反洗錢金融行動特別工作組《40條建議》

反洗錢金融行動特別工作組《40條建議》背景：反洗錢金融行動特別工作組（FinancialActionTaskForcesonMoneyLaundering）簡稱FATF于1989年成立，是一個獨立的專門進(jìn)行國際反洗錢的政府間組織?，F(xiàn)有31個國家和地區(qū)成員和兩個國際組織（歐洲委員會和海灣合作委員會）成員。其宗旨是制定和推動反洗錢政策。該工作組希望借助推行反洗錢政策，防止利用犯罪收益進(jìn)一步犯罪，以及避免洗錢活動影響合法經(jīng)濟活動。為了打擊個人濫用金融系統(tǒng)進(jìn)行毒品洗錢，F(xiàn)ATF在1990年擬定了《40條建議》。該建議為反洗錢工作奠定了基本框架，是為全球而設(shè)計的。內(nèi)容涉及刑事司法制度和法律執(zhí)行，金融制度及其規(guī)章，以及國際合作事宜。為了適應(yīng)新形勢下洗錢手段的發(fā)展，1996年FATF對該建議進(jìn)行了首次修訂。2003年6月，F(xiàn)ATF在對洗錢方法和技術(shù)的年度評估基礎(chǔ)上，對《40條建議》做了進(jìn)一步修訂。此次修訂結(jié)合《打擊恐怖融資8條特別建議》，對原有的《40條建議》進(jìn)行了重大修訂，建立了一個更加廣泛，統(tǒng)一和有力的反洗錢和反恐融資的國際框架。下面將要介紹的就是2003年修訂以后與反洗錢直接相關(guān)的6條建議。IntroductionLegalSystemsScopeofthecriminaloffenceofmoneylaundering(R.1-2)Provisionalmeasuresandconfiscation(R.3)MeasurestoBeTakenByFinancialInstitutionsandNon-FinancialBusinessesandProfessionstoPreventMoneyLaunderingandTerroristFinancingCustomerduediligence[1]andrecord-keeping(R.4)Reportingofsuspicioustransactionsandcompliance[2](R.5-12)Othermeasurestodetermoneylaunderingandterroristfinancing(R.13-16)MeasurestobetakenwithrespecttocountriesthatdonotorinsufficientlycomplywiththeFATFRecommendations(R.17-20)Regulationandsupervision(R.23-25)InstitutionalandOtherMeasuresNecessaryinSystemsforCombatingMoneyLaunderingandTerroristFinancingCompetentauthorities,theirpowersandresources(R.26-32)Transparencyoflegalpersonsandarrangements[3](R.33-34)InternationalCo-operation(R.35)Mutuallegalassistanceandextradition[4](R.36-39)Otherformsofco-operation(R.40)IntroductionMoneylaunderingmethodsandtechniqueschangeinresponsetodevelopingcounter-measures.Inrecentyears,theFinancialActionTaskForce(FATF)hasnotedincreasinglysophisticatedcombinationsoftechniques,suchastheincreaseduseoflegalpersonstodisguisethetrueownershipandcontrolofillegalproceeds,andanincreaseduseofprofessionalstoprovideadviceandassistanceinlaunderingcriminalfunds.Thesefactors,combinedwiththeexperiencegainedthroughtheFATF’sNon-CooperativeCountriesandTerritoriesprocess,andanumberofnationalandinternationalinitiatives,ledtheFATFtoreviewandrevisetheFortyRecommendationsintoanewcomprehensiveframeworkforcombatingmoneylaunderingandterroristfinancing.TheFATFnowcallsuponallcountriestotakethenecessarystepstobringtheirnationalsystemsforcombatingmoneylaunderingandterroristfinancingintocompliancewiththenewFATFRecommendations,andtoeffectivelyimplementthesemeasures.ThereviewprocessforrevisingtheFortyRecommendationswasanextensiveone,opentoFATFmembers,non-members,observers,financialandotheraffectedsectorsandinterestedparties[5].Thisconsultationprocessprovidedawiderangeofinput,allofwhichwasconsideredinthereviewprocess.TherevisedFortyRecommendationsnowapplynotonlytomoneylaunderingbutalsototerroristfinancing,andwhencombinedwiththeEightSpecialRecommendationsonTerroristFinancing[6]provideanenhanced,comprehensiveandconsistentframeworkofmeasuresforcombatingmoneylaunderingandterroristfinancing.TheFATFrecognizesthatcountrieshavediverse[7]legalandfinancialsystemsandsoallcannottakeidenticalmeasurestoachievethecommonobjective,especiallyovermattersofdetail.TheRecommendationsthereforesetminimumstandardsforaction[8]forcountriestoimplementthedetailaccordingtotheirparticularcircumstancesandconstitutionalframeworks[9].TheRecommendationscoverallthemeasuresthatnationalsystemsshouldhaveinplacewithintheircriminaljusticeandregulatorysystems[10];thepreventivemeasurestobetakenbyfinancialinstitutionsandcertainotherbusinessesandprofessions;andinternationalco-operation.TheoriginalFATFFortyRecommendationsweredrawnupin1990asaninitiativetocombatthemisuseoffinancialsystemsbypersonslaunderingdrugmoney.In1996theRecommendationswererevisedforthefirsttimetoreflectevolvingmoneylaunderingtypologies[11].The1996FortyRecommendationshavebeenendorsedbymorethan130countriesandaretheinternationalanti-moneylaunderingstandard.InOctober2001theFATFexpandeditsmandatetodealwiththeissueofthefinancingofterrorism,andtooktheimportantstepofcreatingtheEightSpecialRecommendationsonTerroristFinancing.TheseRecommendationscontainasetofmeasuresaimedatcombatingthefundingofterroristactsandterroristorganizations,andarecomplementary[12]totheFortyRecommendations.Akeyelementinthefightagainstmoneylaunderingandthefinancingofterrorismistheneedforcountriessystemstobemonitoredandevaluated,withrespecttotheseinternationalstandards.ThemutualevaluationsconductedbytheFATFandFATF-styleregionalbodies,aswellastheassessmentsconductedbytheIMFandWorldBank,areavitalmechanismforensuringthattheFATFRecommendationsareeffectivelyimplementedbyallcountries.LEGALSYSTEMSScopeofthecriminaloffenceofmoneylaundering[13]Recommendation1CountriesshouldcriminalizemoneylaunderingonthebasisofUnitedNationsConventionagainstIllicitTrafficinNarcoticDrugsandPsychotropicSubstances[14],1988(theViennaConvention[15])andUnitedNationsConventionagainstTransnationalOrganizedCrime,2000(thePalermoConvention)[16].Countriesshouldapplythecrimeofmoneylaunderingtoallseriousoffences,withaviewtoincludingthewidestrangeofpredicateoffences.Predicateoffencesmaybedescribedbyreferencetoalloffences,ortoathresholdlinkedeithertoacategoryofseriousoffencesortothepenaltyofimprisonmentapplicabletothepredicateoffence(thresholdapproach),ortoalistofpredicateoffences,oracombinationoftheseapproaches.Wherecountriesapplyathresholdapproach,predicateoffencesshouldataminimumcomprisealloffencesthatfallwithinthecategoryofseriousoffencesundertheirnationallaworshouldincludeoffenceswhicharepunishablebyamaximumpenaltyofmorethanoneyear’simprisonmentorforthosecountriesthathaveaminimumthresholdforoffencesintheirlegalsystem,predicateoffencesshouldcomprisealloffences,whicharepunishedbyaminimumpenaltyofmorethansixmonthsimprisonment.Whicheverapproachisadopted,eachcountryshouldataminimumincludearangeofoffenceswithineachofthedesignatedcategoriesofoffences[17].Predicateoffencesformoneylaunderingshouldextendtoconductthatoccurredinanothercountry,whichconstitutesanoffenceinthatcountry,andwhichwouldhaveconstitutedapredicateoffencehaditoccurreddomestically.Countriesmayprovidethattheonlyprerequisiteisthattheconductwouldhaveconstitutedapredicateoffencehaditoccurreddomestically.Countriesmayprovidethattheoffenceofmoneylaunderingdoesnotapplytopersonswhocommittedthepredicateoffence,wherethisisrequiredbyfundamentalprinciplesoftheirdomesticlaw.Recommendation2Countriesshouldensurethat:a)Theintentandknowledge[18]requiredtoprovetheoffenceofmoneylaunderingisconsistentwiththestandardssetforthintheViennaandPalermoConventions,includingtheconceptthatsuchmentalstatemaybeinferredfromobjectivefactualcircumstances.b)Criminalliability,and,wherethatisnotpossible,civiloradministrativeliability,shouldapplytolegalpersons.Thisshouldnotpreclude[19]parallelcriminal,civiloradministrativeproceedingswithrespecttolegalpersonsincountriesinwhichsuchformsofliabilityareavailable.Legalpersonsshouldbesubjecttoeffective,proportionate[20]anddissuasive[21]sanctions.Suchmeasuresshouldbewithoutprejudicetothecriminalliabilityofindividuals.ProvisionalmeasuresandconfiscationRecommendation3CountriesshouldadoptmeasuressimilartothosesetforthintheViennaandPalermoConventions,includinglegislativemeasures,toenabletheircompetentauthoritiestoconfiscatepropertylaundered,proceedsfrommoneylaunderingorpredicateoffences,instrumentalitiesusedinorintendedforuseinthecommissionoftheseoffences,orpropertyofcorrespondingvalue,withoutprejudicingtherightsofbonafidethirdparties.Suchmeasuresshouldincludetheauthorityto:(a)identify,traceandevaluatepropertywhichissubjecttoconfiscation;(b)carryoutprovisionalmeasures,suchasfreezingandseizing,topreventanydealing,transferordisposalofsuchproperty;(c)takestepsthatwillpreventorvoidactionsthatprejudicetheState’sabilitytorecoverpropertythatissubjecttoconfiscation;and(d)takeanyappropriateinvestigativemeasures.Countriesmayconsideradoptingmeasuresthatallowsuchproceedsorinstrumentalitiestobeconfiscatedwithoutrequiringacriminalconviction,orwhichrequireanoffendertodemonstratethelawfuloriginofthepropertyallegedtobeliabletoconfiscation,totheextentthatsucharequirementisconsistentwiththeprinciplesoftheirdomesticlaw.MEASURESTOBETAKENBYFINANCIALINSTITUTIONSANDNON-FINANCIALBUSINESSESANDPROFESSIONSTOPREVENTMONEYLAUNDERINGANDTERRORISTFINANCINGRecommendation4Countriesshouldensurethatfinancialinstitutionsecrecylaws[22]donotinhibit[23]implementationoftheFATFRecommendations.Customerduediligenceandrecord-keepingRecommendation5Financialinstitutionsshouldnotkeepanonymousaccountsoraccountsinobviouslyfictitiousnames.Financialinstitutions[24]shouldundertakecustomerduediligencemeasures,includingidentifyingandverifyingtheidentityoftheircustomers,when:●establishingbusinessrelations;●carryingoutoccasionaltransactions:(i)abovetheapplicabledesignatedthreshold[25];or(ii)thatarewiretransfersinthecircumstancescoveredbytheInterpretativeNote[26]toSpecialRecommendationVII;●thereisasuspicionofmoneylaunderingorterroristfinancing;or●thefinancialinstitutionhasdoubtsabouttheveracity[27]oradequacyofpreviouslyobtainedcustomeridentificationdata.Thecustomerduediligence(CDD)measurestobetakenareasfollows:a)Identifyingthecustomerandverifyingthatcustomer’sidentityusingreliable,independentsourcedocuments,dataorinformation.b)Identifyingthebeneficialowner,andtakingreasonablemeasurestoverifytheidentityofthebeneficialownersuchthatthefinancialinstitutionissatisfiedthatitknowswhothebeneficialowneris.Forlegalpersonsandarrangementsthisshouldincludefinancialinstitutionstakingreasonablemeasurestounderstandtheownershipandcontrolstructureofthecustomer.c)Obtaininginformationonthepurposeandintendednatureofthebusinessrelationship.d)Conductingongoingduediligenceonthebusinessrelationshipandscrutinyoftransactionsundertakenthroughoutthecourseofthatrelationshiptoensurethatthetransactionsbeingconductedareconsistentwiththeinstitution’sknowledgeofthecustomer,theirbusinessandriskprofile[28],including,wherenecessary,thesourceoffunds.FinancialinstitutionsshouldapplyeachoftheCDDmeasuresunder(a)to(d)above,butmaydeterminetheextentofsuchmeasuresonarisksensitivebasisdependingonthetypeofcustomer,businessrelationshiportransaction.Themeasuresthataretakenshouldbeconsistentwithanyguidelines[29]issuedbycompetentauthorities.Forhigherriskcategories,financialinstitutionsshouldperformenhancedduediligence.Incertaincircumstances,wheretherearelowrisks,countriesmaydecidethatfinancialinstitutionscanapplyreducedorsimplifiedmeasures.Financialinstitutionsshouldverifytheidentityofthecustomerandbeneficialownerbeforeorduringthecourseofestablishingabusinessrelationshiporconductingtransactionsforoccasionalcustomers[30].Countriesmaypermitfinancialinstitutionstocompletetheverificationassoonasreasonablypracticablefollowingtheestablishmentoftherelationship,wherethemoneylaunderingrisksareeffectivelymanagedandwherethisisessentialnottointerruptthenormalconductofbusiness.Wherethefinancialinstitutionisunabletocomplywithparagraphs(a)to(c)above,itshouldnotopentheaccount,commencebusinessrelationsorperformthetransaction;orshouldterminatethebusinessrelationship;andshouldconsidermakingasuspicioustransactionsreportinrelationtothecustomer.Theserequirementsshouldapplytoallnewcustomers,thoughfinancialinstitutionsshouldalsoapplythisRecommendationtoexistingcustomersonthebasisofmateriality[31]andrisk,andshouldconductduediligenceonsuchexistingrelationshipsatappropriatetimes.(SeeInterpretativeNotes:Recommendation5andRecommendations5,12and16)Recommendation6Financialinstitutionsshould,inrelationtopoliticallyexposedpersons[32],inadditiontoperformingnormalduediligencemeasures:a)Haveappropriateriskmanagementsystemstodeterminewhetherthecustomerisapoliticallyexposedperson.b)Obtainseniormanagementapprovalforestablishingbusinessrelationshipswithsuchcustomers.c)Takereasonablemeasurestoestablishthesourceofwealthandsourceoffunds.Conductenhancedongoingmonitoringofthebusinessrelationship.Recommendation7Financialinstitutionsshould,inrelationtocross-bordercorrespondentbanking[33]andothersimilarrelationships,inadditiontoperformingnormalduediligencemeasures:a)Gathersufficientinformationaboutarespondentinstitution[34]tounderstandfullythenatureoftherespondent’sbusinessandtodeterminefrompubliclyavailableinformationthereputationoftheinstitutionandthequalityofsupervision,includingwhetherithasbeensubjecttoamoneylaunderingorterroristfinancinginvestigationorregulatoryaction.b)Assesstherespondentinstitution’santi-moneylaunderingandterroristfinancingcontrols.c)Obtainapprovalfromseniormanagementbeforeestablishingnewcorrespondentrelationships.d)Documenttherespectiveresponsibilitiesofeachinstitution[35].e)Withrespectto“payable-throughaccounts[36]”,besatisfiedthattherespondentbankhasverifiedtheidentityofandperformedon-goingduediligenceonthecustomershavingdirectaccesstoaccountsofthecorrespondentandthatitisabletoproviderelevantcustomeridentificationdatauponrequesttothecorrespondentbank.Recommendation8Financialinstitutionsshouldpayspecialattentiontoanymoneylaunderingthreatsthatmayarisefromnewordevelopingtechnologiesthatmightfavouranonymity[37],andtakemeasures,ifneeded,topreventtheiruseinmoneylaunderingschemes.Inparticular,financialinstitutionsshouldhavepoliciesandproceduresinplacetoaddressanyspecificrisksassociatedwithnon-facetofacebusinessrelationshipsortransactions.Recommendation9Countriesmaypermitfinancialinstitutionstorelyonintermediariesorotherthirdpartiestoperformelements(a)(c)oftheCDDprocessortointroducebusiness,providedthatthecriteriasetoutbelowaremet.Wheresuchrelianceispermitted,theultimateresponsibilityforcustomeridentificationandverificationremainswiththefinancialinstitutionrelyingonthethirdparty.Thecriteriathatshouldbemetareasfollows:a)Afinancialinstitutionrelyinguponathirdpartyshouldimmediatelyobtainthenecessaryinformationconcerningelements(a)(c)oftheCDDprocess.FinancialinstitutionsshouldtakeadequatestepstosatisfythemselvesthatcopiesofidentificationdataandotherrelevantdocumentationrelatingtotheCDDrequirementswillbemadeavailablefromthethirdpartyuponrequestwithoutdelay.b)Thefinancialinstitutionshouldsatisfyitselfthatthethirdpartyisregulatedandsupervisedfor,andhasmeasuresinplacetocomplywithCDDrequirementsinlinewithRecommendations5and10.tislefttoeachcountrytodetermineinwhichcountriesthethirdpartythatmeetstheconditionscanbebased,havingregardtoinformationavailableoncountriesthatdonotordonotadequatelyapplytheFATFRecommendations.[38]Recommendation10Financialinstitutionsshouldmaintain,foratleastfiveyears,allnecessaryrecordsontransactions,bothdomesticorinternational,toenablethemtocomplyswiftlywithinformationrequestsfromthecompetentauthorities.Suchrecordsmustbesufficienttopermitreconstructionofindividualtransactions(includingtheamountsandtypesofcurrencyinvolvedifany)soastoprovide,ifnecessary,evidenceforprosecutionofcriminalactivity.Financialinstitutionsshouldkeeprecordsontheidentificationdataobtainedthroughthecustomerduediligenceprocess(e.g.copiesorrecordsofofficialidentificationdocumentslikepassports,identitycards,drivinglicensesorsimilardocuments),accountfilesandbusinesscorrespondence[39]foratleastfiveyearsafterthebusinessrelationshipisended.Theidentificationdataandtransactionrecordsshouldbeavailabletodomesticcompetentauthoritiesuponappropriateauthority.Recommendation11Financialinstitutionsshouldpayspecialattentiontoallcomplex,unusuallargetransactions[40],andallunusualpatternsoftransactions,whichhavenoapparenteconomicorvisiblelawfulpurpose.Thebackgroundandpurposeofsuchtransactionsshould,asfaraspossible,beexamined,thefindingsestablishedinwriting,andbeavailabletohelpcompetentauthoritiesandauditors.Recommendation12Thecustomerduediligenceandrecord-keepingrequirementssetoutinRecommendations5,6,and8to11applytodesignatednon-financialbusinessesandprofessions[41]inthefollowingsituations:a)Casinoswhencustomersengageinfinancialtransactionsequaltoorabovetheapplicabledesignatedthreshold.b)Realestateagents-whentheyareinvolvedintransactionsfortheirclientconcerningthebuyingandsellingofrealestate.c)Dealersinpreciousmetalsanddealersinpreciousstones-whentheyengageinanycashtransactionwithacustomerequaltoorabovetheapplicabledesignatedthreshold.d)Lawyers,notaries,otherindependentlegalprofessionalsandaccountantswhentheypreparefororcarryouttransactionsfortheirclientconcerningthefollowingactivities:?buyingandsellingofrealestate;?managingofclientmoney,securitiesorotherassets;?managementofbank,savingsorsecuritiesaccounts;?organisationofcontributionsforthecreation,operationormanagementofcompanies;?creation,operationormanagementoflegalpersonsorarrangements,andbuyingandsellingofbusinessentities.e)Trustandcompanyserviceproviders[42]whentheypreparefororcarryouttransactionsforaclientconcerningtheactivitieslistedinthedefinitionintheGlossary.ReportingofsuspicioustransactionsandcomplianceRecommendation13Ifafinancialinstitutionsuspectsorhasreasonablegroundstosuspectthatfundsaretheproceedsofacriminalactivity,orarerelatedtoterroristfinancing,itshouldberequired,directlybylaworregulation,toreportpromptlyitssuspicionstothefinancialintelligenceunit(FIU).[43]Recommendation14Financialinstitutions,theirdirectors,officersandemployeesshouldbe:a)Protectedbylegalprovisionsfromcriminalandcivilliabilityforbreachofanyrestrictionondisclosureofinformationimposedbycontractorbyanylegislative,regulatoryoradministrativeprovision,iftheyreporttheirsuspicionsingoodfaithtotheFIU,eveniftheydidnotknowpreciselywhattheunderlyingcriminalactivitywas,andregardlessofwhetherillegalactivityactuallyoccurred.b)Prohibitedbylawfromdisclosingthefactthatasuspicioustransactionreport(STR)orrelatedinformationisbeingreportedtotheFIU.Recommendation15Financialinstitutionsshoulddevelopprogrammesagainstmoneylaunderingandterroristfinancing.Theseprogrammesshouldinclude:a)Thedevelopmentofinternalpolicies,proceduresandcontrols,includingappropriatecompliancemanagementarrangements,andadequatescreeningprocedurestoensurehighstandardswhenhiringemployees.b)Anongoingemployeetrainingprogramme.c)Anauditfunctiontotestthesystem.[44]Recommendation16TherequirementssetoutinRecommendations13to15,and21applytoalldesignatednon-financialbusinessesandprofessions,subjecttothefollowingqualifications:a)Lawyers,notaries,otherindependentlegalprofessionalsandaccountantsshouldberequiredtoreportsuspicioustransactionswhen,onbehalfoforforaclient,theyengageinafinancialtransactioninrelationtotheactivitiesdescribedinRecommendation12(d).Countriesarestronglyencouragedtoextendthereportingrequirementtotherestoftheprofessionalactivitiesofaccountants,includingauditing.b)Dealersinpreciousmetalsanddealersinpreciousstonesshouldberequiredtoreportsuspicioustransactionswhentheyengageinanycashtransactionwithacustomerequaltoorabovetheapplicabledesignatedthreshold.c)Trustandcompanyserviceprovidersshouldberequiredtoreportsuspicioustransactionsforaclientwhen,onbehalfoforforaclient,theyengageinatransactioninrelationtotheactivitiesreferredtoRecommendation12(e).Lawyers,notaries,otherindependentlegalprofessionals,andaccountantsactingasindependentlegalprofessionals,arenotrequiredtoreporttheirsuspicionsiftherelevantinformationwasobtainedincircumstanceswheretheyaresubjecttoprofessionalsecrecyorlegalprofessionalprivilege.[45]OthermeasurestodetermoneylaunderingandterroristfinancingRecommendation17Countriesshouldensurethateffective,proportionateanddissuasivesanctions,whethercriminal,civiloradministrative,areavailabletodealwithnaturalorlegalpersonscoveredbytheseRecommendationsthatfailtocomplywithanti-moneylaunderingorterroristfinancingrequirements.Recommendation18Countriesshouldnotapprovetheestablishmentoracceptthecontinuedoperationofshellbanks[46].Financialinstitutionsshouldrefusetoenterinto,orcontinue,acorrespondentbankingrelationshipwithshellbanks.Financialinstitutionsshouldalsoguardagainstestablishingrelationswithrespondentforeignfinancialinstitutionsthatpermittheiraccountstobeusedbyshellbanks.Recommendation19Countriesshouldconsider:[47]a)Implementingfeasiblemeasurestodetectormonitorthephysicalcross-bordertransportationofcurrencyandbearernegotiableinstruments,subjecttostrictsafeguardstoensureproperuseofinformationandwithoutimpedinginanywaythefreedomofcapitalmovements.b)Thefeasibilityandutilityofasystemwherebanksandotherfinancialinstitutionsandintermediarieswouldreportalldomesticandinternationalcurrencytransactionsaboveafixedamount,toanationalcentralagencywithacomputerizeddatabase[48],availabletocompetentauthoritiesforuseinmoneylaunderingorterroristfinancingcases,subjecttostrictsafeguardstoensureproperuseoftheinformation.Recommendation20CountriesshouldconsiderapplyingtheFATFRecommendationstobusinessesandprofessions,otherthandesignatednon-financialbusinessesandprofessions,thatposeamoneylaunderingorterroristfinancingrisk.Countriesshouldfurtherencouragethedevelopmentofmodernandsecuretechniquesofmoneymanagementthatarelessvulnerabletomoneylaundering.MeasurestobetakenwithrespecttocountriesthatdonotorinsufficientlycomplywiththeFATFRecommendationsRecommendation21Financialinstitutionsshouldgivespecialattentiontobusinessrelationshipsandtransactionswithpersons,includingcompaniesandfinancialinstitutions,fromcountrieswhichdonotorinsufficientlyapplytheFATFRecommendations.Wheneverthesetransactionshavenoapparenteconomicorvisiblelawfulpurpose,theirbackgroundandpurposeshould,asfaraspossible,beexamined,thefindingsestablishedinwriting,andbeavailabletohelpcompetentauthorities.WheresuchacountrycontinuesnottoapplyorinsufficientlyappliestheFATFRecommendations,countriesshouldbeabletoapplyappropriatecountermeasures[49].Recommendation22Financialinstitutionsshouldensurethattheprinciplesapplicabletofinancialinstitutions,whicharementionedabovearealsoappliedtobranchesandmajorityownedsubsidiarieslocatedabroad,especiallyincountrieswhichdonotorinsufficientlyapplytheFATFRecommendations,totheextentthatlocalapplicablelawsandregulationspermit.Whenlocalapplicablelawsandregulationsprohibitthisimplementation,competentauthoritiesinthecountryoftheparentinstitutionshouldbeinformedbythefinancialinstitutionsthattheycannotapplytheFATFRecommendations.RegulationandsupervisionRecommendation23[50]CountriesshouldensurethatfinancialinstitutionsaresubjecttoadequateregulationandsupervisionandareeffectivelyimplementingtheFATFRecommendations.Competentauthoritiesshouldtakethenecessarylegalorregulatorymeasurestopreventcriminalsortheirassociatesfromholdingorbeingthebeneficialownerofasignificantorcontrollinginterestorholdingamanagementfunctioninafinancialinstitution.[51]ForfinancialinstitutionssubjecttotheCorePrinciples[52],theregulatoryandsupervisorymeasuresthatapplyforprudential[53]purposesandwhicharealsorelevanttomoneylaundering,shouldapplyinasimilarmannerforanti-moneylaunderingandterroristfinancingpurposes.Otherfinancialinstitutionsshouldbelicensedorregisteredandappropriatelyregulated,andsubjecttosupervisionoroversightforanti-moneylaunderingpurposes,havingregardtotheriskofmoneylaunderingorterroristfinancinginthatsector.Ataminimum,businessesprovidingaserviceofmoneyorvaluetransfer,orofmoneyorcurrencychangingshouldbelicensedorregistered,andsubjecttoeffectivesystemsformonitoringandensuringcompliancewithnationalrequirementstocombatmoneylaunderingandterroristfinancing.Recommendation24Designatednon-financialbusinessesandprofessionsshouldbesubjecttoregulatoryandsupervisorymeasuresassetoutbelow.a)Casinosshouldbesubjecttoacomprehensiveregulatoryandsupervisoryregimethatensuresthattheyhaveeffectivelyimplementedthenecessaryanti-moneylaunderingandterrorist-financingmeasures.Ataminimum:?casinosshouldbelicensed;?competentauthoritiesshouldtakethenecessarylegalorregulatorymeasurestopreventcriminalsortheirassociatesfromholdingorbeingthebeneficialownerofasignificantorcontrollinginterest,holdingamanagementfunctionin,orbeinganoperatorofacasino?competentauthoritiesshouldensurethatcasinosare