與上市公司會(huì)計(jì)信息披露有關(guān)的外文文獻(xiàn)及翻譯

與上市公司會(huì)計(jì)信息披露有關(guān)的外文文獻(xiàn)及翻譯AnalysisoftheRelationshipbetweenListedCompanies’EarningsQualityandInternalControlInformationDisclosure*JianfeiLeng,LuLiSchoolofBusiness,HohaiUniversity,Nanjing,China1、IntroductionThecasesoffinancialfraudleadtoincalculablelossesintheseyears,whicharerelatedtofirm’sweaksystemofinternalcontrol.Now,bothdomesticandforeignhaveissuedaseriesoflegalnorms.Forexample,Sarbanes-Oxley(SOX)ActforcelistedCompaniestodisclosetheirinternalcontrolinformation,includinginternalcontroldeficienciesandinternalself-assessmentreportandexternalauditor’sauditopinion.Weformulatetwoimportantfiles:“ShanghaiStockExchangelistedcompaniesinternalcontrolguidelines”and“ShenzhenStockExchangelistedcompaniesinternalcontrolguidelines”.Thesefilesrequirecompaniestodiscloseinternalcontrolself-assessmentreportandcommentsofexternalauditor’saudit,whichgreatlyimprovecompany’seffectivenessofinternalcontrolandqualityoffinancialinformation.Accountingearningsisthescoreandoneofthemostimportantelementsinalloftheaccountinginformation,whichmainlyreferstothecompany’sabilityofforecastingfuturenetcashflow.Higherearningsqualityisthekeytotheeffectivefunctionofthemarketandtheinsuranceofthecompany’sfuturecashflow.Thebetterqualityofcompany’searningsinclinedtodisclosemoreinternalcontrolinformationandtogetmoreoutsideinvestment.Therefore,earningsqualityisoneofthemostimportantfactorstoaffectinternalcontrolinformationdisclosure.Inthisarticle,withtheanalysisofmultipleregressions,weexaminetherelationshipofearningsqualityandinternalcontroldisclosureofinformationinthesampleof1273nonfinancialfirmsinshanghaiandShenzhenStockExchangein2010.2.PriorResearchonInternalControlInformationDisclosureListedcompanies’internalcontrolinformationdisclosureismostlyvoluntarybefore2002,butfewcompaniesarewillingtodoso.SinceSarbanes-Oxley(SOX)Actisenforced,manylistedcompaniesareforcedtodisclosetheirinformationofinternalcontrol,whichprovidingmorematerialandinformationtoscholarswhostudylistedcompanies’internalcontrol.Researchesoninternalcontrolinformationdisclosurearemainlyconcentratedonthefollowingfouraspects:1)Thecurrentsituationandsolutionsofinternalcontrolinformationdisclosure.Therearelotsofresearchesonthecurrentsituationofinternalcontrolinformationdisclosure,Mc.Mullen，RaghunandanandRama[1]studied4154companiesduring1989-1993,suggestingthatonly26.5%companiesarewillingtodisclosetheirinternalcontrolinformation,andthatonly10.5%providetheirinternalcontrolreportamongthosecompanieswithdeficienciesontheirfinancialreports.Itshowsthattheproportionofcompaniesvoluntarilydisclosingtheirinternalcontrolinformationislittle,andthatthecompanieswithdeficientfinancialreportaremoreunwillingtoprovidetheinternalcontrolself-assessmentreport.Hermanson[2]alsodidcorrespondingempiricalresearchonlistedcompany’sinternalcontrolinformationdisclosureandgotthesameconclusion.MinghuiLi[3]andDongmeiQin[4]maderelatedresearchesonthecurrentsituationofinternalcontrolinformationdisclosure.Theybelievedthatcurrentlistedcompanies’enthusiasmofdisclosinginternalcontrolinformationisnotstrong,andmuchinternalcontrolinformationwasnotsubstantialbutformal.MinghuiLi[3]alsodrawnontheexperiencesoftheUnitedStatesininternalcontrolinformationdisclosure,andprovidedaseriesofsuggestionsandmeasuresofimprovinginternalcontrolinformationdisclosure.HuaLi,LinaChen[5],XiaofengDaiandJunPan[6]analyzedthecurrentsituationofinternalcontrolinformationdisclosurewithinternalcontroltheories,andpointedouttheproblemsandputforwardthecorrespondingsolution.XinhuaDaiandQiangZhang[7]mainlydidtheresearchonlistedbanks’internalcontrolinformationdisclosure,findingthatourlistedbanks’systemofinternalcontrolinformationdisclosureisnotstandardizedandsufficient.TheyinterpretedthecorrespondingrequirementsoftheUSinternalcontrolinformationdisclosuresetby“Sarbanes-OxleyAct”,suggestingChinatopromotetheimprovementoflistedbanks’internalcontrolinformationstepbystep.Accordingtorelevantprovisionsofinternalcontrolinformationdisclosurerequiredby“ShanghaiStockExchangeGuidelines”and“TheNoticeonListedCompanies’AnnualReportin2006”,YouhongYangandWeiWang[8]analyzedtheinternalcontrolinformationdisclosureoflistedcompaniesonShanghaiStockExchangein2006withdescriptivestatistics,andfoundmanyproblems.2)Impactfactorsofinternalcontrolinformationdisclosure.Bronson,carcello,RaghunandanandDoyle,Ge,McVaysuggestedthatthereisacorrelationbetweencorporateidentityandinternalcontrolinformationdis-closure.Companysize,theproportionofinstitutionalinvestorholding,thenumberofauditcommitteeandthespeedofearningsgrowthhaveimpactoninternalcontrolinformationdisclosure.Manyotherexpertsdidempiricalstudyonsuchquestion.GeandMcVayusedasurveymethodtoanalyzethesample,discoveringthatthedisclosureofmaterialdefectsisrelatedtothecomplexityofthecompanybutthereisnodirectcorrelationwithcompanysizeandprofitability.JifuCaimadearelevantempiricalstudyofA-sharelistedcompaniestofindimpactfactorsoflistedcompanies’internalcontrolinformationdisclosure.Theresultsshowedthatthecompanieswithabetteroperatingperformanceandhigherreliabilityoffinancialreportaremoreinclinedtodiscloseitsinternalcontrolinformation,andviceversa.Thisindicatesthatthecompany’soperatingperformanceandreliabilityoffinancialreportaffectthelistedcompanies’internalcontrolinformationdisclosure.AdrewJ.Lconeselectedlistedcompanieswhodisclosedmaterialdefectsoftheirinternalcontrolinformationintheirannualreportsassamplestostudytheimpactfactorsofinternalcontrolinformationdisclosure.Theresultsshowthatthecomplexityofcorporatestructures,thechangesincompanystructureandtheinputstointernalcontrolarealltheimpactfactorsofinternalcontrolinformationdisclosure.ShaoqingSongandYaoZhangstudiedA-sharelistedcompaniesonShanghaiandShenzhenStockExchangefrom2006to2007,findingthatthereisacorrelationbetweencorporategovernancecharacteristicsandinternalcontrolinformationdisclosure.Auditcommittee,annualstatistics,companysizeandtheplaceoflistinghaveasignificantimpactoninternalcontrolinformationdisclosure.BinWangandHuanhuanLiang[15]studied1884listedcompaniesonShenzhenStockExchangebetween2001and2004.Theymadeuseoftheirratingreportsofinformationdisclosurequalitytoexaminetheinherentrelationshipbetweenlistedcompanies’corporategovernancecharacteristics,characteristicsofoperatingconditionandinformationdisclosurequality,findingthatcorporategovernancecharacteristicsandcharacteristicsofoperatingconditionhaveacertainimpactoninternalcontrolinformationdisclosure.3)Thecostofinternalcontrolinformationdisclosure.Thestudiesonthecostofinternalcontrolinformationdisclosurearenotverymuch.J.Efrim,Boritz,PingZhangthoughtthatthecostsofdisclosinginternalcontrolinformationisenormous,andthemanagementdidnotbelievethatthebenefitsofinternalcontrolinformationdisclosurewouldsurpassthecorrespondingcosts.MariaanalyzedthesamplewhichdisclosestheirinternalcontrolinformationinaccordancewithSECrequirements,primarilystudytherelationshipbetweenthecostsofdisclosinginternalcontrolinformationandtheeffectivenessoftheinternalcontrolsystem.Itisfoundthatthecostofdisclosingdeficienciesofinternalcontrolinformationisfarmorethanthatofdefect-free.4)Correlationbetweeninternalcontrolandearningsquality.Therearemanyresearchesonthecorrelationbetweeninternalcontrolandearningsquality.Doyle[11]studiedtherelationshipbetweeninternalcontrolandearningsquality,andfoundthatinternalcontrolisamotivationofearningsquality.ThestudiesofChan[18]andGohandLi[19]aresimilar.Chan[18]discoveredthatearningsmanagementofthosewhodisclosethematerialdefectsofinternalcontrolhasahigherdegreebutthereturnoninvestmentisverylow.GohandLi’s[19]alsofoundthatcompany’searningsstabilitycanbeincreasedafterimprovingthedefectsofinternalcontrol.LoboandZhou[20]madeacomparisononcompanies’discretionaryaccrualsbetweenbeforeimplementing“Sarbanes-OxleyAct”andafterimplementingit,findingthatcompanies’discretionaryaccrualsdecreasedalotaftertheimplementationof“Sarbanes-OxleyAct”.Doyle,GeandMcvay[10]dividedtheinternalcontroldefectsintotwoaspects:corporatelevelandaccountlevel,findingthatinternalcontroldefectsoncorporatelevelisinfluentialtoearningsquality,butthereisnocorrelationbetweeninternalcontroldefectsonaccountlevelandearningsquality.GuoqingZhang[21]selectednonfinancialA-sharelistedcompaniesin2007asaresearchobjecttostudytheinternalcontrolqualityonearningsquality.Theresultshaveshownthatthereisnocloselinkbetweenhighqualityinternalcontrolandearningsquality,butcompany’scharacteristicsandcorporategovernancefactorsmayaffectinternalcontrolqualityandearningsqualitysystematically.ChunshengFangetal.[22]usedquestionnairesurveytoexaminetherelationshipbetweeninternalcontrolsystemandfinancialreportingquality,findingthatfinancialreportingqualityimprovedafterimplementationofinternalcontrolsystem.JunZhangandJunzhiWang[23]selectedlistedcompaniesonShanghaiStockExchangein2007assample,andusedadjustedJonesmodeltocalculatediscretionaryaccrualsandfoundthatdiscretionaryaccrualssignificantlyreducedafterthereviewofinternalcontrol.ShengwenXieandWenhaiLai[24]selectedA-sharelistedcompaniesonShanghaiStockExchangein2007and2008assamples.Theyanalyzedtherelationshipbetweeninternalcontroldeficienciesandearningsqualitybyusingapairedstudy,andfoundthatlistedcompanies’internalcontrolinformationdisclosurehadaneffectonearningsquality.Basedontheabovestudies,wecanseethatinternalcontrolgetsmoreattentionafterthepromulgationof“Sarbanes-OxleyAct”.Currentresearchescentralizeonthedefectsofexistinglawsandregulations,thecurrentsituationsoflistedcompanies’internalcontrolinformationdisclosure,therelationshipbetweenlistedcompanies’internalcontrolinformationdisclosureandtheiroperatingconditions,financialreportqualityandearningsquality.Amongthecurrentstudies,mosthavefocusedondescriptivestatisticsandtherelationshipbe-tweeninternalcontrolqualityandearningsquality,whilethereisnostudyuseearningsqualityasexplanatoryvariabletoreflectitseffectoninternalcontrolinformationdisclosure.Therefore,thisarticleusesearningsqualityasmainexplanatoryvariableanddisclosureofinternalcontrolasthedependentvariabletodoempiricalstudy,whichcompensateforthelackofcurrentresearchtosomeextent.3.Method3.1.HypothesisHypothesis:thebetterthequalityofearningsis,thehigherthelevelofinternalcontrolinformationdisclosurewillbe.Accordingtoagencytheoryandsignalingtheory,corporatetrusteehasobligationtoreportrelevantinformationtothecorporatecapitalowners,whichgivehelptotheoperationofbusiness.Intheprocessofreporting,correspondinginformationistopassthecorporaterelevantsignaltothecapitalmarket.Thesignalcanmaketheoperatoraffecttheflowofresourcesincapitalmarketinacertainextenttoimprovetheenterprise’sinterests.Thereisthemutuallyreinforcingrelationshipbetweeninternalcontrolinformationdisclosureandthequalityofearnings.Acompanythatcanfullydiscloseitsinformationofinternalcontrolmeansthatitsmanagershaveagooddescriptionofethics.Meanwhile,acompanythatcantaketheinitiativetoshowitsinternalcontrolinformationindetailindicatesthatitscompanyhasahigherself-confidence,whichwillattractmorecapitalmarketresources,increaseitscashflow,enhancethequalityofearnings,andimprovemanagementcapabilities.Conversely,companieswithgoodearningsqualitywillchoosetovoluntarilydisclosetheirinformationofinternalcontrolindetail.Theycandistinguishthemselvestothecompanieswithinferiorearningsqualityandgetmorefavorfrominvestors.上市公司盈余質(zhì)量與內(nèi)部控制信息披露關(guān)系研究冷建飛，李璐（河海大學(xué)商學(xué)院，南京）1、前言近年來金融詐騙案件的發(fā)生帶來了不可估量的損失，這與公司內(nèi)部控制系統(tǒng)弱是有關(guān)系的。目前，國(guó)內(nèi)外相繼頒布了一系列法律規(guī)范。例如，《薩班斯-奧克斯利法案》（SOX）要求股票上市公司披露內(nèi)部控制信息，包括內(nèi)部控制的缺陷，內(nèi)部的自我評(píng)估報(bào)告以及外部審計(jì)師的審計(jì)意見等。我們國(guó)家也制定了兩個(gè)重要的文件：《上海證券交易所股票上市公司內(nèi)部控制指導(dǎo)方針》和《深圳證券交易所股票上市公司內(nèi)部控制指導(dǎo)方針》。這些文件要求公司披露內(nèi)部控制自我評(píng)價(jià)報(bào)告和外部審計(jì)師的審計(jì)意見，從而大大提高了公司內(nèi)部控制與財(cái)務(wù)信息質(zhì)量的有效性。會(huì)計(jì)盈余是一個(gè)得分點(diǎn)，也是所有的會(huì)計(jì)信息中最重要的元素之一，它主要影響公司預(yù)測(cè)未來凈現(xiàn)金流的能力。較高的盈利質(zhì)量是市場(chǎng)有效運(yùn)行的關(guān)鍵和公司未來現(xiàn)金流量的保障。公司的盈余質(zhì)量越好，披露的內(nèi)部控制信息越多，獲得的外部投資也越多。因此，盈余質(zhì)量是影響內(nèi)部控制信息披露的一個(gè)重要因素。在本文中，我們以2010年上海證券交易所和深圳證券交易所的1273家非金融公司為樣本，通過多元回歸分析，研究盈余質(zhì)量與內(nèi)部控制信息披露的關(guān)系。2、已有的關(guān)于內(nèi)部控制信息披露的研究在2002年以前，上市公司內(nèi)部控制信息披露采取自愿性原則，但很少有公司愿意披露。自從《薩班斯-奧克斯利法案》（SOX）實(shí)施之后，許多股票上市公司被迫披露內(nèi)部控制信息，這為研究上市公司內(nèi)部控制的學(xué)者提供了更多的資料和信息。對(duì)內(nèi)部控制信息披露的研究主要集中在以下四個(gè)方面：（1）內(nèi)部控制信息披露的現(xiàn)狀與對(duì)策關(guān)于內(nèi)部控制信息披露現(xiàn)狀的研究有很多，如Mc.Mullen，Raghunandan和Rama對(duì)1989年至1993年期間的4154家公司進(jìn)行了研究，研究表明在那些財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告存在缺陷的公司中，只有26.5%的公司愿意披露內(nèi)部控制信息，只有10.5%的公司提供內(nèi)部控制報(bào)告。這一結(jié)果表明，上市公司自愿披露內(nèi)部控制信息的比例很少，而且財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告存在缺陷的公司更不愿意提供內(nèi)部控制自我評(píng)估報(bào)告。赫曼森也對(duì)上市公司的內(nèi)部控制信息披露做了相應(yīng)的實(shí)證研究，得到了相同的結(jié)論。李明輝和秦冬梅對(duì)內(nèi)部控制信息披露的現(xiàn)狀也做了研究。他們認(rèn)為，目前上市公司披露內(nèi)部控制信息的積極性不高，且大部分內(nèi)部控制信息流于形式?jīng)]有實(shí)質(zhì)性意義。李明輝還借鑒了美國(guó)在內(nèi)部控制信息披露上的經(jīng)驗(yàn)，為完善我國(guó)上市公司內(nèi)部控制信息披露提供了一系列建議和措施。李華，陳麗娜，戴曉峰和潘軍運(yùn)用內(nèi)部控制的理論分析了內(nèi)部控制信息披露的現(xiàn)狀，指出了存在的問題并提出了相應(yīng)的解決方法。戴新華和張強(qiáng)主要對(duì)上市銀行內(nèi)部控制信息披露進(jìn)行了研究，發(fā)現(xiàn)我國(guó)上市銀行內(nèi)部控制信息披露體系不夠規(guī)范和充分。他們對(duì)《薩班斯-奧克斯利法案》(SOX)中有關(guān)美國(guó)內(nèi)部控制信息披露的規(guī)定做了解釋，建議中國(guó)應(yīng)分步實(shí)施上市銀行內(nèi)部控制信息的改進(jìn)完善。根據(jù)《上海股票交易所的指導(dǎo)方針》和《2006年上市公司年報(bào)要求須知》中關(guān)于內(nèi)部控制信息披露的有關(guān)規(guī)定，楊有紅和王衛(wèi)運(yùn)用描述性統(tǒng)計(jì)分析了2006年上海證券交易所上市公司內(nèi)部控制信息披露的情況，發(fā)現(xiàn)了許多問題。（2）內(nèi)部控制信息披露的影響因素布朗森，卡瑟羅，Raghunandan和多伊爾，GE，麥克維認(rèn)為企業(yè)形象與內(nèi)部控制信息存在一定的相關(guān)性。公司規(guī)模，機(jī)構(gòu)投資者持股比例，審計(jì)委員會(huì)的數(shù)量和收入增長(zhǎng)的速度都會(huì)對(duì)內(nèi)部控制信息披露造成影響。許多其他專家對(duì)這樣的問題也進(jìn)行了實(shí)證研究。Ge和麥克維采用問卷調(diào)查法分析樣本，發(fā)現(xiàn)虛假材料的披露與公司的復(fù)雜性有關(guān)但與公司規(guī)模和盈利能力是沒有直接關(guān)聯(lián)的。蔡吉福為了找出上市公司內(nèi)部控制信息披露的影響因素對(duì)A股股票市場(chǎng)上市公司進(jìn)行了相關(guān)的實(shí)證研究。結(jié)果表明，一個(gè)擁有良好經(jīng)營(yíng)業(yè)績(jī)和財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告可靠性較高的公司更傾向于披露內(nèi)部控制信息，反之亦然。這表明，公司的經(jīng)營(yíng)業(yè)績(jī)和財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告的可靠性對(duì)股票上市公司內(nèi)部控制信息披露存在一定的影響。安德魯J·Lcone選擇在其年度報(bào)告中披露內(nèi)部控制重大缺陷信息的股票上市公司作為樣本，以研究?jī)?nèi)部控制信息披露的影響因素。結(jié)果表明，企業(yè)組織結(jié)構(gòu)的復(fù)雜性，公司結(jié)構(gòu)的變化和內(nèi)部控制的輸入都是內(nèi)部控制信息披露的影響因素。宋少卿和張堯?qū)?006年至2007年上海證券交易所和深圳證券交易所A股市場(chǎng)上的上市公司進(jìn)行研究，發(fā)現(xiàn)公司治理特征與內(nèi)部控制信息披露是有關(guān)系的。審計(jì)委員會(huì)，年度統(tǒng)計(jì)數(shù)據(jù)，公司規(guī)模和上市地點(diǎn)對(duì)內(nèi)部控制信息披露都有重大影響。王斌