注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)獨(dú)立性英文文獻(xiàn)中英對(duì)照

注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)獨(dú)立性英文文獻(xiàn)中英對(duì)照變化中的會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)獨(dú)立性——與當(dāng)前環(huán)境與時(shí)俱進(jìn)，理查德·貝克2005年8月——具《注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師?？返闹骶幜_伯特科爾森在他2004年3月的專欄里的研究表明，“會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)的獨(dú)立性”的概念，在過去的150多年中，是不斷變化的。從一般意義上說，會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)的獨(dú)立性與當(dāng)前的商業(yè)環(huán)境是存在著密切的關(guān)聯(lián)的。但是，不同的“會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)的獨(dú)立性”的概念之間，并沒有明顯的過渡。通常情況下，許多審計(jì)的獨(dú)立性的不同概念的提出，都是圍繞著專業(yè)的會(huì)計(jì)師、審計(jì)師、監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)和一般公眾之間的獨(dú)立性，所展開討論的。會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)的獨(dú)立性的最初概念，出現(xiàn)在19世紀(jì)。它的出現(xiàn)，是基于這樣一個(gè)前提的，即主要是英國(guó)本土的專業(yè)會(huì)計(jì)師和審計(jì)師，對(duì)整個(gè)大英帝國(guó)以前的和現(xiàn)有的殖民資本承擔(dān)監(jiān)督的責(zé)任。在此期間，數(shù)量上相對(duì)來說較少的會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所，卻要對(duì)相對(duì)來說大數(shù)量的群體執(zhí)行審計(jì)的任務(wù)。這些專業(yè)的會(huì)計(jì)師和審計(jì)師就有可能同時(shí)對(duì)不同的實(shí)體出具財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告、為不同的投資群體工作。在這個(gè)時(shí)代，會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)獨(dú)立性的概念，并沒有把審計(jì)設(shè)想為一個(gè)獨(dú)立存在的審計(jì)實(shí)體;英國(guó)投資者明確禁止審計(jì)者在其審計(jì)的企業(yè)工作或參與投資。與此同時(shí)，只要會(huì)計(jì)師保持對(duì)主要投資者的審計(jì)服務(wù)，他們的專業(yè)會(huì)計(jì)服務(wù)的范圍，是可以合理地?cái)U(kuò)大的。例如，審計(jì)師被允許可以幫他們所審計(jì)的企業(yè)編制財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表。會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)的獨(dú)立性這一初步的概念在19世紀(jì)末到20世紀(jì)初發(fā)生了改變。在這段時(shí)期，經(jīng)濟(jì)上有了一個(gè)大的變化，那就是資本的主要來源由國(guó)內(nèi)市場(chǎng)轉(zhuǎn)向到外國(guó)資本市場(chǎng)。這一變化的出現(xiàn)是與美國(guó)的大型工業(yè)公司，如采礦，鐵路，能源，電力和電信，的出現(xiàn)相關(guān)聯(lián)的。伴隨著這些美國(guó)大公司的出現(xiàn)的，也包括著對(duì)公司商業(yè)性的理解的改變。在上世紀(jì)30年代，經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家阿道夫貝爾和伽爾迪納指出，推進(jìn)對(duì)這一變化的理解的，是大型企業(yè)所有權(quán)的分離，以及會(huì)計(jì)和審計(jì)對(duì)于公司的財(cái)產(chǎn)權(quán)益的重要性。在這一新思路下，審計(jì)的主要職責(zé)，就是為集體的所有權(quán)益的需要而服務(wù)，而不是某個(gè)具體的無所有權(quán)的利益。這種集體的所有權(quán)益，基本上是由國(guó)內(nèi)的股東組成，通常往往是大銀行或非常富有的投資者。注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)獨(dú)立性英文文獻(xiàn)中英對(duì)照全文共14頁，當(dāng)前為第1頁。聯(lián)邦證券法在新政時(shí)代的通過，以及美國(guó)證券交易委員會(huì)的成立，使會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)的獨(dú)立性的概念，有了再一次的轉(zhuǎn)變。美國(guó)證券交易委員會(huì)的成立，對(duì)建立出具財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告和審計(jì)法規(guī)的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，有著最重要的影響。通過這種努力，公共的會(huì)計(jì)師和審計(jì)師不再認(rèn)為他們的主要職責(zé)，是為那些特定的物主，或某些集體的所有權(quán)益；而是按照一套既定的專業(yè)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，來編制財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表，和進(jìn)行財(cái)務(wù)決算的審計(jì)工作。會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)的獨(dú)立性的概念，轉(zhuǎn)向?yàn)樵谪?cái)務(wù)狀況和經(jīng)營(yíng)業(yè)績(jī)的報(bào)告中保持客觀性和中立性，而不是忠于某一政黨。這一觀點(diǎn)，由西澳佩頓教授，在理論上和書面上被闡述出來，他著重強(qiáng)調(diào)了公司財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表的重要性。注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)獨(dú)立性英文文獻(xiàn)中英對(duì)照全文共14頁，當(dāng)前為第1頁。會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)獨(dú)立性的客觀和中立的概念，一直趨于上風(fēng)，成為主流。直到20世紀(jì)70年代，當(dāng)財(cái)務(wù)會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則委員會(huì)成立，成為獨(dú)立的、權(quán)威的會(huì)計(jì)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)制定者。大約從那個(gè)時(shí)候開始，公共的會(huì)計(jì)公司開始改變其客觀和中立的原則，并開始對(duì)他們的審計(jì)客戶宣傳和提供關(guān)于會(huì)計(jì)和審計(jì)的事項(xiàng)。同時(shí)，在全球范圍內(nèi)，企業(yè)的快速增長(zhǎng)，為公共的會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所提供了大量的機(jī)會(huì)去獲得收入，而這些收入，遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)超過了傳統(tǒng)的審計(jì)服務(wù)所能取得的收入。雖然，美國(guó)注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師協(xié)會(huì)的審計(jì)準(zhǔn)則委員會(huì)（ASB），發(fā)布的審計(jì)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，一直繼續(xù)強(qiáng)調(diào)著與客戶保持獨(dú)立性，但是日益激烈的審計(jì)服務(wù)市場(chǎng)的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)，以及錯(cuò)綜復(fù)雜的國(guó)際商業(yè)慣例，導(dǎo)致一些審計(jì)者不得不違反會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則的客觀性和中立性的，因?yàn)檫@更有利于贏得客戶的信賴。繼2000年初的會(huì)計(jì)和審計(jì)丑聞之后，以及2002年沙賓法案的通過，審計(jì)者被認(rèn)為是值得信賴的顧問的這種想法，似乎已經(jīng)越來越難以讓人信服。一個(gè)潛在的會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)的獨(dú)立性的新概念，仍然未能演變出來，但上市公司會(huì)計(jì)監(jiān)督委員會(huì)（PCAOB）對(duì)這種獨(dú)立性的概念上，似乎更強(qiáng)調(diào)要在更大程度上區(qū)分注冊(cè)審計(jì)師和客戶管理的獨(dú)立性。會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)獨(dú)立性的早期爭(zhēng)議在20世紀(jì)的下半葉，學(xué)術(shù)界和出現(xiàn)了關(guān)于會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)獨(dú)立性的各種爭(zhēng)論和專業(yè)文獻(xiàn)。有一些關(guān)于會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)獨(dú)立性的觀點(diǎn)，是從包括英國(guó)和美國(guó)兩者的會(huì)計(jì)職業(yè)相關(guān)的歷史性觀點(diǎn)中理想化、發(fā)展和演變出來的。例如，托馬斯李，在《公司審計(jì)》第3版（范諾斯得萊因霍爾德，1986年，頁89）中提到的：一個(gè)誠(chéng)實(shí)的審計(jì)者應(yīng)該是完全獨(dú)立的，用獨(dú)立的意志和態(tài)度思考，絕不允許的其觀點(diǎn)和結(jié)論，受到利益沖突所帶來的壓力所影響或?qū)ζ溆兴蕾嚒Ｗ?cè)會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)獨(dú)立性英文文獻(xiàn)中英對(duì)照全文共14頁，當(dāng)前為第2頁。不幸的是，雖然這種對(duì)于會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)獨(dú)立性的表達(dá)，是令人欽佩和向往的，但是這種對(duì)于會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)獨(dú)立性的表達(dá)，在一定程度上，是有不確定性的，因此，判斷一個(gè)會(huì)計(jì)師的審計(jì)是否是獨(dú)立的，根據(jù)托馬斯李的定義要得出結(jié)論，是不可能的。注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)獨(dú)立性英文文獻(xiàn)中英對(duì)照全文共14頁，當(dāng)前為第2頁。皮莫扎爾，在“獨(dú)立性”（在《當(dāng)前審計(jì)的問題》，由木雪納爾和斯特利編輯，保羅查普曼公司出版，1991年）中，主張會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)獨(dú)立的經(jīng)濟(jì)邏輯的辯論，是這樣歸納的：人們期望會(huì)計(jì)師進(jìn)行了審計(jì)后，可以把不能訴訟成功的概率和審計(jì)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)降低到一個(gè)可以接受的水平。用經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)的語言來說，審計(jì)員執(zhí)行審計(jì)工作的費(fèi)用，應(yīng)該是和工作量平等的，換句話說，是會(huì)計(jì)師執(zhí)行審計(jì)任務(wù)時(shí)所產(chǎn)生的費(fèi)用，和其所能減少的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，是成正比的。然而，所有的審計(jì)者都是單獨(dú)的個(gè)體，他們都對(duì)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)和回報(bào)，持有著各自不同的態(tài)度，因此會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)工作的最低標(biāo)準(zhǔn)并不一定必須是相同的。用這種經(jīng)濟(jì)上的理論來解釋會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)的獨(dú)立性，似乎是合乎邏輯的。但是，如果某些審計(jì)者采納了關(guān)于會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)的獨(dú)立性的一般概念，是為了可以獲得好處，從中謀利，以便獲得更多的市場(chǎng)占有率和市場(chǎng)份額，那么這種觀點(diǎn)就不能成立了。換言之，雖然這種立足于經(jīng)濟(jì)上論證是有效的，但是會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)的獨(dú)立性，還是需要一個(gè)可以去完全遵守的原則。正與此相反，相對(duì)于這種經(jīng)過專業(yè)的和經(jīng)濟(jì)論證的會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)獨(dú)立性的概念，巴特利特在“審計(jì)獨(dú)立性的挑戰(zhàn)”（會(huì)計(jì)地平線，第二卷，第五刊，第一期，1991年）中所提出的則大相徑庭。巴特利特認(rèn)為，關(guān)于會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)的獨(dú)立性，有四種不同的比喻。1、“冒煙的槍口”，這個(gè)論點(diǎn)是說只有少數(shù)幾個(gè)事例表明會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)的獨(dú)立性被認(rèn)為是和審計(jì)失敗有所牽連的。大多數(shù)訴訟和被起訴的審計(jì)者，都是基于對(duì)其不稱職或不盡職調(diào)查的說法上的，而不是缺乏獨(dú)立性。然而，因?yàn)闊o法獲得有關(guān)的審計(jì)失敗的詳細(xì)的記錄和其他的訴訟證據(jù)，使這種觀點(diǎn)很難被證明。注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)獨(dú)立性英文文獻(xiàn)中英對(duì)照全文共14頁，當(dāng)前為第3頁。2、“我們這樣做很好?！边@一論點(diǎn)中，根據(jù)民意調(diào)查，公眾會(huì)計(jì)界普遍已經(jīng)得到了高度的關(guān)注。民意調(diào)查結(jié)果顯示，民眾所關(guān)心的，往往是會(huì)計(jì)師對(duì)于職業(yè)本身的尊重、對(duì)問題的客觀性的處理、可靠性和誠(chéng)實(shí)，而不是獨(dú)立性本身。雖然，客觀性、可靠性和誠(chéng)實(shí)，在一定程度上可能和獨(dú)立性有所重疊，什么是所謂的“獨(dú)立性”，實(shí)際上一般公眾并沒有一個(gè)清楚的概念。通常情況下，并沒有人告訴公眾，會(huì)計(jì)師的審計(jì)到底是在做些什么。注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)獨(dú)立性英文文獻(xiàn)中英對(duì)照全文共14頁，當(dāng)前為第3頁。3、“公共利益?！边@個(gè)是要表明，如果在公共會(huì)計(jì)的專業(yè)服務(wù)的范圍內(nèi)有了太多的限制，會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所將無法正確的為客戶提供服務(wù)，而白白的耗費(fèi)了大數(shù)額的費(fèi)用。一些公共的會(huì)計(jì)公司認(rèn)為，提供審計(jì)以外的服務(wù)，讓他們能更好地履行審計(jì)義務(wù)，因?yàn)樗鼈兛梢愿玫厝チ私馑麄兊目蛻簟?、“信任我們。”獨(dú)立性往往是說一個(gè)專業(yè)的會(huì)計(jì)師所擁有的精神狀態(tài)，因此這是不能被實(shí)證、以實(shí)驗(yàn)來觀察，或被量化的。這種說法是基于審計(jì)者自身的經(jīng)濟(jì)利益出發(fā)的，即審計(jì)者被假定為可以、會(huì)保持他的獨(dú)立性和客觀性，以便不損害其自身的長(zhǎng)期的經(jīng)濟(jì)利益。雖然這種假設(shè)可能是備受爭(zhēng)議的，因?yàn)檫@樣做是為了產(chǎn)生最大的、長(zhǎng)期的經(jīng)濟(jì)利益。某個(gè)會(huì)計(jì)師在執(zhí)行審計(jì)時(shí)可能會(huì)因?yàn)閭€(gè)人的經(jīng)濟(jì)利益而去權(quán)衡，從而保留某一個(gè)重要客戶，而不是去保持客觀性和獨(dú)立性，這實(shí)際上也破壞了“信任我們”的這一論調(diào)。市場(chǎng)變化對(duì)會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)獨(dú)立性的影響喬納森?威爾，在“企業(yè)不為人知的欺騙：如何變更審計(jì)工作”（華爾街日?qǐng)?bào)，2004年3月25日）指出，在20世紀(jì)的70年代和80年代的審計(jì)服務(wù)市場(chǎng)，會(huì)計(jì)師進(jìn)行審計(jì)的方式是有所改變的，在一定程度上對(duì)于會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)的獨(dú)立性是有所減弱的。這種變化的開始的第一個(gè)組成部分，是價(jià)格競(jìng)爭(zhēng)。在20世紀(jì)70年代以前，美國(guó)注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師協(xié)會(huì)的行為守則中是禁止會(huì)計(jì)師、審計(jì)者公開的為他們的審計(jì)服務(wù)做廣告的，或者為了贏得公司的客戶而相互競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的，甚至是去參加為審計(jì)舉行的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)性的投標(biāo)、競(jìng)標(biāo)。在受到聯(lián)邦政府的反壟斷訴訟的威脅下，美國(guó)注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師協(xié)會(huì)不得不被迫取消了這些對(duì)反競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的做法的禁令。其結(jié)果是，審計(jì)的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)性招標(biāo)變得司空見慣。審計(jì)變成了商品。注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)獨(dú)立性英文文獻(xiàn)中英對(duì)照全文共14頁，當(dāng)前為第4頁。審計(jì)實(shí)施上的第二個(gè)轉(zhuǎn)變，是越來越強(qiáng)調(diào)“審計(jì)基礎(chǔ)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)”。審計(jì)的基礎(chǔ)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的增大與審計(jì)任務(wù)的數(shù)量的增大成正比，這是合理的，這種假設(shè)是合乎邏輯的。但是，審計(jì)專家是可以確定一家公司的經(jīng)營(yíng)業(yè)務(wù)中，最危險(xiǎn)的那個(gè)部分的。不幸的是，安然公司和其他企業(yè)的倒閉，已經(jīng)表明，一些審計(jì)者沒有辦法充分的確定，公司業(yè)務(wù)的經(jīng)營(yíng)運(yùn)作中，哪個(gè)部分會(huì)遭受著最大的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。此外，審計(jì)者采用基本風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的方法，有可能無法發(fā)現(xiàn)欺詐活動(dòng)。雖然這一會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)獨(dú)立性的新概念，對(duì)于某種環(huán)境下的某個(gè)審計(jì)者，可能是適合的，但往往審計(jì)者會(huì)努力去用欺騙性的會(huì)計(jì)數(shù)字，幫助隱瞞經(jīng)營(yíng)狀況，從而隱瞞真實(shí)的經(jīng)濟(jì)業(yè)績(jī)。在20世紀(jì)90年代，似乎有些審計(jì)者會(huì)忽視他們的最直接的責(zé)任，而按照第三方投資者的利益去行動(dòng)。注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)獨(dú)立性英文文獻(xiàn)中英對(duì)照全文共14頁，當(dāng)前為第4頁。加強(qiáng)會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)的獨(dú)立性法律上禁止擔(dān)任審計(jì)工作的會(huì)計(jì)師與委托人在財(cái)務(wù)上有經(jīng)濟(jì)利益關(guān)系，是美國(guó)從20世紀(jì)30年代直至20世紀(jì)90年代期間，會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)獨(dú)立性原則存在的基礎(chǔ)。但這并不代表這在英國(guó)或其他一些國(guó)家也是同樣正確，即使禁止金融利益上的連帶關(guān)系，通常是實(shí)際中按照最基本的會(huì)計(jì)制度中留心觀察，就可以得出的結(jié)論性做法。實(shí)際上，目前，禁止擔(dān)任審計(jì)工作的會(huì)計(jì)師擁有客戶的財(cái)務(wù)利益幾乎是一個(gè)普遍性的原則。美國(guó)證券交易委員會(huì)和公共會(huì)計(jì)行業(yè)都不約而同的把的他們大部分的注意力，重點(diǎn)地放在，會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)的獨(dú)立性概念的界定，和對(duì)財(cái)政利益的禁令的執(zhí)行上。詳細(xì)的規(guī)則和報(bào)告結(jié)構(gòu)已制定的出來了，目的是為了要揭露，任何一個(gè)會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所的職業(yè)雇員，所可能擁有的經(jīng)濟(jì)利益，也包括這些職業(yè)雇員的配偶，父母，或他們的孩子。上市公司會(huì)計(jì)監(jiān)管委員會(huì)采用了這些規(guī)則中的一大部分，這在一定程度上緩和了那些制度上有不合理地方的地區(qū)的問題。除此之外，還有輪換任用的審計(jì)方法。在某些國(guó)家，如意大利，審計(jì)者可以對(duì)委托人執(zhí)行某一個(gè)特定年限的審計(jì)工作。這種類型的管理方法，在美國(guó)和英國(guó)，從來沒有被認(rèn)真的考慮過。雖然法案要求，個(gè)別審計(jì)者要定期地輪換委托人客戶。而在法國(guó)，會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)的輪換概念是顛倒的：即審計(jì)者的任期為一段固定的時(shí)間，在這段時(shí)間里，他們不能被取代。這種規(guī)則的制定，目的是增加會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)的獨(dú)立性，因?yàn)橛纱藢徲?jì)者對(duì)于被客戶解雇的擔(dān)憂就減少了。關(guān)于會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)獨(dú)立性的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，上市公司會(huì)計(jì)監(jiān)管委員會(huì)通過了臨時(shí)準(zhǔn)則3600T作為其規(guī)章制度。第3600T準(zhǔn)則如下：任何有關(guān)審計(jì)報(bào)告的籌備或發(fā)布的，已經(jīng)登記的注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所及其所有相關(guān)人員，都應(yīng)遵從獨(dú)立性標(biāo)準(zhǔn)：注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)獨(dú)立性英文文獻(xiàn)中英對(duì)照全文共14頁，當(dāng)前為第5頁。（一）依照美國(guó)注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師協(xié)會(huì)的專業(yè)行為守則第101條所描述的，依照裁決的特殊解釋除外，在2003年4月16日[美國(guó)注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師協(xié)會(huì)專業(yè)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，東部部分101條和191條（美國(guó)注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師協(xié)會(huì)2002）]的范圍內(nèi)，是不能取代或修正的；注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)獨(dú)立性英文文獻(xiàn)中英對(duì)照全文共14頁，當(dāng)前為第5頁。（二）標(biāo)準(zhǔn)第1號(hào)、第2號(hào)、第3號(hào)，及解釋中的99-1，00-1和00-2，在獨(dú)立準(zhǔn)則委員會(huì)的范圍內(nèi)，不能取代或修正。從本質(zhì)上來說，上市公司會(huì)計(jì)監(jiān)管委員會(huì)已經(jīng)認(rèn)識(shí)到以前制定的會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)獨(dú)立的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，被美國(guó)注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師協(xié)會(huì)和美國(guó)證券交易委員會(huì)，通過獨(dú)立標(biāo)準(zhǔn)委員會(huì)，又進(jìn)一步的發(fā)展了。對(duì)會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)獨(dú)立性的重新思考我們現(xiàn)在需要的，是一個(gè)完整的對(duì)于會(huì)計(jì)師審獨(dú)立性概念的重新思考。這種復(fù)議可能帶來一種會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)獨(dú)立性的新概念，它是基于重申專業(yè)的會(huì)計(jì)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的客觀性和中立性極其道德規(guī)范上的，而不是主張站在委托人、客戶的立場(chǎng)上?？紤]到一些最近和正在發(fā)生的會(huì)計(jì)和審計(jì)丑聞，顯然，會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)的獨(dú)立性不應(yīng)該站在客戶的立場(chǎng)上。這種觀點(diǎn)要求，會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)的獨(dú)立性的新概念要結(jié)合具體的主張來實(shí)施：（1）審計(jì)者不應(yīng)該提倡擁護(hù)他們的客戶；（2）管理者不能影響查賬公費(fèi)，即審計(jì)費(fèi)用和會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)的范圍。如果沒有過渡到這一概念，會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)的獨(dú)立性的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，將極有可能只是做做門面功夫，根本不足以保證審計(jì)者在實(shí)際中獨(dú)立于委托人管理者而存在。注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)獨(dú)立性英文文獻(xiàn)中英對(duì)照全文共14頁，當(dāng)前為注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)獨(dú)立性英文文獻(xiàn)中英對(duì)照全文共14頁，當(dāng)前為第6頁。TheVaryingConceptofAuditorIndependenceShiftingwiththePrevailingEnvironment，C.RichardBakerAUGUST2005-AsCPAJournalEditor-in-ChiefRobertColsonobservedinhisMarch2004column,“AuditorIndependenceRedux,”theconceptofauditorindependencehasvariedoverthelast150years.Inageneralsense,auditorindependencehasbornearelationshiptotheprevailingcommercialenvironmentindifferenttimeperiods.Therehasnot,however,beenacleartransitionfromoneconceptofauditorindependencetoanother.Frequently,morethanoneideaofauditorindependencehasbeenpresentinthediscussionaboutindependencebetweenprofessionalaccountantsandauditors,regulators,andthegeneralpublic.Theinitialconceptofauditorindependence,whicharoseduringthe19thcentury,wasbasedonthepremise,primarilyBritishinorigin,thataprincipaldutyofprofessionalaccountantsandauditorswastheoversightofabsenteinvestmentsintheexistingandformercoloniesoftheBritishEmpire.Duringthisperiod,arelativelysmallnumberofaccountingfirmscouldperformauditsforarelativelylargenumberofentities.Professionalaccountantsandauditorscouldrenderreportsonthefinancialperformanceofdifferententitiesandcouldworkfordifferentinvestorgroups.Theconceptofauditorindependenceduringthiseradidnotconceiveofauditorsasadvocatesforauditedentities;Britishinvestorsexplicitlyforbadeauditorsfrominvestingorworkinginthebusinessesthattheyaudited.Atthesametime,aslongasauditorsmaintainedtheirprimaryloyaltytotheinvestorsbackhome,thescopeofprofessionalaccountingservicescouldbereasonablybroad.Forexample,auditorswerepermittedtokeepthebooksandpreparethefinancialstatementsfortheentitiestheyaudited.注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)獨(dú)立性英文文獻(xiàn)中英對(duì)照全文共14頁，當(dāng)前為第7頁。Thisinitialconceptofauditorindependencechangedduringthelate19thandearly20thcenturies.Duringthistime,therewasaneconomicshiftfromcapitalcomingprimarilyfromforeignsourcestocapitalderivingprimarilyfromdomesticsources.ThischangewasassociatedwiththeemergenceoflargeAmericancorporationsinindustriessuchasmining,railroads,energy,andtelegraphandtelephone.TheemergenceoflargeAmericancorporationswasaccompaniedbyachangeintheunderstandingofthepurposeandnatureofthebusinesscorporation.Inthe1930s,notedeconomistsAdolfBearleandGardinerMeansarticulatedthischangebyadvancingthepropositionthatlargecorporationswerebasedontheseparationofownershipfrommanagementandthatanimportantroleforaccountingandauditingwastoproperlyvaluetheproprietaryinterestofthecorporation.Inthecontextofthisnewideaofthecorporation,theauditor’sprimarydutywastoservetheneedsofthecollectiveproprietaryinterestratherthanaspecificabsentee-ownershipinterest.Thiscollectiveproprietaryinterestessentiallycompriseddomesticshareholders,thatwereoftenlargebanksorwealthyinvestors,butincreasinglythegeneralpublichasbecomeinvolvedinstockownership.注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)獨(dú)立性英文文獻(xiàn)中英對(duì)照全文共14頁，當(dāng)前為第7頁。ThepassageofthefederalsecuritiesactsduringtheNewDealera,andthecreationoftheSEC,ledtoanothertransitionintheconceptofauditorindependence.TheSEC’smostimportanteffectonauditorindependencederivedfromitseffortstoestablishstandardsforfinancialreportingandauditing.Becauseoftheseefforts,publicaccountantsandauditorsnolongeracceptedthattheirprimaryresponsibilitywastoaspecificabsenteeowner,ortoacollectiveproprietaryinterest,butrathertoasetofprofessionalstandardsestablishedforthepreparationandauditoffinancialstatements.Theconceptofauditorindependenceshiftedinfavorofobjectivityandneutralityinthereportingofthefinancialpositionandtheresultsofoperations,ratherthanloyaltytoaparticularparty.ThisviewwasarticulatedacademicallyandintellectuallybyProfessorW.A.Paton,whostressedtheentityviewofcorporatefinancialreporting.注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)獨(dú)立性英文文獻(xiàn)中英對(duì)照全文共14頁，當(dāng)前為第8頁。Theobjectiveandneutralconceptofauditorindependenceprevaileduntilthe1970s,whenFASBwasestablishedastheauthoritativeindependentaccountingstandardssetter.Fromapproximatelythattime,publicaccountingfirmsbegantomodifytheirobjectiveandneutralfocusandstartedadvocatingfortheirauditclientswithregardtoaccountingandauditingmatters.Simultaneously,therapidgrowthofbusinessenterprisesonaworldwidebasisprovidedlargepublicaccountingfirmswithanopportunitytobecomethepreferredprovidersofawidespectrumofbusinessservices,therevenuesfromwhichquicklyoutpacedthefeesfromtraditionalauditingservices.WhilethestandardsissuedbytheAuditingStandardsBoard(ASB)oftheAICPAcontinuedtostressindependencefromclients,theincreasinglycompetitivemarketplaceforauditservices,alongwiththecomplexityofinternationalbusinesspractices,ledsomeauditorstoreducetheirfocusonobjectiveandneutralinterpretationofaccountingstandardsinfavorofbecomingatrustedadvisorforclients.注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)獨(dú)立性英文文獻(xiàn)中英對(duì)照全文共14頁，當(dāng)前為第8頁。Subsequenttotheaccountingandauditingscandalsoftheearly2000s,andthepassageoftheSarbanes-OxleyActof2002(SOA),theideaofauditorsastrustedadvisorsappearstohavebecomeincreasinglyunsustainable.Theparametersofapotentiallynewconceptofauditorindependencearestillunfolding,butthePublicCompaniesAccountingOversightBoard(PCAOB)seemstobestressingaconceptofauditorindependencethatemphasizesagreaterdegreeofseparationbetweenregisteredauditorsandclientmanagement.PriorDebatesAboutAuditorIndependenceThesecondhalfofthe20thcenturysawvariousdebatesinboththeacademicandtheprofessionalliteraturesaboutauditorindependence.OneargumentpertainingtoauditorindependencedevelopedfromidealizedviewsofprofessionalismthatemergedhistoricallyinboththeBritishandtheAmericanaccountingprofessions.Forexample,ThomasA.Lee,inCompanyAuditing,3rded.(VanNostrandReinhold,1986,page89),suggestedthefollowing:Anhonestauditorwillbehavelikesomeonewhoisindependent,usingindependencetomeananattitudeofmindwhichdoesnotallowtheviewpointsandconclusionsofitspossessortobecomereliantonorsubordinatetotheinfluenceandpressuresofconflictinginterests.Unfortunately,thisadmirableexpressionaboutauditorindependencedoesnotacknowledgethatanauditor’sstateofmindisnotdeterminable,and,therefore,toconcludewhetheranauditorisindependentpursuanttoLee’sdefinitionisimpossible.注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)獨(dú)立性英文文獻(xiàn)中英對(duì)照全文共14頁，當(dāng)前為第9頁。P.Moizier,in“Independence”(inCurrentIssuesinAuditing,editedbyM.ShererandS.Turley,PaulChapmanPublishingLtd.,1991),arguedforaneconomicrationaleforauditorindependence,whichwassummarizedasfollows:注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)獨(dú)立性英文文獻(xiàn)中英對(duì)照全文共14頁，當(dāng)前為第9頁。Thereisanexpectationthattheauditorwillhaveperformedanauditthatwillhavereducedthechancesofasuccessfulnegligencelawsuittoalevelacceptabletotheauditor.Inthelanguageofeconomics,theauditorwillperformauditworkuntilthecostofundertakingmoreworkisequaltothebenefittheauditorderivesintermsofthereductionintheriskofasuccessfullawsuitbeingpossible.Thisthenrepresentstheminimumamountofworkthatthereadercanexpecttheauditortoperform.However,allauditorsareindividualswithdifferentattitudestoriskandreturnandsooneauditor’sminimumstandardofauditworkwillnotnecessarilybethatofacolleague.Thiseconomicargument,whilelogical,wouldbeunsustainableifcertainauditorstookadvantageofthegeneralpresumptionregardingauditorindependenceinordertoobtainincreasedmarketshare.Inotherwords,fortheeconomicargumenttobeeffective,completecompliancewiththeprincipleofauditorindependencewouldberequired.Incontrasttotheprofessionalandeconomicargumentsforauditorindependence,R.W.Bartlett,in“AHereticalChallengetotheIncantationsofAuditIndependence”(AccountingHorizons,vol.5,No.1,1991),suggestedthatauditingisasortofceremonyinvolvingincantationsaboutindependence.Bartlettarguedthattherehavebeenfourkindsof“incantations”regardingauditorindependence:The“smokinggun.”Thisistheargumentthatonlyinafewdocumentedinstanceshasauditorindependencebeenfoundtobeimplicatedinauditfailures,atleastifoneacceptstheevidenceprovidedbylawsuitsandprosecutionsofauditorsforsecuritiesfraud.Mostlawsuitsandprosecutionsofauditorshavebeenbasedonassertionsofincompetenceorlackofduediligenceintheapplicationofauditingstandards,ratherthanlackofindependence.Aninabilitytoobtainaccesstodetailedrecordsoflawsuitsandotherevidenceaboutauditfailures,however,makesthisincantationdifficulttoprove.注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)獨(dú)立性英文文獻(xiàn)中英對(duì)照全文共14頁，當(dāng)前為第10頁?！癢earedoingprettygood.”Basedonpublicopinionsurveys,thepublicaccountingprofessionhasgenerallybeenheldinhighregard.Publicopinionpollsassessingtheesteemoftheprofessionoftenaddressissueslikeobjectivity,reliability,andhonesty,ratherthanindependenceperse.Whileobjectivity,reliability,honesty,andindependencemayoverlap,what“independence”actuallymeanstothegeneralpublicisunclear.Often,thepublicisnotwellinformedaboutwhatauditorsdo.注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)獨(dú)立性英文文獻(xiàn)中英對(duì)照全文共14頁，當(dāng)前為第10頁。The“publicgood.”Thisincantationsuggeststhatiftoomanyconstraintsareplacedonthepublicaccountingprofession’sscopeofservices,accountingfirmswillbeunabletoserveclientsproperly,therebyimposingsignificantcostsonthepublic.Somepublicaccountingfirmshavearguedthatprovidingnonauditingservicesallowsthemtoperformbetterauditsbecausetheycanobtainabetterunderstandingoftheclient’ssystems.“Trustus.”Independenceisoftensaidtobeamentalstatepossessedbyprofessionalaccountantsandthereforenotsubjecttoempiricalobservationorquantification.Thisincantationisbasedontheideaofauditoreconomicself-interest;thatis,auditorsareassumedtomaintainindependenceandobjectivitysoasnottoharmtheirlonger-termeconomicinterests.Thisassumesthatauditorscontinuallyevaluatethecostsandbenefitsassociatedwithethicalbehaviorandalwaysresolveconflictsinfavorofbehavingethicallybecausedoingsoproducesthegreatestlong-termeconomicbenefit.Whiletheseassumptionsmaybeargued,itcanalsobeobservedthattheindividualeconomiccalculusofaparticularauditormayweighinfavorofretaininganimportantclientratherthanbeingobjectiveandindependent,thusunderminingthe“trustus”argument.ChangesintheMarketThatAffectedAuditorIndependence注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)獨(dú)立性英文文獻(xiàn)中英對(duì)照全文共14頁，當(dāng)前為第11頁。JonathanWeil,in“BehindWaysofCorporateFraud:AChangeinHowAuditorsWork”(TheWallStreetJournal,March25,2004),suggeststhatduringthe1970sand1980sthemarketforauditservicesandthewayinwhichauditswereconductedchanged,contributingtoadeclineinauditorindependence.Thefirstcomponentofchangewaspricecompetition.Priortothe1970s,theAICPACodeofConductprohibitedauditorsfrompubliclyadvertisingtheirservices,frommakinguninvitedsolicitationstorivalfirms’clients,andfromparticipatingincompetitivebiddingforaudits.Underthreatsofantitrustactionbythefederalgovernment,theAICPAwascompelledtoremovetheseprohibitionsagainstcompetitivepractices.Asaresult,competitivebiddinginauditingbecamecommonplace.注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)獨(dú)立性英文文獻(xiàn)中英對(duì)照全文共14頁，當(dāng)前為第11頁。Thesecondchangeinhowauditswereconductedwasanincreasedemphasison“risk-basedauditing.”Risk-basedauditingisreasonableinthatthelargestamountofauditeffortisplacedonthegreatestareasofauditrisk.Thislogicalideaassumes,however,thatauditorsareexpertsindeterminingtheriskiestareasofacompany’soperations.Unfortunately,asEnronandotherbusinessfailureshavedemonstrated,someauditorsarenotsufficientlyabletodeterminewhichareasofacompany’soperationsaresubjecttothegreatestrisks.Inaddition,auditorsusingarisk-basedapproachmightnotdetectfraudulentactivities.Whilethisnewconceptofauditorindependencemaybeappropriateforanauditorincertaincircumstances,toooftenanauditor’seffortstoaidmanagementresultedinmisleadingaccountingnumbersthatconcealedtrueeconomicperformance.Duringthe1990s,itappearedthatsomeauditorsneglectedtheirmostimmediateresponsibilitytoactonbehalfofthird-partyinvestorsor,ataminimum,tobeanobjectiveandneutralinterpreterofaccountingstandards.Pre–Sarbanes-OxleyProposalstoEnhanceAuditorIndependenceAlegalprohibitionagainstanauditorpossessingafinancialinterestinaclienthasbeenthecornerstoneofauditorindependencerulesintheUnitedStatessincethe1930s.Untilthe1990s,thiswasnotnecessarilytrueintheUnitedKingdomandsomeothercountries,eventhoughprohibitionsagainstholdingfinancialinterestsweregenerallyobservedinpracticebecauseofthestandardsoftheaccountinginstitutesandcommonlaw.注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)獨(dú)立性英文文獻(xiàn)中英對(duì)照全文共14頁，當(dāng)前為第12頁。Currently,aprohibitionagainstauditorspossessingfinancialinterestsinclientsisvirtuallyauniversalprinciple.BoththeSECandthepublicaccountingprofessionhavefocusedmostoftheirattentionregardingauditorindependenceondefiningandenforcingprohibitionsagainstfinancialinterests.Elaboraterulesandreportingstructureshavebeenformulatedforthepurposeofrevealinganytypeoffinancialinterestonthepartofprofessionalemployeesofaccountingfirms,theirspouses,theirparents,ortheirchildren.ThePCAOBhasadoptedmostoftheserules,withadegreeofrelaxationinareaswheretherulesseemedunreasonable.注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)獨(dú)立性英文文獻(xiàn)中英對(duì)照全文共14頁，當(dāng)前為第12頁。Rotationofauditappointments.Inseveralcountries(e.g.,Italy)auditorsarepermittedtoauditaclientforonlyaspecifiednumberofyears.ThistypeofregulationhasneverbeenseriouslyconsideredintheU.S.ortheU.K.,althoughSarbanes-Oxleyrequiresthatindividualauditorsrotateoffaclientonaperiodicbasis.InFrance,theconceptofauditorrotationisreversed:Auditorsareappointedforafixedperiodoftime,du