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1、asiaac/051109think again: asias risedont believe the hype about the decline of america and the dawn of a new asian age. it will be many decades before china, india, and the rest of the region take over the world, if they ever do.by minxin pei/julaug09/foreign policypower is shifting from west to eas

2、t.not really. dine on a steady diet of books like the new asian hemisphere: the irresistible shift of global power to the east or when china rules the world, and its easy to think that the future belongs to asia. as one prominent herald of the regions rise put it, we are entering a new era of world

3、history: the end of western domination and the arrival of the asian century.sustained, rapid economic growth since world war ii has undeniably boosted the regions economic output and military capabilities. but its a gross exaggeration to say that asia will emerge as the worlds predominant power play

4、er. at most, asias rise will lead to the arrival of a multi-polar world, not another unipolar one.asia is nowhere near closing its economic and military gap with the west. the region produces roughly 30 percent of global economic output, but because of its huge population, its per capita gdp is only

5、 $5,800, compared with $48,000 in the united states. asian countries are furiously upgrading their militaries, but their combined military spending in 2008 was still only a third that of the united states. even at current torrid rates of growth, it will take the average asian 77 years to reach the i

6、ncome of the average american. the chinese need 47 years. for indians, the figure is 123 years. and asias combined military budget wont equal that of the united states for 72 years.in any case, it is meaningless to talk about asia as a single entity of power, now or in the future. far more likely is

7、 that the fast ascent of one regional player will be greeted with alarm by its closest neighbors. asian history is replete with examples of competition for power and even military conflict among its big players. china and japan have fought repeatedly over korea; the soviet union teamed up with india

8、 and vietnam to check china, while china supported pakistan to counterbalance india. already, chinas recent rise has pushed japan and india closer together. if asia is becoming the worlds center of geopolitical gravity, its a murky middle indeed.those who think asias gains in hard power will inevita

9、bly lead to its geopolitical dominance might also want to look at another crucial ingredient of clout: ideas. pax americana was made possible not only by the overwhelming economic and military might of the united states but also by a set of visionary ideas: free trade, wilsonian liberalism, and mult

10、ilateral institutions. although asia today may have the worlds most dynamic economies, it does not seem to play an equally inspiring role as a thought leader. the big idea animating asians now is empowerment; asians rightly feel proud that they are making a new industrial revolution. but self-confid

11、ence is not an ideology, and the much-touted asian model of development does not seem to be an exportable product.asias rise is unstoppable.dont bet on it. asias recent track record might seem to guarantee its economic superpower status. goldman sachs, for instance, expects that china will surpass t

12、he united states in economic output in 2027 and india will catch up by 2050.given asias relatively low per capita income, its growth rate will indeed outpace the wests for the foreseeable future. but the region faces enormous demographic hurdles in the decades ahead. more than 20 percent of asians w

13、ill be elderly by 2050. aging is a principal cause of japans stagnation. chinas elderly population will soar in the middle of the next decade. its savings rate will fall while healthcare and pension costs explode. india is a lone exception to these trends-any one of which could help stall the region

14、s growth.environmental and natural resource constraints could also prove crippling. pollution is worsening asias shortage of fresh water while air pollution exacts a terrible toll on health (it kills almost 400,000 people each year in china alone). without revolutionary advances in alternative energ

15、y, asia could face a severe energy crunch. climate change could devastate the regions agriculture.the current economic crisis, moreover, will lead to huge overcapacity as western demand evaporates. asian companies, facing anemic consumer demand at home, will not be able to sell their products in the

16、 region. the asian export-dependent model of development will either disappear or cease to be a viable engine of growth.political instability could also throw asias economic locomotive off course. state collapse in pakistan or a military conflict on the korean peninsula could wreak havoc. rising ine

17、quality and endemic corruption in china could fuel social unrest and cause its economic growth to sputter. and if a democratic breakthrough somehow forces the communist party from power, china is most likely to enter a lengthy period of unstable transition, with a weak central government and mediocr

18、e economic performance.asian capitalism is more dynamic.hardly. with the united states brought low by wall street and the european economy enfeebled by its welfare state and inflexible labor market, most asian economies appear in great shape. it is tempting to say that asias unique brand of capitali

19、sm, by seamlessly weaving together strategic state intervention, corporate long-term thinking, and insuppressible popular desire for material betterment, will outcompete either the greed-devastated u.s. model or the hidebound european variant.but though asian economies-with the notable exception of

20、japan-are among the fastest-growing in the world today, theres little real evidence to suggest that their apparent dynamism comes from a mysteriously successful form of asian capitalism. the truth is more mundane: the regions dynamism owes a great deal to its strong fundamentals (high savings, urban

21、ization, and demographics) and the benefits of free trade, market reforms, and economic integration. asias relative backwardness is a blessing in one sense: asian countries have to grow faster because theyre starting from a much lower base.asian capitalism does have three unique features, but they d

22、o not necessarily confer competitive advantages. first, asian states intervene more in the economy through industrial policy, infrastructural investment, and export promotion. but whether that has made asian capitalism more dynamic remains an unresolved puzzle. the world banks classic 1993 study of

23、the region, the east asian miracle, could not find evidence that strategic intervention by the state is responsible for east asias success. second, two types of companies-family-controlled conglomerates and giant, state-owned enterprises-dominate asias business landscape. although such corporate own

24、ership structures enable asias largest companies to avoid the short-termism of most american firms, they also shield them from shareholders and market pressures, making asian firms less accountable, less transparent, and less innovative.finally, asias high savings rates, by providing a huge pool of

25、indigenous capital, undeniably fuel the regions economic growth. but pity asias savers. most of them save because their governments provide inadequate social safety nets. government policies in asia penalize savers through financial repression (by keeping deposit rates low and paying household saver

26、s measly returns on their savings) and reward producers by subsidizing capital (typically through low bank lending rates). even export promotion, ostensibly an asian virtue, seems overrated. asian central banks have invested most of their massive export surpluses in low-yielding, dollar-dominated as

27、sets that will lose much of their value due to the long-term inflationary pressures generated by u.s. fiscal and monetary policies.asia will lead the world in innovation.not in our lifetime. if you look only at the growing number of u.s. patents awarded to asian inventors, the united states appears

28、to have a dramatically receding edge in innovation. south korean inventors, for example, received 8,731 u.s. patents in 2008-compared with 13 in 1978. in 2008, close to 37,000 u.s. patents went to japanese inventors. the trend seems sufficiently alarming that one study ranked the united states eight

29、h in terms of innovation, behind singapore, south korea, and switzerland.reports of the death of americas technological leadership are, to paraphrase mark twain, greatly exaggerated. although asias advanced economies, such as japan and south korea, are closing the gap, the united states lead remains

30、 huge. in 2008, american inventors were awarded 92,000 u.s. patents, twice the combined total given to south korean and japanese inventors. asias two giants, china and india, still lag far behindasia is pouring money into higher education. but asian universitis will not become the worlds leading cen

31、ters of learning and research anytime soon. none of the worlds top 10 universities is located in asia, and only the university of tokyo ranks among the worlds top 20. in the last 30 years, only eight asians, seven of them japanese, have won a nobel prize in the sciences. the regions hierarchical cul

32、ture, centralized bureaucracy, weak private universities, and emphasis on rote learning and test-taking will continue to hobble its efforts to clone the united states finest research institutions.even asias much-touted numerical advantage is less than it seems. china supposedly graduates 600,000 eng

33、ineering majors each year, india another 350,000. the united states trails with only 70,000 engineering graduates annually. although these numbers suggest an asian edge in generating brainpower, they are thoroughly misleading. half of chinas engineering graduates and two thirds of indias have associ

34、ate degrees. once quality is factored in, asias lead disappears altogether. a much-cited 2005 mckinsey global institute study reports that human resource managers in multinational companies consider only 10 percent of chinese engineers and 25 percent of indian engineers as even employable, compared

35、with 81 percent of american engineers.dictatorship has given asia an advantage.no. autocracies, mainly in east asia, may seem to have made their countries prosperous. the so-called dragon economies of south korea, taiwan, singapore, indonesia under suharto, and now china experienced their fastest gr

36、owth under nondemocratic regimes. frequent comparisons between china and india appear to support the view that a one-party state unencumbered by messy competitive politics can deliver economic goods better than a multiparty system tied down by too much democracy.but asia also has had many autocracie

37、s that have impoverished their countries-consider the tragic list of burma, pakistan, north korea, laos, cambodia under the murderous khmer rouge, and the philippines under ferdinand marcos. even china is a mixed example. before the middle kingdom emerged from self-imposed isolation and totalitarian

38、 rule in 1976, its economic growth was subpar. china under mao also had the dubious distinction of producing the worlds worst famine.even when you look at autocracies credited with economic success, you find two interesting facts. first, their economic performance improved when they became less brut

39、al and allowed greater personal and economic freedoms. second, the keys to their successes were sensible economic policies, such as conservative macroeconomic management, infrastructural investment, promotion of savings, and pushing exports. dictatorship really has no magic formula for economic deve

40、lopment.comparing a one-party state like china with a democracy such as india is not an easy intellectual exercise. obviously, india has many weaknesses: widespread poverty, poor infrastructure, and minimal social services. china appears to have done much better in these areas. but appearances can b

41、e deceiving. dictatorships are good at concealing the problems they create while democracy is good at advertising its defects.so the autocratic advantage in asia is, at best, an optical illusion.china will dominate asia.not likely. china is on course to overtake japan as the worlds second-largest ec

42、onomy this year. as the regional economic hub, china is now driving asias economic integration. beijings diplomatic influence is expanding as well, supposedly thanks to its newfound soft power. even chinas once antiquated military has acquired a full plethora of new weapons systems and significantly

43、 improved its ability to project force.although it is true that china will become asias strongest country by any measure, its rise has inherent limits. china is unlikely to dominate asia in the sense that it replaces the united states as the regions peacekeeper and decisively influences other countr

44、ies foreign policies. its economic growth is also by no means guaranteed. restive secession-minded minorities (tibetans and uighurs) inhabit strategically important areas that constitute almost 30 percent of chinese territory. taiwan, which is unlikely to return to chinas fold anytime soon, ties dow

45、n substantial chinese military resources. the ruling chinese communist party, which views perpetuating its one-party state as more important than overseas expansionism, is not likely to be seduced by delusions of imperial grandeur.china has formidable neighbors in russia, india, and japan that will

46、fiercely resist any chinese attempts to become the regional hegemon. even southeast asia, where china appears to have reaped the most geopolitical gains in recent years, has been reluctant to fall into chinas orbit completely. nor would the united states simply capitulate in the face of a chinese ju

47、ggernaut.for complex reasons, chinas rise has inspired fear and unease, not enthusiasm, among asians. only 10 percent of japanese, 21 percent of south koreans, and 27 percent of indonesians surveyed by the chicago council on global affairs said they would be comfortable with china being the future l

48、eader of asia.so much for chinas charm offensive.america is losing influence in asia.definitely not. bogged down in iraq and afghanistan and mired in a deep recession, the united states certainly looks like a superpower in decline. its influence in asia has apparently receded as well, with the forme

49、rly mighty dollar in less demand than the chinese yuan and the north korean regime openly flaunting washingtons will. but it is premature to declare the end of u.s. geopolitical preeminence in asia. in all likelihood, the self-correcting mechanisms in its political and economic systems will enable t

50、he united states to recover from its current setbacks.americas leadership in asia derives from many sources, not just its military or economic heft. like beauty, a countrys geopolitical influence is often in the eye of the beholder. although some view the united states declining influence in asia as a fact, many asians think other

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