隱喻轉(zhuǎn)喻比較

CognitiveLinguisticsKeyPointsBasicconceptscognitivelinguisticscateorycategorizationprototypeprototypetheoryMetaphormetonymyiconicitygrammaticalizationTheclassicaltheoryofcategorizationTheprototypetheoryofcategorizationConceptualmetaphorandmetonymyMajortypesoficonicityinlanguageGrammaticalizationCategorizationandcategoriesHaveyouseenatree?Ibetthatstrictlyspeakingyouhaven't,foryouhaveseenawillow,apeachtree,oranyparticulartree,butyouhaven'tseenanabstracttree.Thesameistruewiththeworddog.Haveyouseenadog?Youhaven't,notintheabstractsenseoftheword.Youhaveseenawhitedog,ayellowdog,yourowndogoryourneighbour'sdog,butyouhaven'tseenanabstractdog.Adog(oratreeforthatmatter)standsforallthecharacteristicsofthespeciesitrefersto.Thespecialtermforthisphenomenoniscalledcategory.Andthementalprocessofclassificationiscalledcategorization,whichisoneoftheimportantcapabilitiesofthehumanmind.Categorizationoccurseverywherearoundus,withoutitalotofinformationwouldbeindisorder.Infact,peoplearequiteabletodividetheworldintocategories,andtheycanlearntodistinguishbetweendifferentcategoriessuchasCARandBUS.Forexample,asastudent,youmaybeclassifiedasaFRESHMAN,SOPHOMORE,JUNIOR,orSENIOR;youmayalsobeclassifiedbyyourmajor.Astothecoloursystem,wehavecolourcategories,suchasRED,WHITE,BLACK,YELLOW,andBLUE.MoviesinAmericahavealreadybeencategorizedasG(GeneralAudiences:usedtomeanthatafilmissuitableforanyonetowatch),PG(parentalguidance:usedtodescribeafilmcontainingscenes,subjects,orlanguageconsideredunsuitableforchildrenunlesstheyhaveaparentwiththem),R(restricted:usedtomeanthatthepeopleundertheageof17cannotgotoaparticularfilmunlesstheygowithanadult),orX(usedtomeanthatafilmisnotsuitableforpeopleundertheageof18).Thelistofcategorizationexamplesispracticallyendless.Butwhatprinciplesdopeopleusewhentheydocategorizing.Generallyspeaking,therearetwomajortheorieswhichdealwiththisproblem.Oneistheclassicaltheory,andtheotheristheprototypetheory.10.2.1TheclassicaltheoryTheclassicaltheoryofcategorizationcanbetracedbacktoAristotle,anditiscarriedforwardbystructuralistandtransformationalistlinguists.Accordingtothistheory,intheBIRDcategory,forexample,ifacreaturehastwowings,twolegs,abeak,feathersandlayseggs(thesearethenecessaryconditions),thenitisabird;ontheotherhand,ifacreaturehasallthesefeatures,thisisalsosufficientforclassifyingitasabird.Thisseemstotellusthatcategoriesaredefinedbyalimitedsetofnecessaryandsufficientconditions(theseconditionsareregardedasfeatures).Inotherwords,athingcannotbothbeandnotbe,itcannotbothhaveafeatureandnothaveit,itcannotbothbelongtoacategoryandnotbelongtoit.Thisisthefirstassumptionoftheclassicaltheory.Inthedefinitionofacategory,oneoftwovalues,either[+]or[-],canbeused.Forexample,theBIRDcategoryhasthefeature[+twolegs],but[-fourlegs].Thismeansthatafeatureiseitherinthedefinitionofacategory,oritisnot;anentityeitherhasthisfeature,oritdoesnot.Thatis,featuresarebinary.Thisisthesecondassumption.Onceacategoryhasbeenestablished,ithasdividedtheuniverseintotwosetsofentities.Inthiscase,someentitiesarethemembersofthecategory,whiletheothersarenot.Therearenoborderlinecases.Forinstance,aftertheBIRDcategoryisformed,somecreaturessuchasthesparrow,therobin,andtheswallowarethemembersofBIRD,butotherssuchaslions,tigers,andbearsarenot,becausethelatterarethemembersoftheBEASTcategory.Theviewcanbedemonstratedinthefollowingfigure:ThisshowsthatthetwocategoriesBIRDandBEASThaveclearboundaries.Ingeneral,categorieshaveclearboundaries.Thisisthethirdassumption.Thefourthassumptionisthatallmembersofacategoryhaveequalstatus.Thismeansthatamemberthathasallthefeaturesofacategoryisafullmemberofthecategory;amemberthatdoesnothaveallthefeaturesisnotamember.Thereisnosuchcaseinwhichonememberisbetterthanothersinthesamecategory.Therefore,accordingtothisview,wecannotsaythatthesparrowisabettermemberthantheostrichintheBIRDcategory.Theclassicaltheoryhasdominatedforalongtime,butithasalsosufferedfromcriticisms.Suchaviewofcategorizationisboundtorunintodifficultieswhenitisusedtodescribecategorieswhichhavegoodandbadmembersandfuzzyboundaries.Thingsintheworldaremuchtoocomplexforatheoryasneatastheclassicaltheory.Certainthingsdonotfallintoclear-cutcategories.Forinstance,doostrichesandpenguinsbelongtotheBIRDcategory?Eveniftheydo,aren'ttheylessofbirdsthanrobinsare?Thenwhataboutducksandpeacocks?Aretheymoreofbirdsthanpenguins?(SeeFigure1inthenextsection)PrototypetheoryInthefruitcategorythereareagreatnumberofexamplessuchasorange,apple,banana,peach,apricot,plum,tangelo,andpapaya.Ifyouareaskedwhicharethebestexamples,youwouldpossiblyanswerthatorangeandapplearethebestones.Thebestexamplesofacategoryarecalledprototypes.Somescholarsthinkthatnaturalcategoriesareorganizedaccordingtoprototypes.Accordingtoprototypetheory,peopledecidewhetheranentitybelongstoacategorybycomparingthatentitywithaprototype.Iftheentityissimilartotheprototype,itisincludedinthecategory.However,ifitissufficientlydifferent,itisplacedinanothercategory,inwhichitresemblestheprototypeforthatcategorymoreclosely.Membersofacategorythereforedifferintheirprototypicality,ordegreetowhichtheyareprototypical.Forexample,arobinandasparrowareveryprototypicalbirds,whileostrichesandpenguinsareverylowinprototypicality.Infact,ostrichesandpenguinscanbecallednonprototypesbecausetheyarefarawaytheprototypeofabirdFigure1:TheBIRDcategoryPrototypetheorystartedinthemid-1970swithE.Rosch'spsycholinguisticresearchintotheinternalstructureofcategories.Fromitspsycholinguisticorigin,prototypetheoryhasmovedmainlyintwodirections.Ontheonehand,information-processingpsychologytakesRosch'sfindingsandproposals,andtriestodeviseformalmodelsforhumanconceptualmemoryanditsoperation.Ontheotherhand,prototypetheoryhasasteadilygrowingsuccessinlinguisticssincetheearly1980s.Itisthislinguistictraditionofprototype-theoreticalresearchthatprototypetheoryhasaveryimportantstatusincognitivelinguistics.Prototypetheoryisusefulforexplaininghowpeopledealwithuntypicalexamplesofacategory.Thisishowunbirdybirdssuchaspenguinsandpelicanscanstillberegardedasbirds.Theyaresufficientlyliketheprototype,eventhoughtheydonotshareallitscharacteristics.Butithasafurtheradvantage:itcanexplainhowpeopledealwithdamagedexamples.Previouslylinguistshadfounditdifficulttoexplainwhypeoplecouldstillcategorizeaone-wingedrobinwhocouldn'tflyasabird,orathree-leggedlionasalion.Nowwejustassumethatthesegetmatchedagainsttheprototypeinthesamewayasanuntypicalcategorymember.Aone-wingedrobinwhocan'tflycanstillbeabird,eventhoughit'snotsuchatypicalone.Inaddition,prototypetheorycanworkforactionsaswellasobjects.Forexample,peoplecanjudgethatmurderisabetterexampleofkillingthanexecuteorsuicide,andthatstareisabetterexampleoflookingthanpeerorsquint.LevelsofcategorizationAnobjectcanbelongtomanydifferent,relatedcategories.Forexample,thewoodenobjectuponwhichyouaresittingcanbecalledbyseveraldifferentnames:furniture,chair,ordeskchair.Sowecanseethatcategoriesarrangefromleveltolevel.Somecategorylevelsarecalledsuperordinatelevels,whichmeanhigherlevelsormoregenerallevels.Furnitureandanimalareexamplesofsuperordinatecategorylevels.Basic-levelcategoriesaremorespecific,butnottoospecific.Chairisanexampleofbasic-levelcategories.Finally,therearesubordinatelevels,whichmeanslowerlevelormorespecificcategories.Deskchairisanexampleofsubordinatecategories.However,basiclevelcategorieshaveaspecialstatus.Noticethattherearedifferencesbetweenthetermsprototypeandbasic-levelcategory.Aprototypeisabestexampleofacategory,whetherthecategorylevelissuperordinate,basic-level,orsubordinate.Ithasbeenfoundthatchildrenlearnbasiclevelwordsfirst,forthesimplereasonthattheyarenottoogeneralnortoospecificandtheyaremostuseful.Basiclevelcategoriesarebasicinthreerespects.Perception:Overallperceivedshape;singlementalimage;fastidentification.Communication:Shortest,mostcommonlyusedandcontextuallyneutralwords,firstlearnedbychildrenandfirsttoenterthelexicon.Knowledgeorganization:Mostattributesofcategorymembersarestoredatthislevel.Itisnothardtoseethatbasiclevelcategoriestakeprimacyovercategoriesatotherlevels.Thisismostlybecauseitisatthislevelthatweperceivetheevidentdifferencesbetweenobjectsandorganismsoftheworld.Mostofthetime,weunderstandsuperordinatecategoriesinaidofthefeaturesofbasiclevelcategories.Forinstance,thecomprehensionoffurniturecomesfromthecollectivepropertiesoftypicalmemberslikechairs,tables,desks,andbedsinthebasiclevel.Similarly,bythetimeachildcanunderstandanimal,hemusthavelearntcat,dog,lion,tiger,cow,andmanyothers.10.3ConceptualmetaphorandmetonymyConceptualmetaphorTraditionally,metaphorisafigureofspeechinwhichonethingiscomparedtoanotherbysayingthatoneistheother,asin“Heisatiger”.Itisapropertyofwords,andisusedforsomeartisticandrhetoricpurpose.However,thisviewhasbeenchallengedrecentlybycognitivelinguists.Inthecognitivelinguisticview,metaphorisapropertyofconcepts,anditisapowerfulcognitivetoolforourconceptualizationofabstractcategories.Itispervasiveinourlanguage.Accordingtocognitivelinguistics,metaphorisdefinedasunderstandingoneconceptualdomainorcognitivedomainintermsofanotherconceptualdomain.Theconceptualdomainfromwhichwedrawmetaphoricalexpressionstounderstandanotherconceptualdomainiscalledsourcedomain(“tiger”intheaboveexample),whiletheconceptualdomainthatisunderstoodthiswayiscalledtargetdomain(“He”intheaboveexample).Thus,metaphorcanbediagrammedasfollows:CONCEpTUALDOMAIN(A)ISCONCEPTUALDOMAIN(B)I ITARGETDOMAIN SOURCEDOMAINThus,incognitivelinguisticsmetaphoriscalledconceptualmetaphorbecauseitisapropertyofconcepts.Fromthisdiagramwecanseethataconceptualmetaphorconsistsoftwoconceptualdomains,inwhichonedomainisunderstoodintermsofanother.Someexamplesofconceptualmetaphorareinthefollowing:LOVEISAJOURNEYLookhowfarwe'vecome.We'lljusthavetogoourseparateways.Wecan'tturnbacknow.Ourmarriageisontherocks.We'vegottenoffthetrack.Thisrelationshipisfoundering.IDEASAREFOODTherearetoomanyfactshereformetodigestthemall.Ijustcan'tswallowthatclaim.That'sfoodforthought.Hedevouredthebook.ANARGUMENTISWARYourclaimsareindefensible.Theyattackedeveryweakpointinourargument.I'veneverwonanargumentwithhim.Youdisagree?Okay,shoot!Ifyouusethatstrategy,he'llwipeyouout.Heshotdownallofmyarguments.10.3.2ConceptualmetonymyAccordingtotheclassicaldefinition,metonymyisafigureofspeechinwhichonewordissubstitutedforanotheronthebasisofsomematerial,causal,orconceptualrelation.Sometypicalsubstitutionsincludeauthorforwork,placeforacharacteristicproductofthatplace,objectforpossessor,abstractfeaturesforconcreteentities,etc.Someexamplesare:HaveyoueverreadShakespeare?WarywantsBurgundy(redorwhitewinefromtheBurgundyareaofFrance).Thecrownobjectstotheproposal.Iwantmylovetobewithmeallthetime.However,therhetoricaltreatmentofmetonymyfacesaninterestingparadox.Ontheonehand,itcapturesalotofphenomenawhichcontinuetobeproductiveandwide-spreadinavarietyoflanguages;inaddition,theseseemtobeproducedandunderstoodnaturallyandspontaneously.Ontheotherhand,itregardsmetonymyasafigureofspeech,thatis,adeparturefromthelinguisticnorm,servingornamentalandliterarypurposesanddemandingsuitabletrainingforitssuccessfuluseandcomprehension.Whenweturnedtoacognitiveviewoffigurativelanguage,weonlypaidattentiontotheroleofmetaphorbutnotthatofmetonymy,intheconstructionofabstractcategories.However,metonymydoesplayaveryimportantpartinthestructuresofemotioncategories.Forexample,wehaveageneralmetonymicprinciple:THEBODILYSYMPTOMSOFANEMOTIONSTANDFORTHEEMOTION.Accordingtothisprinciple,wecanfindthatthereareindeedbodilysymptomswhichseemtobehelpfulforadescriptionoftheconceptualstructureofemotionsbecausetheyarepeculiartooneparticularemotion:dropintemperatureforFEAR(e.g.“Iwaschilledtothebone.”),erectpostureforPRIDE(e.g.“Heswelledwithpride.”),droopingpostureforSADNESS(e.g.“Myheartsank.”),andjumpingupanddownforJOY(e.g.“Hewasjumpingforjoy.”).Obviouslythesephysiologicalphenomenahelpusinconceptualizingtheseemotions.Metonymydiffersfrommetaphorinacognitivetheory,buttheyalsoworktogether.Asamatteroffact,themainclaimsmadebycognitivelinguistsinthedescriptionofmetaphoralsoapplytometonymy:(i)bothareregardedasbeingconceptualinnature;(ii)bothcanbeconventionalized(i.e.automatic,unconscious,effortlessandgenerallyestablishedasamodelofthinking);(iii)botharemeansofextendingtheresourcesofalanguage;and(iv)bothcanbeexplainedasmappingprocesses.Themaindifferencebetweenthemisthatmetaphorinvolvesamappingacrossdifferentconceptualorcognitivedomainswhilemetonymyisamappingwithinoneconceptualdomain.Inmetonymy,onecategorywithinadomainistakenasstandingforanothercategoryinthesamedomain.Themainfunctionofametonymicexpressionistoactivateonecognitivecategorybyreferringtoanothercategorywithinthesamedomain(seeexamples(8)-(11)),andbydoingthat,tohighlightthefirstcategoryorthesubdomaintowhichitbelongs.Considerthefollowingthreeexamplesofpart-wholerelations(Croft,1993:350):Weneedacoupleofstrongbodiesforourteam.Therearealotofgoodheadsintheuniversity.Weneedsomenewfacesaroundhere.Obviously,inthethreesentencesaboveareferencetohumanbeingsisbeingmade.Whatisinterestinghereaboutthemisthatineachcaseoneparticularrelevantaspectofahumanbeingishighlighted.Inthesportscontextofthefirstexample,thedomainPHYSICALSTRENGTHrelatedtothecategoryBODYishighlighted,andintheuniversitycontextthedomainINTELLIGENCEisrelatedtoHEAD.ThecategoryFACEisparticularlyappropriateinthecontextofnewpeople,becausethisiswhatweusuallyperceivefirstwhenwemeetstrangers.So,giventheobservationsabove,wecanofferthecognitivelinguisticdefinitionofmetonymy:Metonymyisacognitiveprocessinwhichonecognit