外部性與公共物品_第1頁
外部性與公共物品_第2頁
外部性與公共物品_第3頁
外部性與公共物品_第4頁
外部性與公共物品_第5頁
已閱讀5頁，還剩139頁未讀， 繼續(xù)免費(fèi)閱讀

下載本文檔

版權(quán)說明：本文檔由用戶提供并上傳，收益歸屬內(nèi)容提供方，若內(nèi)容存在侵權(quán)，請進(jìn)行舉報或認(rèn)領(lǐng)

文檔簡介

Chapter18ExternalitiesandPublicGoodsChapter18ExternalitiesandPuTopicstobeDiscussedExternalitiesWaysofCorrectingMarketFailureExternalitiesandPropertyRightsCommonPropertyResourcesTopicstobeDiscussedExternalTopicstobeDiscussedPublicGoodsPrivatePreferencesforPublicGoodsTopicstobeDiscussedPublicGExternalitiesNegativeActionbyonepartyimposesacostonanotherpartyPositiveActionbyonepartybenefitsanotherpartyExternalitiesNegativeExternalCostScenarioSteelplantdumpingwasteinariverTheentiresteelmarketeffluentcanbereducedbyloweringoutput(fixedproportionsproductionfunction)ExternalCostScenarioExternalCostScenarioMarginalExternalCost(MEC)isthecostimposedonfishermendownstreamforeachlevelofproduction.MarginalSocialCost(MSC)isMCplusMEC.ExternalCostScenarioMCS=MCIDP1AggregatesocialcostofnegativeexternalityP1q1Q1MSCMSCIWhentherearenegativeexternalities,themarginalsocialcostMSCishigherthanthemarginalcost.ExternalCostsFirmoutputPriceIndustryoutputPriceMECMECIThedifferencesisthemarginalexternalcostMEC.q*P*Q*TheindustrypetitiveoutputisQ1whiletheefficientlevelisQ*.

Theprofitmaximizingfirmproducesatq1whiletheefficientoutputlevelisq*.MCS=MCIDP1AggregateP1q1Q1MSExternalCostNegativeExternalitiesencourageinefficientfirmstoremainintheindustryandcreateexcessiveproductioninthelongrun.ExternalCostNegativeExternalExternalitiesPositiveExternalitiesandInefficiencyExternalitiescanalsoresultintoolittleproduction,ascanbeshowninanexampleofhomerepairandlandscaping.ExternalitiesPositiveExternalMCP1ExternalBenefitsRepairLevelValueDIsresearchanddevelopmentdiscouragedbypositiveexternalities?q1MSBMEBWhentherearepositiveexternalities(thebenefitsofrepairstoneighbors),marginalsocialbenefitsMSBarehigherthanmarginalbenefitsD.q*P*Aself-interestedhomeownerinvestsq1inrepairs.Theefficientlevelofrepairsq*ishigher.ThehigherpriceP1discouragesrepair.MCP1ExternalBenefitsRepairLeWaysofCorrectingMarketFailureAssumption:ThemarketfailureispollutionFixed-proportionproductiontechnologyMustreduceoutputtoreduceemissionsUseanoutputtaxtoreduceoutputInputsubstitutionpossiblebyalteringtechnologyWaysofCorrectingMarketFailTheEfficientLevelofEmissionsLevelofEmissions246DollarsperunitofEmissions02468101214161820222426MSCMCAE*Theefficientlevelofemissionsis12(E*)whereMCA=MSC.Assume:1)Competitivemarket2)Outputandemissionsdecisionsareindependent3)ProfitmaximizingoutputchosenAtEothemarginalcostofabatingemissionsisgreaterthanthemarginalsocialcost.E0AtE1themarginalsocialcostisgreaterthanthemarginalbenefit.E1Whyisthismoreefficientthanzeroemissions?TheEfficientLevelofEmissioWaysofCorrectingMarketFailureOptionsforReducingEmissionstoE*EmissionStandardSetalegallimitonemissionsatE*(12)EnforcedbymonetaryandcriminalpenaltiesIncreasesthecostofproductionandthethresholdpricetoentertheindustryWaysofCorrectingMarketFailStandardsandFeesLevelofEmissionsDollarsperunitofEmissionsMSCMCA312E*StandardFeeStandardsandFeesLevelofEmiOptionsforReducingEmissionstoE*EmissionsFeeChargeleviedoneachunitofemissionWaysofCorrectingMarketFailureOptionsforReducingEmissionsTotalAbatementCostCostislessthanthefeeifemissionswerenotreduced.TotalFeeofAbatementStandardsandFeesLevelofEmissionsDollarsperunitofEmissionsMSCMCA312E*FeeTotalCostislessthantheTotaStandardsVersusFeesAssumptionsPolicymakershaveasymmetricinformationAdministrativecostsrequirethesamefeeorstandardforallfirmsWaysofCorrectingMarketFailureStandardsVersusFeesWaysofCFirm2’sReducedAbatementCostsFirm1’sIncreasedAbatementCostsMCA1MCA2TheCaseforFeesLevelofEmissions246FeeperUnitofEmissions01234567891011121313514Thecostminimizingsolutionwouldbeanabatementof6forfirm1and8forfirm2andMCA1=MCA2=$3.3.752.50Theimpactofastandardofabatementof7forbothfirmsisillustrated.NotefficientbecauseMCA2<MCA1.Ifafeeof$3wasimposedFirm1emissionswouldfallby6to8.Firm2emissionswouldfallby8to6.MCA1=MCA2:efficientsolution.Firm2’sReducedFirm1’sIncreAdvantagesofFeesWhenequalstandardsmustbeused,feesachievethesameemissionabatementatlowercost.Feescreateanincentivetoinstallequipmentthatwouldreduceemissionsfurther.WaysofCorrectingMarketFailureAdvantagesofFeesWaysofCorrABCistheincreaseinsocialcostlessthedecreaseinabatementcost.MarginalSocialCostMarginalCostofAbatementTheCaseforStandardsLevelofEmissionsFeeperUnitofEmissions0246810121416246810121416EBasedoninpleteinformationstandardis9(12.5%decrease).ADE<ABCDABCBasedoninpleteinformationfeeis$7(12.5%reduction).Emissionincreasesto11.ABCistheincreaseMarginalMarSummary:Feesvs.StandardsStandardsarepreferredwhenMSCissteepandMCAisflat.Standards(inpleteinformation)yieldmorecertaintyonemissionlevelsandlesscertaintyonthecostofabatement.WaysofCorrectingMarketFailureSummary:Feesvs.StandardsWaySummary:Feesvs.StandardsFeeshavecertaintyoncostanduncertaintyonemissions.Preferredpolicydependsonthenatureofuncertaintyandtheslopesofthecostcurves.WaysofCorrectingMarketFailureSummary:Feesvs.StandardsWayTransferableEmissionsPermitsPermitshelpdevelopapetitivemarketforexternalities.AgencydeterminesthelevelofemissionsandnumberofpermitsPermitsaremarketableHighcostfirmwillpurchasepermitsfromlowcostfirmsWaysofCorrectingMarketFailureTransferableEmissionsPermitsQuestionWhatfactorscouldlimittheefficiencyofthisapproach?WaysofCorrectingMarketFailureQuestionWaysofCorrectingMarTheCostsandBenefits

ofReducedSulfurDioxideEmissionsCostofReducingEmissionsConversiontonaturalgasfromcoalandoilEmissioncontrolequipmentTheCostsandBenefits

ofReduBenefitsofReducingEmissionsHealthReductionincorrosionAestheticTheCostsandBenefits

ofReducedSulfurDioxideEmissionsBenefitsofReducingEmissionsSulfurDioxideEmissionsReductionsSulfurdioxideconcentration(ppm)2040600Dollarsperunitofreduction0.020.040.060.08MarginalSocialCostMarginalAbatementCostObservationsMAC=MSC@.0275.0275isslightlybelowactualemissionlevelEconomicefficiencyimprovedSulfurDioxideEmissionsReducEmissionsTradingandCleanAirBubblesFirmcanadjustpollutioncontrolsforindividualsourcesofpollutantsaslongasatotalpollutantlimitisnotexceeded.OffsetsNewemissionsmustbeoffsetbyreducingexistingemissions2000offsetssince1979EmissionsTradingandCleanAiCostofachievingan85%reductioninhydrocarbonemissionsforDuPontThreeOptions85%reductionateachsourceplant(totalcost=$105.7million)85%reductionateachplantwithinternaltrading(totalcost=$42.6million)85%reductionatallplantswithinternalandexternaltrading(totalcost=$14.6million)EmissionsTradingandCleanAirCostofachievingan85%reduc1990CleanAirActSince1990,thecostofthepermitshasfallenfromanexpected$300tobelow$100.CausesofthedropinpermitpricesMoreefficientabatementtechniquesPriceoflowsulfurcoalhasfallenEmissionsTradingandCleanAir1990CleanAirActEmissionsTrRecyclingHouseholdscandisposeofglassandothergarbageatverylowcost.Thelowcostofdisposalcreatesadivergencebetweentheprivateandthesocialcostofdisposal.WaysofCorrectingMarketFailureRecyclingWaysofCorrectingMaTheEfficientAmountofRecyclingScrapCost04812MCRMSCm*Witharefundabledeposit,MCincreasesandMC=MSC=MCR.MC+perunitrefundMCm1Withoutmarketinterventionthelevelofscrapwillbeatm1

andm1

>m*.TheEfficientAmountofRecyclRefundableDepositsAmountofGlass$DPricefallstoP’andtheamountofrecycledglassincreasestoM*.SvSrSThesupplyofglassisthesumofthesupplyofvirginglass(Sr)andthesupplyofrecycledglass(Sr).M1PWithoutrefundsthepriceofglassisPandSrisM1.S’rS’P’M*WithrefundsSrincreasestoS’randSincreasestoS’.RefundableDepositsAmountofGExternalitiesandPropertyRightsPropertyRightsLegalrulesdescribingwhatpeopleorfirmsmaydowiththeirpropertyForexampleIfresidentsdownstreamownedtheriver(cleanwater)theycontrolupstreamemissions.ExternalitiesandPropertyRigBargainingandEconomicEfficiencyEconomicefficiencycanbeachievedwithoutgovernmentinterventionwhentheexternalityaffectsrelativelyfewpartiesandwhenpropertyrightsarewellspecified.ExternalitiesandPropertyRightsBargainingandEconomicEfficiProfitsUnderAlternative

EmissionsChoices(Daily)Nofilter,nottreatmentplant 500 100 600Filter,notreatmentplant 300 500 800Nofilter,treatmentplant 500 200 700Filter,treatmentplant 300 300 600

Factory’s Fishermen’s Total Profit Profit ProfitProfitsUnderAlternative

EmisAssumptionsFactorypaysforthefilterFishermenpayforthetreatmentplantEfficientSolutionBuythefilteranddonotbuildtheplantExternalitiesandPropertyRightsAssumptionsExternalitiesandPBargainingwith

AlternativePropertyRightsNoCooperation Profitoffactory $500 $300Profitoffishermen $200 $500CooperationProfitoffactory $550 $300Profitoffishermen $250 $500

RighttoDump RighttoCleanWaterBargainingwith

AlternativePConclusion:CoaseTheoremWhenpartiescanbargainwithoutcostandtotheirmutualadvantage,theresultingoutewillbeefficient,regardlessofhowthepropertyrightsarespecified.ExternalitiesandPropertyRightsConclusion:CoaseTheoremExterCostlyBargaining---TheRoleofStrategicBehaviorBargainingrequiresclearlydefinedrulesandpropertyrights.ExternalitiesandPropertyRightsCostlyBargaining---TheRoleALegalSolution---SuingforDamagesFishermenhavetherighttocleanwaterFactoryhastwooptionsNofilter,paydamagesProfit=$100($500-$400)Filter,nodamagesProfit=$300($500-$200)ExternalitiesandPropertyRightsALegalSolution---SuingforALegalSolution---SuingforDamagesFactoryhastherighttoemiteffluentFishermenhavethreeoptionsPutintreatmentplantProfit=$200FilterandpaydamagesProfit=$300($500-$200)Noplant,nofilterProfit=$100ExternalitiesandPropertyRightsALegalSolution---SuingforConclusionAsuitfordamagesresultsinanefficientoute.QuestionHowwouldimperfectinformationimpacttheoute?ExternalitiesandPropertyRightsConclusionExternalitiesandPrTheCoaseTheorematWorkNegotiatinganEfficientSolution1987---NewYorkgarbagespill(200tons)litteredtheNewJerseybeachesThepotentialcostoflitigationresultedinasolutionthatwasmutuallybeneficialtobothparties.TheCoaseTheorematWorkNegotCommonPropertyResourcesCommonPropertyResourceEveryonehasfreeaccess.LikelytobeoverutilizedExamplesAirandwaterFishandanimalpopulationsMineralsCommonPropertyResourcesCommoCommonPropertyResourcesFishperMonthBenefits,Costs($perfish)DemandHowever,privatecostsunderestimatetruecost.Theefficientleveloffish/monthisF*whereMSC=MB(D)MarginalSocialCostF*PrivateCostFCWithoutcontrolthenumberoffish/monthisFCwherePC=MB.CommonPropertyResourcesFishCommonPropertyResourcesSolutionPrivateownershipQuestionWhenwouldprivateownershipbeimpractical?CommonPropertyResourcesSolutCrawfishFishinginLousianaFindingtheEfficientCrawfishCatchF=crawfishcatchinmillionsofpounds/yrC=costindollars/poundCrawfishFishinginLousianaFiCrawfishFishinginLousianaDemandC=0.401=0.0064FMSCC=-5.645+0.6509FPCC=-0.357+0.0573FCrawfishFishinginLousianaDeCrawfishFishinginLousianaEfficientCatch9.2millionpoundsD=MSCCrawfishFishinginLousianaEfCrawfishCatch(millionsofpounds)CCost(dollars/pound)DemandMarginalSocialCostPrivateCostCrawfishasaCommon

PropertyResource0.325CrawfishCatchCDemandMarginalPublicGoodsQuestionWhenshouldgovernmentreplacefirmsastheproducerofgoodsandservices?PublicGoodsQuestionPublicGoodsPublicGoodCharacteristicsNonrivalForanygivenlevelofproductionthemarginalcostofprovidingittoanadditionalconsumeriszero.NonexclusivePeoplecannotbeexcludedfromconsumingthegood.PublicGoodsPublicGoodCharacPublicGoodsNotallgovernmentproducedgoodsarepublicgoodsSomearerivalandnonexclusiveEducationParksPublicGoodsNotallgovernmentD1D2DWhenagoodisnonrival,thesocialmarginalbenefitofconsumption(D),isdeterminedbyverticallysummingtheindividualdemandcurvesforthegood.EfficientPublicGoodProvisionOutput0Benefits(dollars)12345678109$4.00$5.50$7.00MarginalCost$1.50EfficientoutputoccurswhereMC=MBat2unitsofoutput.MBis$1.50+$4.00or$5.50.D1D2DWhenagoodisnonrival,PublicGoodsPublicGoodsandMarketFailureHowmuchnationaldefensedidyouconsumelastweek?PublicGoodsPublicGoodsandMPublicGoodsFreeRidersThereisnowaytoprovidesomegoodsandserviceswithoutbenefitingeveryone.Householdsdonothavetheincentivetopaywhattheitemisworthtothem.Freeridersunderstatethevalueofagoodorservicesothattheycanenjoyitsbenefitwithoutpayingforit.PublicGoodsFreeRidersPublicGoodsEstablishingamosquitoabatementpanyHowdoyoumeasureoutput?Whodoyoucharge?Amosquitometer?PublicGoodsEstablishingamosTheDemandforCleanAirCleanAirisapublicgoodNonexclusiveandnonrivalWhatisthepriceofcleanair?TheDemandforCleanAirCleanTheDemandforCleanAirChoosingwheretoliveStudyinBostoncorrelateshousingpriceswiththequalityofairandothercharacteristicsofthehousesandtheirneighborhoods.TheDemandforCleanAirChoosiTheDemandforCleanAirNitrogenOxides(pphm)0Dollars1234567810920002500300050015001000LowIneMiddleIneHighIneTheDemandforCleanAirNitrogTheDemandforCleanAirFindingsAmountpeoplearewillingtopayforcleanairincreasessubstantiallyaspollutionincreases.Higherineearnersarewillingtopaymore(thegapbetweenthedemandcurveswiden)NationalAcademyofSciencesfoundthata10%reductioninautoemissionsyieldedabenefitof$2billion---somewhatgreaterthanthecost.TheDemandforCleanAirFindinPrivatePreferencesforPublicGoodsGovernmentproductionofapublicgoodisadvantageousbecausethegovernmentcanassesstaxesorfeestopayforit.Determininghowmuchofapublicgoodtoprovidewhenfreeridersexistisdifficult.PrivatePreferencesforPublicDeterminingtheLevel

ofEducationalSpendingEducationalspendingperpupil$0Willingnesstopay$$1200$600$1800$2400W1W2W3AWTheefficientlevelofeducationalspendingisdeterminedbysummingthewillingnesstopayforeducationforeachofthreecitizens.DeterminingtheLevel

ofEducaDeterminingtheLevel

ofEducationalSpendingEducationalspendingperpupil$0Willingnesstopay$$1200$600$1800$2400W1W2W3AWWillmajorityruleyieldanefficientoute?W1willvotefor$600W2andW3willvotefor$1200Themedianvotewillalwayswininamajorityruleelection.DeterminingtheLevel

ofEducaQuestionWillthemedianvoterselectionalwaysbeefficient?AnswerIftwoofthethreepreferred$1200therewouldbeoverinvestment.Iftwoofthethreepreferred$600therewouldbeunderinvestment.PrivatePreferencesforPublicGoodsQuestionPrivatePreferencesfoMajorityruleisinefficientbecauseitweighseachcitizen’spreferenceequally---theefficientouteweighseachcitizen’svotebyhisorherstrengthofpreference.PrivatePreferencesforPublicGoodsMajorityruleisinefficientbSummaryThereisanexternalitywhenaproduceroraconsumeraffectstheproductionorconsumptionactivitiesofothersinamannerthatisnotdirectlyreflectedinthemarket.Pollutioncanbecorrectedbyemissionstandards,emissionsfees,marketableemissionspermits,orbyencouragingrecycling.SummaryThereisanexternalitySummaryInefficienciesduetomarketfailuremaybeeliminatedthroughprivatebargainingamongtheaffectedparties.Commonpropertyresourcesarenotcontrolledbyasinglepersonandcanbeusedwithoutapricebeingpaid.SummaryInefficienciesduetomSummaryGoodsthatprivatemarketsarenotlikelytoproduceefficientlyareeithernonrivalornonexclusive.Publicgoodsareboth.Apublicgoodisprovidedefficientlywhentheverticalsumoftheindividualdemandsforthepublicgoodisequaltothemarginalcostofproducingit.SummaryGoodsthatprivatemarkSummaryUndermajorityrulevoting,thelevelofspendingprovidedwillbethatpreferredbythemedianvoter---thisneednotbetheefficientoute.SummaryUndermajorityrulevot

EndofChapter18ExternalitiesandPublicGoodsEndofChapter18ExternalitieChapter18ExternalitiesandPublicGoodsChapter18ExternalitiesandPuTopicstobeDiscussedExternalitiesWaysofCorrectingMarketFailureExternalitiesandPropertyRightsCommonPropertyResourcesTopicstobeDiscussedExternalTopicstobeDiscussedPublicGoodsPrivatePreferencesforPublicGoodsTopicstobeDiscussedPublicGExternalitiesNegativeActionbyonepartyimposesacostonanotherpartyPositiveActionbyonepartybenefitsanotherpartyExternalitiesNegativeExternalCostScenarioSteelplantdumpingwasteinariverTheentiresteelmarketeffluentcanbereducedbyloweringoutput(fixedproportionsproductionfunction)ExternalCostScenarioExternalCostScenarioMarginalExternalCost(MEC)isthecostimposedonfishermendownstreamforeachlevelofproduction.MarginalSocialCost(MSC)isMCplusMEC.ExternalCostScenarioMCS=MCIDP1AggregatesocialcostofnegativeexternalityP1q1Q1MSCMSCIWhentherearenegativeexternalities,themarginalsocialcostMSCishigherthanthemarginalcost.ExternalCostsFirmoutputPriceIndustryoutputPriceMECMECIThedifferencesisthemarginalexternalcostMEC.q*P*Q*TheindustrypetitiveoutputisQ1whiletheefficientlevelisQ*.

Theprofitmaximizingfirmproducesatq1whiletheefficientoutputlevelisq*.MCS=MCIDP1AggregateP1q1Q1MSExternalCostNegativeExternalitiesencourageinefficientfirmstoremainintheindustryandcreateexcessiveproductioninthelongrun.ExternalCostNegativeExternalExternalitiesPositiveExternalitiesandInefficiencyExternalitiescanalsoresultintoolittleproduction,ascanbeshowninanexampleofhomerepairandlandscaping.ExternalitiesPositiveExternalMCP1ExternalBenefitsRepairLevelValueDIsresearchanddevelopmentdiscouragedbypositiveexternalities?q1MSBMEBWhentherearepositiveexternalities(thebenefitsofrepairstoneighbors),marginalsocialbenefitsMSBarehigherthanmarginalbenefitsD.q*P*Aself-interestedhomeownerinvestsq1inrepairs.Theefficientlevelofrepairsq*ishigher.ThehigherpriceP1discouragesrepair.MCP1ExternalBenefitsRepairLeWaysofCorrectingMarketFailureAssumption:ThemarketfailureispollutionFixed-proportionproductiontechnologyMustreduceoutputtoreduceemissionsUseanoutputtaxtoreduceoutputInputsubstitutionpossiblebyalteringtechnologyWaysofCorrectingMarketFailTheEfficientLevelofEmissionsLevelofEmissions246DollarsperunitofEmissions02468101214161820222426MSCMCAE*Theefficientlevelofemissionsis12(E*)whereMCA=MSC.Assume:1)Competitivemarket2)Outputandemissionsdecisionsareindependent3)ProfitmaximizingoutputchosenAtEothemarginalcostofabatingemissionsisgreaterthanthemarginalsocialcost.E0AtE1themarginalsocialcostisgreaterthanthemarginalbenefit.E1Whyisthismoreefficientthanzeroemissions?TheEfficientLevelofEmissioWaysofCorrectingMarketFailureOptionsforReducingEmissionstoE*EmissionStandardSetalegallimitonemissionsatE*(12)EnforcedbymonetaryandcriminalpenaltiesIncreasesthecostofproductionandthethresholdpricetoentertheindustryWaysofCorrectingMarketFailStandardsandFeesLevelofEmissionsDollarsperunitofEmissionsMSCMCA312E*StandardFeeStandardsandFeesLevelofEmiOptionsforReducingEmissionstoE*EmissionsFeeChargeleviedoneachunitofemissionWaysofCorrectingMarketFailureOptionsforReducingEmissionsTotalAbatementCostCostislessthanthefeeifemissionswerenotreduced.TotalFeeofAbatementStandardsandFeesLevelofEmissionsDollarsperunitofEmissionsMSCMCA312E*FeeTotalCostislessthantheTotaStandardsVersusFeesAssumptionsPolicymakershaveasymmetricinformationAdministrativecostsrequirethesamefeeorstandardforallfirmsWaysofCorrectingMarketFailureStandardsVersusFeesWaysofCFirm2’sReducedAbatementCostsFirm1’sIncreasedAbatementCostsMCA1MCA2TheCaseforFeesLevelofEmissions246FeeperUnitofEmissions01234567891011121313514Thecostminimizingsolutionwouldbeanabatementof6forfirm1and8forfirm2andMCA1=MCA2=$3.3.752.50Theimpactofastandardofabatementof7forbothfirmsisillustrated.NotefficientbecauseMCA2<MCA1.Ifafeeof$3wasimposedFirm1emissionswouldfallby6to8.Firm2emissionswouldfallby8to6.MCA1=MCA2:efficientsolution.Firm2’sReducedFirm1’sIncreAdvantagesofFeesWhenequalstandardsmustbeused,feesachievethesameemissionabatementatlowercost.Feescreateanincentivetoinstallequipmentthatwouldreduceemissionsfurther.WaysofCorrectingMarketFailureAdvantagesofFeesWaysofCorrABCistheincreaseinsocialcostlessthedecreaseinabatementcost.MarginalSocialCostMarginalCostofAbatementTheCaseforStandardsLevelofEmissionsFeeperUnitofEmissions0246810121416246810121416EBasedoninpleteinformationstandardis9(12.5%decrease).ADE<ABCDABCBasedoninpleteinformationfeeis$7(12.5%reduction).Emissionincreasesto11.ABCistheincreaseMarginalMarSummary:Feesvs.StandardsStandardsarepreferredwhenMSCissteepandMCAisflat.Standards(inpleteinformation)yieldmorecertaintyonemissionlevelsandlesscertaintyonthecostofabatement.WaysofCorrectingMarketFailureSummary:Feesvs.StandardsWaySummary:Feesvs.StandardsFeeshavecertaintyoncostanduncertaintyonemissions.Preferredpolicydependsonthenatureofuncertaintyandtheslopesofthecostcurves.WaysofCorrectingMarketFailureSummary:Feesvs.StandardsWayTransferableEmissionsPermitsPermitshelpdevelopapetitivemarketforexternalities.AgencydeterminesthelevelofemissionsandnumberofpermitsPermitsaremarketableHighcostfirmwillpurchasepermitsfromlowcostfirmsWaysofCorrectingMarketFailureTransferableEmissionsPermitsQuestionWhatfactorscouldlimittheefficiencyofthisapproach?WaysofCorrectingMarketFailureQuestionWaysofCorrectingMarTheCostsandBenefits

ofReducedSulfurDioxideEmissionsCostofReducingEmissionsConversiontonaturalgasfromcoalandoilEmissioncontrolequipmentTheCostsandBenefits

ofReduBenefitsofReducingEmissionsHealthReductionincorrosionAestheticTheCostsandBenefits

ofReducedSulfurDioxideEmissionsBenefitsofReducingEmissionsSulfurDioxideEmissionsReductionsSulfurdioxideconcentration(ppm)2040600Dollarsperunitofreduction0.020.040.060.08MarginalSocialCostMarginalAbatementCostObservationsMAC=MSC@.0275.0275isslightlybelowactualemissionlevelEconomicefficiencyimprovedSulfurDioxideEmissionsReducEmissionsTradingandCleanAirBubblesFirmcanadjustpollutioncontrolsforindividualsourcesofpollutantsaslongasatotalpollutantlimitisnotexceeded.OffsetsNewemissionsmustbeoffsetbyreducingexistingemissions2000offsetssince1979EmissionsTradingandCleanAiCostofachievingan85%reductioninhydrocarbonemissionsforDuPontThreeOptions85%reductionateachsourceplant(totalcost=$105.7million)85%reductionateachplantwithinternaltrading(totalcost=$42.6million)85%reductionatallplantswithinternalandexternaltrading(totalcost=$14.6million)EmissionsTradingandCleanAirCostofachievingan85%reduc1990CleanAirActSince1990,thecostofthepermitshasfallenfromanexpected$300tobelow$100.CausesofthedropinpermitpricesMoreefficientabatementtechniquesPriceoflowsulfurcoalhasfallenEmissionsTradingandCleanAir1990CleanAirActEmissionsTrRecyclingHouseholdscandisposeofglassandothergarbageatverylowcost.Thelowcostofdisposalcreatesadivergencebetweentheprivateandthesocialcostofdisposal.WaysofCorrectingMarketFailureRecyclingWaysofCorrectingMaTheEfficientAmountofRecyclingScrapCost04812MCRMSCm*Witharefundabledeposit,MCincreasesandMC=MSC=MCR.MC+perunitrefundMCm1Withoutmarketinterventionthelevelofscrapwillbeatm1

andm1

>m*.TheEfficientAmountofRecyclRefundableDepositsAmountofGlass$DPricefallstoP’andtheamountofrecycledglassincreasestoM*.SvSrSThesupplyofglassisthesumofthesupplyofvirginglass(Sr)andthesupplyofrecycledglass(Sr).M1PWithoutrefundsthepriceofglassisPandSrisM1.S’rS’P’M*WithrefundsSrincreasestoS’randSincreasestoS’.RefundableDepositsAmountofGExternalitiesandPropertyRightsPropertyRightsLegalrulesdescribingwhatpeopleorfirmsmaydowiththeirpropertyForexampleIfresidentsdownstreamownedtheriver(cleanwater)theycontrolupstreamemissions.ExternalitiesandPropertyRigBargainingandEconomicE

溫馨提示

  • 1. 本站所有資源如無特殊說明，都需要本地電腦安裝OFFICE2007和PDF閱讀器。圖紙軟件為CAD,CAXA,PROE,UG,SolidWorks等.壓縮文件請下載最新的WinRAR軟件解壓。
  • 2. 本站的文檔不包含任何第三方提供的附件圖紙等，如果需要附件，請聯(lián)系上傳者。文件的所有權(quán)益歸上傳用戶所有。
  • 3. 本站RAR壓縮包中若帶圖紙，網(wǎng)頁內(nèi)容里面會有圖紙預(yù)覽，若沒有圖紙預(yù)覽就沒有圖紙。
  • 4. 未經(jīng)權(quán)益所有人同意不得將文件中的內(nèi)容挪作商業(yè)或盈利用途。
  • 5. 人人文庫網(wǎng)僅提供信息存儲空間，僅對用戶上傳內(nèi)容的表現(xiàn)方式做保護(hù)處理，對用戶上傳分享的文檔內(nèi)容本身不做任何修改或編輯，并不能對任何下載內(nèi)容負(fù)責(zé)。
  • 6. 下載文件中如有侵權(quán)或不適當(dāng)內(nèi)容，請與我們聯(lián)系，我們立即糾正。
  • 7. 本站不保證下載資源的準(zhǔn)確性、安全性和完整性, 同時也不承擔(dān)用戶因使用這些下載資源對自己和他人造成任何形式的傷害或損失。

評論

0/150

提交評論