薩爾瓦多國際經(jīng)濟學(xué)件PPT學(xué)習(xí)教案

1、會計學(xué)1 薩爾瓦多國際經(jīng)濟學(xué)件薩爾瓦多國際經(jīng)濟學(xué)件 第1頁/共52頁 第2頁/共52頁 第3頁/共52頁 第4頁/共52頁 FIGURE 9-1 Partial Equilibrium Effects of an Import Quota. 第5頁/共52頁 第6頁/共52頁 第7頁/共52頁 第8頁/共52頁 第9頁/共52頁 第10頁/共52頁 第11頁/共52頁 第12頁/共52頁 第13頁/共52頁 第14頁/共52頁 第15頁/共52頁 FIGURE 9-2 Partial Equilibrium Effect of an Export Subsidy. 第16頁/共52頁 第17頁

2、/共52頁 第18頁/共52頁 第19頁/共52頁 第20頁/共52頁 第21頁/共52頁 第22頁/共52頁 nConcerns nDifficult to pick winners and devise appropriate policies to nurture them. nEfforts largely neutralized when leading nations undertake strategic trade policies at the same time. nRetaliation in other markets may eliminate any gains.

3、第23頁/共52頁 n1930 Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act nRaised average import duties to 59% by 1932. nSpurred international retaliation 第24頁/共52頁 n1934 Trade Agreements Act nAuthorized the president to negotiate mutual tariff reductions by as much as 5%. nReductions were based on the principle of most favored nati

4、on. nThe most favored nation principle extends to all trading partners any reciprocal tariff reduction negotiated with any trading partner. nFor example, a negotiated reduction with Canada would extend to Mexico if it had most favored nation status. 第25頁/共52頁 n1947 The General Agreement on Tariffs a

5、nd Trade (GATT) nDesigned to promote expanded international trade through multilateral negotiations. nGATT rested on three basic principles: 1.Nondiscrimination 2.Elimination of nontariff barriers 3.Consultation among nations in solving trade disputes 第26頁/共52頁 n1950s Movements away from free trade

6、1.Peril-point provisions prevented the president from negotiating tariff reductions that would seriously damage a domestic industry. 2.Escape clause allowed any domestic industry claiming injury from imports to petition for tariff reduction. 3.National security clause prevented tariff reductions whe

7、n they would hurt industries important for national defense. 第27頁/共52頁 n1962 Trade Expansion Act nAuthorized the president to negotiate across the board tariff reductions of up to 50%. nIntroduced Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) to workers displaced by international trade. nAllowed the passage of

8、the Kennedy Round negotiation of the GATT. 第28頁/共52頁 n1974 Trade Reform Act nAuthorized the president to negotiate tariff reductions of up to 60% and the elimination of tariffs below 5%. nContributed to passage of the Tokyo Round negotiations of the GATT. 第29頁/共52頁 n1984 The Trade and Tariff Act nAu

9、thorized the president to negotiate international agreements for the protection of intellectual property rights. nExtended the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), a system by which developing nation exports are granted preferential access to US markets. nProvided authority for negotiations lead

10、ing to free trade with Israel. 第30頁/共52頁 n1988 The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act nRequired the U.S. Special Trade Representative to set a rigorous schedule for negotiating reductions in trade barriers with countries maintaining high barriers to U.S. exports. 第31頁/共52頁 FIGURE 9-3 U.S. Average Tariff Rates on Dutiable Imports, 1900-2000. 第32頁/共52頁 第33頁/共52頁 第34頁/共52頁 第35頁/共52頁 第36頁/共52頁 第37頁/共52頁 第38頁/共52頁 第39頁/共52頁 第40頁/共52頁 第41頁/共52頁 第42頁/共52頁 第43頁/共52頁 第44頁/共52頁 第45頁/共52頁 第46頁/共52頁 第47頁/共52頁 第48頁/共52頁 FIGURE 9-4 Maximization of the Inte