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1、UNIT 9 Chinese-American Relations: A History (IIThe Cold War to the PresentThe Cold WarAfter the war, a new war of international tension, intrigue and political posturing, called the Cold War, forced the U. S. to scrap any thoughts of the false comforts of official isolation. It joined the United Na

2、tions (UN and other international organizations, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO, the International Monetary Fund (IMF, and the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT. It was determined to play a major, if not dominant role, in post war international affairs. The world was

3、the stage for intense rivalry between the Communists, on one side, and democratic Capitalists on the other. It fostered close scrutiny of each other, as well as a brisk interchange of often fabricated and distorted propaganda between the polarized sides. It injected the fear that if one side blinked

4、, a nuclear war would be triggered. The world, seemingly, was always on the verge of warfare. This environment placed the United States and China on opposite sides once the Communists took power in China in 1949. This constant friction jeopardized chances for meaningful political interaction and int

5、ercourse. This atmosphere of distrust and fear left little incentive for the different sides to talk seriously.By the end of the Second World War, or during the last year or two of the war, the world stage was being set for the Cold War. President Trumans attitude toward China hardened. American pol

6、icy was explicit that only one China, Nationalist China led by Chiang Kai-shek, on the island of Taiwan, was the official China. The Americans made it abundantly clear, that Mao Tsetungs Communist Regime, on mainland China, would not occupy Chinas permanent seat in the United Nations Security Counci

7、l.The outbreak of war on the Korean Peninsula brought about an abrupt change of focus in American foreign policy. The new American strategy was to militarily isolate or alienate China in Asia. To accomplish this, the United States established bases in East Asia and mutual defense treaties in East As

8、ia. Treaties were negotiated with Japan, the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand. American President Eisenhower later expanded these to include South Korea, Pakistan, and Thailand. To cap off this anti-China strategy, the US strengthened ties with Taiwan or Nationalist China, with which the form

9、er had official diplomatic ties.In the 1950s, American power and credibility deteriorated somewhat in the Cold War. Its own people, who began to oppose McCarthyism and the blunt anti-communist policies of John Foster Dulles, the American Secretary of State in the Eisenhower Administration, helped to

10、 undermined national prestige.In 1953, Josef Stalin, the Soviet leader, died. These events helped to bring about a shift in direction in American foreign policy. The United States began to look more to Asian events as major threats to Americas national security. The Iron Curtain was firmly establish

11、ed in Europe, and NATO forces provided secure protection on the western side of the curtain. For the time being, things looked fairly stable in Europe. In the East, because of the end of the Korean War and the exodus of the French from Indo-China, things were not as stable. The American political el

12、ite contended that the foremost problem was the vacuum left by the French withdrawal from Indo-China. To officials in the United States, this void must not be filled by another communist regime. The realization of objectives of the domino theory (the essence of which was, that if not checked, countr

13、ies in a given area will all gradually fall to communist rule could not be allowed to perpetuate. The Chinese Revolution had established a communist regime in the most populouscountry in the world, and the tensions between North and South Korea were not going to go away overnight. Success of the dom

14、ino theory looked more likely in Asia than in Europe. The United States felt that it needed to concentrate its energies and resources in Asia. American policies, during the 1960s and early 1970s, essentially were to prevent communist takeovers in Asia, in particular, particularly in South Vietnam an

15、d Taiwan. American policy was to contain communism where it already existed, while simultaneously coexisting peacefully with its cold war communist rivals. Military expenditures increased as defense budgets went sky high with democratic and communist bureaucracies building huge arsenals or inventori

16、es of high velocity, even supersonic destructive nuclear weapons, in a very fragile polarized world. Even China tested a thermal nuclear weapon in the early 60s.Thawing of the Cold War-the 1970s to 2001American Cold War policy ensued until the early 1970s, when some major changes in thinking were in

17、augurated. Communist Chinas entry to th e United Nations was a setback for the United States. The Vietnam War was not going well. In the early 70s, American President Nixon, the arch-conservative and anti-communist president, up to that point, was preparing to visit China and the Soviet Union. Why w

18、ould an American president visit these enemies? The Americans came to the realization that the development of good relations with its counterparts in the communist world was necessary. A forthcoming, more pragmatic approach to foreign policy with China was to be a departure from the adverse ideologi

19、cal approach. The United States had lost solid backing from traditional supporters, as illustrated by Communist Chinas entry into the United Nations.The question as to whether Nationalist China or the Peopl es Republic of China should hold Chinas permanent Security Council seat, was a topic of much

20、discussion and debate for years. For many countries, the idea of ignoring one third of the worlds population at the UN was difficult to rationalize. This debate ensued until 1971, when the Peoples Republic of China finally displaced Nationalist China at the United Nations, including the permanent se

21、at, originally held by Nationalist China in the Security Council. A baffled United States could no longer persuade nor intimidate the majority of the countries in the UN General Assembly to keep Communist China out of the UN. The United States had little choice but to eventually extend official reco

22、gnition to the Peoples Republic of China.The war-weary American people were no longer supporting the war in Vietnam and no longer eagerly supporting traditional foreign policy. A major scandal (Watergate, that would rock the Nixon Administration to the resultant resignation of the president, was abo

23、ut to be disclosed. Practical solutions were needed for practical problems. Peaceful coexistence meant finding some common ground on which to activate international trust and cooperation. Nixons consecutive predecessors, Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson would have rolled over in their graves

24、 if they could have seen these changes. These changes would have appeared alien, contradictory or even contrived, to them and their contemporaries.Presidents Ford, Reagan, Bush, and Clinton saw the need to keep communication channels open with China. Americans finally realized that they could no lon

25、ger keep down a sleeping giant. No longer a Paper Tiger, China was a reality, and was entitled to an important place in world decision-making venues.In the 1980s following the Cultural Revolution and the death of Mao Tsetung, Chinas outlook on the world changed dramatically. Deng Xiaopengs reforms w

26、ere to bring China closer to being a major world partner in international trade and the development of world markets. This was cappedwith its admission to the World Trade Organization (WTO in December 2001. China has been most willing to comply with all of the regulations of the WTO. Americans have only half-heartedly opposed Chinas entry, by unfairly using