ITIF-如何更好地重建跨大西洋數(shù)據(jù)關(guān)系（英文）-2021.3-正式版-WN4

HowtoBuildBackBettertheTransatlanticDataRelationship

NIGELCORYANDELLYSSEDICK|MARCH2021

Transatlanticdataflowsareessentialtoorganizationsofallsizesandindustries—notjustlargetechnologyfirms.TheEUandUnitedStatesmustestablishclear,consistentlegalmechanismsfordatatransferssobothsidescanthriveinanincreasinglydigitalglobaleconomy.

KEYTAKEAWAYS

Transatlanticdigitalrelationsareincrisis.WiththeEU-U.S.PrivacyShieldinvalidatedandotherlegalmechanismsfortransferringdataunderscrutiny,thereisaseriousriskofadefactodatalocalizationpolicyhurtingbothsides.

Cross-borderdataflowsarecriticalforfirmsacrossthewholeeconomy—frommanufacturingandtransporttofinancialandInternetservices.Millionsofjobsandalargeshareoftransatlantictradethusdependonstrongdigitalties.

RestrictionsondataflowsdisproportionatelyaffectSMEs,whichoftenrelyondigitaltoolstoreachnewcustomersandgrowtheirbusinessesandarelesslikelythanlargefirmstohavetheresourcestonavigatecomplexlegalrequirements.

Beyondtradeandcommerce,governmentagenciesalsodependoncross-borderdataflowsforpurposesrangingfromregulatoryoversighttoinvestigatingcrimes,protectingnationalsecurity,andmore.

PolicymakersshouldrebuildarobustframeworkfortransatlanticdataflowswithasuccessortothePrivacyShield,newGDPR-complianttransfermechanisms,andimprovedlawenforcementcooperationtoaccesselectronicevidence.

Fullyharmonizingpoliciesisunrealistic,buttheEUandUnitedStatesshouldbepragmaticandforgeabroadcooperativeagendabasedonsharedvaluesasastrategiccounterweighttoauthoritariandigitalpowerslikeChinaandRussia.

ApragmaticU.S.-EUdigitalalliancewouldbemutuallybeneficialininfluencingglobaldata-sharingframeworks,AIregulation,electronicIDs,standardssetting,investmentscreening,andexportcontrolsfordataanddigitaltechnologies.

INFORMATIONTECHNOLOGY&INNOVATIONFOUNDATION | MARCH2021

CONTENTS

Introduction 2

TheEUandUnitedStatesNeedtoRepairandReinforcetheDigitalTransatlantic

Relationship

4

TheRoleandValueofDataFlowsandDigitalTradeintheTransatlanticRelationship

5

What’satStake:TheValuableRoleofTransatlanticDataFlowsAcrossSectors

11

Industrial,Transport,andAutomotiveSectors:OfMachinesandData

11

TheAutomotiveandTransportSectorsRelyonDataFlowstoSupportDrivers,

ConnectedVehicles,andRelatedServices

14

AConnectedorFragmentedTransatlanticManufacturingNetwork?

18

Financial,Payment,andInsuranceServices:KeyEnablersofGlobalDigitalTrade

19

DataFlowsSupporttheGrowthofSmallandMedium-SizedEnterprises

24

ConsumerInternetServices:Connected,Personalized,andValuable?OrDisconnected,

Generic,andLessValuable?

27

MaximizingtheBenefitsofTransatlanticHealthDataTransfers

30

DataTransfersDriveTransatlanticLifeSciencesResearch

31

GDPRMakesItHard,IfNotImpossible,forHealthDataTransferstoU.S.and

InternationalPublicHealthAgencies

34

TransatlanticHealthDataSharingBenefitsEveryone:ButItIsGettingHarder,More

Costly,andMoreComplicated

35

PolicyRecommendations

36

NegotiateaNewPrivacyShield

36

EUShouldRedoubleEffortstoBuildNewDataTransferMechanismsUnderGDPR

37

ImproveTransatlanticLawEnforcementCooperationandDataRequests

38

BuildaTransatlanticAgendaBasedon“DigitalRealpolitik”

39

Conclusion

42

Endnotes

44

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countrybecausetheyareheldaccountableforhowtheymanagedata,meaninglocallegalrequirementstravelwiththedata,regardlessofwhereitisstoredandprocessed.

4

ThiscontrastswiththeEuropeanfocusonthegeographyofdatastorage.MakinginternationaltransfersofEUpersonaldataincreasinglydifficult,costly,andlegallyuncertainleaveslocaldatastorageandprocessingastheonlyviableoption,whichistheendgoalformanyprivacyadvocatesandpolicymakersinEurope.Asitstands,theEU’sapproachtodataprivacyiscreatingtheworld’slargestdefactodatalocalizationframework.TheEU’sonlypeerisChina’sbroadandgrowingexplicitdatalocalizationregime,withlawsthatmakelocaldatastorageandprocessingthenormandtransferstheexception.Atsomepoint,thepressureonU.S.policymakerstoreciprocatewithequallyrestrictiverulespreventingEUfirmssuchasVolkswagen,Phillips,Siemens,andSanofifromtransferringdatafromtheirU.S.operationstotheirEUheadquarterswillbecomesignificantenoughtospurretaliatoryaction.

Itisinfeasibleforfirmstobuildoutlocalhumanresources,management,researchanddevelopment(R&D),regulatorycompliance,andinformationtechnology(IT)andcustomersupportservicesineachandeverymarketthathaslocaldatastoragerequirements.Suchrequirementsunderminetheabilityofallfirms—especiallygloballyengagedones—toleveragethedistributedpoweroftheInternetandcentralizedITsystemstomanagelocal,regional,andglobalbusinessoperationsandcomplianceactivities.Itisimpossibletofullylocalizeanydigitalprocess,good,orservicewithoutsomelevelofimpactordisruption.Whileitmaybetechnicallypossibleforacompany—particularlyalargeone—tofullylocalizedatastorage,therewouldbemajordisruptionsandchangestothetypeandqualityofservices,aswellaslimitsontheuseoftechnologiessuchasartificialintelligence(AI)whereinalgorithmsimprovewithlargerdatasets.Theunderlyingdatastorageinfrastructuredoesnotnecessarilyrelyontheabilitytoexchangedataacrossborders,buttheservicesbuiltonitcertainlydo.

Transatlanticdataflowshaveenormouseconomicimplications.Two-wayEU-U.S.digitaltradegrewfromanestimated$166billionin2005to$292billionin2015.Thesectoralcasestudiesinthisreportshowwhatisatstake.Despitethepopularmisconceptionthatdataflowsonlybenefitsearchenginesandsocialnetworks,severingtransatlanticdataflowswouldhavewide-reachingimpactsacrosstheglobaleconomy.Yet,someEUpolicymakersthinkthatrestrictingorcuttingoffdataflowsanddigitaltradewiththeUnitedStatesisagoodthingasitalignswiththeir“digitalsovereignty”goals,believingthatifithurtsleadingU.S.techfirms,thenitmustbegood—withoutrealizingorappreciatingthebroaderandmuchlargercosts.ThisstanceignoresthefactthatdoingsowouldalsohurtthehundredsofEuropeanfirmsthatusedPrivacyShieldandSCCstomanagedatatransfersbetweentheirheadquartersandofficesandoperationsintheUnitedStates.

5

Unfortunately,thisprotectionistimpulseisalsoevidentinEurope’songoingefforttodefineitsowndigitaleconomyframework,suchastheEuropeanCommission’sdatastrategyanditsDataGovernanceAct.

6

Buttheimpactisnotonlytradeandinnovation-related—governmentsonbothsidesoftheAtlanticdependonfirmsbeingabletotransferdataaspartofday-to-dayregulatoryrequirements,whetherforfinancialoversightofthebanking,financial,andpaymentssectors(forfinancialstability,counter-terrorismfinancing,oranti-money-launderingpurposes)orthereviewofclinicaltrialsbyrespectivepublichealthagencies.Thisisobviouslyinadditiontolawenforcementandnationalsecuritycooperation.

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ThisreportstartsbyoutliningthehistoryofthetransatlanticdigitalrelationshiptoshowhowboththeEUandUnitesStateshavecontinuouslyrecognizedthevalueinworkingtogethertoaddressissuesastheyarise.However,thisreportalsomakesthecasethatthisrelationshipshouldnotbebasedontroubleshooting,butideally,onabroaderdigitalagenda,givenbothsidessharemanyvaluesandinterests.Itthenanalyzesestimatesoftheeconomicvalueoftransatlanticdigitaltrade,beforeprovidingaseriesofsectoralcasestudiestoshowhowfirmsinadiverserangeofsectors—fromautomotiveandotheradvancedmanufacturerstolifesciencestoconsumerInternetservicestofinancialandbankingservices—usetransatlanticdataflows.

Finally,thisreportprovidesrecommendationstobuildabetter,stronger,andbroadertransatlanticdigitalrelationship:

PolicymakersshouldnegotiateanewPrivacyShield.Longterm,thetwosidescouldworktowardlegislationandatreatyagreementthatwouldcodifysomeoftheircommitments.Inanidealworld,theUnitedStatesandEuropewouldworktogetherwithlike-mindedcountriestodevelopa“GenevaConventionforData,”whichwouldcreateconsensusonissuesaroundgovernmentaccesstodata.

TheEUshouldredoubleeffortstobuildnewdatatransfermechanismsunderGDPR.Thiswouldbeinadditiontothemoreimmediateneedtomakeexistinglegaltools(SCCsandbindingcorporaterules)clear,reasonable,andaccessible.

TheUnitedStatesandEUshouldconcludenegotiationstoimprovetransatlanticaccesstoelectronicevidenceforlawenforcementinvestigations.

TheEUandUnitedStatesshouldbuildabroaderagendaforpragmaticcooperationondataanddigitalpolicyissues—onebasedon“digitalrealpolitik.”Suchcooperationwouldbeeconomicallybeneficialtobothsidesgiventheirextensiveeconomicconnections.Furthermore,whiletherearepointsofconflict,overall,theirsharedvaluesstandinstarkcontrasttothoseofauthoritariandigitalpowerssuchasChinaandRussia.Suchanagendacouldworkonhowtodevelopdatasharingframeworks;developandapplytheappropriateregulationofAI,suchasviaalgorithmicaccountability;developinteroperableelectronicidentitysystems;buildpre-standardizationcooperationfornewandemergingtechnologies;developacoordinatedstrategytocounterChina’seffortstoundulyinfluenceinternationalstandardssettingforAIanddigitalpolicies;andcooperateandcoordinateinvestmentscreeningandexportcontrolsthatincreasinglydealwithdataanddigitaltechnologies.

THEEUANDUNITEDSTATESNEEDTOREPAIRANDREINFORCETHEDIGITALTRANSATLANTICRELATIONSHIP

Despiteconstantpressureoverthelastdecade—andasreactionstotheSnowdenrevelationscontinuetoreverberate—boththeEUandUnitedStateshavekeptthetransatlanticdataanddigitalrelationshipgoing.Despitethechallenges,thereislargelybipartisansupportintheUnitedStatesforEU-U.S.digitalengagement.

TherewassubstantialcontinuityacrosstheObamaandTrumpadministrations,whichislikelytocontinueintheBidenadministration.In2014,PresidentObamaissuedpresidentialpolicydirectivenumber28on“SignalsIntelligenceActivities,”whichincludedsafeguardsfornon-U.S.

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personsinsignalsintelligence.

7

PrivacyShieldwassignedunderPresidentObama,andwasalsosupportedbytheTrumpadministration.TheU.S.FederalTradeCommissionenforcedPrivacyShieldthroughoutbothadministrations.Meanwhile,theU.S.CongresscontinuestodebateacomprehensiveU.S.dataprivacybillthatwouldnodoubtimprovetheoverallcontextforengagementwiththeEU.However,dataprivacylegislationwouldnotaddressthefundamentaldisagreementoverU.S.governmentsurveillancethatisattheheartofSchremsII.

Withoutpoliticalintervention,itislikelythattransatlanticdatatransferswilleventuallybecutoff.

Giventhis,rebuildingastrongtransatlanticrelationshipwillrequireactiononbothsides.MostofthefocushasbeenontheUnitedStates,whichhasalreadymadechangestoaccountforEUconcernsandsignaleditswillingnesstoconsiderfurtherchanges.Yet,ongoingconflictoverEUpolicyremains.TheUnitedStatesshouldtakeintoconsiderationEuropeanconcernsasitupdatesitslawsandpoliciesaroundgovernmentaccesstodataanddataprotection.However,theEUshouldalsoconsiderpolicyandlegalreformstoGDPRandotherdigitalpoliciesaspartofconstructiveeffortstobuildbothshort-andlong-termtoolstoaddressbothnewandongoingissuesregardinginternationaldatagovernance.EUmemberstatesalsoneedtobeconsistentinaddressingdataprivacyandsurveillanceissues.NationalsecurityisnotaEuropeanCommissionorEUcompetency,sodoingsowillrequireEUmemberengagement.IftheEUcontinuestotakealargelyhands-offapproachabouttheneedtoaddressallrelatedissue—notjustprivacy,buttradeandnationalsecurity—itwillleadtoruinasitleavesprivacyadvocates,theEDPB,andthecourtsinthedriver’sseatofacriticallyimportantpartofthetransatlanticrelationship.

8

Withoutpoliticalintervention,itislikelythattransatlanticdatatransferswilleventuallybecutoff.

Thestakesinvolvedinbuildingasuccessfultransatlanticdigitalrelationshiparealreadyhigh,buttheygrowevenhigher,giventhemanyglobaldebatesaboutdataanddigitaltechnologies.IftheEUandUnitedStateswanttotrulyworktogetherontheseissues—astheEuropeanCommissionfrequentlycallsfor—theybothneedtoshowthattheycanaddresstheirownissuesinawaythatpresentsamodelforothercountries.Absentsuchanoutcome,callsfortransatlanticcooperationonglobalissueswouldbeseenasmeaningless.

THEROLEANDVALUEOFDATAFLOWSANDDIGITALTRADEINTHETRANSATLANTICRELATIONSHIP

Digitaltrade—includingbothdigitalanddigitallyenabledservices—isanincreasinglyimportantcomponentoftheglobaleconomy.Asthesectoralcasestudiesshow,cross-bordertransfersofdataunderpinvirtuallyallbusinessprocessesininternationaltradeandinvestment.

9

Estimatingthevalueoftransatlanticdataflowsanddigitaltradeischallenging.

10

Forexample,approximatingvaluebytheaggregatevolumeofdatatransfershassignificantlimitations.

11

Thevalueofdatadependsonitscontent.

12

Dataisalsohighlycontextspecific.Anindividualperson’sdatamaybevaluabletothatperson,butonlyholdbroadervaluewhenaggregatedwithdatafrommanyotherindividualsandothersourcesofdata.Thevalueofdataistemporalinthatitmayonlybecomevaluablewhenusedaspartoffutureanalysis.Furthermore,somedataflowsmaybenon-monetized—representingintra-companytransfersthatarecommerciallyvaluable,butnotcapturedinaformaltransaction.Similarly,grossdomesticproduct(GDP)andothereconomicstatisticsdonotmeasurethevalueofconsumersurplus,suchaswhenconsumers

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accessdigitalgoodsandservicesatnofinancialcost.

13

Whileestimatingthevalueofthespecificunderlyingdataanditstransferisdifficult,itisclearthatcontinuousdataaggregationandanalysisbyfirmscreatesenormousvalue,inwhattheOrganizationforEconomicCooperationandDevelopment(OECD)callsthe“globaldatavaluecycle.”

14

Whileprecise,comprehensive,andconsistentmeasurementofthevalueofdataanddigitaltradeinandbetweentheUnitedStatesandEUisnotyetpossible,therearearangeofestimatesthatsupportwhatweknowanecdotally—thatdataanddigitaltraderepresentanimportantandfast-growingpartoftheglobaleconomy.

15

InAugust2020,theU.S.DepartmentofCommerce’sreport“NewDigitalEconomyEstimates”calculatedthatthedigitaleconomyaccountedfor9percentofU.S.GDPin2018,whichrankeditjustbelowthemanufacturingsector(whichaccountedfor11.3percent)andjustabovefinanceandinsurance(7.6percent).

16

From2006to2018,theU.S.digitaleconomy’srealvalueaddedgrewatanannualrateof6.8percent.Itsupported8.8millionjobs,whichrepresented5.7percentofU.S.totalemployment.

17

InEurope,thevalueaddedfromtheinformationandcommunicationtechnology(ICT)sectorin2017wasequivalenttoatleast3.9percentofGDP,2.5percentoftotalemployment,and18.6and20.6percentofthetotalR&DpersonnelandresearchersintheEU,respectively.

18

EmploymentintheEU’sICTservicessectorgrewby22.7percentbetween2012and2017.

19

Andasof2020,oneofthefastest-growingaspectsoftheglobaldigitaleconomy,the“appeconomy,”accountsforover2millionjobsintheU.S.andEUalike.

20

Dataanddigitaltraderepresentanimportantandfast-growingpartoftheglobaleconomy.

TraditionaltradestatisticscapturesomeoftheEU-U.S.digitaltraderelationship,butnotall.

21

TheUnitedStatesisboththelargest(non-EU)marketforEurope’sdigitallyenabledservicesanditslargestsupplier.

22

Indicativeofthis,abouthalfofalldataflowsinboththeUnitedStatesandEuropearetransatlantictransfers.

23

In2018,digitallyenabledservicesaccountedforthemajorityofU.S.servicesexports(55percent),nearlyhalfofU.S.servicesimports(48percent),andafull69percentofU.S.globalsurplusinservices.

24

TheU.S.alsoaccountedfor32percentofexportsand39percentofimportsofdigitallyenabledservicesfromandtotheEU.

25

TheU.S.DepartmentofCommerce’sICTandpotential-ICTbaseddigitaltradedataprovidesthebroadest,andmostrecent,estimateoftransatlanticdigitaltrade,whichintotal,wasworth$295billionin2018.ItcapturesbothICTservicesthatareusedtofacilitateinformationprocessingandcommunication(e.g.,computerandtelecommunicationservices)andpotentiallyICT-enabledservicesthatcanpredominantlybedeliveredremotelyoverICTnetworks,suchasfinancial,insurance,intellectualproperty,professionalandmanagementservices,andR&Dservices,amongothers.

26

Thedataestimatesthat,in2018,ICTandpotential-ICTbaseddigitaltradebetweentheUnitedStatesandEuropewas$188billioninexportsto,and$107billioninimportsfrom,theEU,respectively(see

figure1)

.

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Figure1:U.S.exportsandimportsofICTandpotentialICT-baseddigitaltradewiththeEU(2018)

27

UpdatingtheU.S.DepartmentofCommerce’s“digitallydeliverableservices”(DDS)estimate—whichcomprisesamorenarrowsetofservicesthanthoseincludedintheestimatesabove—ismorereadilycomparableacrosscountries(usingtradeinvalueadded(TiVA)andEurostatdatabases),butdoesnothavedataforrecentyears(mostrecentdataisfor2015).AnalysisofDDStradecapturesamixoftransactionsthatareentirelydigital,somewhatdigital,orentirelynon-digital.

28

Italsoshowsthattransatlantictradeislargeandgrowing.U.S.DDSexportstotheEUrosefrom$98billionto$183billionbetween2005and2015,whileEUDDSexportstotheUnitedStatesrosefrom$67billionto$108billion(see

figure2)

.

Figure2:U.S.exportsandimportsofdigitallydeliveredserviceswiththeEU(2005-1015)

29

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TheEU’sDDSexportsvaryconsiderablybymemberstate,whichhighlightstheeconomicdifferencesbetweenmemberstatesandtheiruseofdata,services,andICTs.

30

AccordingtoTiVAdata,GermanyhasseenconsistentlyrisingDDSexports,growingfrom$36billionin2010to$65billionin2018(see

figure4)

.FrancehasalsoseenitsDDSexportsgrow,from$27billionin2011to$41billionin2018(see

figure5)

.Bycontrast,Italy’sexportshavebarelygrown(see

figure6),

increasingonlyfrom$6.1billionto$8.6billionbetween2010and2018.TheNetherlands’DDSexportsdeclined,fallingfrom$41billionin2010to$26billionto2018.Despitethatcountry’slowoverallDDSexports,however,DDSservicesremainimportanttotheNetherlands,exhibitingahighdegreeofDDSexportintensity(DDSexportsasapercentageoftotalserviceexports).

ParsingoutDDSexportsbyindustryshowsfurthervariationbetweentheUnitedStatesandtheEU.IntheUnitedStates,“other”DDSexports,representedbyservices(e.g.,thelegal,scientific,andarchitecturalfields),hasdominatedinrecentyears(see

figure3)

.Royaltiesandlicensing,aswellasfinancialservices,arealsobothsignificantdriversofDDSexports.ITservicesdominateinGermany(growingfrom$11.6billionin2012to$22billioninyear2018),while“other”remainsataclosesecond,indicatingaheavyITfocusinGermanyrelativetootherEUcountries(see

figure4)

.InFrance,licensingand“other”servicestakethelead,followedbyITandfinancialservices(see

figure5)

.ITservicesalsodominateinItaly,withthatsectoroutweighinglicensingand“other”relatedDDSexports(see

figure6)

.TheEUwillcontinuetoremainakeyregionformanyDDSsectorsgoingforward,rivaledbytheUnitedStates,Japan,andincreasingly,China.

Figure3:U.S.exportsofdigitallydeliveredservicesglobally,byproductgroup(2010-2018)

31

$500B

$400B

Other

$300B

FinancialServices

$200B

IntellectualProperty

$100B

ICTServices

InsuranceandPensionServices

$0B

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

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Figure4:Germany’sexportsofdigitallydeliveredservicesoutsidetheEU,byproductgroup(2010-2018)

32

$70B

$60B

$50B

$40B

Other

$30B

ICTServices

$20B

IntellectualProperty

$10B

FinancialServices

InsuranceandPensionServices

$0B

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

Figure5:France’sexportsofdigitallydeliveredservicesoutsidetheEU,byproductgroup(2011-2018)

33

$50B

$40B

$30B

Other

$20B

ICTServices

$10B

IntellectualProperty

InsuranceandPensionServices

FinancialServices

$0B

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

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Figure6:Italy’sexportsofdigitallydeliveredservicesoutsidetheEU,byproductgroup(2010-2018)

34

$12B

$10B

Other

$8B

$6B

ICTServices

$4B

IntellectualProperty

$2B

FinancialServices

InsuranceandPensionServices

$0B

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

Acomprehensiveassessmentoftransatlanticdigitaltradeneedstotakeintoaccountvaluable(butnon-monetized)intra-firmdatatransfersthatrepresentservicessuppliedviaaffiliateslocatedinbothEuropeandtheUnitedStates.

35

Asin2018,abouttwo-thirdsoftheservicesprovidedinternationallybothbyandtotheUnitedStateswerethroughaffiliates.

36

Many(ifnotall)multinationalcompaniesintheUnitedStatesandEUrelyoncross-borderdatatransferstosupporttheirinternationalbusinessoperations.Again,therearemeasurementissuesasdifferencesincoverageandclassificationmakeitdifficulttocomparetradeinserviceswithservicessuppliedthroughaffiliates.

37

However,theyarestillusefulinshowingthatthedatadisplayedin

figure5

and

figure6

areconservativeestimatesofthefullvalueofdigitalanddigitallyenabledservicesinthetransatlanticeconomicrelationship.

38

Acomprehensiveassessmentoftransatlanticdigitaltradeneedstotakeintoaccountvaluable(butnon-monetized)intra-firmdatatransfersthatrepresentservicessuppliedviaaffiliateslocatedinbothEuropeandtheUnitedStates.

TheU.S.DepartmentofCommerceestimatedthat53percentofthe$839billioninservicesprovidedinEuropebyU.S.affiliatesin2017wasdigitally