborderadjustment.IfcarbonpricingregimesabroadhavelowerpricesthanthoseinEurope,thentheCBAMlevywillstillbereducedbytheamountofthecarbonprice.Likewise,exportsfromcountrieswithemissionstrading
systemscanreceivecreditforthecarbonpriceassociatedwithpurchasingemissionsallowances,ifsuchallowancesarenotgivenaway.
Importantquestionsremainabouthowcreditingwillwork,butatpresent,onlytrue
carbonpricingregimeswillbecredited.Oneproposedalternativewouldallowcreditsforpurchasesofcarbonoffsets,asawaytoencourageflowsofclimatefinance
(
SandlerandSchrag2022
).Othershavesuggestedallowingcreditsforcost-imposing
regulationsorforsubnationalefforts.Manyofthesesuggestionsraisevexingimplementationissues,evenbeyondthoseraisedbytheEUCBAM.
Inmostcases,theincidenceofatarifffallsonconsumersinthemarketthatleviesthetariff,andthesamewouldbeexpectedinmarketsthatimplementCBAMs,suchthatEuropeanconsumers(directlyorindirectly)payhighercostsforsteel,iron,aluminum,fertilizers,cement,andelectricity.Sincethesegoodswouldbemoreexpensivein
Europe,thatwouldgeneratehighercostsforgoodsproducedinEuropethatusethesegoodsasinputs.4,5
Althoughconsumersbeartheultimateburdenofmosttariffs,thesetariffstypicallyentaillargetransfersfromconsumerstobothdomesticproducersandthestate(intheformoftariffrevenue).InthecaseofEuropeanproducers,thehigherdomestic
4Theconsumerburdenfromtariffsarisesbecauseworldsupplytoanyparticularcountryisclosetoperfectlyelastic,sotheconsumersideofthemarketbearstheentiretax
burden.Intheory,largecountriescandrivedowntheworldpriceofgoodswhenthey
levytariffs,byloweringworldwidedemandforsuchgoodsandraisingworldwidesupplyofsuchgoods.Inpractice,these“termsoftradeeffects”havenotbeenobservedinthemultiplestudiesthathaveconsideredthecaseofrecentUStariffsonChinesegoods;
see
ClausingandLovely(2024)
.
5Basedontheearlyimplementationexperience,theEuropeanUnionwillconsiderexpand-ingthescopeofCBAM.ThisincludesexpansiontootherEUETSsectorscurrentlyleftout,butalsotheinclusionofdownstreamgoods.Thelatterwouldalterthecharacterofthepolicy,asthepolicydesignwouldshiftawayfromcloselymirroringEUETSpolicy
elements.Inconsideringexpansion,theEuropeanUnionwillwanttobalanceimpactonemissionsandcarbonleakagewiththeadministrativecostsnecessarytoextendthe
scopeofthemechanism.
ResourcesfortheFuture4
pricethatconsumerspaymerelycompensatesthemfor(somepartof)thecostofpurchasingemissionsallowances.
AnexportingcountryfacingaCBAMcanconvertthetransferfromEuropean
consumerstothestate(intheformoftariffrevenue)intolocalrevenueinsteadof
Europeanrevenuebyadoptingcarbonpricing.Forexample,considerthecasewhereMozambique—whichexportedover95percentofitsaluminumtotheEUin2019—
leviesanaluminum-sectorcarbonpriceequivalenttotheEUCBAMcharge(World
Bank2023).BecauseMozambiquefirmswilllikelyfacethecarbonpriceineithercase,theywillbeindifferentaboutthecollectionofthecarbonprice,butwheretherevenueendsup(inthehandsoftheEuropeanorMozambicantaxauthorities)willdepend
onwhetherMozambiquehasacarbonpriceinplace.ThisgivestheMozambique
governmentapowerfulincentivetolevyacarbonpriceonthealuminumsector.If
MozambicanfirmsarecleanerthanthemarginalEuropeansupplier,theymaybenefitfromtheCBAM;iftheyaredirtier,theymaybeharmedbyit.Ingeneral,thecleanestsupplierswillseepriceincreasesthatexceedtheircarbonfees,whilethedirtiest
supplierswillpaymoreinfeesthanthepricepremium,ordiverttheirproducttoothermarkets,facinghighertransportationandlogisticscosts.
CountriesmayhaveotherreasonstoadoptcarbonpricinginresponsetoCBAMs,
especiallyifCBAMsproliferate.Forinstance,forgovernmentsthatfindcarbonpricingdifficulttoimplementduetodomesticpoliticalconstraints,theexternalpressureofaCBAMcanprovidebothimpetusandascapegoat,akintopushinganopendoor,aspolicymakerscanpointoutthatexportingfirmswouldhavetopaythesefeeswhentheyexportregardlessofdomesticpolicyaction.
However,thestrengthofalltheseincentivesmaybemodestformanycountries.
Countriesthatexportlargequantitiesofenergy-intensiveproductstotheEuropeanUnion,suchasTürkiyeandUkraine,havefarstrongerincentivesthancountriesthatexportfarfewerquantitiestoCBAMjurisdictions.Atpresent,thesmallscopeof
CBAMsandnumberofjurisdictionsthatimposethemlimitssuchincentives,butifCBAMsdeepenandwiden,suchincentiveswouldincrease.
Evencountriesthatalreadyhavecarbonpricingpoliciesinplacemightconsider
changingtheparametersoftheirprogramsinresponsetotheCBAM.AnexampleisChina,whichisconsideringaddingthesteel,cement,andaluminumsectorstoitsETSaheadofthe2026startforCBAMcharges(
Reuters2024
).
CBAMsalsomayinduceresponsesonothermargins,evenwithoutacountryadoptingcarbonpricing.Forinstance,CBAMsmayprovideincentivestolocateenergy-intensiveproductionnearcleanenergysourcesorinnovatecleanerproductionmethods.Suchresponsesalsomaybeimportantindrivingemissionsreductions.However,countriesmayreshuffleenergyuseorunderlyingtrade.Forexample,ifacountryusesmore
hydropowerforfertilizerproductionwhileusingdirtierenergysourcesforotherneeds,itsresponsetotheCBAMwillmerelyrelabelexistingenergyuse.Likewise,ifcleanersourcesofproductiongotoCBAMmarkets,whereasdirtiersourcesarediverted
elsewhere,theextentofindustrialcarbonizationwillbemorelimitedthanifCBAMmarketsbecamemorewidespread.
HowCarbonBorderAdjustmentsMightDriveGlobalClimatePolicyMomentum5
Evenwhengovernmentsadoptcarbonpricing,theiradoptionmaybefarfroman
economy-widecarbonprice.Instead,theymayfocusonCBAMsectors,orevensolelyonexportsfromCBAMsectors.WhileexporttaxesarenotpermissibleundertheUSConstitution,noWorldTradeOrganization(WTO)rulesprohibitthem.Levyingan
exporttaxsolelyonexportsdestinedforCBAMmarkets,however,maybeimpractical.Exporterswouldsimplydiverttradetonon-CBAMmarketswhenfeasible,andtradewouldreshuffleasaresult.WhethertheEuropeanUnionwouldcreditsucharegimealsoremainsunclear.
Further,bothbroaderexporttaxesandcarbonpricingwouldcontinuetoraise
competitivenessconcernsinmarketswithoutcarbonpricing,absentasystemof
exportrebates.Thus,industrialoppositiontosuchpolicieswouldbeexpected,
althoughpolicymakersmightconsiderotherwaystoreducenegativeeffectson
industry,includingloweringothertaxes,moreinfrastructuresupport,orotherpolicytools.
Oneimplementationquestioniswhethertocreditforcarbonpricesenactedbysub-nationalgovernments,suchasUSstates,Canadianprovinces,orChinesecities.Thisapproachcouldincentivizeclimatepoliciesatasub-nationallevel,whichmaybemorepoliticallyviableandwhichmaybeaprecursortonationalactioninthelongrun.Still,theapproachcouldinvitegaming.Similartothereshufflingissuesidentifiedabove,
highlylocalizedjurisdictionsthatincludefactoriesthatexporttotheEuropeanUnionmayenactcarbonpricing.Also,creditingsub-nationalcarbonpricesincreasesthe
administrativeburdensbyaddingmorepoliciestoreviewandevaluate.TheconditionsarestilluncertainunderwhichtheEuropeanUnionwillcreditforcarbonpricesalreadypaid.Itwillpresumablywanttostrikeabalancebetweenofferingsufficientprotectionagainstloopholesandavoidingoverlyburdensomerestrictionsthatothercountries
mayperceiveasinfringingontheirownpolicyspace.
Carbonpricingsystemsbasedoncarbonintensitytargetsposeanotherchallenge.
Notably,theChineseETSisbasedonreducingthecarbonintensityofcoveredsectorsovertime,withoutnecessarilycappingtheabsolutequantityofemissions.Thepricediscoverythattakesplaceundersuchapolicydesignisdifferentfromwhatcouldbeexpectedunderanormalcap.Thismightaffectjudgmentsonequivalency.
Atahighlevel,thehopeisthattheEUandUKCBAMsleadtoavirtuouscycle,wheremoreandmorecountriesadoptcarbonpricingaspartoftheirfightagainstclimate
change.If,forexample,Thailand,Brazil,India,andothercountriesnowdiscussing
domesticcarbonpricingalsoimplementborderadjustments,additionalcountrieswillseethedirectadvantageofcarbonpricingtoavoidtariffsonexportsandthepoliticalbenefitofjoiningthemomentum.Asthecarbonpricingwavegathersmorecountries,itbecomesstronger,andultimatelycandrawineventhemostreluctantgovernments.
CoordinatedactiononcarbonpricingandCBAMswillinturnmakethepoliciesmorestreamlined,loweringcomplianceandadministrationcosts.Forexample,countriescanworktogethertodevelopsimilarapproachestomeasuringcarbonemissionsaswell
asprotocolsformonitoringandverifyingreportedemissions.Coordinationwillhelpindividualcountriesbuildcapacitydomesticallybyleveraginglessonsfromelsewhere
ResourcesfortheFuture6
andbuildconfidenceintheglobalsystem.Forexample,morethanadozencountrieshavealreadybegunaprocesstocoordinateonmeasuring,monitoring,andverifyingmethaneemissionsfromtheoilandgassector.
Importantly,globalcoordinationtoovercomepolicyreluctancehasworkedinother
domains.The2021internationaltaxagreementshowsarecentprecedentforglobal
coordinationonthelong-vexingglobalcollectiveactionproblemoftaxcompetition
(
Clausing2023
).TheincentivesbehindtheinternationaltaxagreementaresimilartoCBAM:ifcountriesdonotadopttheagreedcorporateminimumtax,theirmultinationalcompaniesoperatinginadoptingjurisdictionsarestillonthehooktopaythetax.Thiscreatesincentivesforcountriestojointheagreementtoavoidlosingfiscalrevenuestoothercountries.
HowCarbonBorderAdjustmentsMightDriveGlobalClimatePolicyMomentum7
4.CBAMSpilloversinPractice
EvidenceisgrowingthattheEUCBAMisalreadyleadingtoglobalspillovers.When
theEUCBAMwasfirstdiscussedinJuly2019,57carbon-pricinginitiativeswereeitherimplementedorscheduledforimplementationglobally(
WorldBank2019
).As
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