金融學(xué)專業(yè)外文翻譯、中英對照、英漢互譯

1、畢業(yè)論文外文資料翻譯 題 目 普通合伙人在私募股權(quán)基金 投資業(yè)務(wù)的缺乏研究探析究 學(xué) 院 經(jīng)濟學(xué)院 專 業(yè) 金融學(xué) journal of chinese economic and business studies, 2012,6(3):10-13.study on the lack of the general partner in the private equity business wang jinghuaabstract: this paper firstly points out the phenomenon and reason of the lack of the general

2、 partner (gp) in chinas private equity business, and then discusses the risks caused by the lack of the gp. based on this, the paper puts forward some relevant policy suggestions. this papers innovations lie in analyzing the reasons and risks of the lack of the general partner (gp) in chinas private

3、 equity business. this papers contribution is to discuss the pes risk and its controlling from a new angle. the conclusion is that the gp lack is a special phenomenon in the pe development, and the lack will produce many risks, so we should implement various measures to develop gp. key words: privat

4、e equity, general partners, general partners lackintroductionearly in the development of private equity investment trust, one of the more mainstream view was that it was a realistic choice of the private equity industry (li jianhua, 2007; lee ching yun, 2007), and has gradually become a trust compan

5、ys new favorite. at the time of trust industry keen on private equity, does the trust company really have a talents advantages, or can it act as a real fund management person? in addition to the trust company, the private equity fund by means of sponsorship is qualified for playing the role of the f

6、und managers.early in the development of china private equity investment industry, the trust company may also be thought to have certain talent advantages. however, with the fast development of the private equity investment activities in china, there emerges a asymmetric phenomenon: one aspect is th

7、at there exist a large amount of lp (limited parters) and investment thirst; the other aspect is that gp(the general parters) in the private equity investment business, namely qualified fund manager, is seriously insufficient. it is known that the private equity investment be separated from the expe

8、rienced fund manager, namely the general partner. this asymmetric problem cannot be solved in the short time. however, the more long this asymmetries last, the more disadvantageous is it for the industry development. the lack of gp may become the bottleneck which influences the healthy and long-term

9、 development of the private equity investment, because the implied risk from the lack will became important factors considered by investors, and this judgment may eventually became restricting factors of the long-term development of china private equity investment industry. compared to the history o

10、f private equity markets abroad for decades, the development time of china private equity fund, whether security or equity investment, is very short. the training for advanced professional talents required by the private equity investment industry has barely begun. therefore, with such fast developm

11、ent of private equity investment, the talent bottleneck stands out. this paper will firstly analyze the reasons of the lack of gp in china private equity investment, then discuss the risks caused by the lack of gp. based on this, the paper puts forward some relevant policy suggestions.the reason of

12、the lack of gp(general partners)the lack of gp is considered as a specific economic phenomenon in china, it is not a universal one. the gps lack can be explained from the two aspects including demand and supply. one is the excessive demand on investment, the other is the insufficient supply of inves

13、tment tools and investment goods. the gps supply, which is associated with the supply side, cant meet the growth of the market demand. the reason of the lack of gp is mainly reflected in the following aspects:1. the imbalance of economy developmentin the course of early economy development, the deve

14、lopment of the real economy is put emphasized on, the virtual economy development is lagging behind, so there is no gps living space. and it also caused the imbalance in the supply of gp and lp. on the one hand, the development of the real economy forms a large number of potential supply of lp (the

15、second reason in the later); on the other hand, the delayed development of virtual economy leads gp supply shortage.in recent years, the development of the capital market and virtual economy not only promotes forming a large number of lp, but also trains a number of securities investment funds and t

16、heir corresponding senior manager. but from the strict perspective of pe, they are not full sense of the gp. because the private equity investment not only includes securities investment, but also other risk investment business. therefore, with the rapid development of pe, some original securities i

17、nvestment funds and their executives are starting to turn to pebusiness, even so it cannot meet the needs of gp from pe funds.2.the lagging development of the private equity marketfrom the proportion of private equity fund investment in the gdp annually, the united statess private equity fund is 0.6

18、% of gdp for the year, the europeans and the asias is 0.35% and 0.2% respectively, while in china the ratio is less than 0.1%. gdp in china is 3 times that in india and in australia, but the size of the private placement market is generally close to theirs. currently, more than 95% of the private eq

19、uity funds in chinas capital market is characteristic with foreign-funded background, and only less than 5% of the private equity funds is really local private equity funds. delayed development of the private equity market is an important reason for the lack of gp.3.the lagging specification of the

20、relevant laws and regulationsat the beginning, the private equity fund controls consciously the risk according to the principles of industry self-regulation, which has been continued until happening of the subprime crisis. in the industry, there are different views on whether we should make a indepe

21、ndent legislation toward the private equity fund. some people think it is not necessary to make legislation. and they think although pe has developed hundreds of years in foreign countries, there is still no specific regulation. they mainly depend on reputation mechanismsself-regulation mechanisms t

22、o regulate the pes behaviour, so there is no need for the separate legislation. therefore they think we should not make independent legislation toward the private equity fund. this situation also leads to the lagging specification of the relevant laws andregulations on a private equity investment, a

23、nd the lag restricts the development of the gp. however, as the lack of the trust culture and external market regulation mechanism in china, it is obviously not sufficient to only rely on the individual creditas the primary means of controlling the principal-agent risk.risks arising from the lack of

24、 gpthe foregoing analysis shows there are many factors which cause the lack of gp. then what is the influence of the lack of gp. in the following, the paper will make a in-depth and concrete analysis on the risk caused by the lack of gp. the concrete risks are shown as follows:1. risk of the potenti

25、al-transfer-trustas the development of pe in china, pe investment activities appear increasingly active. the general investors, qualified institutional investors, even financial institutions such as the trust company, bank and insurance company, are paying close attention to huge commercial opportun

26、ities and rich return from pe investments, and having certain investment impulse. however, the supply of gp as a important role related to pe investment activities is seriously insufficient, and is difficult to meet the demand of investors and pe funds. especially, when the sponsor itself is not eno

27、ugh to be competent for gp, and not willing to abandoned such market opportunities at the same time, some institutions complete gps investment and management function by cooperating with the third-party investment consultants and the main way is to employ the third-party investment consultants. unde

28、r this condition, the gps function is decomposed, the delegate-agent relationship between sponsors and investment consultants is comparatively fuzzy. and the employing relationship is substituted for the delegate-agent relationship, while the duty and risk-bearing of the employing and the delegate-a

29、gent are different. in actual operation, some institutions implement transfer-trust in the name of employing, this is really a potential-transfer-trust. in the process of the potential-transfer-trust, both parts of the transfer-trust do not bear decision risks, and transfer the risk duties. which wi

30、ll finally damage the investors interests(wang, 2011).2.risks of investors interestgenerally, the investor pays more attention to high return on investment. if gp is in the lack, and the current gp can not be qualified for fund managers responsibilities, investors profits will not get effective prot

31、ection. this is mainly because the current gp in the field of venture capital investment lacks professional abilities. compared with the pes risks in internationally mature markets, operational risks from the gps lack may be greater. therefore, the lack of gp further increases the risk of pes invest

32、ments, which finally makes the investors interest risk greater.3. gp credit riskgp is the key factor which influences the success of private equity investments. in the long run, gps fundraising capacity will be influenced by the successful investment performance in the early phase, and it can be sai

33、d that obtaining an absolute income is the root survival factor, because customers requirements for absolute income is very high. therefore, once the private equitys performance declines sharply and even losses, customer loyalty will be greatly reduced, the private equity will face a survival dilemm

34、a. obviously, there exists reciprocal causation relationship between gps historical performance and its market reputation. therefore, the lack of the qualified gp or the fund manager required by the private equity investment will inevitably affect the investment performance of gp, leading to the cre

35、dit risk.conclusions and policy recommendationsthe above analysis shows the gps lack may cause many risks, such as the risk of the potential-transfer-trust, risks of investors interest, gp credit risk, and restraints on the capital market development. and these risks are an inevitable phenomenon acc

36、ompanying the process of economy development. if we can formulate appropriate policies and regulations, and take appropriate regulatory measures, risks from the gps lack can be controlled. to control radically the risk of the gps lack, we should firstly solve the problem of the gps lack. therefore,

37、it is necessary to establish a mature and effective mode for training gp, to increase the supply of qualified gp.from the requirements and training mode for qualified managers of the foreign mature private equity, we can draw the following conclusions: in addition to the basic job conditions, for fu

38、ture managers, the management ability, grasping ability for investment opportunities, financing ability, investment decision ability, risk recognition and control ability, and product innovation ability are paid close attention to. however, the ability which is related to the private equity manageme

39、nt is difficult to obtain from books, and they must obtain them through the continuous accumulation in practice. only by that, a qualified fund manager can be trained successfully. certainly, the entire process may take many years.similarly, it may take a lot of years to build a talent market or tal

40、ent pool of the private equity manager to meet the investors needs. therefore, it is an effective way to set up a training model from top to bottom, to strengthen the training for gp. the concrete suggestion is as follows:1. with the strict legislation and industry regulations to determine employees

41、 this is a requirement for the employees basic condition. without the corresponding conditions, the employee should not be allowed to enter the industry. at present, there are some regulations on employees qualification for the private security investment, but there is no strict rules on employees q

42、ualification for the private equity investment. and it is necessary to note that as the risk from the private equity investment is greater than the private security investment, the qualification identification of the private equity investment should be much stricter.2. building the trust culturethe

43、means of managing financial affairs of the private equity fund is in essence a means of the financial management of the trust. under the condition that the trust culture has not been established, the construction of the trust culture has a subtle effect on talents cultivating. therefore, we should s

44、trengthen the trust culture building, and use the cultural influences to improve the gps training, to increase the supply of gp.3.building the training platform in the industrytheir own training platforms constructed by industry associations are quite different from the platform of the production-ed

45、ucation-research cooperation in colleges and universities. industry associations can do many important works to carry out the vocational training, and they can also employ foreign counterparts and experts to promote the professional vocational training. these will make a difference for the training

46、of the qualified gp.4. establishing the professional talent pool of private wealth managementthe employee unit should actively take the initiative to provide all relevant learning opportunities to train the employee capacity, to build their own talent pool. for example, when the trust company carrie

47、s out the private equity business, it can make use of its existing talent to purposefully develop their own professional managers of private equity. at the same time, the trust company can take advantage of cooperation opportunity with other investment adviser companies, or to attract the best talen

48、ts, or to absorb some excellent investment consultants. through that way, the trust company can establish the appropriate talent pool, and improve its investment advisory capacity.5. employees learning by doingwhat the training of the unit or the industry can provide is only a learning opportunity.

49、but whether the trainees can learn and become qualified top fund managers or qualified gp depends finally on their own learning abilities. therefore, the employee must be down-to-earth, be strict with themselves, cultivate their own trust sense, and improve their capacities of risk investment and ma

50、nagement.references 1 can kut, risk management in european private equity funds: survey evidencej. the journal of private equity, summer 2006b.2 li jianhua, zhang liwen. private equity investment trust and the development of chinas private equity marketj. the world economy, 2007 (5): 74-84.3 lee chi

51、ng yun, trust: the realistic choice of chinas private equity fund, china urban economy j, 2007:87-89.journal of chinese economic and business studies, 2012,6(3):10-13.普通合伙人在私募股權(quán)基金投資業(yè)務(wù)的缺乏研究探析王景華摘 要 本文首先指出，在中國的私募股權(quán)投資業(yè)務(wù)的普通合伙人（gp）缺乏的現(xiàn)象和原因，然后討論的gp缺乏造成的風(fēng)險。在此基礎(chǔ)上，提出了一些相關(guān)的政策建議。本文的創(chuàng)新在于，在中國的私募股權(quán)投資業(yè)務(wù)的普通合伙人（gp）缺

52、乏的原因分析和風(fēng)險。本文的貢獻是站在pe的風(fēng)險及其控制從一個新的角度來討論。得出的結(jié)論是，gp缺乏是一個特殊的現(xiàn)象，在pe發(fā)展，缺乏會產(chǎn)生很多風(fēng)險，因此我們應(yīng)該采取各種措施發(fā)展gp。關(guān)鍵詞 私募股權(quán)基金;普通合伙人;普通合伙人缺乏 一、前言 早在私人股權(quán)投資信托的發(fā)展，更多的主流觀點之一是，它是一個現(xiàn)實的選擇私募股權(quán)行業(yè)（2007年李建華，李菁云，2007），并已逐漸成為信任公司的新的最喜歡的。當(dāng)時熱衷于私募股權(quán)投資信托業(yè)，信托公司是否真的有一個人才的優(yōu)勢，它可以作為一個真正的基金管理人，除了信托公司，私募基金通過贊助資格扮演的基金經(jīng)理。 早在中國私募股權(quán)投資行業(yè)的發(fā)展，信托公司也可能被認(rèn)為是

53、有一定的人才優(yōu)勢。然而，隨著中國私募股權(quán)投資活動的快速發(fā)展，出現(xiàn)不對稱的現(xiàn)象：一個方面是，存在大量的lp（有限parters）和投資口渴，另一個方面就是，gp（一般parters ）的私募股權(quán)投資業(yè)務(wù)，即合資格的基金經(jīng)理，是嚴(yán)重不足。據(jù)了解，私募股權(quán)投資經(jīng)驗豐富的基金經(jīng)理，即普通合伙人分開。在很短的時間，這種不對稱的問題不能得到解決。然而，這種不對稱最后，更為不利的是它的產(chǎn)業(yè)的發(fā)展。 gp缺乏可能會成為瓶頸，從而影響健康和長遠發(fā)展的私募股權(quán)投資，因為缺乏隱含風(fēng)險將成為重要的投資者，而本判決考慮的因素可能最終成為中國私募股權(quán)投資行業(yè)的長遠發(fā)展的制約因素。相比國外私募股權(quán)投資市場的歷史，幾十年來，

54、中國私募股權(quán)投資基金的發(fā)展時間，是否安全或股本投資，是很短的。由私人股權(quán)投資行業(yè)所需的高級專業(yè)人才的培訓(xùn)才剛剛開始。因此，私募股權(quán)投資的快速發(fā)展，人才瓶頸脫穎而出。本文將首先分析gp在中國私募股權(quán)投資缺乏的原因，然后討論的gp缺乏所造成的風(fēng)險。在此基礎(chǔ)上，提出了一些相關(guān)的政策建議。二、原因缺乏gp（一般合伙人） gp缺乏被視為中國的一個特定的經(jīng)濟現(xiàn)象，它是不是一個通用的。從需求和供給兩個方面，其中包括gp缺乏可以解釋。一個是過度的投資需求，另一種是投資工具和投資品的供給不足。 gp的供應(yīng)，這是與供應(yīng)方，不能滿足市場需求的增長。 gp缺乏的原因主要體現(xiàn)在以下幾個方面： (一)經(jīng)濟發(fā)展的不平衡 在

55、早期經(jīng)濟發(fā)展的過程中，強調(diào)把發(fā)展實體經(jīng)濟，虛擬經(jīng)濟發(fā)展相對滯后，所以有沒有g(shù)p的生活空間。這也造成在gp和lp的供應(yīng)失衡。一方面，實體經(jīng)濟的發(fā)展形成了大量的潛在供應(yīng)lp（在以后的第二個原因），另一方面，虛擬經(jīng)濟的發(fā)展導(dǎo)致的延遲gp供應(yīng)短缺。近年來，資本市場和虛擬經(jīng)濟的發(fā)展不僅促進形成了大量的lp，但也培養(yǎng)了一些證券投資基金和其相應(yīng)的高級經(jīng)理，但是，從嚴(yán)格的角度來講，pe不是完全意義上的gp。由于私募股權(quán)投資，不僅包括證券投資，還包括其他的風(fēng)險投資業(yè)務(wù)。因此，pe的快速發(fā)展，一些原有的證券投資基金及其高管開始轉(zhuǎn)向pe，即便如此，它不能滿足需要從pe基金的gp。 （二）發(fā)展滯后的私募股權(quán)投資市場

56、從私人股權(quán)基金投資在每年的國內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值所占的比例，美國的私人股權(quán)基金是國內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值的0.6為一年，在歐洲的和亞洲的0.35和0.2分別，而在中國的比例是小于0.1 。中國國內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值的3倍，在印度和澳大利亞，但私募市場的大小一般是接近他們的。目前，超過95的私募股權(quán)投資基金在中國資本市場的特點是具有外資背景的，只有不到5的私募股權(quán)投資基金是真正本土私募基金。延遲的私募股權(quán)投資市場的發(fā)展是gp缺乏的一個重要原因。 （三）相關(guān)法律法規(guī)的滯后規(guī)范 在初期，私募股權(quán)投資基金有意識地控制風(fēng)險的原則，行業(yè)自律，一直持續(xù)到發(fā)生次貸危機。在行業(yè)內(nèi)，我們是否應(yīng)該做一個獨立的立法，向私募基金有不同的看法。有些人認(rèn)

57、為它是沒有必要制定法律。他們認(rèn)為，雖然pe已經(jīng)開發(fā)了數(shù)百多年在國外，但仍然沒有具體規(guī)定。他們主要依靠“口碑”機制 - 自我調(diào)節(jié)機制，以規(guī)范pe的行為，因此沒有必要單獨立法。因此，他們認(rèn)為，我們不應(yīng)該向私募基金的獨立的立法。這種情況也導(dǎo)致私募股權(quán)投資的有關(guān)法律，法規(guī)規(guī)范的滯后和滯后制約了發(fā)展的gp。然而，由于缺乏信任文化和外部市場監(jiān)管機制，在中國，這顯然是不夠的，只能依靠個人信用委托代理風(fēng)險控制的主要手段。三、從gp缺乏所帶來的風(fēng)險 以上分析表明，導(dǎo)致gp缺乏的因素有很多。那么，什么是gp缺乏的影響。下面，本文將做一個深入和具體分析的gp缺乏造成的風(fēng)險。具體風(fēng)險如下： （一）潛在轉(zhuǎn)入信托風(fēng)險 pe在中國的發(fā)展，出現(xiàn)pe投資活動日益活躍。一般的投資者，合格的機構(gòu)投資者，甚至是信托公司，銀行和保險公司等金融機構(gòu)，密切關(guān)注從pe投資巨大的商業(yè)機會和豐厚的回報，具有一定的投資沖動。然而，gp作為一個重要的角色，pe投資活動有關(guān)的供應(yīng)嚴(yán)重不足，難以滿足投資者和私募股權(quán)基金的需求。特別是，當(dāng)贊助商本身是不足夠主管gp，和不愿意以放棄了這