亞開行-中國的長期增長前景

CONTENTSTABLES,FIGURES,ANDBOXESivACKNOWLEDGMENTSviCURRENCYEQUIVALENTSviiABBREVIATIONSviiEXECUTIVESUMMARYviiiIIntroduction1sBLabor8DCapital10FResults18BLabor23D.Capital26Appendixes41thonsReferences50TABLES,FIGURES,ANDBOXESnrsriesngpenancingDebtprisesACKNOWLEDGMENTSCURRENCYEQUIVALENTSABBREVIATIONS–UnitedStatesEXECUTIVESUMMARYedeI.INTRODUCTIONn86420 01969864201020304050607010203040506070808642000 RepublicofKorea08642019205101520250(ii)Sector-basedapproach:Anotherapproach,usingsectoralcatch-up,deploysasimilart(iii)ExtendedSolowmodel10:Bailliuetal.(2016),RobertsandRussell(2019),andHigginsSummersandPritchett(2014)Barro(2016)Sasakietal.(2021)Zhuetal.(2019)Bailliuetal.(2016)Higgins(2020)RobertsandRussell(2019)8765432102023202820332038III.MODELSPECIFICATIONANDRESULTSrm(3).),FigureFigure9:ImpactofFertilityAssumptionsonWorking-AgePopulationProjectionsupto2050(5).d0ysneMaandIwasaki1)conductedameta-analysisof213studiesonreturnstoeducation,confirmingthatamajorityof2000–20402000–204000High-High-incomecountriesUppermiddle-incomecountries2010201520202025203020352040s0SourcesHerd0)viaWorldBank’sDevelopmentDataHub(/);andauthors’calculations.sksonlineGrossdomesticsavings(%ofGDP)Gross?xedcapitalformation(%ofGDP) Working-agepopulation(%oftotalpopulation)00t-50t-45t-40t-35t-30t-25t-20t-15t-10t-5t+5tt-50t-45t-40t-35t-30t-25t-20t-15t-10t-5t+5t+10t+15t+20t+25t+30t+35t+40t+45t+50blicofKorea50ldo502000–20402000–20402000–204002000–20400505050enosg0010,00020,00030,00040,00050,000atyhantheservicesectordeclinedafterwhilelowskillservicesabsorbedpartofthelaidoff656543210-1nallaborshift30componentsandtheoverallfor2001–2002.30CBO(2005)notesthatresearchbyGriliches(1991)arguedthatR&Dspending,assuminghighsocialreturnsfromR&D,couldaccountforalmostthree-quartersofTFPgrowthduringthepostwarperiod.F.Results),the2001–20052006–20102011–20152016–20192020–20252026–20302031–20352036–20402001–20052006–20102011–20152016–20192020–20252026–20302031–20352036–2040TFPTFP86420neeCdggy35SeediscussioninBox3laterinpartIV.aegoffceendofFigureBItseemsunlikelyout050-5-10-1550-5-10-15QQ12007Q12008Q12009Q12010Q12011Q12012Q12013Q12014Q12015Q12016Q12017Q12018Q12019Q12020Q12021Q12022eOctober2022).ISdte0JLJLQHYNSNGDHBFJXZAHZJBJHLSCXZAHZJBJGSSXHNSDIMGZA.ReformAreased76543210k(iii)Raisefemaleworkforceparticipation.40Possiblemeasuresincludestrengtheningrually86486420PRCJapan 0446.447.728.629.80n054.6Rural86420 Total(ii)Improveruraleducationandsupportchildrenofmigrantworker.Morefundingfrom(iii)Improvethequalityofeducationandqualificationoftheworkforce.Thisincludesls045Calculatedasinvestmentratio(GFCFas%of045Calculatedasinvestmentratio(GFCFas%ofGDP)dividedbyGDPgrowth(Kwan2004).incontributortogrowthasconsumptiontookahitchartICOR0oSOEon765432100esreductionincludedcement,glass,andagriculture(Boulter2018).Atthesametime,SOEsinthe48SOEsareenterpriseswhoseentireassetsarestate-ownedandareregisteredasanunincorporatedeconomicorganization.49Kroeber(2020,chapter14)notesthatsupply-sidestructuralreformsstartedtocollidewitheconomicgrowthtargetsin2018andwereshelved.Boulter(2018)notesthattheprofitmargininthesteelsectorimprovedin2016–2018.ey(ii)Leveltheplayingfield.Thereshouldbealevelplayingfieldfortheprivatesectorto(iii)SeparatesocialfunctionsfromSOEs.InthePRC,manySOEsalsoperformsocialfivImproveSOEmanagement.ThemanagementandsupervisionofSOEsmustbeoROAstateholdingenterprisesROAprivateenterpriseserprisesROEprivateenterprises050500ise0LoansShadowbank?nancingCorporatebondsEquitysShareincreditoutstandingShadowbank?nancingoutstanding(RHS)500-15dind0smallloansbyoplesBankofChinaothersfromOECD.accessedSeptember022);andADBcalculations.8–2022o 9876543210Do20132014201520162017201820192020Note:Chartshowstheratioofshort-termloanstoiumandlongtermloansShorttermloanshaveaSourcesOECD022b);andADBcalculations.rJoint-stockcommercialbanksPolicybanks CitycommercialbanksOtherRuralcommercialbanksLargecommercial20202007Q42008Q42009Q42010Q42011Q42012Q42013Q42014Q42015Q42016Q42017Q42018Q42019Q42020Q42021Q42022Q20ansOtherconsumerloansMortgageloansHouseholddebt(RHS)0Financialrepressionandassetpriceinflation.Banks’netinterestmargintendstomovewiththe Corporatedebt0Corporate00-10a(ii)Businessloansoutstanding(aspercentageofGDP)havehardlyincreasedoverthepast(iii)LoanstoSMEscouldnotincreasetheirshareafter2012(until2017,latestavailabledata).(iv)Theratioofshort-termtomedium-andlong-termSMElendingstagnatedafter2017,wheneconomicconditionsbecamefraughtwithhigheruncertainty.n(ii)Shiftbusinessloanstotheprivatesector.Increasetheshareofloanstotheprivate(iv)Movetolonger-termfinancing.Ahighshareofshort-termloanspotentiallyleadstoaAgriculture002022).2022).grk00sc002000–202020002005201020152020ssNote:Non-OECDcomprises46economies.pxdatasetcodeFDIINDEXessedSeptember0.020032006201020152020yesZheng,Zhuang,andWang(2020)seeinsufficientintellectualproperty(IP)rightsprotectionasangementis(ii)Facilitatenewtradeandinvestmentagreements.Lookingforward,thePRC’sr(iii)Loosenrestrictionsonforeigndirectinvestment.TopotentiallyincreaseFDIinflow,wsthatstrengtheningIPrightsoV.OUTLOOKONPOLICYCHALLENGESANDREFORMSrPAPPENDIXES9876543210DeviationetancywhereNsistheshareofpopulationwithnoeducation.Tpi,Tsi,andTtiaretheshareofagegroupiwith(3).WhileHiggins(2020)andRobertsandRussell(2019)onlyprovideaggregatedresults,Bailliuetal.snAuthors’estimateKLAuthors’forecas