巴塞爾銀行監(jiān)管委員會有效銀行監(jiān)管核心原則（英文版）

CorePrinciplesforEffectiveBankingSupervision

(BasleCommitteeonBankingSupervision)

(BasleSeptember1997)

CorePrinciplesforEffectiveBankingSupervision(BasleCorePrinciples)

1.

Weaknessesinthebankingsystemofacountry,whetherdevelopingordeveloped,canthreatenfinancialstabilitybothwithinthatcountryandinternationally.Theneedtoimprovethestrengthoffinancialsystemshasattractedgrowinginternationalconcern.TheCommuniquéissuedatthecloseoftheLyonG-7SummitinJune1996calledforactioninthisdomain.Severalofficialbodies,includingtheBasleCommitteeonBankingSupervision,theBankforInternationalSettlements,theInternationalMonetaryFundandtheWorldBank,haverecentlybeenexaminingwaystostrengthenfinancialstabilitythroughouttheworld.

2.

TheBasleCommitteeonBankingSupervision1hasbeenworkinginthisfieldformanyyears,bothdirectlyandthroughitsmanycontactswithbankingsupervisorsineverypartoftheworld.Inthelastyearandahalf,ithasbeenexamininghowbesttoexpanditseffortsaimedatstrengtheningprudentialsupervisioninallcountriesbybuildingonitsrelationshipswithcountriesoutsidetheG-10aswellasonitsearlierworktoenhanceprudentialsupervisioninitsmembercountries.Inparticular,theCommitteehaspreparedtwodocumentsforrelease:acomprehensivesetofCorePrinciplesforeffectivebankingsupervision(TheBasleCorePrinciples)(attached);andaCompendium(tobeupdatedperiodically)oftheexistingBasleCommitteerecommendations,guidelinesandstandardsmostofwhicharecross-referencedintheCorePrinciplesdocument.

BothdocumentshavebeenendorsedbytheG-10centralbankGovernors.TheyweresubmittedtotheG-7andG-10FinanceMinistersinpreparationfortheJune1997DenverSummitinthehopethattheywouldprovideausefulmechanismforstrengtheningfinancialstabilityinallcountries.

3.

IndevelopingthePrinciples,theBasleCommitteehasworkedcloselywithnon-G-10supervisoryauthorities.ThedocumenthasbeenpreparedinagroupcontainingrepresentativesfromtheBasleCommitteeandfromChile,China,theCzechRepublic,HongKong,Mexico,RussiaandThailand.Nineothercountries(Argentina,Brazil,Hungary,India,

TheBasleCommitteeonBankingSupervisionisaCommitteeofbankingsupervisoryauthoritieswhichwasestablishedbythecentralbankGovernorsoftheGroupofTencountriesin1975.ItconsistsofseniorrepresentativesofbankingsupervisoryauthoritiesandcentralbanksfromBelgium,Canada,France,Germany,Italy,Japan,Luxembourg,Netherlands,Sweden,Switzerland,UnitedKingdomandtheUnitedStates.ItusuallymeetsattheBankforInternationalSettlementsinBasle,whereitspermanentSecretariatislocated.

Indonesia,Korea,Malaysia,PolandandSingapore)werealsocloselyassociatedwiththework.ThedraftingofthePrinciplesbenefitedmoreoverfrombroadconsultationwithalargergroupofindividualsupervisors,bothdirectlyandthroughtheregionalsupervisorygroups.

4.

TheBasleCorePrinciplescomprisetwenty-fivebasicPrinciplesthatneedtobeinplaceforasupervisorysystemtobeeffective.ThePrinciplesrelateto:

Preconditionsforeffectivebankingsupervision-Principle1Licensingandstructure-Principles2to5Prudentialregulationsandrequirements-Principles6to15Methodsofongoingbankingsupervision-Principles16to20Informationrequirements-Principle21Formalpowersofsupervisors-Principle22,andCross-borderbanking-Principles23to25.

InadditiontothePrinciplesthemselves,thedocumentcontainsexplanationsofthevariousmethodssupervisorscanusetoimplementthem.

5.

NationalagenciesshouldapplythePrinciplesinthesupervisionofallbankingorganisationswithintheirjurisdictions.2ThePrinciplesareminimumrequirementsandinmanycasesmayneedtobesupplementedbyothermeasuresdesignedtoaddressparticularconditionsandrisksinthefinancialsystemsofindividualcountries.

6.

TheBasleCorePrinciplesareintendedtoserveasabasicreferenceforsupervisoryandotherpublicauthoritiesinallcountriesandinternationally.Itwillbefornationalsupervisoryauthorities,manyofwhichareactivelyseekingtostrengthentheircurrentsupervisoryregime,tousetheattacheddocumenttoreviewtheirexistingsupervisoryarrangementsandtoinitiateaprogrammedesignedtoaddressanydeficienciesasquicklyasispracticalwithintheirlegalauthority.ThePrincipleshavebeendesignedtobeverifiablebysupervisors,regionalsupervisorygroups,andthemarketatlarge.TheBasleCommitteewillplayarole,togetherwithotherinterestedorganisations,inmonitoringtheprogressmadebyindividualcountriesinimplementingthePrinciples.ItissuggestedthattheIMF,theWorldBankandotherinterestedorganisationsusethePrinciplesinassistingindividualcountriestostrengthentheirsupervisoryarrangementsinconnectionwithworkaimedatpromotingoverallmacroeconomicandfinancialstability.ImplementationofthePrincipleswillbereviewedattheInternationalConferenceofBankingSupervisorsinOctober1998andbienniallythereafter.

Incountrieswherenon-bankfinancialinstitutionsprovidefinancialservicessimilartothoseofbanks,manyofthePrinciplessetoutinthisdocumentarealsocapableofapplicationtosuchnon-bankfinancialinstitutions.

7.

SupervisoryauthoritiesthroughouttheworldareencouragedtoendorsetheBasleCorePrinciples.ThemembersoftheBasleCommitteeandthesixteenothersupervisoryagenciesthathaveparticipatedintheirdraftingallagreewiththecontentofthedocument.

8.

Thechairpersonsoftheregionalsupervisorygroups3aresupportiveoftheBasleCommittee'seffortsandarereadytopromotetheendorsementoftheCorePrinciplesamongtheirmembership.DiscussionsareinprogresstodefinetheroletheregionalgroupscanplayinsecuringtheendorsementofthePrinciplesandinmonitoringimplementationbytheirmembers.

9.

TheBasleCommitteebelievesthatachievingconsistencywiththeCorePrinciplesbyeverycountrywillbeasignificantstepintheprocessofimprovingfinancialstabilitydomesticallyandinternationally.Thespeedwithwhichthisobjectivewillbeachievedwillvary.Inmanycountries,substantivechangesinthelegislativeframeworkandinthepowersofsupervisorswillbenecessarybecausemanysupervisoryauthoritiesdonotatpresenthavethestatutoryauthoritytoimplementallofthePrinciples.Insuchcases,theBasleCommitteebelievesitisessentialthatnationallegislatorsgiveurgentconsiderationtothechangesnecessarytoensurethatthePrinciplescanbeappliedinallmaterialrespects.

10.

TheBasleCommitteewillcontinuetopursueitsstandard-settingactivitiesinkeyriskareasandinkeyelementsofbankingsupervisionasithasdoneindocumentssuchasthosereproducedintheCompendium.TheBasleCorePrincipleswillserveasareferencepointforfutureworktobedonebytheCommitteeand,whereappropriate,incooperationwithnon-G-10supervisorsandtheirregionalgroups.TheCommitteestandsreadytoencourageworkatthenationalleveltoimplementthePrinciplesinconjunctionwithothersupervisorybodiesandinterestedparties.Finally,theCommitteeiscommittedtostrengtheningitsinteractionwithsupervisorsfromnon-G-10countriesandintensifyingitsconsiderableinvestmentintechnicalassistanceandtraining.

ArabCommitteeonBankingSupervision,CaribbeanBankingSupervisorsGroup,AssociationofBankingSupervisoryAuthoritiesofLatinAmericaandtheCaribbean,EasternandSouthernAfricaBankingSupervisorsGroup,EMEAPStudyGrouponBankingSupervision,GroupofBankingSupervisorsfromCentralandEasternEuropeanCountries,GulfCooperationCouncilBankingSupervisors'Committee,OffshoreGroupofBankingSupervisors,RegionalSupervisoryGroupofCentralAsiaandTranscaucasia,SEANZAForumofBankingSupervisors,CommitteeofBankingSupervisorsinWestandCentralAfrica.

PreconditionsforEffectiveBankingSupervision

1.Aneffectivesystemofbankingsupervisionwillhaveclearresponsibilitiesandobjectivesforeachagencyinvolvedinthesupervisionofbankingorganisations.Eachsuchagencyshouldpossessoperationalindependenceandadequateresources.Asuitablelegalframeworkforbankingsupervisionisalsonecessary,includingprovisionsrelatingtoauthorisationofbankingorganisationsandtheirongoingsupervision;powerstoaddresscompliancewithlawsaswellassafetyandsoundnessconcerns;andlegalprotectionforsupervisors.Arrangementsforsharinginformationbetweensupervisorsandprotectingtheconfidentialityofsuchinformationshouldbeinplace.

LicensingandStructure

2.

Thepermissibleactivitiesofinstitutionsthatarelicensedandsubjecttosupervisionasbanksmustbeclearlydefined,andtheuseoftheword"bank"innamesshouldbecontrolledasfaraspossible.

3.

Thelicensingauthoritymusthavetherighttosetcriteriaandrejectapplicationsforestablishmentsthatdonotmeetthestandardsset.Thelicensingprocess,ataminimum,shouldconsistofanassessmentofthebankingorganisation'sownershipstructure,directorsandseniormanagement,itsoperatingplanandinternalcontrols,anditsprojectedfinancialcondition,includingitscapitalbase;wheretheproposedownerorparentorganisationisaforeignbank,thepriorconsentofitshomecountrysupervisorshouldbeobtained.

4.

Bankingsupervisorsmusthavetheauthoritytoreviewandrejectanyproposalstotransfersignificantownershiporcontrollinginterestsinexistingbankstootherparties.

5.

Bankingsupervisorsmusthavetheauthoritytoestablishcriteriaforreviewingmajoracquisitionsorinvestmentsbyabankandensuringthatcorporateaffiliationsor

structuresdonotexposethebanktounduerisksorhindereffectivesupervision.

PrudentialRegulationsandRequirements

6.

Bankingsupervisorsmustsetprudentandappropriateminimumcapitaladequacyrequirementsforallbanks.Suchrequirementsshouldreflecttherisksthatthebanksundertake,andmustdefinethecomponentsofcapital,bearinginmindtheirabilitytoabsorblosses.Atleastforinternationallyactivebanks,theserequirementsmustnotbelessthanthoseestablishedintheBasleCapitalAccordanditsamendments.

7.

Anessentialpartofanysupervisorysystemistheevaluationofabank'spolicies,practicesandproceduresrelatedtothegrantingofloansandmakingofinvestmentsandtheongoingmanagementoftheloanandinvestmentportfolios.

8.

Bankingsupervisorsmustbesatisfiedthatbanksestablishandadheretoadequatepolicies,practicesandproceduresforevaluatingthequalityofassetsandtheadequacyofloanlossprovisionsandloanlossreserves.

9.

Bankingsupervisorsmustbesatisfiedthatbankshavemanagementinformationsystemsthatenablemanagementtoidentifyconcentrationswithintheportfolioandsupervisorsmustsetprudentiallimitstorestrictbankexposurestosingleborrowersorgroupsofrelatedborrowers.

10.

Inordertopreventabusesarisingfromconnectedlending,bankingsupervisorsmusthaveinplacerequirementsthatbankslendtorelatedcompaniesandindividualsonanarm's-lengthbasis,thatsuchextensionsofcreditareeffectivelymonitored,andthatotherappropriatestepsaretakentocontrolormitigatetherisks.

11.

Bankingsupervisorsmustbesatisfiedthatbankshaveadequatepoliciesandproceduresforidentifying,monitoringandcontrollingcountryriskandtransferriskintheirinternationallendingandinvestmentactivities,andformaintainingappropriatereservesagainstsuchrisks.

12.

Bankingsupervisorsmustbesatisfiedthatbankshaveinplacesystemsthataccuratelymeasure,monitorandadequatelycontrolmarketrisks;supervisorsshouldhavepowerstoimposespecificlimitsand/oraspecificcapitalchargeonmarketriskexposures,ifwarranted.

13.

Bankingsupervisorsmustbesatisfiedthatbankshaveinplaceacomprehensiveriskmanagementprocess(includingappropriateboardandsenior

managementoversight)toidentify,measure,monitorandcontrolallothermaterialrisksand,whereappropriate,toholdcapitalagainsttheserisks.

14.

Bankingsupervisorsmustdeterminethatbankshaveinplaceinternalcontrolsthatareadequateforthenatureandscaleoftheirbusiness.Theseshouldincludecleararrangementsfordelegatingauthorityandresponsibility;separationofthefunctionsthatinvolvecommittingthebank,payingawayitsfunds,andaccountingforitsassetsandliabilities;reconciliationoftheseprocesses;safeguardingitsassets;andappropriateindependentinternalorexternalauditandcompliancefunctionstotestadherencetothesecontrolsaswellasapplicablelawsandregulations.

15.

Bankingsupervisorsmustdeterminethatbankshaveadequatepolicies,practicesandproceduresinplace,includingstrict"know-your-customer"rules,thatpromotehighethicalandprofessionalstandardsinthefinancialsectorandpreventthebankbeingused,intentionallyorunintentionally,bycriminalelements.

MethodsofOngoingBankingSupervision

16.

Aneffectivebankingsupervisorysystemshouldconsistofsomeformofbothon-siteandoff-sitesupervision.

17.

Bankingsupervisorsmusthaveregularcontactwithbankmanagementandthoroughunderstandingoftheinstitution'soperations.

18.

Bankingsupervisorsmusthaveameansofcollecting,reviewingandanalysingprudentialreportsandstatisticalreturnsfrombanksonasoloandconsolidatedbasis.

19.

Bankingsupervisorsmusthaveameansofindependentvalidationofsupervisoryinformationeitherthroughon-siteexaminationsoruseofexternalauditors.

20.

Anessentialelementofbankingsupervisionistheabilityofthesupervisorstosupervisethebankinggrouponaconsolidatedbasis.

InformationRequirements

21.Bankingsupervisorsmustbesatisfiedthateachbankmaintainsadequaterecordsdrawnupinaccordancewithconsistentaccountingpoliciesandpracticesthatenablethesupervisortoobtainatrueandfairviewofthefinancialconditionofthebankandtheprofitabilityofitsbusiness,andthatthebankpublishesonaregularbasisfinancialstatementsthatfairlyreflectitscondition.

FormalPowersofSupervisors

22.Bankingsupervisorsmusthaveattheirdisposaladequatesupervisorymeasuresto

bringabouttimelycorrectiveactionwhenbanksfailtomeetprudentialrequirements(suchasminimumcapitaladequacyratios),whenthereareregulatoryviolations,orwheredepositorsarethreatenedinanyotherway.Inextremecircumstances,thisshouldincludetheabilitytorevokethebankinglicenceorrecommenditsrevocation.

Cross-borderBanking

23.

Bankingsupervisorsmustpractiseglobalconsolidatedsupervisionovertheirinternationally-activebankingorganisations,adequatelymonitoringandapplyingappropriateprudentialnormstoallaspectsofthebusinessconductedbythesebankingorganisationsworldwide,primarilyattheirforeignbranches,jointventuresandsubsidiaries.

24.

Akeycomponentofconsolidatedsupervisionisestablishingcontactandinformationexchangewiththevariousothersupervisorsinvolved,primarilyhostcountrysupervisoryauthorities.

25.

Bankingsupervisorsmustrequirethelocaloperationsofforeignbankstobeconductedtothesamehighstandardsasarerequiredofdomesticinstitutionsandmusthavepowerstoshareinformationneededbythehomecountrysupervisorsofthosebanksforthepurposeofcarryingoutconsolidatedsupervision.

Principle1:

Aneffectivesystemofbankingsupervisionwillhaveclearresponsibilitiesandobjectivesforeachagencyinvolvedinthesupervisionofbankingorganizations.Eachsuchagencyshouldpossessoperationalindependenceandadequateresources.Asuitablelegalframeworkforbankingsupervisionisalsonecessary,including

provisionsrelatingtoauthorizationofbankingorganizationsandtheirongoingsupervision;powerstoaddresscompliancewithlawsaswellassafetyandsoundnessconcerns;andlegalprotectionforsupervisors.Arrangementsforsharinginformationbetweensupervisorsandprotectingtheconfidentialityofsuchinformationshouldbeinplace.

Thisstandardrequiresthefollowingcomponentstobeinplace:

.

aclear,achievableandconsistentframeworkofresponsibilitiesandobjectivessetbylegislationfor(eachof)thesupervisor(s)involved,butwithoperationalindependencetopursuethemfreefrompoliticalpressureandwithaccountabilityforachievingthem;

.

adequateresources(includingstaffing,fundingandtechnology)tomeettheobjectivesset,providedontermsthatdonotunderminetheautonomy,integrityandindependenceofthesupervisoryagency;

.

aframeworkofbankinglawthatsetsoutminimumstandardsthatbanksmustmeet;allowssupervisorssufficientflexibilitytosetprudentialrulesadministratively,wherenecessary,toachievetheobjectivessetaswellastoutilisequalitativejudgement;providespowerstogatherandindependentlyverifyinformation;and,givessupervisorspowertoenforcearangeofpenaltiesthatmaybeappliedwhenprudentialrequirementsarenotbeingmet(includingpowerstoremoveindividuals,invokesanctionsandrevokelicences);

.

protection(normallyinlaw)frompersonalandinstitutionalliabilityforsupervisoryactionstakeningoodfaithinthecourseofperformingsupervisoryduties;and,

.

asystemofinteragencycooperationandsharingofrelevantinformationamongthevariousofficialagencies,bothdomesticandforeign,responsibleforthesafetyandsoundnessofthefinancialsystem;thiscooperationshouldbesupportedbyarrangementsforprotectingtheconfidentialityofsupervisoryinformationandensuringthatitisusedonlyforpurposesrelatedtotheeffectivesupervisionoftheinstitutionsconcerned.

Principle2

Thepermissibleactivitiesofinstitutionsthatarelicensedandsubjecttosupervisionasbanksmustbeclearlydefined,andtheuseoftheword"bank"innamesshouldbecontrolledasfaraspossible.

Principle3

Thelicensingauthoritymusthavetherighttosetcriteriaandrejectapplicationsforestablishmentsthatdonotmeetthestandardsset.Thelicensingprocess,ataminimum,shouldconsistofanassessmentofthebankingorganisation'sownershipstructure,directorsandseniormanagement,itsoperatingplanandinternalcontrols,anditsprojectedfinancialcondition,includingitscapitalbase;wheretheproposedownerorparentorganisationisaforeignbank,thepriorconsentofitshomecountrysupervisorshouldbeobtained.

Inordertofacilitateahealthyfinancialsystem,andtodefinepreciselythepopulationofinstitutionstobesupervised,thearrangementsforlicensingbankingorganisationsandthescopeofactivitiesgovernedbylicencesshouldbeclearlydefined.Inparticular,ataminimum,theactivityoftakingaproperbankdepositfromthepublicwouldtypicallybereservedforinstitutionsthatarelicensedandsubjecttosupervision

asbanks.Theterm“bank”shouldbeclearlydefinedandtheuseoftheword“bank”6innamesshouldbecontrolledtotheextentpossibleinthosecircumstanceswherethegeneralpublicmightbemisledbyunlicensed,unsupervisedinstitutionsimplyingotherwisebytheuseof“bank”intheirtitles.

Bybasingbankingsupervisiononasystemoflicensing(orchartering)deposit-takinginstitutions(and,whereappropriate,othertypesoffinancialinstitutions),thesupervisorswillhaveameansofidentifyingthepopulationtobesupervisedandentrytothebankingsystemwillbecontrolled.Thelicensingauthorityshoulddeterminethatnewbankingorganisationshavesuitableshareholders,adequatefinancialstrength,alegalstructureinlinewithitsoperationalstructure,andmanagementwithsufficientexpertiseandintegritytooperatethebankinasoundandprudentmanner.Itisimportantthatthecriteriaforissuinglicencesareconsistentwiththoseappliedinongoingsupervisionsothattheycanprovideoneofthebasesforwithdrawingauthorisationwhenanestablishedinstitutionnolongermeetsthecriteria.Wherethelicensingandsupervisoryauthoritiesaredifferent,itisessentialthattheycooperatecloselyinthelicensingprocessandthatthesupervisoryauthorityhasalegalrighttohaveitsviewsconsideredbythelicensingauthority.Clearandobjectivecriteriaalso

Thisincludesanyderivationsoftheword"bank",including"banking".

reducethepotentialforpoliticalinterferenceinthelicensingprocess.Althoughthelicensingprocesscannotguaranteethatabankwillbewellrunafteritopens,itcanbeaneffectivemethodforreducingthenumberofunstableinstitutionsthatenterthebankingsystem.Licensingregulations,aswellassupervisorytools,shouldbedesignedtolimitthenumberofbankfailuresandtheamountofdepositorlosseswithoutinhibitingtheefficiencyandcompetitivenessofthebankingindustrybyblockingentrytoit.Bothelementsarenecessarytomaintainpublicconfidenceinthebankingsystem.

Havingestablishedstrictcriteriaforreviewingabankinglicenceapplication,thelicensingauthoritymusthavetherighttorejectapplicationsifitcannotbesatisfiedthatthecriteriasetaremet.Thelicensingprocess,ataminimum,shouldconsistofanassessmentofthebankingorganisation’sownershipstructure,directorsandseniormanagement,itsoperatingplanandinternalcontrols,anditsprojectedfinancialcondition,includingitscapitaladequacy;whentheproposedownerisaforeignbank,priorconsentofitshomecountrysupervisorshouldbeobtained.

A.OwnershipStructure

Supervisorsmustbeabletoassesstheownershipstructureofbankingorganisations.Thisassessmentshouldincludethebank'sdirectandindirectcontrollingandmajor7directorindirectshareholders.Thisassessmentshouldreviewthecontrollingshareholders'pastbankingandnon-bankingbusinessventuresandtheirintegrityandstandinginthebusinesscommunity,aswellasthefinancialstrengthofallmajorshareholdersandtheirabilitytoprovidefurtherfinancialsupportshoulditbeneeded.Aspartoftheprocessofcheckingintegrityandstanding,thesupervisorshoulddeterminethesourceoftheinitialcapitaltobeinvested.

Whereabankwillbepartofalargerorganisation,licensingandsupervisoryauthoritiesshoulddeterminethattheownershipandorganisationalstructurewillnotbeasourceofweaknessandwillminimisetherisktodepositorsofcontagionfromtheactivitiesconductedbyotherentitieswithinthelargerorganisation.Theotherinterestsofthebank'smajorshareholdersshouldbereviewedandthefinancialconditionoftheserelatedentitiesassessed.Thebankshouldnotbeusedasacaptivesourceoffinanceforitsowners.Whenevaluatingthecorporateaffiliationsandstructureoftheproposedbankwithinaconglomerate,thelicensingandsupervisoryauthoritiesshoulddeterminethattherewillbesufficienttransparencytopermitthemtoidentifytheindividualsresponsibleforthesoundoperationsofthebankandtoensurethattheseindividualshavetheautonomywithinthe

Inmanycountries,a"major"shareholderisdefinedasholding10%ormoreofabank'sequitycapital.

conglomeratestructuretorespondquicklytosupervisoryrecommendationsandrequirements.Finally,thelicensingandsupervisoryauthoritiesmusthavetheauthoritytopreventcorporateaffiliationsorstructuresthathindertheeffectivesupervisionofbanks.Thesecanincludestructureswherematerialpartsareinjurisdictionswheresecrecylawsorinadequatefinancialsupervisionaresignificantobstaclesandstructureswherethesameownerscontrolbankswithparallelstructureswhichcannotbesubjectedtoconsolidatedsupervisionbecausethereisnocommoncorporatelink.

B.OperatingPlan,SystemsofControlandInternalOrganization

Anotherelementtoreviewduringthelicensingprocessistheoperationsandstrategiesproposedforthebank.Theoperatingplanshoulddescribeandanalyzethemarketareafromwhichthebankexpectstodrawthemajorityofitsbusinessandestablishastrategyforthebank'songoingoperations.Theapplicationshouldalso

describehowthebankwillbeorganizedandcontrolledinternally.Thelicensingagencyshoulddetermineifthesearrangementsareconsistentwiththeproposedstrategyandshouldalsodeterminewhetheradequateinternalpoliciesandprocedureshavebeendevelopedandadequateresourcesdeployed.Thisshouldincludedeterminingthatappropriatecorporategovernancewillbeinplace(amanagementstructurewithclearaccountability,aboardofdirectorswithabilitytoprovideanindependentcheckonmanagement,andindependentauditandcompliancefunctions)andthatthe"foureyes"principle(segregationofvariousfunctions,cross-checking,

dualcontrolofassets,doublesignatures,etc.)willbefollowed.Itisessentialtodeterminethatthelegalandoperationalstructureswillnotinhibitsupervisiononeitherasoloorconsolidatedbasisandthatthesupervisorwillhaveadequateaccesstomanagementandinformation.Forthisreason,supervisorsshouldnotgrantalicencetoabankwhentheheadofficewillbelocatedoutsideitsjurisdictionunlessthesupervisorisassuredthatitwillhaveadequateaccesstomanagementandinformation.(SeeSectionEbelowforlicensingofbanksincorporatedabroad.)

C.FitandProperTestforDirectorsandSeniorManagers

Ake