《產(chǎn)品出口翻譯問(wèn)題研究8200字（論文）》

產(chǎn)品出口問(wèn)題分析翻譯及原文報(bào)告非關(guān)稅壁壘對(duì)伊朗主要玉米出口的影響研究介紹在所有發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家和新興工業(yè)化國(guó)家中,貿(mào)易增長(zhǎng)是發(fā)展的一個(gè)重要指標(biāo)。因此,商品出口在發(fā)展中國(guó)家經(jīng)濟(jì)中占據(jù)主導(dǎo)地位。所以,大多數(shù)國(guó)家都調(diào)整了其外貿(mào)方案的結(jié)構(gòu)。由于多邊貿(mào)易談判的周期性輪回，許多國(guó)家的商品進(jìn)口關(guān)稅已經(jīng)下降到相對(duì)較低的水平，研究人員對(duì)現(xiàn)有的非關(guān)稅壁壘可能扭曲和限制國(guó)際貿(mào)易的程度越來(lái)越感興趣。有些貿(mào)易限制可能需要國(guó)家確保食品供應(yīng)的安全以及植物，動(dòng)物和環(huán)境的健康安全。然而，有時(shí)政府超越了保護(hù)國(guó)內(nèi)工業(yè)所必需的程度。希爾曼指出，各國(guó)可以采取政策來(lái)保護(hù)公民的福利，但這些措施的目的必須是為了合法的達(dá)成國(guó)內(nèi)目標(biāo)而作出貢獻(xiàn)，而且法規(guī)必須平等地適用于國(guó)內(nèi)生產(chǎn)的產(chǎn)品出口和進(jìn)口。否則，政策主要是保護(hù)國(guó)內(nèi)產(chǎn)業(yè)在考慮非關(guān)稅壁壘時(shí)，比較有意思的是，為什么政府可能會(huì)更喜歡采用關(guān)稅手段。Deardorff和Stern提出以下可能的解釋?zhuān)褐贫壬系南拗?，例如關(guān)稅和貿(mào)易總協(xié)定（GATT）/世貿(mào)組織規(guī)則以及限制使用關(guān)稅的國(guó)家憲法所制定的限制；公司和員工在影響政策選擇方面的作用；對(duì)貿(mào)易伙伴政策的反應(yīng)或報(bào)復(fù)的考慮，以及不同政策可能執(zhí)行的方式的不確定性。Deardorff和Stern贊成最后這些解釋?zhuān)驗(yàn)檎J(rèn)為，關(guān)稅在減少進(jìn)口方面將無(wú)法有效運(yùn)作。Baldwin將“非關(guān)稅扭曲”定義為“導(dǎo)致國(guó)際貿(mào)易的商品和服務(wù)或?qū)ｉT(mén)用于生產(chǎn)這些商品和服務(wù)的資源的任何措施（公共或私人）”，以減少潛在的現(xiàn)實(shí)世界收入。”Hillman將非關(guān)稅壁壘定義為“直接阻礙進(jìn)口進(jìn)入國(guó)家的關(guān)稅以外的任何政府機(jī)構(gòu)或做法，不區(qū)分進(jìn)口歧視，但對(duì)國(guó)內(nèi)生產(chǎn)或分銷(xiāo)不具有同等效力”。Lloyd分析了區(qū)域“單一市場(chǎng)”，將單一市場(chǎng)定義為一個(gè)價(jià)格普遍的法律，“允許運(yùn)輸和其他運(yùn)輸成本阻止完美套利”，因?yàn)椤叭∠羞吔绾头沁吔缦拗粕唐焚Q(mào)易和商品稅協(xié)調(diào)以及影響進(jìn)入市場(chǎng)的其他措施。Mahe將非關(guān)稅壁定義為除了導(dǎo)致世界福利下降的關(guān)稅以外的收縮，Thornsbury等人認(rèn)可了Hillman的定義，還包括身份、度量和質(zhì)量標(biāo)準(zhǔn)、SPS措施和包裝措施。存在各種各樣的非關(guān)稅壁壘。各國(guó)必須通知其非關(guān)稅措施。貿(mào)發(fā)會(huì)議收集和分析這些通知,區(qū)分以下七大類(lèi)措施:?對(duì)關(guān)稅措施（海關(guān)附加費(fèi)，附加費(fèi)用，進(jìn)口稅收內(nèi)部稅）?價(jià)格管理措施（行政定價(jià)，自愿出口限制，反傾銷(xiāo)，反補(bǔ)貼措施）?財(cái)務(wù)措施（預(yù)付款要求，多種匯率，轉(zhuǎn)移延誤）?自動(dòng)許可措施（自動(dòng)許可證，事先監(jiān)控）?數(shù)量控制措施（非自動(dòng)許可，包括事先授權(quán)，配額，禁止，出口限制安排，企業(yè)特定限制）?壟斷措施（單通道進(jìn)口，強(qiáng)制性國(guó)家服務(wù)）?技術(shù)措施（技術(shù)法規(guī)，裝運(yùn)前檢驗(yàn)，特殊定制手續(xù)，退回二手產(chǎn)品的義務(wù)，回收義務(wù)）玉米出口是伊朗非石油商品的重要組成部分。因此，重要的是確定這些玉米出口面臨的問(wèn)題。雖然伊朗是世界貿(mào)易組織（WTO）的觀察員，但它受益于普遍制度（GSP）和最惠國(guó)待遇（MFN）關(guān)稅。因此，非關(guān)稅壁壘是伊朗玉米出口面臨的主要問(wèn)題之一。開(kāi)心果，葡萄干和蝦是伊朗農(nóng)業(yè)部門(mén)的三大出口產(chǎn)品。開(kāi)心果是非石油出口第二名。在漁業(yè)產(chǎn)品中，蝦是第二大出口品。伊朗是開(kāi)心果的最大生產(chǎn)國(guó)，也是葡萄干和蝦主要生產(chǎn)國(guó)之一，但它有可能生產(chǎn)更多的這些產(chǎn)品。此外，許多國(guó)家對(duì)這些商品沒(méi)有進(jìn)口能力。因此，本研究分析了從伊朗進(jìn)口這些貨物的國(guó)家對(duì)這些產(chǎn)品貿(mào)易流量的影響。討論估算結(jié)果表明，進(jìn)口國(guó)采用的關(guān)稅和非關(guān)稅壁壘是影響貿(mào)易流量的重要因素。開(kāi)心果和蝦的非關(guān)稅壁壘的彈性分別為2.24和0.56，這意味著非關(guān)稅壁壘的百分比增加會(huì)使開(kāi)心果和蝦的貿(mào)易流量減少2.24和0.56％。我們的研究結(jié)果很大程度上證實(shí)了以往研究的發(fā)現(xiàn)。Moenius報(bào)道說(shuō)，進(jìn)口國(guó)的具體國(guó)家的產(chǎn)品和進(jìn)程標(biāo)準(zhǔn)減少了農(nóng)業(yè)部門(mén)的進(jìn)口。Fontagne等人重點(diǎn)是衛(wèi)生和植物衛(wèi)生（SPS）和技術(shù)性貿(mào)易壁壘（TBT）措施。他們表示，這些措施對(duì)切花和加工食品如飲料的雙邊貿(mào)易產(chǎn)生不利影響。開(kāi)心果和蝦的關(guān)稅變量的彈性分別為0.11和0.34，這表明關(guān)稅的百分比增長(zhǎng)將使開(kāi)心果和蝦的貿(mào)易流量減少僅0.11和0.34％。這表明非營(yíng)利部門(mén)的這些產(chǎn)品的出口比關(guān)稅更大程度上減少了。Disdier，F(xiàn)ontagne和Mimouni發(fā)現(xiàn)，SPS和TBT措施對(duì)經(jīng)合組織進(jìn)口產(chǎn)生了負(fù)面影響，效果高于關(guān)稅。對(duì)于葡萄干，NTB的彈性為1.13，意味著NTBs不會(huì)對(duì)該產(chǎn)品的貿(mào)易流量產(chǎn)生負(fù)面影響。Disdier，F(xiàn)ontagne和Mimouni還調(diào)查了NTBs對(duì)經(jīng)合組織進(jìn)口商農(nóng)業(yè)分行業(yè)的影響。他們估計(jì)一些行業(yè)的非關(guān)稅壁壘的估計(jì)系數(shù)是正的。這表明農(nóng)業(yè)中不是所有的SPS和TBT都是保護(hù)主義的設(shè)備。關(guān)稅對(duì)葡萄干出口的影響是細(xì)微的，可以忽略不計(jì)。結(jié)論因此，我們的結(jié)果表明：非關(guān)稅壁壘對(duì)開(kāi)心果和蝦制品的貿(mào)易產(chǎn)生負(fù)面影響。這些產(chǎn)品出口減少的最重要原因是SPS和TBT措施。根據(jù)世貿(mào)組織規(guī)則，允許各國(guó)通過(guò)SPS和TBT協(xié)議的規(guī)定，以保護(hù)人類(lèi)，動(dòng)植物的健康以及環(huán)境，野生動(dòng)物和人類(lèi)安全非關(guān)稅壁壘的效果高于開(kāi)心果和蝦的關(guān)稅。這表明現(xiàn)在的非關(guān)稅壁壘比關(guān)稅更為重要。非關(guān)稅壁壘并沒(méi)有對(duì)葡萄干的貿(mào)易流量產(chǎn)生負(fù)面影響。這一結(jié)果表明，葡萄干有適合出口條件，或者主要進(jìn)口國(guó)沒(méi)有嚴(yán)格的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)和規(guī)定出口和世界對(duì)玉米的需求正在越來(lái)越多地關(guān)注質(zhì)量，包裝，標(biāo)簽和產(chǎn)品標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。SPS和TBT協(xié)議包括了這些特征。因此，出口玉米的國(guó)家如伊朗的決策者在設(shè)計(jì)方案時(shí)必須考慮這些特點(diǎn)。這些措施尚未在伊朗的主要玉米出口上采用。因此，進(jìn)口開(kāi)心果，葡萄干和蝦，特別是歐盟成員的國(guó)家，已經(jīng)減少了從伊朗的進(jìn)口。簡(jiǎn)言之，如果伊朗建立最新的生產(chǎn)體系，就會(huì)促進(jìn)玉米的出口。美國(guó)的傾銷(xiāo)與反傾銷(xiāo)：綜合審查重點(diǎn)問(wèn)題繼美國(guó)決定對(duì)中國(guó)光伏企業(yè)反傾銷(xiāo)和反壟斷調(diào)查之后，歐盟也緊隨其后和歐洲委員會(huì)一起針對(duì)中國(guó)光伏產(chǎn)品為25家企業(yè)提起反傾銷(xiāo)申訴，“反傾銷(xiāo)和反壟斷”的負(fù)面影響表明美國(guó)的裁決正在升級(jí)。根據(jù)業(yè)內(nèi)人士披露，由于歐盟市場(chǎng)占了中國(guó)光伏產(chǎn)品出口總量的90%以上，反傾銷(xiāo)調(diào)查一旦啟動(dòng)，將對(duì)國(guó)內(nèi)光伏企業(yè)來(lái)說(shuō)是一個(gè)沉重的打擊，同時(shí)也可能大規(guī)模地推動(dòng)國(guó)內(nèi)光伏市場(chǎng)。這已經(jīng)通過(guò)一系列的國(guó)內(nèi)政策信號(hào)反映出來(lái)。在美國(guó)反傾銷(xiāo)案之后，中國(guó)光伏巨頭英利、無(wú)錫尚德、天合光能和阿特斯26日發(fā)表聯(lián)合聲明，要求歐盟委員會(huì)謹(jǐn)慎對(duì)待申訴。面對(duì)挑起“價(jià)格戰(zhàn)”的指責(zé)，中國(guó)太陽(yáng)能板廠商聲稱(chēng)價(jià)格下降的原因是中國(guó)企業(yè)提高技術(shù)水平而降低成本的結(jié)果。該聲明強(qiáng)調(diào)，從整個(gè)光伏產(chǎn)業(yè)的價(jià)值鏈中看出，中國(guó)的優(yōu)勢(shì)就是規(guī)模生產(chǎn)和制造成本低。因此，大多數(shù)產(chǎn)品都是光伏組件并且生產(chǎn)過(guò)程中只增加值0.2-0.3美元/瓦。由于太陽(yáng)能發(fā)電設(shè)備國(guó)際平均安裝成本大約是2.5-3美元/瓦，所以中國(guó)光伏產(chǎn)業(yè)只占整個(gè)價(jià)值鏈中的8%-10%。最終的結(jié)果仍然難以預(yù)料，但近期中國(guó)出口到美國(guó)的光伏產(chǎn)品數(shù)量正在萎縮，“反傾銷(xiāo)和反壟斷”的負(fù)面影響不斷升級(jí)。據(jù)河北海關(guān)統(tǒng)計(jì)，今年二月和三月在當(dāng)?shù)氐墓夥隹诜謩e減少了17%，14%。在六月份，與去年同比下降達(dá)到33%。在臺(tái)州，浙江省，共有數(shù)百光伏企業(yè)，光伏面板的出口量與去年同期相比，上半年下跌36.8%，跌至86.28億美元。中國(guó)企業(yè)在國(guó)際市場(chǎng)上遭遇持續(xù)的冷漠對(duì)待，引起了業(yè)界的預(yù)，為了啟動(dòng)加速?lài)?guó)內(nèi)的光伏市場(chǎng)，即將推出的一系列與以前完全不同的積極政策。分析師稱(chēng)，不斷升級(jí)的“反傾銷(xiāo)和反壟斷”，反過(guò)來(lái)又加速推國(guó)內(nèi)光伏市場(chǎng)的擴(kuò)大。通過(guò)“十二五”規(guī)劃連接到分布式光伏發(fā)電的重要性的意思是“電網(wǎng)瓶頸”已被遏制國(guó)內(nèi)光伏市場(chǎng)的擴(kuò)大很長(zhǎng)一段時(shí)間很可能早破。短期內(nèi)的國(guó)際影響，特別是占據(jù)中國(guó)光伏產(chǎn)品出口市場(chǎng)90%的歐盟連續(xù)采取“反傾銷(xiāo)和反壟斷”措施，將在相當(dāng)一段時(shí)間內(nèi)國(guó)內(nèi)廠商產(chǎn)生負(fù)面影響。反傾銷(xiāo)和競(jìng)爭(zhēng)法：透視印度盡管反傾銷(xiāo)手段的日益流行，但經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家和學(xué)者對(duì)反傾銷(xiāo)行為的理論是持有批評(píng)的態(tài)度。反傾銷(xiāo)理論是是一種不可取的價(jià)格歧視做法，其中包括出口商為了占領(lǐng)市場(chǎng)以掠奪性的低價(jià)出口到這里的市場(chǎng)，促使當(dāng)?shù)氐母?jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手停業(yè)，逐步積累成壟斷寡頭。反傾銷(xiāo)稅這一理論下，對(duì)抵消出口商的掠奪性?xún)r(jià)格歧視是有必要的。經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家、學(xué)術(shù)界和政府機(jī)構(gòu)全面地批評(píng)這個(gè)反傾銷(xiāo)稅理論，下面討論批評(píng)的各種原因。從經(jīng)濟(jì)的角度來(lái)看，沒(méi)有任何理由支持反傾銷(xiāo)的法律，因?yàn)檎麄€(gè)市場(chǎng)的價(jià)格差異是最常見(jiàn)的利潤(rùn)最大化的現(xiàn)象。根據(jù)這一論點(diǎn)，沒(méi)有理由譴責(zé)一些出口的價(jià)格，他們只是恰好比當(dāng)?shù)厥袌?chǎng)價(jià)格低。國(guó)內(nèi)價(jià)格歧視，即一個(gè)國(guó)家的國(guó)內(nèi)區(qū)域市場(chǎng)之間的價(jià)格差異，通常不會(huì)受到懲罰?？梢哉f(shuō)沒(méi)有任何經(jīng)濟(jì)理由來(lái)更嚴(yán)厲的對(duì)待“國(guó)際化”的征收反傾銷(xiāo)稅的價(jià)格歧視。不同類(lèi)別傾銷(xiāo)，只有掠奪性定價(jià)的傾銷(xiāo)和能提高整體福利的傾銷(xiāo)策略才能引起大多數(shù)的關(guān)注。然而，這兩種形式的傾銷(xiāo)主要涉及的理論境界，因?yàn)樵诂F(xiàn)實(shí)世界中大多數(shù)反傾銷(xiāo)案件不涉及這兩個(gè)類(lèi)別的定義傾銷(xiāo)。事實(shí)上，今天的貿(mào)易環(huán)境，其特點(diǎn)是增加來(lái)自不同國(guó)家的之間出口商的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)，掠奪性定價(jià)的做法可以說(shuō)是徒勞的，因?yàn)槭袌?chǎng)的統(tǒng)治和壟斷定價(jià)都沒(méi)有實(shí)現(xiàn)。因此，一般經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家看法是頻繁使用反傾銷(xiāo)措施不能作為必要合理，防止掠奪性定價(jià)手段。另一種常見(jiàn)的批評(píng)是反傾銷(xiāo)的措施，他們根本沒(méi)有有效地幫助國(guó)內(nèi)產(chǎn)業(yè)，即使他們的目的是保護(hù)。由于國(guó)際供應(yīng)商的擴(kuò)張，投訴人未能針對(duì)所有可能的供應(yīng)商那就意味著只針對(duì)某些供應(yīng)商征收反傾銷(xiāo)稅，即使效果顯著，只會(huì)分流到其他非目標(biāo)國(guó)家的市場(chǎng)上，在進(jìn)口市場(chǎng)上沒(méi)有明顯的價(jià)格效應(yīng)。此外，沒(méi)有競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力的行業(yè)更有可能比其他行業(yè)需要得到保護(hù)，而不太可能從中長(zhǎng)期受益。反傾銷(xiāo)保護(hù)往往使消費(fèi)者付出了巨大的成本。他們保護(hù)生產(chǎn)者而犧牲消費(fèi)者的，從而導(dǎo)致價(jià)格更高，產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量更低，更少的購(gòu)買(mǎi)選擇，進(jìn)而降低大多數(shù)人的生活標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。對(duì)國(guó)內(nèi)產(chǎn)業(yè)而言，反傾銷(xiāo)措施破壞的就業(yè)機(jī)會(huì)比他們創(chuàng)造的更多。反傾銷(xiāo)措施的成本比創(chuàng)造的利益更高。過(guò)于沉重的反傾銷(xiāo)稅可能會(huì)削減進(jìn)口即使國(guó)內(nèi)企業(yè)不能生產(chǎn)的產(chǎn)品。消費(fèi)者的負(fù)擔(dān)和損害可能超過(guò)依賴(lài)于進(jìn)口產(chǎn)品上游行業(yè)得到的利益。反傾銷(xiāo)的法律是含糊不清的。因?yàn)橛刑嗟臉?biāo)準(zhǔn)，生產(chǎn)者永遠(yuǎn)不知道采用哪種標(biāo)準(zhǔn)而被追究責(zé)任。無(wú)論是程序上和實(shí)質(zhì)上，國(guó)家主管部門(mén)已經(jīng)開(kāi)始不公平的使用反傾銷(xiāo)規(guī)則。例如，OECD研究得出結(jié)論，可以保護(hù)主義目的而濫用反傾銷(xiāo)措施。盡管烏拉圭回合談判期間已經(jīng)商定并通過(guò)了WTO反傾銷(xiāo)協(xié)定，但研究發(fā)現(xiàn)，“反傾銷(xiāo)程序仍然可以作為貿(mào)易保護(hù)主義的工具”。反傾銷(xiāo)法的是固定化的，國(guó)內(nèi)生產(chǎn)商可以借助政府的幫助，以即使一直沒(méi)有外國(guó)的傾銷(xiāo)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)。該法也允許生產(chǎn)者使用不道德反傾銷(xiāo)措施作為競(jìng)爭(zhēng)手段。從法理學(xué)來(lái)看，反傾銷(xiāo)也是沒(méi)有道理的。從權(quán)利的角度來(lái)看，反傾銷(xiāo)的法律防止在雙方達(dá)成─合約的價(jià)格。反傾銷(xiāo)的法律不能被任何自由民主理論索尼解釋的。它們是不實(shí)用的，因?yàn)樗鼈儠?huì)不導(dǎo)致提供更多的商品。事實(shí)上，他們只為少數(shù)人提供商品，即生產(chǎn)者以犧牲消費(fèi)者為代價(jià)。他們只會(huì)社會(huì)的和諧而不是增加。他們侵犯的權(quán)利。即便再分配者也將反駁他們，因?yàn)樗麄冊(cè)诟F人和中產(chǎn)階級(jí)富人中進(jìn)行收入再分配。有人認(rèn)為，征收反傾銷(xiāo)稅沒(méi)有任何經(jīng)濟(jì)意義，因?yàn)樗菑耐饷娌扇⌒袆?dòng)，而不是針對(duì)不公平貿(mào)易國(guó)內(nèi)同行業(yè)提供了一份對(duì)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的保障。經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家認(rèn)為，傾銷(xiāo)是一種自然現(xiàn)象，不一定是在不公平的WTO反傾銷(xiāo)協(xié)定（以及在主題國(guó)國(guó)內(nèi)反傾銷(xiāo)立法）下的考慮。從經(jīng)濟(jì)角度來(lái)看有兩個(gè)前提條件，一個(gè)公司在國(guó)際價(jià)格歧視下進(jìn)行貿(mào)易：1、公司應(yīng)該有很強(qiáng)的壟斷性或者在其國(guó)內(nèi)市場(chǎng)至少是寡頭壟斷位置。2、公司應(yīng)受到保護(hù)，在其國(guó)內(nèi)市場(chǎng)有天然或人工的貿(mào)易壁壘與外國(guó)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)。當(dāng)滿足這兩個(gè)條件，這對(duì)企業(yè)而言很自然就開(kāi)始傾銷(xiāo)，而不是在出口國(guó)進(jìn)行必要的不公平競(jìng)爭(zhēng)。因此，似乎沒(méi)有任何經(jīng)濟(jì)上的理由來(lái)譴責(zé)出口價(jià)格比國(guó)內(nèi)市場(chǎng)價(jià)格低的現(xiàn)象。如果沒(méi)有合理的理由拒絕政治經(jīng)濟(jì)方面針對(duì)國(guó)內(nèi)產(chǎn)業(yè)的保護(hù)，那么反傾銷(xiāo)的法律繼續(xù)實(shí)施。像麥基作者認(rèn)為，在法典僅僅存在鼓勵(lì)國(guó)外出口商提高他們產(chǎn)品的價(jià)格，因?yàn)檫@樣做有可能避免引發(fā)反傾銷(xiāo)訴訟。反傾銷(xiāo)只威脅到價(jià)格，因?yàn)閲?guó)外供應(yīng)商毫不猶豫地害怕過(guò)于激進(jìn)的價(jià)格競(jìng)爭(zhēng)觸發(fā)反傾銷(xiāo)調(diào)查。但無(wú)論他們?nèi)绾闻Ρ苊膺@樣的行動(dòng)，他們不能完全消除遭遇反傾銷(xiāo)調(diào)查的可能性，即使他們以同樣的價(jià)格賣(mài)他們的產(chǎn)品，但因?yàn)槿騾R率波動(dòng)可以使它看起來(lái)在國(guó)外市場(chǎng)銷(xiāo)售的價(jià)格是低于國(guó)內(nèi)市場(chǎng)價(jià)格。這樣也會(huì)遭到反傾銷(xiāo)申訴或上訪的威脅，出口企業(yè)自愿限制出口，從而導(dǎo)致減少競(jìng)爭(zhēng)。也有人指出，反傾銷(xiāo)的法律還能夠使國(guó)內(nèi)生產(chǎn)者提高價(jià)格。這是因?yàn)榉磧A銷(xiāo)的法律威脅到參與激烈價(jià)格競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的外國(guó)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)者。這樣一來(lái)，國(guó)內(nèi)生產(chǎn)商可以和在價(jià)格恐懼之下的出口商一起提高其價(jià)格。因此，存在反傾銷(xiāo)的法律對(duì)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)有兩種傷害的方式，一是迫使出口企業(yè)以較高的價(jià)格賣(mài)出和另一個(gè)是保證國(guó)內(nèi)生產(chǎn)者自由提高產(chǎn)品價(jià)格，否則可能收取更高的反傾銷(xiāo)稅。因此，反傾銷(xiāo)的法律本質(zhì)上可以說(shuō)，它有利于國(guó)內(nèi)生產(chǎn)商在消費(fèi)者的支出限制外國(guó)與其競(jìng)爭(zhēng)，并因此與競(jìng)爭(zhēng)法的直接沖突是保護(hù)主義。很多時(shí)候，企業(yè)濫用反傾銷(xiāo)的法律，任意發(fā)起調(diào)查。這對(duì)出口商而言提出口成本并且導(dǎo)致效率損失。參與調(diào)查過(guò)程的成本可能會(huì)非常高（分配給準(zhǔn)備調(diào)查等法律費(fèi)用，時(shí)間和資源），這引起了貿(mào)易的成本。此外，研究顯示，一旦反傾銷(xiāo)調(diào)查開(kāi)始它總是導(dǎo)致征收反傾銷(xiāo)稅。因此任何情況下實(shí)際的開(kāi)始都是在反傾銷(xiāo)的法律下得到一個(gè)很好的保護(hù)機(jī)會(huì)。外文原文StudyingtheEffectsofNon-TariffBarriersontheExportoftheMainAgriculturalProductsofIranIntroductionInalldevelopedandnewlyindustrializedcountries,growthoftradeisanindicatorofdevelopment.Therefore,theexportofcommoditiesplaysapredominantroleintheeconomyofdevelopingcountries.Forthisreason,mostcountrieshaveadjustedthestructureoftheirforeigntradeprograms.Becausetariffsonimportsofcommoditieshavebeenreducedtorelativelylowlevelsinmanycountriesduetocyclicalroundsofmultilateraltradenegotiations,researchershavebecomeincreasinglyinterestedintheextenttowhichexistingNTBsmightdistortandrestrictinternationaltrade.Sometraderestrictionsmaybenecessaryforcountriestoensurethesafetyofthefoodsupplyandthehealthofplants,animalsandtheenvironment.However,sometimesgovernmentsgobeyondwhatisnecessarytoprotectdomesticindustries.Hillmannotedthatcountriescanadaptpoliciestoprotectthewelfareoftheircitizens,butthepurposeofthesemeasuresmustbetocontributetoalegitimatedomesticobjectiveandregulationsmustbeappliedequallytodomesticallyproducedproductsandimports.Otherwise,thepoliciesmainlyprotectdomesticindustries.WhenconsideringNTBs,itisinterestingtoaskwhygovernmentsmightpreferthemovertariffs.DeardorffandSternsuggestedthefollowingpossibleexplanations:institutionalconstraints,suchasthosebuiltintotheGeneralAgreementonTariffsandTrade(GATT)/WTOrulesandintonationalconstitutionsthatlimittheuseoftariffs;therolesoffirmsandworkersininfluencingthechoiceofpolicies;considerationsofreactiontoorretaliationagainstthepoliciesoftradingpartnersanduncertaintyaboutthewaysinwhichdifferentpoliciesmayperform.DeardorffandSternfavoredthelastoftheseexplanationsinsofarasgovernmentsperceivethattariffswillnotworkeffectivelyinreducingimports.Baldwindefineda"non-tariffdistortion"as"anymeasure(publicorprivate)thatcausesinternationallytradedgoodsandservices,orresourcesdevotedtotheproductionofthesegoodsandservices,tobeallocatedinsuchawayastoreducepotentialrealworldincome."HillmandefinedNTBsas"anygovernmentaldeviceorpracticeotherthanatariffwhichdirectlyimpedestheentryofimportsintoacountryandwhichdiscriminatesagainstimports,butdoesnotapplywithequalforceondomesticproductionordistribution."Lloydanalyzedtheconceptofaregional"singlemarket,"definingasinglemarketasoneinwhichthelawofonepriceprevails,"allowingfortransportandothertransportcostswhichpreventperfectarbitrage,"asaresultof"theremovalofallborderandnon-borderrestrictionsoncommoditytradeandtheharmonizationofcommoditytaxesandothermeasureswhichaffectaccesstomarkets."Mahe's[11]definedanNTBasarestrictionotherthanatariffthatleadstoadecreaseinworldwelfareandThornsburyetal.[13]endorsedHillman'sdefinitionandalsoincludedstandardsofidentity,measureandquality,SPSmeasuresandpackagingmeasures.AwidevarietyofNTBsexist.Countriesmustnotifytheirnon-tariffmeasures.ThesenotificationsarecollectedandanalyzedbytheUNCTAD,whichdistinguishesbetweenthefollowingsevenbroadcategoriesofmeasures:?Para-tariffmeasures(customssurcharges,additionalcharges,internaltaxesleviedonimports)?Pricecontrolmeasures(administrativepricing,VoluntaryExportRestraints,anti-dumping,countervailingmeasures)?Financemeasures(advancepaymentrequirements,multipleexchangerates,transferdelays)?Automaticlicensingmeasures(automaticlicense,priorsurveillance)?Quantitycontrolmeasures(non-automaticlicensingincludingpriorauthorizations,quotas,prohibitions,exportrestraintarrangements,enterprisespecificrestrictions)?Monopolisticmeasures(singlechannelforimports,compulsorynationalservices)?Technicalmeasures(technicalregulations,pre-shipmentinspection,specialcustomformalities,obligationtoreturnusedproducts,obligationofrecycling)Theexportofagriculturalproductsisaveryimportantpartofthenon-oilcommoditiesofIran.Thus,itisimportanttodeterminewhatproblemsfacetheexportoftheseagriculturalproducts.AlthoughIranisobservermembershipofWorldTradeOrganization(WTO),itbenefitsfromGeneralizedSystemofPrefaces(GSP)andMostFavoredNation(MFN)tariffs.Therefore,Non-TariffBarriers(NTBs)representoneofthemainproblemsconfrontingtheexportofIran’sagriculturalproducts.Pistachios,raisinsandshrimparethreemainexportproductsofIran’sagriculturalsector.Pistachiosarethesecondrankednon-oilexport.Amongfisheryproducts,shrimpisthesecondgreatestexportablegood.Iranisthelargestproducerofpistachiosandoneofthemajorproducersofraisinsandshrimp,butithasthepotentialtoproducemoreoftheseproducts.Inaddition,manycountrieshaveanunusedimportcapacityforthesecommodities.Therefore,thisstudyanalyzestheimpactofNTBsimposedbycountriesimportingthesegoodsfromIranonthetradeflowoftheseproducts.DisscusionTheresultsoftheestimationsshowthatthetariffandnon-tariffbarriersadoptedbytheimportingcountriesaresignificantfactorsthataffectthetradeflows.TheelasticityofNTBsforpistachioandshrimpwere2.24and0.56,respectively,whichimpliesthatapercentincreaseintheNTBswoulddecreasethepistachioandshrimptradeflowby2.24and0.56%.Ourresultslargelyconfirmthefindingofpreviousstudies.Moeniusreportedthatcountry-specificproductandprocessstandardsofimportersreduceimportsintheagriculturalsector.Fontagneetal.focusedonSanitaryandPhytoSanitary(SPS)andTechnicalBarrierstoTrade(TBT)measures.Theyshowedthatthesemeasuresnegativelyinfluencebilateraltradeofcutflowersandofprocessedfoodssuchasbeverages.Theelasticityofthetariffvariableforpistachiosandshrimpwas0.11and0.34,respectively,whichsuggeststhatapercentincreaseinthetariffswoulddecreasethepistachioandshrimptradeflowbyonly0.11and0.34%.ThisshowsthatNTBshavereducedtheexportoftheseproductstoagreaterextentthanwouldtariffs.Disdier,FontagneandMimounifoundthatSPSandTBTmeasureshaveanegativeimpactonOECDimportsandthattheireffectishigherthanthatoftariffs.Forraisins,theelasticityofNTBswas1.13,implyingthatNTBshavenotaffectedthetradeflowofthisproductnegatively.Disdier,FontagneandMimounialsoinvestigatedtheeffectofNTBsonagriculturalsubsectorsofOECDimporters.TheirestimatedcoefficientofNTBsforsomesectorswaspositive.ThissuggeststhatnotallSPSandTBTsinagricultureareprotectionistdevices.Theeffectoftariffsontheexportofraisinswasnegativeandnegligible.ConclusionThus,ourresultssuggestthefollowing:?NTBsnegativelyimpactthetradeofpistachioandshrimpproducts.ThemostimportantreasonsforthereducedexportoftheseproductsareSPSandTBTmeasures.AccordingtoWTOrules,countriesareallowedtoadoptregulationsundertheSPSandTBTagreementsinordertoprotecthuman,animalandplanthealthaswellastheenvironment,wildlifeandhumansafety?TheeffectofNTBsishigherthanthatoftariffsforpistachiosandshrimp.ThisshowsthatnowadaysNTBsaremoreimportantthantariffs?NTBshavenotnegativelyimpactedthetradeflowofraisins.ThisresultshowsthatraisinshavesuitableconditionsforexportorthatthemainimportingcountriesdonothavehardstandardsandregulationsTheexportandtheworlddemandforagriculturalproductsisincreasingfocusingonquality,packaging,labelingandstandardsofproducts.SPSandTBTagreementsconsistofthesecharacteristics.Therefore,policymakersincountriesthatexportagriculturalproducts,suchasIran,mustconsiderthesecharacteristicswhendesigningtheirprograms.ThesemeasureshavenotyetbeenimposedonthemainagriculturalexportsofIran.Therefore,thecountriesthatimportpistachios,raisinsandshrimp,especiallyEuropeUnionmembers,havereducedtheirimportsfromIran.Inshort,ifIranbuildsup-to-dateproductionsystems,itwillincreaseitsexportsofagriculturalproducts.DumpingandAnti-dumpingintheUnitedStates:AComprehensiveReviewofKeyIssuesAftertherecentdecisionofU.S.toforwardanti-dumpingandanti-monopolyinvestigationsonChinesePVenterprises,EUalsofolloweditsstepsas25enterprisesfiledananti-dumpingcomplainttogetheragainstChinesePVproductswithEUCommission,asignthatthenegativeimpactof“anti-dumpingandant-monopoly”U.S.verdictisescalating.AsEUmarketaccountsforover90percentofChina’sPVproductexport,theanti-dumpinginvestigation,onceinitiated,wouldbeanotherblowtothemisery-riddendomesticPVenterprisesandmaypushdomesticPVmarkettoinitiatelarge-scaleacceleration,accordingtoindustryinsiders,whichhasalsobeenprovedbyaseriesofdomesticpolicysignals.AstheyhavedonebeforewiththeU.S.anti-dumpingcase,domesticPVgiantsincludingYingliSolar,Suntech,TrinaSolarandCanadianSolarreleasedajointstatementon26th,requestingEUCommissiontobeprudentwiththecomplaint.Facedwithaccusationsofprovokinga“price-war”,domesticpanelfirmsclaimthedropinpriceisaresultoflowercostsduetotechnicalprogressachievedbyChineseenterprises.

ThestatementemphasizesthatseenfromthevaluechainofentirePVindustry,Chinatakesadvantageoflargeproductionscaleandlowmanufacturingcosts.HencemostproductsarePVmodulesandmanufacturingaddedvalueregisters0.2-0.3USD/watt.Astheinternationalaverageinstallationcostofsolarpowerdeviceisaround2.5-3USD/watt,ChinesePVindustryonlyaccountsfor8-10percentintheentirevaluechain.

Althoughthefinalresultremainsunpredictable,recentlytheexportvolumeofChina’sPVproductstotheU.S.isshrinking,asignoftheescalatingnegativeimpactof“anti-dumpingandanti-monopoly”.AccordingtostatisticsofHeibeiCustoms,thisFebruaryandMarchwitnessed17percentand14percentreductionsrespectivelyinlocalPVexport.InJune,theyear-on-yeardecreaserateamountedto33percent.InTaizhou,Zhejiangprovince,hometohundredsofPVenterprises,thePVpanelexportvolumedropped36.8percentonayear-on-yearbasistoUSD86.28millioninthefirsthalf.

Thecontinuouscold-shouldertreatmentreceivedbyChineseenterprisesoninternationalmarkethasarousedindustry’sexpectationfortheacceleratedinitiationofdomesticPVmarket,andaseriesofupcomingpolicieshaverespondedtosuchexpectationinapositivemanner,whichisquitedifferentfrombefore.Analystssaytheescalating“anti-dumpingandanti-monopoly”hasinturnpusheddomesticPVmarkettowardsinitiatinglarge-scaleacceleration.TheimportanceattachedtodistributedPVpowergenerationby“The12thFive-YearPlan”means“thegridbottleneck”thathasbeencurbingtheexpansionofdomesticPVmarketforalongtimeislikelytobebrokensooner.Butintheshortterm,internationalimpacts,especiallythesuccessive“anti-dumpingandanti-monopoly”measurestakenbyEU,anexportdestinationof90percentofChinesePVproducts,willexertnegativeimpactondomesticmanufacturersforquitesometime.ANTIDUMPINGANDCOMPETITIONLAW:INDIANPERSPECTIVEDespitethegrowingpopularityofanti-dumpingactions,thetheoreticalunderpinningforanti-dumpingactionshasbeencriticizedalmostuniversallybyeconomistsandscholars.Anti-dumpingtheoryholdsthatpricediscriminationisanundesirablepracticewherebypredatoryexportersattackmarketsbyshippingatunfairlylowprices,drivinglocalcompetitorsoutofbusiness,andaccumulatingmonopolyoroligopolypower.Anti-dumpingduties,underthistheory,arenecessarytocounteractpredatorypricediscriminationbyexporters.Economists,academicsandgovernmentorganizationsroundlycriticizethisjustificationforanti-dumpingduties,foravarietyofreasons,discussedbelow.Fromthepointofviewofeconomics,thereisnoreasontosupportanyanti-dumpinglaw,sincepricedifferentiationacrossmarketsisalegitimateandaperfectlyrational,sensibleandlegitimateprofit-maximizationaction.Underthislineofargument,thereisnojustificationforcondemningcertainexportpricessimplybecausetheyhappentobelowerthanpricesinothermarkets.Domesticpricediscriminationi.e.,differencesinpricingbetweenonecountry’sdomesticregionalmarkets,normallyisnotpenalized.Therearguablyisnoeconomicreasonfortreating“international”pricediscriminationanymoreharshlybyimposingdumpingduties.Ofthedifferentcategoriesofdumping,onlypredatorypricingdumpingandmostinstancesofstrategicdumpingraiseoverallwelfareconcerns.Yet,thesetwoformsofdumpingpertainlargelytothetheoreticalrealm,asmostanti-dumpingcasesintherealworlddonotinvolvedumpingasdefinedbythesetwocategories.Indeed,intoday’stradeenvironment,characterizedbyincreasingcompetitionamongavarietyofexportsuppliersfromdifferentcountries,predatorypricingpracticesarguablyarefutilebecausemarketdominationandmonopolisticpricingarenotattainable.Economists,therefore,generallytaketheviewthatfrequentuseofanti-dumpingactioncannotbejustifiedasnecessarytopreventpredatorypricing.Anothercommoncriticismofanti-dumpingmeasuresisthattheydonotaffordeffectiveassistancetothedomesticindustrytheyareintendedtoprotect.Becauseoftheexpansionofinternationalsuppliers,acomplainant’sfailuretotargetallpossiblesupplierscouldmeanthatanti-dumpingdutiesagainstonlysomesuppliers,evenifsignificant,wouldmerelydivertthesourceofexportstonon-targetedcountries,withoutanappreciablepriceeffectintheimportmarket.Moreover,uncompetitiveindustriesaremorelikelythanotherstoreceiveprotection,andarenotlikelytobenefitfromitinthelongterm.Theanti-dumpingprotectionsoftencomeatasubstantialcosttoconsumers.Theyprotectproducersattheexpenseofconsumers,whichresultsinhigherprices,lowerqualityproducts,lessconsumerchoiceandageneralloweringofthestandardoflivingforthevastmajorityofpeople.Anti-dumpingmeasuresalsodestroymorejobsthantheycreate.Thecoststotheeconomyofanti-dumpingmeasuresaresignificantlyhigherthanthebenefittotheprotecteddomesticindustry.Overbroadanti-dumpingdutiesmaycurtailimportationofproductsnotevenproducedbydomesticcompanies.Theburdenanddamagetoconsumerindustriesdependentontheimportedproductcanbesignificantandcanoutweighanybenefitstotheupstreamcomplainantindustry.Theanti-dumpinglawsareambiguousandvague.Producersneverknowbywhichstandardtheywillbeheldaccountablebecausetherearesomanystandards.Anti-dumpingruleshavebeenimplementedandappliedbynationalauthoritiesinanunfairmanner,bothprocedurallyandsubstantively.Forexample,anOECDstudyconcludedthatanti-dumpingmeasures“canbeabusedforprotectionistpurposes”.DespitetheliberalizingchangesagreeduponduringtheUruguayRoundnegotiationsandadoptedintheWTOAnti-dumpingAgreement,thestudyfoundthat“anti-dumpingprocedurescanstillserveasaprotectionisttool”.Thewayanti-dumpinglawsarestructured,domesticproducerscanenlistthehelpofgovernmenttopreventforeigncompetitionevenwhentherehasbeennodumping.Thelawallowsproducerstounethicallyuseanti-dumpingmeasuresasweaponstobatterthecompetition.Fromthepointofjurisprudencealso,anti-dumpingisnotjustified.Fromarightsstandpoint,anti-dumpinglawspreventconsentingadultsfromenteringinto-contractsatamutuallyagreeduponprice.Anti-dumpinglawscannotbejustifiedbyanytheoryofliberaldemocracy.Theyarenotutilitarianbecausetheydonotresultinprovidingthegreatestgoodforthegreatestnumber.Indeed,ducersattheexpenseofthegreatestnumberi.e.consumers.Theyreduceratherthanenhancesocialcooperationandharmony.Theyviolaterights.Evenredistributionists’wouldargueagainstthembecausetheyredistributeincomeinthewrongdirection-fromthepoorandmiddleclassestotherich.Ithasbeenarguedthatimpositionofanti-dumpingdutiesmakeslittleeconomicsenseasitissortofprotectionprovidedtodomesticindustryagainstcompetitionfromoutsideratherthanactionagainstunfairtrade.Economistsarguethat‘dumping’isanaturalphenomenonandisnotnecessarily‘unfair’asconsideredundertheWTOAnti-dumpingAgreement(aswellasthedomesticanti-dumpinglegislationinthesubjectcountries).Fromaneconomicpointofviewtherearetwopreconditionsforafirminwhichitcanengageininternationalpricediscrimination:1.Thefirmshouldhaveastrongmonopolistic-oratleastoligopolistic-positioninitshomemarket.2.Thefirmshouldbeprotectedfromforeigncompetitioninitshomemarketbynaturalorartificialbarrierstotrade.Whenthesetwoconditionsaremet,itisquitenaturalforfirmstodumpandisnotnecessarily’unfair’practiceonthepartoftheexportingcountry.Therefore,theredoesnotseemtobeanyeconomicjustificationforanti-dumpingrulesthatcondemnallsalesofexportsatpriceslowerthanhome-marketprice.Besidesthepolitical-economicconsiderationofprotectionsof