《國(guó)際商務(wù)談判》羅伊列維奇,原版課件,第十二章 PPT

1、mcgraw-hill/irwin 2004 the mcgraw-hill companies, inc., all rights reserved.chapter 12 managing negotiation mismatchesmcgraw-hill/irwin 2004 the mcgraw-hill companies, inc., all rights reserved. introduction :in this chapter, we begin by discussion how to manage the social contract and shadow negoti

2、ation. next , we turn to a discussion of how to respond to the other partys hard distribution tactics, which is followed by a discussion of the options available to negotiators who are faced with another party who is more powerful. we then discuss possible tactics to use with generally difficult neg

3、otiators, examine how to respond to ultimatums ,and conclude the chapter with a discuss of how to manage difficult conversations.mcgraw-hill/irwin 2004 the mcgraw-hill companies, inc., all rights reserved. the titles:1.managing the shadow negotiation and social contract 2.responding to the other sid

4、es hard distributive tactics3.responding when the other side has more power 4.the special problems of handing ultimatums5.responding when the other side is being difficult mcgraw-hill/irwin 2004 the mcgraw-hill companies, inc., all rights reserved.1 managing the shadow negotiation and social contrac

5、tthe shadow negotiation occurs in parallel with the substantive negotiation and is concerned with how the negotiation will proceed. who will have influence and power? what is acceptable behavior? who is included or excluded from the discussion?frequently these matters are not decided in the open but

6、 occur “in the shadows”. the result of this ongoing shadow negotiation is a social contract regarding how the negotiation will proceed, who has influence and power, and what the boundaries of the negotiation are. mcgraw-hill/irwin 2004 the mcgraw-hill companies, inc., all rights reserved.kolb and wi

7、lliams (2001) suggest that negotiators ignore shadow negotiations at their peril because the unaddressed shadow negotiation can lead to negotiations that are “blocked or stalledundermined by hidden assumptions, unrealistic expectations, or personal histories”. they identify three strategic levers av

8、ailable to help people navigate the shadow negotiation: power moves, process moves, and appreciate movesmcgraw-hill/irwin 2004 the mcgraw-hill companies, inc., all rights reserved. power movespower move are designed to bring reluctant bargainers back to the table. there are three kinds of power move

9、s : incentives, pressure tactics ,and the use of allies. process movesprocess moves are designed to alter the negotiation process itself through adjustments to the agenda, sequencing, decision rules, and the like.mcgraw-hill/irwin 2004 the mcgraw-hill companies, inc., all rights reserved. appreciate

10、 movesappreciate moves are designed to break cycles of contentiousness that may have led to deteriorating communication, acrimony, or even silence.mcgraw-hill/irwin 2004 the mcgraw-hill companies, inc., all rights reserved. 2 responding to the other sides hard distributive tacticsby hard tactics we

11、mean the distributive tactics that the other party uses in a negotiation to put pressure on negotiators to do something that is not in their best interest. as a party managing a negotiation mismatch, you can respond to these tactics in the following ways: call them on it, ignore them, respond in kin

12、d, offer to change to more productive methods.mcgraw-hill/irwin 2004 the mcgraw-hill companies, inc., all rights reserved.3 responding when the other side has more power when dealing with a party with more power, negotiators have at least four alternative. they can :(1) protect themselves(2) cultiva

13、te their best alternative to a negotiated agreement (batna)(3) formulate a “trip wire alert system”(4) correct the power imbalance mcgraw-hill/irwin 2004 the mcgraw-hill companies, inc., all rights reserved.4 the special problems of handing ultimatumsan ultimatums is an attempt “to induce compliance

14、 or force concessions from a presumably recalcitrant opponent” . ultimatums typically have three components: (1) a demand (2) an attempt to create a sense of urgency (3) a threat of punishment if compliance dose not occurrobinson (1995) has developed one possible response to ultimatums, which he cal

15、ls the “farpoint gambit” .the success of the response hangs on the ability to say “yes, but” to an ultimatum. mcgraw-hill/irwin 2004 the mcgraw-hill companies, inc., all rights reserved.robinson advise that the farpoint gambit only be used when all three of the following conditions exist:(1) when th

16、e initiator is perceived as behaving unethically and ignores appeals to reason.(2) when the respondent is truly interested in the basic but needs more time to consider it .(3) when there are issue central to the deal that genuinely need clarification. mcgraw-hill/irwin 2004 the mcgraw-hill companies

17、, inc., all rights reserved.5 responding when the other side is being difficult when the other side presents a pattern of clear difficult behavior, two possibilities exist: in the one hand, it is possible that the negotiator does not know any other way to negotiate, but might be responsive to sugges

18、tions for changing his or her behavior. on the other hand, it may be that the other party has a difficult personality and her behavior is consistent within and outside the negotiation context.ury (1991), suggest a broadbased approach that may be used with any other party who is being difficult. mcgr

19、aw-hill/irwin 2004 the mcgraw-hill companies, inc., all rights reserved.urys breakthrough approach: step1: dont reactgo to the balcony step2: disarm them step to their side step3: change the game dont reject, reframe step4: make it easy to say yesbuild them a golden bridge step5: make it hard to say

20、 nobring them to their sense, not their knees. mcgraw-hill/irwin 2004 the mcgraw-hill companies, inc., all rights reserved.responding to difficult people:it is possible to cope with invariably difficult people contending with their behavior on equal behavioral termas opposed to giving in to them, ac

21、cepting their behavior, or getting them to change their values, beliefs, or attitudes. in short, negotiators must effectively counterbalance the potential power these behavior give to those who use them.mcgraw-hill/irwin 2004 the mcgraw-hill companies, inc., all rights reserved.having conversation with difficult people: there are at least three things that people can do once they have an awareness of their likely response to an upcoming difficult conversation:(1)they can visualize in their mind how the conversation wi