兩個英文原版案例

Whitakerv.Whitaker,52N.Y.368;MatterofWilburv.EstateofWarren,104N.Y.192;1Clark,NewYorkLawofContracts,p.517,n.46).Itappearsdehors（在…之外）thepleadings（答辯狀）,thattheintiffisnotaresidentofNewYork,butofPennsylvaniaAnyrightswhichshemighthavehad,ifshehadbeenaresident,undersection101oftheSocialWelfareLawarethereforenotgermanetoaconsiderationofthiscase(also,cf.MatterofSalm,171Misc.367,371).Asintiffdoesnot,uponanysuggestedtheory,haveagoodcauseofactionagainstthedefendant,thecomintshouldbedismissedwithoutleavetopleadover.“愛和慈愛”為什么不能成為對價？列舉了哪些例外Calboun在Calboun案中，說：“愛和慈愛本身或道德上的義務即構成足夠的對本案為什么不能依紐約州的社會福利法主張其權利。，在Hammerv.Sindway，124N.Y.538（1891）案中，的叔叔在年滿15歲時對他說，如果在年滿21歲之前不喝酒、不抽煙、不．也不賭博，就可以從他叔叔那里得到5000。后來，果真按他叔叔的要求去做了對其行為的克制構成了叔叔諾言的對價。你認為本案與Hamer案的有嗎？。，Schoenungv.206Wis.52,238N.W.852Wis.ActionbyLeoSchoenung,byhisguardianadlitem,againstHelenGallet,asadministratrixoftheestateofRobertH.Hippe,deceased.Judgmentfordefendant,andintiffappeals.Reversedandremanded,withdirections.該案例來自、《國際商法教學案例（英文）選編，法律2007版，第313頁intiff,whileaminor,commencedthisactiononMarch13,1930,torecoverpossessionofanautoandhispromissorynotefor$250,whichhehaddeliveredtodefendantinexchangeforanotherauto ,iffappealedfromajudgmententeredMarch6,1931,dismissinghisOnApril15,1929,intiff,aminor,nineteenyearsofage,purchasedfromdefendantanautofor$300,forwhichhegavehisjudgmentnotefor$250andanauto,whichdefendantacceptedintradeatavaluationof$50.Atthattimeintiffwasanemancipated（脫離監(jiān)護的）minorlivingwithhisparentsonafarm,whichwasthree fromthecitywherehewasemployedat$75permonthinanimplementbusiness.Hisbrotherwasapartownerofthatbusiness,andintiffusuallydrovewithhimtoandfromwork.Hehadbeenworkingforseveralyears,andhadbeenpermittedtokeephisearnings,whichhehadusedtoprovidehisnecessariesandtopayfortwocheaperautos.UptoJune6,1929,hehaddriventheauto,whichhehadpurchasedonApril15,1929,fromsixhundredtoonethousandonpleasuretrips,andhaduseditoccasionallyingoingtoorfromhiswork.Onseveraloccasionshehadleftitatdefendant'sgarageforadjustmentsandrepairsforwhichnochargesweremade.OnJune6,1929,herestoredtheautotodefendantbyleavingitatdefendant'sgarage,andhedemandedthereturnofhisnoteandhisformerauto.Defendantrefusedtoacceptthereturnedautoandtheoftitlethereto,andalsorefusedtoreturnintiff'snoteandhisformerauto,whichdefendanthadsoldandwhichhadbeenwrecked.Later,onJune6,defendantremovedtheauto,whichintiffhadreturned,fromdefendant'sgaragetothepublicstreetinfrontofintiff'sceofemployment.Atrafficofficerorderedintifftoremoveitfromthestreet,andintiffthentookittohisfather'sfarm,whereithasremained.Sincethenintiffofferedittodefendantseveraltimes,butdefendantrefusedtoacceptit.Thetermsofthepurchasewerefairandreasonable,andtherewasnothingwrongwiththeautowhenintiffreturneditonJune6.Thelowercourtconcludedthattheautowasnecessarytointifftocarryonhisbusinessandemployment;thathewasanemancipatedminorandliableonhiscontract;andthathewasnotentitledtorescissionandtorecoverhisnoteandformerFRITZ,Thatintiffwasanemancipatedminorwasimmaterialasamatteroflawinthisaction.Emancipationdoesnotremoveoraffectaminor'sincapacitytosubjecthimselftocontractualliabilityforthingswhicharenotnecessaries.Consequently,intifflackedcapacitytocontractforthepurchaseofthisauto,unlessitwasanecessaryforhimundertheparticularfactsandcircumstancesofthiscase.In31C.J.1077,§175,itissaid:“Theterm‘necessaries,’asusedinthelawrelatingtotheliabilityofinfantstherefor,isarelativeterm,somewhatflexible,exceptwhenappliedtosuchthingsasareobviouslyrequisiteforthemaintenanceofexistence,anddependsonthesocialpositionandsituationinlifeoftheinfant,aswellasuponhisownfortuneandthatofhisparents.Theparticularinfantmusthaveanactualneedforthearticlesfurnished;notformereornament（裝飾）orpleasure.Thearticlesmustbeusefulandsuitable,buttheyarenotnecessariesmerelybecauseusefulorbeneficial.Concerningthegeneralcharacterofthethingsfurnished,tobenecessariesthearticlesmustsupplytheinfant's alneeds,eitherthoseofhisbody,orthoseofhismind.However,theterm‘necessaries'isnotconfinedtomerelysuchthingsasarerequiredforabaresubsistence（最低限度生活費）.Thereisnopositiverulebymeansofwhichitmaybedeterminedwhatareorwhatarenotnecessaries,forwhatmaybeconsiderednecessaryforoneinfantmaynotbenecessariesforanotherinfantwhosestateisdifferentastorank,socialposition,fortune,health,orothercircumstances,thequestionbeingonetobedeterminedfromtheparticularfactsandcircumstancesofeachcase.”InCovaultv.Nevitt,157Wis.113,146N.W.1115,1117,51L.R.A.(N.S.)Ann.Cas.1916A,959,thequestionaroseastowhetheraminorwhoownedrealestatecouldcontractfortheemploymentofajanitor.Thiscourtsaid:“Itisclearthatintheinstantcasetheallegedcontractcouldonlybesustained,ifatall,uponthegroundthatitwasacontractfornecessaries;anditisequallyclearthatsuchacontractisnotacontractfornecessaries.22Cyc.584,585;HollingsworthonContracts,p.31;16Am.&Eng.Ency.ofLaw(2dEd.)276.Thegeneralrulerespectingnecessariesisthattheymustbesuchastosupplythe alneedsoftheinfant.Manifestlythecontractinthiscaseisnotacontractfornecessariesunderwhichaliabilitycouldbeendnorforthebenefitoftheinfant.”InWallacev.NewdaleFurnitureCo.,188Wis.205,205N.W.819,820,aminorsoughttorecovermoneywhichshehadpaidaspartofthepurchasepriceforwhichsheusedforkeeroomers,andthenreturnedduringherminoritytothedefendant.Thiscourtsaid:“Ithasnotbeencontendedbycounselfortheappellantthatthearticlespurchasedbytheintiffwerenecessaries,andthatshecouldnotrescindforthatreason,norwouldtheargumentbesoundifmade.Thefactthataminorengagesinbusinessdoesnotremovetheincapacitytomakegeneralcontracts,and,intheabsenceofstatutes,purchasesmadeintradecannotberegardedasnecessaries.”Althoughconditionsandcircumstancesmayexistbecauseofwhichanautomaybeconsideredanecessaryforaminor,ithasthusfarbeenheldthatamotorvehicleisnotanecessaryandthathiscontractforthepurchasethereofisvoidable.Inthecaseatbaranautowasnotnecessaryforthe aluseorsupportofintiff.Themerefactthathisceofemploymentwasthree fromthehomeofhisparents,withwhomheresided,didnotnecessitatehisownershipofanauto.Thatisparticularlytrueinthiscase,becausehisbrother'sauto wasavailableforintifftotraveltoandfromhisceofemployment.Likewise,inasmuchashelackedcapacitytocontractforanautoforuseinabusinessofhisown,hewasalsothusincapacitatedtocontractforanautowhichhemightoccasionallyhaveuseforinperforminghisworkforhisemployer.Itfollowsthatwhenintiff,duringhisminority,restoredthatautoandtheoftitletothedefendant,hewasentitledtothereturnofhisnoteandhisformerauto,orthevaluethereof.Judgmentreversed,andcauseremanded,withdirectionstoenterjudgmentfortherecoverybyintiffofthesumof$50,withinterestfromJune6,1929,andthesurrenderforcancellationofintiff'snotefor$250,datedApril15,1929.未成年人為什么要就生活必需品的合同承擔責任？中國法律中有沒有類似的規(guī)定？《民法通則》第12條規(guī)定：“不能完全辨認自己行為的精神在Covault案《選編（英文》p.315，段1）中，為什么認為，未成年雇用一個“看門人”不是為了獲得生活必需品？（說：Thegeneralrulerespectingnecessariesisthattheymustbesuchastosupply alneedsofinfant.即，生活必需品僅限于個人使用ofthepurchasepriceforfurniture,whichsheusedforkeeroomers）中《選編（英文》p.315，段2）中，為什么認為，該未成年人的家具不是生活必需品？（Thefactthataminorengagesinbusinessdoesnotremovetheincapacitytomakegeneralcontracts,and,intheabsenceofstatutes,purchases