外文翻譯-政府績(jī)效-教訓(xùn)和挑戰(zhàn)

PAGE中文4350字外文文獻(xiàn)翻譯原文：GovernmentPerformance:LessonandChallengesThisarticleconcentratesonattemptsbyOECDcountriestointroduceperformance-basedorresults-basedbudgetingandmanagement.Theneedtoenhancepublicsectorperformancehasbecomemoreurgentasgovernmentsfacemountingdemandsonpublicexpenditure,callsforhigherqualityservicesand,insomecountries,apublicincreasinglyunwillingtopayhighertaxes.Performancebudgetingandperformancemanagementseektomovethefocusofbudgeting,managementandaccountabilityawayfrominputstowardsresults,i.e.bettervalueformoney.DrawingondatafromtheOECD/WorldBankBudgetPracticesandProceduresDatabase,thearticleexploresthetrendsandcountryapproaches(differentphases,variousobjectives),discussesaccountabilitytothepublic(includingexternalperformanceauditing),andrecognisestheimportanceofcontextandawhole-of-governmentapproach,inparticularforchangingthebehaviourofkeyactorsandmotivatingpoliticianstouseperformanceinformation.Thelimitationsandtensionsofperformancebudgetingandperformancemanagementarealsodiscussed,aswellasproblemsofmeasurementandtheefficientuseofperformanceinformation.Agreatdealofrhetorichassurroundedtheintroductionofperformancemanagementandbudgeting.Supportersclaimthatithasthecapacitytotransformgovernments.However,itisimportantthatthisreformshouldnotbeseenasapanaceaandthatgovernmentshaverealisticexpectationsaboutwhatitcanachieveandthetimeneededtoreachtheseobjectives.Evencountriesthathavebeenusingthisapproachforover15yearscontinuetostrugglewithissuesofmeasurement;thisisespeciallythecaseforoutcomes.Akeychallengeforallcountriesisobtaininggoodqualityinformationwhichisvalid,reliable,andtimely.Numerouschallengescanbeencounteredincludingsettingclearobjectives,findingaccuratemeasuresofperformanceandhavinggoodsystemsofdatacollection.Settingobjectives:Forsomeagenciesorprogrammes,evensettingclearobjectivescanbeaproblemwhenthereisnoagreementonwhatthemissionis,ortherearediversemissions,overlappingandfragmentedprogrammes,andstakeholderswithdifferentinterests.Findingaccuratemeasuresofperformance:Thedesignofmeasuresismadedifficultbyfindingmeasuresforspecificactivities,andbyrelatingwhatanagencyorprogrammeactuallycontributestowardsachievingspecificoutcomes.Outputandoutcomemeasureseachpresentadifferentsetofchallenges(OECD,2002b).Outcomesaretechnicallymoredifficulttomeasure;theyarecomplexandinvolvetheinteractionofmanyfactors,plannedandunplanned.Also,thereareproblemswithtimelagissuesandinsomecasestheresultsarenotwithinthecontrolofthegovernment.Outcomes,however,haveastrongappealforthepublicandpoliticians.Mostcountriesappeartohaveadoptedacombinationofoutputsandoutcomes.Establishingandmaintainingsystemsofdatacollection:Toensurequalitythereneedstobeaprocessbywhichdatacollectedareverifiedandvalidated.However,settingupandmaintainingthesesystemscanbebothcomplexandcostly.AsdiscussedinSection6,theauditingofperformanceinformationcanhelptoimprovestandardsandprovidesomelegitimacyforthereportedresults.Itisespeciallychallengingtoassurethequalityofthedatawhenagenciesaredependentonthirdpartiestoprovidetheinformation.Thisisparticularlyaprobleminfederalistsystems(Curristine,2002).Performancetargetshelptoclarifyperformanceexpectationsforanorganisationforagiventimeperiod.Countries,however,continuetostrugglewiththeissuesoftargetlevelandnumbers.Thereareproblemswithsettingtargetstoolowand/ortoohigh.Settingtargetstoolowmeansthatagenciesarenotchallengedtoimproveperformance.Settingthemtoohigh,whileitcanmotivateorganisations,alsocreatesunrealisticexpectationsandsituationsinwhichagencieswillfail(Perrin,2002).Ittakestimetogettherightlevelandtogetthecomparativedatatorealisethattargetsaresetattoohighortoolowalevel.Toomanytargets:Thereisalsoanissueabouthowmanytargetstohave.Toomanytargetscreateinformationoverloadandmakeitdifficulttoselectpriorities;toofewtargetscreatedistortioneffects.Againittakestimetogetarealisticbalance.Severalcountrieshavestartedoutwithalargenumberoftargetsandsubsequentlyreducedthem.Forexample,intheUnitedKingdomwhenperformanceagreementsfordepartmentswerefirstintroducedaspartofthecomprehensivespendingreviewin1998,therewereintotal600targetsacrossgovernment.Bythetimeoftherevisedspendingreviewin2002,thatnumberhadbeenreducedto130targets(H.M.Treasury,2004).Avoidingdistortingbehaviour:Thisisachallengeforallgovernments.Possibleperverseeffectsincludegoaldistortion–thatis,organisationsandmanagersfocusingonafewspecificindicatorsandtargets,usuallythemostachievableor“saleable”,attheexpenseoftheoverallobjectivesorprogramme.Inextremecasesofgoaldistortion,agenciesorstaff,underpressuretomeettargets,maydeliberatelypresentmisleadinginformation.InmanyOECDcountries,theobjectiveofintroducingperformanceintothebudgetprocessistoimprovebudgetarydecisionmakingandtoactasanincentiveforagenciestoimproveperformance.Mostcountries,however,continuetostrugglewiththisapproach.Asdiscussedabove,oneofthekeyissuesisobtaininggoodqualityandreliableperformancedata.Briefly,otherchallengesincludeestablishingsomelinkbetweenfinancialinformationandperformanceinformation.Thisisparticularlychallengingforoutcomemeasures.Inmanycountriestherearealsoproblemswiththestructureofthebudgetandaccountingissues.Budgetstendtobestructuredinaccordancewithinstitutionalandfunctionalboundariesandnotaccordingtoresultscategories.Alsoifthereisnosystemofcostrecording,itisdifficulttorelatetruecoststoresults.Gettingtherightmixofincentives:Thisisparticularlyimportantwhencountriesuseperformanceinformationinresourceallocation.Afundamentalquestioniswhetherfinancialrewardsshouldbegivenforgoodperformanceandbadperformanceshouldbepunishedand,ifso,how.Punishingfailurebyremovingresourcescreatesaclearsignaltootheragenciesthatperformanceisconsideredimportant.However,itdoesnothelpaddresstheunderlyingcausesofpoorperformance.Indeedinsomecasesfailuretomeettargetscanbetheresultoflackoffundingorotherresources.Whilerewardinggoodperformanceisintuitivelyappealing,itdoesnottakeintoaccountcostissuesandgovernmentpriorities.Inaclimateofbudgetarysaving,aquestioniswhethertogiveadditionalfundingtoanagency,especiallyonethatisnotagovernmentpriority.Ineithercase,thereisalwaysthedangerthatlinkingresultstofinancialresourcescancreateincentivestodistortandcheatinpresentinginformation.Oneofthemostdifficultchallengesistocreatearesults-basedculturewithinorganisationsandthroughoutgovernment.Toachievechangeinbehaviourandcultureacrossgovernmentrequiresawhole-of-governmentapproachandthecreationoftherightmixofincentivesthattakesaccountofhowtheactionsofkeyactorsinfluenceeachother.Mostcountriescontinuetostrugglewithachievingchangeinthebehaviourofpublicservantsandpoliticians;thisisalong-termprocess.Obtainingandmaintainingthesupportofmanagersandemployeeswithingovernmentorganisationsiscrucial.Thisreformhasthepotentialtoimprovethefocusonorganisationalgoals,toprovidemanagerswithbetterinformationfordecisionmakingonprogrammes,budgetsandpolicies,andtoimproveinternalreportingandcontrols.Gainingthesebenefitsischallengingbecauseitrequirestechnicalaswellasculturalchange.Intechnicaltermsitcanbedifficulttomeasurewhatanagencydoesandtolinkorganisationalobjectivestoindividualgoals.Itisimportanttoobtainthebuy-inoffrontlineemployees;thiscanbefacilitatedbytherightmixofformalandinformalincentivesandcontrols.Obtainingthestrongsupportoftheorganisationalleadershipandmanagerscanbefacilitatedbygivingthemthenecessaryflexibilitytoachievegoals.Withoutthisflexibility,managerswillhavetheresponsibilityforachievingtargetswithouttheabilitytodeliver,andnoonewantstobeheldaccountablefortargetsthatarenotwithinhis/hercontrol.Withinthecontextofagovernment-wideapproach,ifandhowtheperformanceinformationisusedbypoliticiansandtheMinistryofFinancecancreateincentiveswhichimpactonhowmanagersbehave.Ifperformanceinformationisrequiredbutnotusedbyleadersormanagersindecisionmaking,thereisadangerofitbecomingaburdenonorganisationsintermsofcostofinformationsystemsandstafftime.Theprovisionofthisinformation,inadditiontotherequirementsofthetraditionalcontrolmechanisms,caninterferewithgettingthejobdone.Ifthishappens,thenperformancemanagementandbudgetingcanbecomeadistraction,adistortionoranexpensivepaperexerciseratherthanameanstotransformorganisationsandanessentialpartofgoodmanagement.Obtainingandmaintainingthesupportofpoliticians:AsdiscussedinSection7,thisisakeychallengefacingreformers.Thesupportofpoliticiansinthelegislatureandtheexecutivehelpstoreinforcetheneedforchangeandtopushreform,althoughitisparticularlydifficulttoobtainthesupportofpoliticiansinthelegislature.Issuesofhorizontalandverticalco-ordination:Manygoalsandoutcomescutacrossgovernmentorganisationsandinvolvetheworkofmanyagencies.WhilesomeOECDcountrieshaveestablishedcross-governmentalhorizontalgoalsandtargets,itisprovingdifficulttoachieveco-ordinationacrossdepartmentsandtoholdthemaccountableforresults.Ataverticallevelthereisanissuewithdifferentactorswantingthesameinformationfordiversepurposes;theirinformationalneedsarenotthesame.Managingexpectations:Realisticexpectationsareneededbothaboutwhatcanbeachievedbythisreformandhowlongitwilltake.Along-termapproachandpersistenceareneeded:ittakestimetoovercomethetechnicalissuesandtochangethebehaviourofpublicservantsandpoliticians.Theperformanceofgovernmentcanbeimprovedthroughafocusonresultsinpolicyadvice,centralanddepartmentalmanagementprocesses,andparliamentaryandpublicaccountability.Itisimportanttofirstidentifytherelativepriorityoftheseareasinaparticularcountry.Whatagovernmentshoulddoisdifferentineachcase.ThemajorityofOECDcountriesareimplementingperformancemanagementandperformancebudgeting,althoughtheextentandtheapproachesvarywidelyacrosscountries.Theintroductionofperformancemanagementandbudgetingappearstobeanimportantandenduringinnovationinpublicmanagement.Itisclearlyastrongdeviceforhorizontalprioritysetting,policyalignmentandcostanalysis.Thesereformshaveimprovedtransparencythroughtheprovisionofmoreinformationongovernmentperformancetothepublic.However,someinitialhopeshavebeentooambitious.Mostcountriescontinuetostrugglewithchangingthebehaviourofpublicservantsandpoliticians.Thisisalong-termprocess.Toachievechangeinbehaviourandcultureacrossgovernmentrequiresawhole-of-governmentapproachandthecreationoftherightmixofincentivesandcontrols(formalandinformal)andanunderstandingofthesystemsandhowtheactionsofkeyactorsinfluenceeachother.Thereisnoclearpatternofinputcontrolsbeinglightenedasperformanceindicatorsarestrengthened.Thisraisesissuesaboutbalancingaccountabilityandflexibility.Whatevertheaccountabilitysystemsinplace,theyneedtobebalancedagainstthefreedomrequiredbymanagerstodotheirjobs.Criticsofthetraditionalsystemofaccountabilityarguethatruleshadbecomeendsinthemselves,thataccountabilitystressedcompliance,andthathierarchicalstructureshinderedefficiencyandperformance.Thus,thecriticsemphasisedtheneedstorelaxinputcontrols.Thereareobviousdangersinrelaxinginputcontrolstoosoonaftertheintroductionofoutputandoutcomemeasures.However,therearealsodangersinfailingtorelaxthesecontrolssufficiently,withthepossibleeffectthatoutputandoutcomemeasuresbecomeanexpensivepaperexercise,withlittleimpactonmanagers’abilitytoimproveperformance.Ifthesystemhastoomanyrestrictionsandmanagersdonothaveenoughfreedomtoimproveperformance,thenfailuretorelaxinputcontrolscanresultininefficiency.Thecommonassumptionthattheperformanceinformationthatisusefulfortheexecutivewouldalsoservethelegislatureremainsunproven.Withafewexceptions,performancereportinghasbeenneitherwelcomednorusedbyOECDmembercountrylegislaturesintheiroversightanddecisionmaking.Performancemeasuresandtargetsareonlyonesourceofinformationaboutperformance,andtheyarenosubstitutefortheindependent,in-depthqualitativeexaminationoftheimpactofpoliciesthatevaluationscanprovide.ThecombinedexperiencesofOECDcountrieshighlighttheimportanceoftakingalong-termapproachandhavingrealisticexpectationsaboutthecapacityofperformancemanagementandbudgetingtoimproveperformanceandaccountability.Along-termapproachandpersistenceareneededtoachievethenecessarytechnicalandbehaviouralchangesthatthisleverrequires.Finally,fromawiderperspective,thedesignofcross-governmentperformanceinterventionsneedscarefulanalysisandconsiderationofoptions.Broadly,theseinterventionsare:leadership;strategicplanning;performancemanagement;theinclusionoftargetsandmeasuresintheformalbudgeting,managementandoversightprocesses;andpolicyevaluation.Eachhasdifferentstrengthsandlimitations.Thereisadangerofgovernmentsbecomingfixatedonaparticularformalsolutiontotheproblemofimprovingperformance.Theperformanceorientationofpublicmanagementisheretostay.Itisessentialforsuccessfulgovernment.Societiesarenowtoocomplextobemanagedonlybyrulesforinputandprocessandapublic-spiritedculture.Theperformancemovementhasincreasedformalisedplanning,reportingandcontrolacrossmanygovernments.Thishasimprovedtheinformationavailabletomanagersandpolicymakers.Butexperienceshowsthatthiscanriskleadingtoanewformofbureaucraticsclerosis.Moreattentionneedstobegiventokeepingperformancetransactioncostsincheck,andtomakingoptimaluseofsocialandinternalisedmotivatorsandcontrols.Source：TeresaCurristine.GovernmentPerformance：LessonsandChallenges[J].OECDJournalonbudgeting，2005，5(1)：127-151.譯文：政府績(jī)效：教訓(xùn)和挑戰(zhàn)本文將集中介紹經(jīng)濟(jì)合作與發(fā)展組織國(guó)家引入的，以績(jī)效結(jié)果為基礎(chǔ)的預(yù)算編制和績(jī)效管理。在一些國(guó)家，公眾越來(lái)越不愿意支付更高的稅款，而各國(guó)政府的公共支出需求卻越來(lái)越大，因此面臨著很大的財(cái)務(wù)危機(jī)，且壓力巨大，因此需要在支出不增加的基礎(chǔ)上滿足公共服務(wù)需求是關(guān)鍵，政府績(jī)效是一種以尋求實(shí)現(xiàn)政府服務(wù)更高質(zhì)量的重要工具，可以舒緩財(cái)務(wù)危機(jī)的巨大壓力，因此必須加強(qiáng)公共部門的政府績(jī)效?？?jī)效預(yù)算和績(jī)效管理使公眾忽略了對(duì)政府公共服務(wù)項(xiàng)目落成和項(xiàng)目開銷的關(guān)注，轉(zhuǎn)而重視預(yù)算編制、管理和問(wèn)責(zé)制，即追求更好的經(jīng)濟(jì)效益。結(jié)合經(jīng)合組織、世界銀行的預(yù)算方式和程序數(shù)據(jù)庫(kù)編制的數(shù)據(jù)，文章探討了政府績(jī)效的發(fā)展趨勢(shì)和國(guó)家的行政手段（不同階段，不同的目標(biāo)），討論了對(duì)公眾的問(wèn)責(zé)（包括審計(jì)的外在表現(xiàn)），并認(rèn)識(shí)到環(huán)境的重要性和總體的政府方針是改變關(guān)鍵行為者的行為和激勵(lì)政客利用特定的績(jī)效信息。文章也對(duì)績(jī)效預(yù)算和績(jī)效管理受到的限制和所處的緊張局勢(shì)，以及計(jì)量問(wèn)題和績(jī)效信息的有效利用進(jìn)行了討論。績(jī)效管理和預(yù)算編制的引入已經(jīng)受到很多輿論的關(guān)注。支持者認(rèn)為政府進(jìn)行績(jī)效行為可以改變政府活動(dòng)。然而，需要認(rèn)識(shí)到的是，績(jī)效行為不應(yīng)該被看作是靈丹妙藥。各國(guó)政府關(guān)于它能達(dá)到什么效果，以及達(dá)到績(jī)效目標(biāo)所需要的時(shí)間，都要切合實(shí)際，不能有過(guò)高的期望。即使國(guó)家使用政府績(jī)效這種手段解決計(jì)量問(wèn)題已經(jīng)持續(xù)超過(guò)了15年，但效果不彰。對(duì)于所有國(guó)家來(lái)說(shuō)，關(guān)鍵的挑戰(zhàn)在于要取得良好的質(zhì)量信息（包括有效，可靠，及時(shí)）。在這之中可能會(huì)遇到諸多挑戰(zhàn)：包括設(shè)定明確的目標(biāo)，尋找準(zhǔn)確的績(jī)效計(jì)量措施，并具有良好的數(shù)據(jù)收集系統(tǒng)。設(shè)定目標(biāo)：對(duì)于某些機(jī)構(gòu)或方案，即使是設(shè)定了明確的目標(biāo)，但當(dāng)人們沒(méi)有明確績(jī)效任務(wù)，或沒(méi)有達(dá)成一致的意見(jiàn)，或出現(xiàn)有不同的績(jī)效任務(wù)，或方案又有重疊或大相徑庭，或利益相關(guān)者有不同利益等許多情況下，設(shè)定目標(biāo)都無(wú)法完成。尋求精確的績(jī)效措施：績(jī)效措施的設(shè)計(jì)工作難點(diǎn)在于需要具體問(wèn)題具體分析，針對(duì)不同的活動(dòng)需求來(lái)設(shè)計(jì)不同的方案。比如，在實(shí)際工作中怎樣聯(lián)系相關(guān)機(jī)構(gòu)，具體的操作步驟該怎么做，使得最后可以得到高質(zhì)量的績(jī)效成果。這對(duì)要實(shí)現(xiàn)生產(chǎn)和成果的每項(xiàng)措施都提出了不同的挑戰(zhàn)（OECD，2002b）。結(jié)果在技術(shù)上是難以衡量的：它們非常復(fù)雜，涉及很多的因素，是計(jì)劃內(nèi)的、計(jì)劃外的相互作用形成的。另外，因?yàn)闀r(shí)間滯后的原因，以及在某些情況下績(jī)效結(jié)果是不受政府控制的?？?jī)效結(jié)果對(duì)于公眾和政界來(lái)說(shuō)，會(huì)形成強(qiáng)烈的反響。多數(shù)國(guó)家采取了生產(chǎn)和成果的相結(jié)合的方式以尋求精確的績(jī)效措施。建立和維護(hù)數(shù)據(jù)收集系統(tǒng)：為了保證信息質(zhì)量，需要有一個(gè)對(duì)收集的數(shù)據(jù)進(jìn)行驗(yàn)證和確認(rèn)的過(guò)程。但是，建立和維護(hù)這些系統(tǒng)可能既昂貴又復(fù)雜?？?jī)效審計(jì)信息可以有助于提高績(jī)效標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，并為立法機(jī)關(guān)提供報(bào)告結(jié)果。機(jī)構(gòu)依賴于第三方所提供的信息以保證數(shù)據(jù)的質(zhì)量，是特別具有挑戰(zhàn)性的做法。尤其在聯(lián)邦制系統(tǒng)中，是一個(gè)關(guān)鍵問(wèn)題(Curristine，2002)。績(jī)效目標(biāo)有助于證實(shí)組織在給定的時(shí)間內(nèi)的績(jī)效期望是否能夠完成。國(guó)家則繼續(xù)為目標(biāo)的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)問(wèn)題，比如水平和數(shù)字而尋求解決方案。對(duì)目標(biāo)的設(shè)定過(guò)高或過(guò)低都是問(wèn)題。設(shè)定目標(biāo)太低意味著各機(jī)構(gòu)在提高績(jī)效時(shí)不會(huì)有挑戰(zhàn)。如果設(shè)定目標(biāo)太高，雖然可以激發(fā)組織的動(dòng)力，但也會(huì)造成政府不切實(shí)際的期望，在某些情況下機(jī)構(gòu)會(huì)失敗(Perrin，2002)。因此需要花費(fèi)時(shí)間去確認(rèn)績(jī)效水平，并獲得比較數(shù)據(jù)，以實(shí)現(xiàn)制定的目標(biāo)不會(huì)過(guò)高或過(guò)低。過(guò)多的目標(biāo)：目標(biāo)的多少也是一個(gè)問(wèn)題。過(guò)多的目標(biāo)會(huì)造成信息過(guò)載，并難以選擇先后次序。過(guò)少的目標(biāo)會(huì)造成信息失真。同樣的，這也需要時(shí)間來(lái)平衡。有些國(guó)家一開始進(jìn)行績(jī)效時(shí)有大量的政府績(jī)效目標(biāo)，但隨后越來(lái)越少。例如，在英國(guó)，當(dāng)部門的績(jī)效協(xié)議第一次被作為1998年綜合開支審查的一部分介紹給公眾時(shí)，總共有超過(guò)600個(gè)政府績(jī)效目標(biāo)。到了2002年修訂的支出審查進(jìn)行時(shí)，這一數(shù)字已減少到130個(gè)(H.M.Treasury，2004)。避免扭曲行為：這對(duì)于所有政府來(lái)說(shuō)都是挑戰(zhàn)?？赡茉斐傻呢?fù)面影響包括目標(biāo)失真，即組織和管理人員要重點(diǎn)關(guān)注一些具體的指標(biāo)和目標(biāo)——通常是最可實(shí)現(xiàn)的或“實(shí)用”——在總體目標(biāo)或計(jì)劃上的開支。在目標(biāo)失真、機(jī)構(gòu)或工作人員、存在實(shí)現(xiàn)目標(biāo)的壓力，在極端的情況下實(shí)現(xiàn)目標(biāo)，可能會(huì)出現(xiàn)故意誤導(dǎo)的信息。在許多經(jīng)合組織國(guó)家，引入績(jī)效目標(biāo)是進(jìn)入預(yù)算過(guò)程，提高預(yù)算決策，作為提高績(jī)效的一種鼓勵(lì)機(jī)制。關(guān)鍵問(wèn)題之一是取得有良好質(zhì)量和可靠的績(jī)效數(shù)據(jù)。而另外有的一些挑戰(zhàn)包括建立一些財(cái)政信息和績(jī)效信息之間的聯(lián)系。這是特別具有挑戰(zhàn)性的成果措施。很多國(guó)家也有關(guān)于預(yù)算和會(huì)計(jì)結(jié)構(gòu)的問(wèn)題。財(cái)政預(yù)算往往是按照體制和職能界限構(gòu)建的，而不是按結(jié)果類別。此外，如果沒(méi)有成本記錄系統(tǒng)，它是很難講清真正的成本與成果的。獲得獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)的正確組合：當(dāng)國(guó)家在資源配置中使用績(jī)效信息時(shí)，這是特別重要的。一個(gè)根本的問(wèn)題是，是否應(yīng)對(duì)好的績(jī)效給予經(jīng)濟(jì)回報(bào)，對(duì)壞的績(jī)效進(jìn)行處罰。如果真的這么做了，應(yīng)該怎么做？通過(guò)沒(méi)收資源來(lái)懲治失敗的績(jī)效，制造了一個(gè)明確的信號(hào)給其他機(jī)構(gòu)，讓它們認(rèn)識(shí)到績(jī)效的重要性。但是，它并不能幫助解決質(zhì)量較差的績(jī)效的根本原因。事實(shí)上，在某些情況下，未能達(dá)到目標(biāo)，可能是因?yàn)橘Y金或其他資源的缺乏。同時(shí)，獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)良好的績(jī)效是直觀的表現(xiàn)，但它沒(méi)有考慮到成本問(wèn)題以及政府的優(yōu)先事項(xiàng)。在節(jié)約預(yù)算的大氣候下，有一個(gè)問(wèn)題是：是否能提供額外資金給進(jìn)行績(jī)效的機(jī)構(gòu)，尤其當(dāng)這不是一個(gè)政府的優(yōu)先事項(xiàng)的情況下。而在同個(gè)大氣候下，總有一種危險(xiǎn)，就是讓財(cái)政資源與結(jié)果掛鉤，激勵(lì)措施可能會(huì)造成提供信息的歪曲和欺騙。最困難的一個(gè)挑戰(zhàn)是通過(guò)政府和組織建立一個(gè)以績(jī)效結(jié)果為基礎(chǔ)的風(fēng)氣。為了達(dá)到行為和文化的改變，通過(guò)政府尋求政府整體方式，該獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)的正確組合結(jié)果需要考慮關(guān)鍵人員會(huì)怎么行動(dòng)來(lái)互相影響。大多數(shù)國(guó)家不斷的在解決這個(gè)對(duì)于達(dá)到公務(wù)員和政治家的行為的變化問(wèn)題——這是一個(gè)長(zhǎng)期的過(guò)程。獲取和保持管理者和人員在政府內(nèi)部組織的支持是至關(guān)重要的。這項(xiàng)改革有可能提高對(duì)組織目標(biāo)的重視，向管理者做出方案，預(yù)算和政策，提供更好的決策信息，并改善內(nèi)部報(bào)告和內(nèi)部控制。但獲得這些好處是不容易的，