外層空間遙感法律制度淺析法學(xué)論文

1、本文檔來(lái)源于第一文庫(kù)網(wǎng)：/news/43F1C89FB0DFBF64.html外層空間遙感法律制度淺析法學(xué)論文外層空間遙感法律制度淺析法學(xué)論文 PrematureLegalFrameworkofRemoteSensingfromOuterSpace Fromtheintroductionoftechnicaldoctrines，Remotesensingsatellitesmakeitpossibletogatherinformationonmineralresources，weatherandclimaticchanges，aswellasresou

2、rcesmanagementanditcanbedrawnaconclusionthatremotesensingisahumanactivitywhichhasalreadybeenpracticeinconnectionwithcommoninterestsallovertheworldforscoresofyears.InitialdiscussionsregardingremotesensingfromouterspacetookplaceattheFirstUNConferenceonPeacefulUsesofOuterSpaceinViennain1968.Intheearly1

3、970s，Argentina，BrazilandotherDevelopingcountriesassertedthateachStatehaspermanentsovereigntyovernaturalresourceswithintheirterritoryandthatanyinformationacquiredregardingthoseresourceswasincludedintheconceptofsovereignty.Thus，developingcountriesarguedthattheconsentofthesensedStatewasaprerequisitetoa

4、nyspace-basedremotesensingoftheirsovereignterritory.Moreover，theymaintainedthatifremotesensingdidoccur，theywereentitledtoanydatageneratedandthatthedistributionofsuchdatatothirdpartieswasimpermissiblewithouttheconsentoftheStatesensed. Actually，followingthelaunchofthefirstcivilianremotesensingsatellit

5、ein1972，developedaswellassomedevelopingcountrieshadbeendemandingsomespeciallegalregime，significantlysince1978，whentheWorkingGroupsetupunderUNCOPUOSfinallyfinishedtheirdraftof17principles.“EventsintheWorkingGroupmaywellhavebeenastrawinthewindforatrendthatwassoontobecomeapparentinanotherforum.Thistren

6、dclearlyreflectedthemountinginfluenceofdevelopingcountriesandthepressureoftheircombinedweightininternationalaffairs.ItwasmanifestintheSecondUNConferenceontheExplorationandPeacefulUsesofOuterSpace（UNISPACEII），whichwasconvenedinViennainAugust1982.”（1）However，ifthemisgivingsentertainedbysomeWesternindu

7、strializedpowersaboutpossiblecontroversyregardingtheinterpretationandapplicationofsomeofthepotentialprinciplestreaty，wereignored，theultimateresultwouldbecompletelydifferent.AfteralengthydebateontheConference，thePrinciplesRelatingtoRemoteSensingoftheEarthfromSpace（Principles），whichwasannexedinUNresol

8、ution41/65，wasapprovedandadoptedunanimouslyonDecember11th，1986. Thesefinal15principles，generalspeaking，recognizethegreatbenefitpossiblyderivedfromremotesensingandalsotheopportunitiespotentiallyarisingfromthemisuse.Afterall，itisunderstandableforaUNresolution，inandbyitself，beingnotlegallybindingornotl

9、eadingtoseriousconflicts.Rather，itsbeenhighlightedintheensuingdiscussionforacoupledecades.Beforefocusingonpossiblecontroversialissues，aglanceatthoseunlikelyfordisputeisnecessary.Apartfromthetechnicaldefinition（2），basically，thoseprinciples，asreiterationsofalreadyacceptedprinciplesofouterspacelaw，inpa

10、rticular，supervisedunderorevencopiedverbatimetliteratimfrom1967theTreatyonPrinciplesGoverningtheActivitiesofStatesintheExplorationandUseofOuterSpace，includingtheMoonandOtherCelestialBodies（OuterSpaceTreaty），arecandidatesofdisqualificationforcontroversy.Forexample，PrincipleII，“Remotesensingactivities

11、shallbecarriedoutforthebenefitandintheinterestsofallcountries”（3），III，“shallbeconductedinaccordancewithinternationallaw”（4），andIV，“irrespectiveoftheirdegreeofeconomicorscientificdevelopmentandstipulatestheprincipleoffreedomofexplorationanduseofouterspaceonthebasisofequality”（5）.TheseparticularUNPrin

12、ciplesaremerelyarestatementoftermsfromtheOuterSpaceTreatyorotherwell-establishedcustomaryinternationallaw.Inasense，suchprinciplesmightnotescapethecharacteristicsofobscurityorambiguity，eitherofwhich，however，isnotauniqueissuetothelevelofremotesensingframeworkbuttothelevelofinternationalspacelawanddoes

13、notrefertotheemergencyofdivergenttextualinterpretationsofsuchresolution. Additionally，thesameasforegoingcases，toprovideanaddedprotectionforthesensedstate，PrincipleIVaddsthatremotesensingactivitiesmustbeconductedwithrespecttoallStatespermanentsovereigntyoveritswealthandnaturalresources，andmaynotbecon

14、ductedinsuchamannerdetrimentaltothelegitimaterightsofthesensedState（6），eventhoughtheissueofsovereigntyofsatesovertheirownnaturalresources，includinginformationderivedfromremotesensingregardingsuchresourceshadbeenoneofthemostbothersomeissuesformanyyearsduringthedraftingprocessandhasservedasastumblingb

15、locktoachievingconsensus（7），whichwillbediscussedhereinafter.Besides，“Anassociatedprinciple，lackingexpectationsoffuturecontroversiality，istheprinciplethataStatecarryingoutremotesensingprogramsistoinformtheU.N.Secretary-GeneralinaccordancewithArticleIVoftheRegistrationConventionandArticleXIoftheOuterS

16、paceTreaty”（8）；“Also，theprinciplerelatingtothepromotionoftheprotectionoftheEarthsenvironmentanddisclosureofinformationthatiscapableofavertinganyphenomenonharmfultosuchenvironmentaswellastheprincipleapplicabletothepromotionoftheprotectionofmankindfromnaturaldisastersandthetransmittalofrelevantinforma

17、tiontoaffectedStates.”（9）（10）Hence，theUNPrinciplesalsomakeitclearthattheprotectionoftheearthsenvironmentandtheprotectionofmankindfromnaturaldisastersareofextremeimportance. Incontrasttothoseforegoingprinciples，thereareplentyofpossibleareaswheredifferencesofinterpretationmayarise.Firstofall，theUNPrin

18、ciplesapplyonlyto“naturalresourcesmanagement，landuse，andtheprotectionoftheenvironment，”（11）media，meteorologicalandmilitaryapplicationsaresupposednotincluded（12）.ThusitisconceivablethatnewsorganizationsmaydisregardtheentirePrinciplesifstrictlyinterpretedfromaliteralstandpoint.Andalso，thePrinciplesdon

19、otapplytomilitaryreconnaissanceorsurveillance.SuchkindofidentificationinnarrowsensewascontributedtothosesufficientlybroadtermsinthecontextofthePrinciples，inavoidanceoffailuretoachieveunanimityonasetofothercivilianactivities.Infact，inutmostcircumstances，unanimityplaysarolenomorethanadoptionbynegative

20、consensuswithoutmajorityvotes（13）.ThisisjustthebeautyofaUNresolutionwithtolerationondeliberationspermeatedthrough，ratherthananinternationalconvention，whichmaynotbetracedtoopposedpositions.Asmentionedhereinbefore，despitethegreatinfluencebydevelopingcountriesandtheircombinationssuchas“Group77”，thedeve

21、lopedcountriesespeciallytheWesternpowersendeavoroftryingnottoconcludeatreatywasevenmoresignificant.“OnechampionedbytheUnitedStatesandmanywesternnationsregardedthefreedomofacquiringandimpartinginformationasafundamentalhumanrightwhereasdevelopingnationsandtheSoviet-ledsocialistcountriespredictedtheirc

22、aseastheirinalienablerighttodisposeoftheirnaturalresourcesandofinformationconcerningsuchresources.”（14） Hence，thecontroversialissuesarecenteringonthoseprinciplesnewlyintroducedunderinternationalcooperation，whichcanbutbeledbytechnicallydevelopedcountriesandseeminglybenefitthedevelopingnations，payinga

23、ttentionto“andtakingintoparticularconsiderationtheneedsofthedevelopingcountries”（15）.Simplyspeaking，theUnitedSateshadlongbeenaproponentoftheinternationalavailabilityofremotelysenseddataonanondiscriminatorybasis，commonlyreferredtoasthe“OpenSkies”policy.TheUNPrincipleslargelyembodiedthispolicyintheway

24、oftripleconceptions，whichareequitableparticipation，technicalassistanceandaccesstodata.Althoughnon-binding，theU.S.commercialremotesensingregulatoryregimerecognizesthem，forthemostpart，asinternationalobligationsandrequiresthoselicensedintheU.S.tocomplywiththedataaccessibilityprinciple.Thereasonisthatth

25、ePrinciplesgivenbirthtoinmultilateralmovesweresubstantiallyinvirtueoftheAmericanpreviouspracticesinbilateralapproach. Toillustrate，thoseLandsatagreementsbeforethePrinciplesmaybestbetakenasanexample，whichareagreementsconcludedbetweentheNationalAeronauticsandSpaceAdministration（NASA）ofU.S.andanumberof

26、countriesspreadovertheworld：Argentina，Australia，Brazil，Canada，India，Italy，Japan，Swedenetc.（16）“TheauthorityforNASAtoenterintosuchagreementsderivesfromtheNASAActof195，whichprovidesthatactivitiesinspaceshouldbedevotedtopeacefulpurposesforthebenefitofallmankind，whileSection205ofthatActempowersNASAtoeng

27、ageinaprogramofinternationalcooperationinworkdonepursuanttothisAct，andinthepeacefulapplicationoftheresultsthereof。”（17）Forthosecountries，theLandsatagreementsinvolvedthebuildingofgroundstationsforacquisitionandprocessingofremotesensingsatellitedata，attheirownexpense.Inadditiontoeachcountrypayingforit

28、sownshareintheproject，itwasalsoagreedunderLandsatarrangementsthatdataobtainedfromexperimentswouldbemadeavailabletotheinternationalscientificcommunity.Besides，countrieswithoutLandsatfacilitiesbutwithintheovercastrangeofthegroundstationswouldbeservedwithinformation（18）bonafide，prevailingtheprincipleof

29、pactatertiisnecnocentnecprosunt.Suchpracticewasbornetheacquiescenceinmeetingofmindsthatasensorstatemightconductwithoutconsentinadvancefromsensedstate.Besides，advancedtechnologywasnotinmonopolybymutualagreementsandthedatawouldbeinpublicityfortheworld. Hence，imitationallyandcorrespondingly，PrincipleVs

30、ays，“Statescarryingoutremotesensingactivitiesshallpromoteinternationalcooperationintheseactivities.Tothisend，theyshallmakeavailabletootherStatesopportunitiesforparticipationtherein.Suchparticipationshallbebasedineachcaseonequitableandmutuallyacceptableterms”；andPrincipleVI，“Inordertomaximizetheavail

31、abilityofbenefitsfromremotesensingactivities，Statesareencouraged，throughagreementsorotherarrangements，toprovidefortheestablishmentandoperationofdatacollectingandstoragestationsandprocessingandinterpretationfacilities，inparticularwithintheframeworkofregionalagreementsorarrangementswhereverfeasible.”T

32、hemutualagreementsareherebyhighlightedasaguaranteeforfeasibilityofparticipation，becausewithoutcontractualtransactions，theterm“equitable”mayfallintoinconsequentialextensionofitssubjectsaswellasobjects，whereofthe“opportunities”seemsurprisingchanceratherthanrationalexpectation.Inanutshell，theUNPrincipl

33、esareconsideredtopermitStatestofreelysenseandpubliclydistributedatafromouterspacewithouttheconsentofthesensedState.Moreover，itisnowregardedaswell-establishedcustomaryinternationallawthatremotesensingmaybeconductedwithoutpriorconsent.Fordissemination，suchkindsofconclusionsareatleastdrawndirectlybysom

34、escholarsongroundoftheabsenceofspecificprovisionsinthePrinciplesconcerningdisseminationofdata. Asforsensing，“AlthoughithasbeenarguedbysomenationsthatpriorconsentforremotesensingofaStateshouldbesought，suchprotestationshaveneveradverselyaffectedoperationalprogress.PrincipleXIIIoftheResolutionmentionsp

35、riorconsultationandnotpriorconsent。Itisformulatedasfollows：topromoteandintensifyinternationalcooperation，especiallywithregardtotheneeds，ofdevelopingcountries，aStatecarryingoutremotesensingoftheearthfromspaceshall，uponrequest，enterintoconsultationwithaStatewhoseterritoryissensedinordertomakeavailable

36、opportunitiesforparticipationandenhancethemutualbenefitstobederivedtherefrom.Consensuscouldnotbereachedregardingpriorconsultation，butitisclear，nonetheless，thatastateconsideringthatitislikelytobesubjectedtoforeignremotesensinghasaright，andwithoutrestriction，torequestthatconsultationstakeplaceandthatt

37、herequestedStateshallenterintoconsultationswithaStatewhoseterritoryissensed.”（19）Suchinferencerepresentssomeoptimisticviewpointsbutdoesntstandadequatereasonsforitsfeasibility.AsMyerspointedout，“TheThirdWorldStatesarefacedwithseriousproblems，primarilybecausetheydonotpossessthetechnologyandmeanstocond

38、uctremotesensing.TheymustrelyonthedevelopedStatestoprovidethedataandtoassistintheanalysis”（20）. Inlightofthenegotiatingpositions，suchprinciplesprovidedformaymakenomoresensebutforanyStateinpossessionofripetechnology，whetheritsadevelopedcountryoradevelopingcountry.Asexemplified，therehasbeenabrightnova

39、intheouterspaceundertakinginrecentthreedecades，PeoplesRepublicofChina，sincetheChinesefirstrecoverableremotesensingwassuccessfullylaunchedandrecoveredin1975andChinaRemoteSensingSatelliteGroundStation（RSGS）beganoperatedfunctioningin1986.Chinahasmadesufficientlyrapidprogressinspatialundertakingandbecom

40、eoneoftheleadingcountriesinremotesensingtechnology，onthebasisofwhich，Chinaissubstantiallycapabletoparticipateininternationalcooperationwithotherforeignsatellitemanagementauthorities，forexample，in1999，theChina-BrazilEarthResourcesSatellite01（CBERS1）collectivelyexploredanddevelopedbybothcountrieswassu

41、ccessfullylaunchedasthebeginningofasatelliteseries（21）；in2003，ChinaRSGShadconcludedorcontinuedimplementingaseriesofinternationalorregionalagreements，includingLandsat-5/7withAmericaUSGS，Spot-1/2/4/5andEnvisatwithFranceCNESandSpotImage，Radarsat-1withCanadaCSAandRSI，ERS-2withESRINsubsidiarytoESA，Envisa

42、tDataReceptionwithNorwaysKongsbergSpacetec，attendanceonIndiaIRSConf.etc.ConsideringthepreviousexamplesofU.S.andChina，itsobviousthatavailableopportunitiesforequitableparticipationmustnotbelackofthereciprocaltechnicalabilityandnegotiations. Insummary，PrincipleVandVIaredeemedtoconfirmtheunrestrictedrig

43、httoremotesensingwithoutpriorconsentornotification.Additionally，remote-sensingStatesarerequiredtoenterintoconsultationswithsensedStatesuponrequest.Inthissense，PrincipleXIIIisattributedmuchmoreinreturnfortechnicaldiscrepancysituations.Furthermore，Statesconductingremotesensingarerequiredtoprovidetechn

44、icalassistanceonmutuallyagreedtermsandareencouraged，preferablythroughregionalagreements，toestablishdatacollection，storage，processingandinterpretationfacilities，byPrincipleVII（22）.Thereasonfortheseprovisionsisevidentinasmuchastheapplicationoftherelevantprinciplesinsuchcaseismadedependenton“mutuallyac

45、ceptableterms”。Concretely，suchmadeavailable“technicalassistance”shouldalsoapplytheprevioustwoprinciples，asstipulatingtheneedsofdevelopingcountriesand“wheneverfeasible”isathands.Moreover，inreturn，thestatesubjecttoremotesensinghasaccesstothedataonanon-discriminatorybasisandatareasonableprice.Thosestat

46、esconductingremotesensingactivitiesmustmakeavailabletoallStates，attheirrequestandtothegreatestextentfeasibleandpracticable，anyrelevantnon-discriminatoryaccessanditwaspartoftheU.S.“OpenSkies”policytobeginwithandcodifiedbyPrincipleXII（23）.Thisincludesaccesstoavailableanalyzedinformationinthepossession

47、ofanyStateparticipatinginremotesensingonthesamebasisandterms，andmostsignificantly，sensedStatesshallhaveaccesstoprimaryandprocesseddataconcerningtheterritoryundertheirjurisdictionassoonasitisproducedonanondiscriminatorybasisandonreasonablecostterms.Nevertheless，thiscouldnotbeviewedasavictorywhenitcom

48、estofurtheringthedevelopmentoflesserdevelopedcountriesinthattheyshouldhaveimmediateaccesstostateoftheartdataandinformationonreasonableterms，providedtheguaranteethattheyhavethemeanstopayforit. Problemsremain，certainly.HowwillthesensedStateknowthedataorinformationhasbeenproduced？Whatistherealmeaningof

49、informationregardingsuchactivities？Furthermore，apartfromthecontractualtransmission，isthereisocracyinremotesensinglegalframework，especiallyinthecaseoftechnicalassistance，whereasitisnotpureassistancebuttheassistedstatesconductpartialarmslengthdeals，interalia，bindingthedemandedaccesstodata？Lastbutnotth

50、eleast，apartfromthemethodofcovenantencouraged，evenalittlebitbroadlyinterpreting，fromtheangleofathirdpartystate，aretheacquirementandthedisseminationofremotesensingdataneedingthepriorapprovalofoperatorstateorsensedstate，orisitadlibitumonsovereignty？SuchproblemshavekeptGordianknotsinthecircumstancesofg

51、reattechnical，economicandpoliticaldiscrepancyamongstthecountries.Notonlythesensedstatesemphasizedsovereigntyinremotesensingactivities，butalsothesensorstateshighlighteditonverificationissue.Dataistreasure，andbeforeideallycontributedtoandsharedbytheworld，mustbeproprietarybysomesubjects，whetherthereisa

52、nyagreementornot.Toresolvesuchcommunicativeproblem，in1978，aproposaltocreateanInternationalSatelliteControlAgencywastabledbyFranceduringthefirstsessionoftheDisarmamentConferenceoftheUnitedNationsheldinNewYork.ThisproposalagaincameupfordebateattheSecondDisarmamentConferencein1982.Themainmotivationbehi

53、ndtheproposalwasinspiredbymilitaryconsiderations.（24） “AmongthemostimportanttaskstobeentrustedtotheAgencyundertheFrenchproposalwouldbetheacquisition，processinganddisseminationofdataand/orinformation.DatainthiscontextwouldincluderoughimagesandelectromagneticsignalsobtainedbytheAgencyssatellites，orput

54、atitsdisposalbysatellite-operatingStates.Informationwouldincludetheanalysedresultsofthedataaswellasallotherinformationonarmssystems，geographicalconditions，militaryinstallationsetc.，whichwouldbeusefultotheAgencyinaccomplishingitsduties.Suchauxiliaryinformationwouldbecomeavailableeitherfromfreelyacces

55、siblesourcesorbesuppliedbyindividualmemberStates.”（25）Regretfully，suchproposaldidnotseekforsupportivecommentsfromU.S.orUSSRatthattime，andwasnullifiedwithregardstoexcessiveexpenditureinvolved.（26）Albeit；intheUNPrinciples，suchdirectivespiritwasincorporatedinPrincipleVIII，“TheUnitedNationsandtherelevan

56、tagencieswithintheUnitedNationssystemshallpromoteinternationalcooperation，includingtechnicalassistanceandcoordinationintheareaofremotesensing”。However，withoutrealisticattractiontotechnicallydevelopedcountries，howcomeitseemsmuchchanceofthisstrategyrealizedintheforeseeablefuture？So，suchproblemsarestay

57、ingahostofdiscussioninthescholarlyliteratures. Finally，turningbackwardstoPrincipleIV，thedeclarationofsensedstateslegitimaterightsonsovereignty，deemedasnotincentiveforcontroversyasaforementioned，hadstrictlyinterpretedasonlyreferringtotheconductofremotesensingactivitiesbutnotincludingthedetrimentalres

58、ultscausedbydisseminationofdata，especiallytothenon-participantstates.WhiletheU.S.acceptedinternationalresponsibilityfortheouterspaceactivitiesofitsgovernmentalornon-governmentalentities，itcouldneveraccepttheextensionofsuchresponsibilitytoterrestrialactivities，aschampionedbytheSoviet-ledsocialistcountries，exceptinaccordancewithgenerallyrecognizedprincipleofinternationallaw.（27）Reachingcompromisesincorrespondencewithsuchattitudes，thePrincipless