國際經(jīng)濟學之貿(mào)易政策工具

TheInstrumentsofTradePolicyIntroductionBasicTariffAnalysisCostsandBenefitsofaTariffOtherInstrumentsofTradePolicyTheEffectsofTradePolicy:ASummarySummaryChapterOrganizationIntroductionThischapterisfocusedonthefollowingquestions:Whataretheeffectsofvarioustradepolicyinstruments?Whowillbenefitandwhowilllosefromthesetradepolicyinstruments?Whatarethecostsandbenefitsofprotection?Willthebenefitsoutweighthecosts?Whatshouldanation’stradepolicybe?Forexample,shouldtheUnitedStatesuseatarifforanimportquotatoprotectitsautomobileindustryagainstcompetitionfromJapanandSouthKorea?ClassificationofCommercialPolicyInstrumentsIntroductionCommercialPolicyInstrumentsTradeContractionTradeExpansionTariffExporttaxImportquotaVoluntaryExportRestraint(VER)ImportsubsidyExportsubsidyVoluntaryImportExpansion(VIE)

PriceQuantity

PriceQuantityBasicTariffAnalysisTariffscanbeclassifiedas:SpecifictariffsTaxesthatareleviedasafixedchargeforeachunitofgoodsimportedExample:Aspecifictariffof$10oneachimportedbicyclewithaninternationalpriceof$100meansthatcustomsofficialscollectthefixedsumof$10.AdvaloremtariffsTaxesthatareleviedasafractionofthevalueoftheimportedgoodsExample:A20%advaloremtariffonbicyclesgeneratesa$20paymentoneach$100importedbicycle.Acompoundduty(tariff)isacombinationofanadvaloremandaspecifictariff.

Moderngovernmentsusuallyprefertoprotectdomesticindustriesthroughavarietyofnontariffbarriers,suchas:ImportquotasLimitthequantityofimportsExportrestraintsLimitthequantityofexportsBasicTariffAnalysisSupply,Demand,andTradeinaSingleIndustrySupposethattherearetwocountries(HomeandForeign).Bothcountriesconsumeandproducewheat,whichcanbecostlesstransportedbetweenthecountries.Ineachcountry,wheatisacompetitiveindustry.SupposethatintheabsenceoftradethepriceofwheatatHomeexceedsthecorrespondingpriceatForeign.ThisimpliesthatshippersbegintomovewheatfromForeigntoHome.BasicTariffAnalysisTodeterminetheworldprice(Pw)andthequantitytrade(Qw),twocurvesaredefined:HomeimportdemandcurveShowsthemaximumquantityofimportstheHomecountrywouldliketoconsumeateachpriceoftheimportedgood.Thatis,theexcessofwhatHomeconsumersdemandoverwhatHomeproducerssupply:MD=D(P)–S(P)ForeignexportsupplycurveShowsthemaximumquantityofexportsForeignwouldliketoprovidetherestoftheworldateachprice.Thatis,theexcessofwhatForeignproducerssupplyoverwhatforeignconsumersdemand:XS=S*(P*)–D*(P*)BasicTariffAnalysisQuantity,QPrice,PPrice,PQuantity,QMDDSAPAP2P1S2D2D2–S22S1D1D1–S11DerivingHome’sImportDemandCurveBasicTariffAnalysisP2P*AD*S*P1XSPrice,PPrice,PQuantity,QQuantity,QS*2–D*2S*2D*2DerivingForeign’sExportSupplyCurveBasicTariffAnalysisD*1S*1S*1–D*1WorldEquilibriumXSPrice,PQuantity,QMDPWQW1BasicTariffAnalysis11EffectsofaTariffAssumethattwolargecountriestradewitheachother.SupposeHomeimposesataxof$2oneverybushelofwheatimported.Thenshipperswillbeunwillingtomovethewheatunlessthepricedifferencebetweenthetwomarketsisatleast$2.Figureillustratestheeffectsofaspecifictariffof$tperunitofwheat.BasicTariffAnalysisXSPTMDD*S*DSPW2QT1QWBasicTariffAnalysisEffectsofaTariffP*T3tPrice,PQuantity,QPrice,PQuantity,QPrice,PQuantity,QHomemarketWorldmarketForeignmarketHomemarketWorldmarketForeignmarketIntheabsenceoftariff,theworldpriceofwheat(Pw)wouldbeequalizedinbothcountries.Withthetariffinplace,thepriceofwheatrisestoPTatHomeandfallstoP*T

(=PT

–t)atForeignuntilthepricedifferenceis$t.InHome:producerssupplymoreandconsumersdemandless

duetothehigherprice,sothatfewerimportsaredemanded.InForeign:producerssupplylessandconsumersdemandmoreduetothelowerprice,sothatfewerexportsaresupplied.Thus,thevolumeofwheattradeddeclinesduetotheimpositionofthetariff.BasicTariffAnalysisTheincreaseinthedomesticHomepriceislessthanthetariff,becausepartofthetariffisreflectedinadeclineinForeign’sexportprice.IfHomeisasmallcountryandimposesatariff,theforeignexportpricesareunaffectedandthedomesticpriceatHome(theimportingcountry)risesbythefullamountofthetariff.BasicTariffAnalysisATariffinaSmallCountrySPrice,PQuantity,QDPW+tPWImportsaftertariffS1D1ImportsbeforetariffD2S2BasicTariffAnalysisConsumerandProducerSurplusConsumersurplusItmeasurestheamountaconsumergainsfromapurchasebythedifferencebetweenthepriceheactuallypaysandthepricehewouldhavebeenwillingtopay.Itcanbederivedfromthemarketdemandcurve.Graphically,itisequaltotheareaunderthedemandcurveandabovetheprice.Example:Supposeapersoniswillingtopay$20perpacketofpills,butthepriceisonly$5.Then,theconsumersurplusgainedbythepurchaseofapacketofpillsis$15.CostsandBenefitsofaTariffGeometryofConsumerSurplusCostsandBenefitsofaTariffabP1P2DPrice,PQuantity,QQ2Q1ProducersurplusItmeasurestheamountaproducergainsfromasalebythedifferencebetweenthepriceheactuallyreceivesandthepriceatwhichhewouldhavebeenwillingtosell.Itcanbederivedfromthemarketsupplycurve.Graphically,itisequaltotheareaabovethesupplycurveandbelowtheprice.Example:Aproducerwillingtosellagoodfor$2butreceivingapriceof$5gainsaproducersurplusof$3.CostsandBenefitsofaTariffGeometryofProducerSurplusCostsandBenefitsofaTariffdcP2P1SPrice,PQuantity,QQ2Q1CostsandBenefitsofaTarifffortheImportingCountryCostsandBenefitsofaTariffPTPWP*TbcdeDa=consumerloss(a+b+c+d)=producergain(a)=governmentrevenuegain(c+e)QTD2S2SS1D1Price,PQuantity,QTheareasofthetwotrianglesbanddmeasurethelosstothenationasawhole(efficiencyloss)andtheareaoftherectangleemeasuresanoffsettinggain(termsoftradegain).Theefficiencylossarisesbecauseatariffdistortsincentivestoconsumeandproduce.Producersandconsumersactasifimportsweremoreexpensivethantheyactuallyare.Trianglebistheproductiondistortionlossandtriangledistheconsumptiondistortionloss.Thetermsoftradegainarisesbecauseatarifflowersforeignexportprices.CostsandBenefitsofaTariffIfthetermsoftradegainisgreaterthantheefficiencyloss,thetariffincreaseswelfarefortheimportingcountry.Inthecaseofasmallcountry,thetariffreduceswelfarefortheimportingcountry.CostsandBenefitsofaTariffNetWelfareEffectsofaTariffPTPWP*TbdeD=efficiencyloss(b+d)=termsoftradegain(e)ImportsSPrice,PQuantity,QCostsandBenefitsofaTariffImportQuotas:TheoryAnimportquotaisadirectrestrictiononthequantityofagoodthatisimported.Example:TheUnitedStateshasaquotaonimportsofforeigncheese.Therestrictionisusuallyenforcedbyissuinglicensestosomegroupofindividualsorfirms.Example:Theonlyfirmsallowedtoimportcheesearecertaintradingcompanies.Insomecases(e.g.sugarandapparel),therighttosellintheUnitedStatesisgivendirectlytothegovernmentsofexportingcountries.OtherInstrumentsofTradePolicyAnimportquotaalwaysraisesthedomesticpriceoftheimportedgood.Licenseholdersareabletobuyimportsandresellthematahigherpriceinthedomesticmarket.Theprofitsreceivedbytheholdersofimportlicensesareknownasquotarents.OtherInstrumentsofTradePolicyWelfareanalysisofimportquotasversusofthatoftariffsThedifferencebetweenaquotaandatariffisthatwithaquotathegovernmentreceivesnorevenue.Inassessingthecostsandbenefitsofanimportquota,itiscrucialtodeterminewhogetstherents.Whentherightstosellinthedomesticmarketareassignedtogovernmentsofexportingcountries,thetransferofrentsabroadmakesthecostsofaquotasubstantiallyhigherthantheequivalenttariff.OtherInstrumentsofTradePolicyPriceinU.S.Market466WorldPrice280bcdDemanda8.456.32Supply5.149.26Price,$/tonQuantityofsugar,milliontonsEffectsoftheU.S.ImportQuotaonSugarOtherInstrumentsofTradePolicyImportquota:2.13milliontons=consumerloss(a+b+c+d)=producergain(a)=quotarents(c)ExportSubsidies:TheoryExportsubsidyApaymentbythegovernmenttoafirmorindividualthatshipsagoodabroadWhenthegovernmentoffersanexportsubsidy,shipperswillexportthegooduptothepointwherethedomesticpriceexceedstheforeignpricebytheamountofthesubsidy.Itcanbeeitherspecificoradvalorem.OtherInstrumentsofTradePolicySummaryAtariffdrivesawedgebetweenforeignanddomesticprices,raisingthedomesticpricebutbylessthanthetariffrate(exceptinthe“small”countrycase).Inthesmallcountrycase,atariffisfullyreflectedindomesticprices.Thecostsandbenefitsofatarifforothertradepolicyinstrumentsmaybemeasuredusingtheconceptsofconsumerandproducersurplus.ThedomesticproducersofagoodgainThedomesticconsumersloseThegovernmentcollectstariffrevenuebaEffectsofanExportSubsidyOtherInstrumentsofTradePolicyPSPWP*SPrice,PQuantity,QExportsgfeSubsidydc=producergain(a+b+c)=consumerloss(a+b)=costofgovernmentsubsidy(b+c+d+e+f+g)DSAnexportsubsidyraisespricesintheexportingcountrywhileloweringthemintheimportingcountry.Inaddition,andincontrasttoatariff,theexportsubsidyworsensthetermsoftrade.Anexportsubsidyunambiguouslyleadstocoststhatexceeditsbenefits.OtherInstrumentsofTradePolicyFigure8-12:Europe’sCommonAgriculturalProgramOtherInstrumentsofTradePolicyPrice,PQuantity,QSDEUpricewithoutimportsWorldprice=costofgovernmentsubsidySupportpriceExportsVoluntaryExportRestraintsAvoluntaryexportrestraint(VER)isanexportquotaadministeredbytheexportingcountry.Itisalsoknownasavoluntaryrestraintagreement(VRA).VERsareimposedattherequestoftheimporterandareagreedtobytheexportertoforestallothertraderestrictions.OtherInstrumentsofTradePolicyLocalContentRequirementsAlocalcontentrequirementisaregulationthatrequiresthatsomespecifiedfractionofafinalgoodbeproduceddomestically.Thisfractioncanbespecifiedinphysicalunitsorinvalueterms.Localcontentlawshavebeenwidelyusedbydevelopingcountriestryingtoshifttheirmanufacturingbasefromassemblybackintointermediategoods.OtherInstrumentsofTradePolicyLocalcontentlawsdonotproduceeithergovernmentrevenueorquotarents.

Instead,thedifferencebetweenthepricesofimportsanddomesticgoodsgetsaveragedinthefinalpriceandispassedontoconsumers.Example:Supposethatautoassemblyfirmsarerequiredtouse50%domesticparts.Thecostofimportedpartsis$6000andthecostofthesamepartsdomesticallyis$10,000.Thentheaveragecostofpartsis$8000(0.5x$6000+0.5x$10,000).Firmsareallowedtosatisfytheirlocalcontentrequirementbyexportinginsteadofusingpartsdomestically.OtherInstrumentsofTradePolicyOtherTradePolicyInstruments

ExportcreditsubsidiesAformofasubsidizedloantothebuyerofexports.Theyhavethesameeffectasregularexportsubsidies.NationalprocurementPurchasesbythegovernment(orpublicfirms)canbedirectedtowardsdomesticgoods,eveniftheyaremoreexpensivethanimports.Red-tapebarriersSometimesgovernmentsplacesubstantialbarriersbasedonhealth,safetyandcustomsprocedures.OtherInstrumentsofTradePolicyTable8AI-1:Fr