產(chǎn)權(quán)理論與財(cái)務(wù)和會(huì)計(jì)研究

產(chǎn)權(quán)理論與財(cái)務(wù)和會(huì)計(jì)研究魏明海教授PhoneYSU-minghai2內(nèi)容提要為什么選擇產(chǎn)權(quán)理論？如何運(yùn)用產(chǎn)權(quán)理論研究財(cái)務(wù)與會(huì)計(jì)問題？專用資產(chǎn)與繼承對(duì)財(cái)務(wù)和會(huì)計(jì)問題的解釋關(guān)系資產(chǎn)與腐敗對(duì)財(cái)務(wù)和會(huì)計(jì)問題的解釋股權(quán)分置改革后的相關(guān)問題〔股權(quán)可交易性對(duì)會(huì)計(jì)問題的解釋〕SYSU-minghai3第一局部為什么選擇產(chǎn)權(quán)理論？SYSU-minghai4先看Top-downresearchapproachSYSU-minghai5InstitutionsGovernmentFirmorganizationsystemCorporate

governanceRoleofaccounting

andcorporatepoliciesTop-downResearchFrameworkSYSU-minghai6CountryInstitutionsThelegalsystem(thecourtandthelaw)Thegovernment(regulations,publicsectorgovernance)Thesociety(religion,ideology,custom,socialnorm)MarketsProduct,labor,manager,rawmaterial,financialcapitalFirmsFirmboundary(verticalintegration,diversification)OwnershipandcontrolstructuresGovernancestructures(accounting,boardsofdirectors,executivecompensation,reputationmechanisms)SYSU-minghai7Top-downresearchapproach

(FAN2006)ObserveIdentifyakeyinstitutionalfactorDevelopaseriesofresearchissuesAnalyzehowincentivesandbehaviorsofeconomicagents(governmentsorfirms)areaffectedwhenweimposetheinstitutionalconstraintAnalyzehowthegovernancestructuresofcontractsandorganizationsarechosensubjecttotheinstitutionalconstraintDatacollectionandempiricaltestsSYSU-minghai8keyinstitutionalfactorsOwnershipConcentration,transferabilityGovernmentownershipFamilyownershipOrganizationVerticalintegration,diversification,groupaffiliationAllocationofdecisionrightswithinafirmSYSU-minghai9Top-downApproach的程序是〔T.J.Wong,2005〕IdentifykeyinstitutionalfactorsthatshapeorganizationandincentivesThesefactorsincludepropertyrules,government’sroleineconomy,marketandlegaldevelopmentThesefactorsalsoshapethecorporategovernance,accountingandcorporatepoliciesApplycommontheoriesoranalyticalframeworks--onlyinstitutionsaredifferentSYSU-minghai10可以從哪些方面理解

InstitutionalSettingInstitutionsofEastAsia〔T.J.Wong,2005〕PoliticaleconomyClosetiesbetweengovernmentandbusinessRentseekingsocietyLegalsystemsPoorprotectionofpropertyrightsPrivateenforcementofcontractsWeakprotectionofoutsideshareholdersCultureandsocialnormLowtrustsocietyRelationship-basedtransactionsFamilyfirmsSYSU-minghai11China’sInstitutionalSetting〔EconomicintransitionGovtvs.Market〕〔T.J.Wong,2005〕Capitalmarkets(statevs.market)IPO,rightsofferingsanddelistingcontrolledbygovt(quotasystem;ROEtargets)Statebanks–relatedlendingGovernmentnotmarketplaysabigroleMajorityownershipbythestatepartialprivatization(minorityshares)ofSOEsdirect(SAMB)andindirect(parentSOE)governmentmajorityownershipGovernmentsharescannottobesoldeasilyIncentiveissues:softbudgetconstraints;SOEpursuingnon-economicgoalsSYSU-minghai12Control(mgmtvs.state)1992,centralgovtgrantedSOEs14rights,mainlyoperatingrightsRightsnotgiven:M&A,disposalofassets,appointmentofchairmanandCEOBoardsandmanagementfilledwithgovtbureaucrats;notprofessionalIncentivesissue:governmentinterventions;doubleagencyofmanagement

EconomyisdecentralizedLocalgovernmentsownSOEsandhaveproductionandfiscalautonomyListedSOEcanbringresourcesandpoliticalcapitaltolocalgovtWeaklegalsystemsandundevelopedmarketsPoorlydevelopedlegalsystemandmarkets,moregovernmentinterventionsInstitutionsvaryacrossprovincesinChina,whichallowsx-sectionalcomparisonsacrossregionsSYSU-minghai13再看一篇論文及投資者保護(hù)會(huì)計(jì)研究

BushmanR，ASmith.2001.Financialaccountinginformationandcorporategovernance.JournalofAccountingandEconomics.32:237–333.SYSU-minghai14財(cái)務(wù)會(huì)計(jì)信息股價(jià)信息經(jīng)濟(jì)業(yè)績(jī)渠道1更好地辨識(shí)好項(xiàng)目和壞項(xiàng)目（項(xiàng)目辨識(shí)）渠道2對(duì)經(jīng)理人項(xiàng)目選擇和利益侵占的約束（治理作用）渠道3減少投資者之間的信息不對(duì)稱（逆向選擇）降低外部融資成本財(cái)務(wù)會(huì)計(jì)信息影響經(jīng)濟(jì)業(yè)績(jī)的三條渠道轉(zhuǎn)引自Bushman和Smith（2001）SYSU-minghai15當(dāng)投資者權(quán)利的法律保護(hù)較強(qiáng)時(shí)，經(jīng)濟(jì)業(yè)績(jī)可以作為投資者保護(hù)程度的一個(gè)替代變量。Bushman和Smith〔2001〕在綜述相關(guān)的會(huì)計(jì)實(shí)證研究時(shí)，詳細(xì)分析了會(huì)計(jì)信息提高經(jīng)濟(jì)業(yè)績(jī)的三條渠道。SYSU-minghai16在不考慮逆向選擇和道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的情況下，公司高管人員和投資者仍然可能由于缺乏相關(guān)、可靠的信息對(duì)投資工程進(jìn)行錯(cuò)誤的判斷，從而導(dǎo)致無效投資。會(huì)計(jì)信息能夠幫助公司高管人員和投資者區(qū)分投資工程的優(yōu)劣，提高投資的效率，發(fā)揮工程辨識(shí)的作用〔如圖中渠道1所示〕。然而，在研究設(shè)計(jì)中往往難以單獨(dú)區(qū)分出這一渠道的作用機(jī)制，與其他渠道的作用相別離，因此，相關(guān)的實(shí)證研究并不多見〔Biddle和Hilary，2006〕。SYSU-minghai17考慮到公司高管人員可能存在的道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，會(huì)計(jì)信息在投資者與公司高管人員的鼓勵(lì)和約束機(jī)制中可發(fā)揮重要的治理作用〔如圖中渠道2所示〕，降低公司內(nèi)部的代理本錢。這個(gè)領(lǐng)域的研究隨著公司治理相關(guān)研究的擴(kuò)展得到了迅速的開展。SYSU-minghai18由于公司內(nèi)部人與外部投資者〔包括潛在投資者〕之間存在著信息不對(duì)稱，會(huì)計(jì)信息有助于緩解這種信息不對(duì)稱，幫助外部投資者對(duì)公司資產(chǎn)進(jìn)行合理定價(jià)，減少可能發(fā)生的逆向選擇現(xiàn)象〔如圖中渠道3所示〕。這個(gè)領(lǐng)域的研究大都伴隨著對(duì)資本市場(chǎng)有效性的檢驗(yàn)和討論。SYSU-minghai19財(cái)務(wù)會(huì)計(jì)信息是公司財(cái)務(wù)會(huì)計(jì)過程和外部報(bào)告系統(tǒng)的產(chǎn)品，并按要求公開披露，反映公司財(cái)務(wù)狀況和業(yè)績(jī)。在投資者保護(hù)中，財(cái)務(wù)會(huì)計(jì)信息主要有定價(jià)和治理兩個(gè)方面的作用機(jī)制：SYSU-minghai20一方面，財(cái)務(wù)會(huì)計(jì)信息能夠降低公司內(nèi)部人與外部投資者之間的信息不對(duì)稱程度，促進(jìn)投資者事前準(zhǔn)確定價(jià)和形成正確的投資決策；另一方面，財(cái)務(wù)會(huì)計(jì)信息進(jìn)入治理過程，約束和限制公司內(nèi)部人的時(shí)機(jī)主義行為或利益侵占行為，減少事后可能的代理本錢，保護(hù)投資者獲取投資回報(bào)〔Healy和Palepu，2001〕。SYSU-minghai21SYSU-minghai22SYSU-minghai23SYSU-minghai24SYSU-minghai25SYSU-minghai26PropertyrightsandtransactioncostsasusefulanalyticaltoolsforunderstandinghowgovernanceworksSYSU-minghai27EconomicsofPropertyRightsEconomicsofTransactionCostsAgencyTheorySYSU-minghai28Thepropertyrightstheory–overviewAnyassetisattachedwithabundleofpropertyrightsThepropertyrightsoftheassetareassigned(partitioned)amongeconomicagentsthroughlaws/rulesandexchangesThepropertyrightstheoryanalyzeswhatdeterminethepartitionofthepropertyrights,andtheireconomicconsequencesPropertyrightstheoryaddressesoptimalallocationofrightsthatmaximizeenforcement(publicorprivate)Transactioncostsareimportantdeterminantsofthepropertyrightsassignments,becausetheyaffecttheexchange/transferofpropertyrightsWecanapplythepropertyrighttheorytostudyhowthepropertyrulesandtransactioncostsofamarketaffecttheformandgovernanceofeconomicorganizations(contracts,ownership)SYSU-minghai29BasicconceptsCostsoftransferringpropertyrightsSpecializedassetsRelationship-basedcontractingSYSU-minghai30Thecostoftransferringpropertyrights(Alchian,1965)Exchange(transfer)cost,atypeoftransactioncost,criticallydeterminetheallocationofpropertyrightsTransfercostoftenoccurduetogovernmentregulation,orevenprohibition,oftradeThedifferencesbetweenpublicandprivateownershiparisefromtheinabilityofapublicownertosellhisshareofpublicownership.Theinabilitytosellone’sshareofpublicownershipremainsapotentfactorinthecosts-rewardsystemimpingingonallmembersofthepublicandontheemployeesofthepublicownedinstitution.SYSU-minghai31ThecostoftransferringpropertyrightsSoon,wewilllearnhowtransfercostimportantlydeterminesgovernancestructureLet’sreviewtheconceptofassetspecificityandhowitaffectsgovernancestructureoftransactionSYSU-minghai32TypesofassetspecificityPhysicalcapitalspecificityHumancapitalspecificityReputationandpersonaltrustmaydevelopthroughtransactionsSite(proximity)specificityTemporalspecificityExamples?SYSU-minghai33Howcantheriskofappropriationbeavoid?Long-termcontractsAnexplicitlystatedcontractualguaranteelegallyenforcedbythegovernmentorsomeotheroutsideinstitutionAnimplicitcontractualguaranteeenforcedbythemarketmechanismofwithdrawingfuturebusinessifopportunisticbehavioroccursSYSU-minghai34Marketmechanisminimplicitlong-termcontracts(Klein,Crawford,Alchian,1978;KleinandLeffer,1982)Onewayofmarketenforcementisbyofferingtothepotentialcheaterafuturepremium(e.g.,repeatedbusinessopportunities),apricesufficientlygreaterthanaveragevariablecosttoassureaquasi-rentstreamthatwillexceedthepotentialgainfromcheatingThepresentdiscountedvalueofthisfuturepremiumstreammustbegreaterthananyincreaseinwealththatcouldbeobtainedbythepotentialcheaterifheinfactcheatedandwereterminatedTheofferofsuchalong-termrelationshipwiththepotentialcheaterwilleliminatesystematicopportunisticbehaviorSYSU-minghai35CategorizingtransactionsNonspecificinvestmentMixedinvestmentIdiosyncraticinvestmentOccasionaltransactionPurchasingstandardequipmentPurchasingcustomizedequipmentConstructingaplantRecurrenttransactionPurchasingstandardmaterialPurchasingcustomizedmaterialSite-specifictransferofintermediateproductacrosssuccessivestagesSYSU-minghai36CategorizinggovernancestructuresoftransactionsNonspecificinvestmentMixedinvestmentIdiosyncraticinvestmentOccasionaltransactionMarketgovernance(Classicalcontracting)Trilateralgovernance(Neoclassicalcontracting)Trilateralgovernance(Neoclassicalcontracting)RecurrenttransactionMarketgovernance(Classicalcontracting)Bilateralgovernance(Relationalcontracting)Unifiedgovernance(Verticalintegration;Relationalcontracting)SYSU-minghai37第二局部運(yùn)用產(chǎn)權(quán)理論研究財(cái)務(wù)與會(huì)計(jì)問題：專用資產(chǎn)與繼承對(duì)財(cái)務(wù)和會(huì)計(jì)問題的解釋Succession:

TheRolesofSpecializedAssetsandTransferCostsJosephP.H.FanMingJianYin-HuaYehSYSU-minghai39SomeObservationsaboutFamilyBusinessPersistentconcentrationofownershipFamily(heirorcloserelative)successionMixedperformanceinsuccession,especiallyinfamilysuccessionPerez-Gonzales(2006),Bennedsenetal.(2007),VillalongaandAmit(2006)SYSU-minghai40ResearchQuestionsusesuccessionasaneventtoaddressthefollowingquestions:Whyfamilysuccession,hencetheemergenceoffamilyfirms?Whypersistentconcentrationofownership?Whatarethefundamentaldeterminantsofsuccessionperformance?Howdofirmgovernancestructuresevolvearoundsuccession?SYSU-minghai41ExplanationsofMixedPerformanceof

FamilyOwnershipandHeirSuccessionOutsiderexpropriationThoughaprofessionalmanagerismoreproductive,hisinterestisnotnecessarilyalignedwiththefamily(BhattacharyaandRavikumar,2002).Seriousinweakinstitutionalenvironments(Burkart,Panuzi,andShleifer,2003)InsiderexpropriationFamilyfirmsarecompetitive,butinsiderscapturemostofthegain,leavinglittletooutsideinvestors(VillalongaandAmit,2007)Transfercostsofspecializedassets(thisfocus)SYSU-minghai42ThepropertyrightapproachCoase(1937)FirmsexisttomitigatecostsinmarketexchangesKlein,Crawford,Alchian(1979),Williamson(1979),GrossmanandHart(1985)Holdupproblemsintransactionsinvolvingspecializedinvestments,andverticalintegrationasaviablegovernancestructureofthetransactionsDemsetz(1967),DemsetzandLehn(1985)ThestructureofcorporateownershipandhowitevolvesovertimeJensenandMeckling(1976)andmostsubsequentpapersinaccountingandfinanceConflictofinterestbetweenmanagersandshareholdersasfirmownershipbecomediffusedSYSU-minghai43KeyhypothesisGobacktotheoldpropertyrightliterature(Alchian,1965,1969;Klen,Crawford,Alchian,1979;Williamson,1978),testingthepossibilitythat

Familyownershipandfamilysuccessionarearrangementstoprotectspecializedassetsthataredifficulttopartition,value,andtransferacrossindividualsororganizationalboundariesSYSU-minghai44Specializedassetsinentrepreneurialactivities1.EntrepreneurialactivitiesarespecialEntrepreneurs’superiormanagementskills,creativity,leadershipcharisma,secretformula,reputation,business/politicalconnections,etc.Theseassetsarespecifictotheentrepreneursbecausethey

cannotbequicklylearnedoreasilyboughtandsoldinmarketplaceSYSU-minghai45Specializedassetsinentrepreneurialactivities2.Thereexiststrongideologies(personalinterests)inentrepreneurialactivitiesEntrepreneurialactivitiesoftenconsumealargeamountofentrepreneurs’time,effort,andfinancialcapital,dictatinganideology(strongpersonalinterest)totakeontheseactivitiesandassociaterisksBecauseoftheirextraordinaryinterestsandefforts,entrepreneursattachahighvalueoftheirfirmsthatarenotcomparablypricedbythemarketSYSU-minghai46Specializedassetsinentrepreneurialactivities3.EntrepreneurialactivitiesoftenhavestrongteamspiritWhentherequiredlabor,financialandhumancapitalinputsarelargeandbeyondwhatanindividualentrepreneurcansupply,friendsand/orfamilymembersoftenjointobecomebothhighlymotivatedanddisciplinedlaborforceandcontributorsoffinancialcapital.Bondedandenforcedbyfriendshiporbloodtie,contractswithco-foundersorfamilymembersareoftenshortofdetailsTheseimplicit

contractscanbehardtoenforceuponsuccessionSYSU-minghai47HightransfercostsofspecializedassetsSpecializedassetscontributetotheinitialsuccessofentrepreneurialactivitiesButdifficultiesarisewhentheseassetsaretobetransferredacrossindividualsororganizationalboundariesEveninstandardizedbusiness,familymembersorbusinesspartnersmaydisputeabouttheirindividualcontributionstoandhencerewardsoftheirteamactivities,resultingincostlyinfightingSYSU-minghai48PredictionsOwnershipconcentrationCross-sectionally,ownershipconcentrationincreasewithassetspecificity,sothatthecostsandbenefitsofthespecializedassetsconcentrateontheentrepreneur

FamilyoroutsidesuccessionThechoiceofsuccessordependsonhowwellthevalueofthespecializedassetscanbepreserved,orconverselyhowlargeisthevaluedissipationduringandafterthetransferAnheiroracloserelativewouldbechosenasthesuccessoriftheextentofassetspecificityislargeFirmvalueAnoveralldeclineinfirmcapitalizedvaluewithintheprocessofsuccessionAcrossfirms,theextentofvaluedissipationdependsonthedegreeofassetspecificityintheirbusinessactivitiesSYSU-minghai49PredictionsofgovernancestructurechangesAssumingthatthesuccessoronlypartiallyinheritsspecializedassets,suchasreputation,politicalconnection,etc,hewouldneedtoshoreuphiscredibilitytostakeholdersbyenhancinginternalgovernanceMoreconcentratedownershipMoreoutsiderparticipationonboardandmanagementSeparatingchairmanandCEOpositionsMorecashdividendsSYSU-minghai50DefiningsuccessionAnentrepreneursteppingdownfromthetopexecutiveposition(typicallythechairmaninAsia),replacedbyafamilymemberoranunrelatedprofessionalDifferentfromordinaryamanagerialturnover,successionistypicallyassociatedwithtransferofcontrollingownershipSYSU-minghai51SamplingprocedureStartingwithallpubliclytradedfirmsinHongKong,Singapore,andTaiwanExcludingSOEs,foreignercontrolledfirms,andfinanciallydistressedfirmsTrackingtopexecutiveturnoversstartingfromtheIPOyearExcludingthefirstturnoverifthesubsequentturnoveroccurwithin5yearsSYSU-minghai52TheSuccessionSampleYearHongKongSingaporeTaiwanTotal198700221988004419890066199000661991005519920461019930549199406713199504610199645112019977261519983381419999412252000124132920019112222002830112003640102004210320052103Total6247108217SYSU-minghai53SamplebyindustryIndustryHongKongSingaporeTaiwanTotalAgriculture,ForestryandFishing0101ConstructionandRealEstate206834FoodandKindredProducts1157TextileandApparel311317Lumber,Furniture,PaperandPrinting1247Chemicals,Petroleum,Rubber,PlasticandLeather501520MineralsandMetals121316Machinery,EquipmentandInstrument1172644TransportationandCommunication241016Utility1012Commerce85619FinancialCompany47314Service511420SYSU-minghai54SuccessorChoices

HongKongSingaporeTaiwanTotalFamilymember4369%1736%8074%14065%Heir1829%49%5753%7936%Relative2540%1328%2321%6128%Outsiders610%1736%2422%4722%Sold-out1321%817%44%2512%Unknown00%511%00%52%Total62100%47100%108100%217100%SYSU-minghai55MeasurementofAssetSpecificityIdeology(personalinterest)WhethertheoldchairmanisthefounderWhethertheentrepreneurhasanybusinessinmuseum,gallery,recreationfacilities,club,garden,movie,newspaperorbookpublication,advertisement,restaurantandhotel(DemsetzandLehn,1985)IndivisibilityofcommonpropertyWhetherco-foundedNumberoffamilymembersco-managingthebusinessRelationshipandreputationcapitalWhetherthebusinessislaborintensiveAccesstolongtermloansSYSU-minghai56SummarystatisticsSYSU-minghai57CharacteristicsofoutgoingandincomingleadershipOutgoingchairmanSuccessorMeanAge67.3550.22Education1.812.26Whetherafounder0.51Tenurewithfirm24.228.65Whetheroldchairmanholdcompanypositionaftersteppingdown0.25Whethersuccessor'spriorpositionisCEO0.36MedianAge70.0049.00Education2.002.00Whetherafounder1.00Tenurewithfirm25.754.50Whetheroldchairmanholdcompanypositionaftersteppingdown0.00Whethersuccessor'spriorpositionisCEO0.00SYSU-minghai58SuccessorChoiceand

OwnershipStructure

SYSU-minghai59Successionandfirmvalue

Monthlycumulativeabnormalstockreturn(CAR)aroundsuccessionSYSU-minghai60Successionandfirmvalue

Monthlycumulativeabnormalstockreturn(CAR)aroundsuccession,byeconomySYSU-minghai61StatisticsofCARaroundsuccession

VariableObs.MeanMedianStd.Dev.FullsampleCAR(-60,0)144-0.5558-0.54121.1225CAR(-36,0)161-0.1560-0.27280.8471CAR(0,+48)179-0.0288-0.07540.8302HongKongCAR(-60,0)54-1.2567-1.02240.8656CAR(-36,0)58-0.5400-0.76000.7163CAR(0,+48)540.0233-0.09301.0643SingaporeCAR(-60,0)300.22170.04840.7734CAR(-36,0)320.1884-0.09500.7176CAR(0,+48)32-0.1849-0.37340.8080TaiwanCAR(-60,0)60-0.3139-0.41011.1270CAR(-36,0)710.0025-0.22440.8902CAR(0,+48)93-0.0054-0.04090.6712SYSU-minghai62RegressionresultsoffirmvaluechangesaroundsuccessionSYSU-minghai63DailycumulativenetofmarketstockreturnofaHK-basedconglomeratearounddeathofthefounderSYSU-minghai64DailycumulativenetofmarketstockreturnofaHKlistedcompanyaroundthenewsthatits98year-oldfounderwassenttohospitalDepartmentRetreat@Shenzhen202164CumulatedDailyStockReturnSYSU-minghai65TheRoleofEntrenchmentItissometimesdifficulttoremoveanowner-managerrefusingtochangeuntilheisveryoldordead.FirmvaluedeteriorateuntiltheentrenchmentproblemiscorrectedbysuccessionIsthestockreturnpatternprimarilydrivenbyentrenchment?Overall,CARdidnotincreaseaftertheoldchairmanleftposition,suggestingentrenchmentisnotthefullstoryWeareinvestigatingthispossibilitymorethoroughlyFindingthatbothpre-andpost-turnoverCARnegativelyrelatedtowhethertheoutgoingchairmanremainsonboardafterturnover,Donotfindsimilareffectsofoutgoingchairman’sageandtenureSYSU-minghai66RegressionresultsofgovernancestructurechangesaroundsuccessionSYSU-minghai67SummaryandConclusionSpecializedassetsplayacrucialroleintheemergenceoffamilyownershipAtendencythatentrepreneurialfirms,throughfamilysuccessions,evolveintofamilyownedandmanagedfirmsAtendencythatfamilyownershipstaysconcentratedacrossgenerationsofmanagementTheslow(orlackof)diffusionofownershipandcontrolcanbeexplainedbythedesiretoprotectvalueassociatedwithspecializedassetsApronounceddissipationoffirmvalueduringsuccession,whichispositivelyrelatedtoassetspecificityFirmownershipandgovernancestructuresevolvetoadapttothenewleadershipSYSU-minghai68FounderSuccessionandAccountingProperties68JosephFanTJWongTianyuZhangSYSU-minghai69BroadResearchQuestionsUsingthesampleoffamilysuccessionof3Asianeconomies(HK,SingaporeandTaiwan),totestwhetherchangefromrelationship-basedcontractingtoarm’slengthcontractinginfluencesaccountingpropertiesSuccessioneffectonlytotestwhethertheeffectismorepronouncedinfoundersuccession69SYSU-minghai70MotivationBalletal(2003)findsthatAsianfirmspracticeinsider-basedaccountingthathaslesstimelylossrecognition.FanandWong(2002)findsthatcontrolconcentrationofAsianfirmsisassociatedwithloweraccountingquality(earnings-returnrelation)Specializedassetsandrelationship-basedcontracting,whichliesdeeperthanownershipandagencyconflicts,explainstheaboveobservationSuccessioncomparesbeforeandafterperiods,reduceendogeneity70SYSU-minghai71DefinitionofSuccessionSuccessionasaneventinwhichacontrollingowner/managerstepsdownfromthetopexecutive(usuallychairmaninAsia)positionsItisanticipatedthatsometimesitwillbeambiguousaboutwhenasuccessionstartsandends.Typicallysuccessionisaprocessthat

takestimetocompleteTheytrackfirmsfrom5yearsbeforeto5yearsaftertheirchairmanturnovers.Theeventwindowissetbydataavailability71SYSU-minghai721.SpecificAssets,FamilyownershipandRelationship-basedcontractingAnimportantbenefitoffamilyownershipistoprotectandcapitalizeonspecificassetsornon-transferablepropertyrights(Alchian,1965,1969;Coase,1937,1960;Demsetz,1964,1967)Entrepreneurs’superiormanagementskills,creativity,secretformula,reputation,business/politicalconnections,etc.Specializedassets,aswellasfamilyownership,facilitaterelationship-basedcontractinginplaceofarm’slengthcontracting72SYSU-minghai732.Relationship-basedcontractingandaccountingpropertiesRelationship-basedcontractingArisingfrompossessionofspecializedIndicatedbyfamilycontrolToprotectrentofspecializedassetsAccountingpropertiesOpaqueaccountingtoprotectspecializedassetsSpecializedassetsisdifficulttobemeasuredbyaccountingLessexternaldemandforaccountinginformation73SYSU-minghai743.SpecializedassetsaroundsuccessionManyofthesespecializedassetsarenotfullytransferable,noteventoone’schildrenThisdisruptionduringfamilysuccessionallowsustoexamineifthereductioninassetspecificityisassociatedwithincreaseinaccountingqualityaroundsuccessionSuccessionwillleadtoimprovementinaccountingqualityFoundersuccessionwillleadtoevenhigherimprovementinaccountingqualitybecausefoundertendstopossessmorespecificassetsAnexampleofspecializedasset…74SYSU-minghai7575SYSU-minghai76LiKa-shing〔77〕wassenttohospitalonSep.6th,2005.76CumulatedDailyStockReturnSYSU-minghai77MeasuringAccountingQualityHowtomeasurequalityinliterature?Accruals(unsigneddiscretionaryaccruals)[Leuzetal.]TimelylossrecognitionMarket-basedModel(Basu,1997)Incomepersistence(BallandShivakumar,2005)77SYSU-minghai78Table1Sample78SYSU-minghai79Question1Whethersuccessionleadtoimprovementinaccountingquality?79SYSU-minghai80Table2DiscretionaryAccruals80SYSU-minghai81Table3TimelyLossRecognition81SYSU-minghai82Question2Whetherfoundersuccessionleadstomorepronouncedimprovementinaccountingquality?Whetherfounder-controlledfirmsareassociatedmoreopaqueaccountingpriortosuccession?82SYSU-minghai83Table4FounderEffectondiscretionaryaccruals83SYSU-minghai84Table5PanelA:Foundereffectontimelylossrecognition84SYSU-minghai85Table5PanelB:Foundereffectinpre-successionperiod85SYSU-minghai86Inaddition…Founder’sageandeducationmatterforaccountingqualityinpre-successionperiodSYSU-minghai87Table6EffectofFounder’sageandEducationondiscretionaryaccrualsinpre-successionperiod87SYSU-minghai88Table6EffectofFounder’sageandEducationontimelylossrecognitioninpre-successionperiod88SYSU-minghai89ConclusionAccountingsystemshiftsfrommoreinsider-basedtooutsider-basedaroundsuccessionLevelofspecificassetsmatterfortheshift89SYSU-minghai90第三局部運(yùn)用產(chǎn)權(quán)理論研究財(cái)務(wù)與會(huì)計(jì)問題：關(guān)系資產(chǎn)與腐敗對(duì)財(cái)務(wù)和會(huì)計(jì)問題的解釋PublicGovernanceandCorporateFinance:EvidencefromCorruptionCasesJosephP.H.FanOliverM.RuiMengxinZhaoSYSU-minghai92CorporateFinancingPatternsinEmergingMarketsCompaniesinemergingmarketsrelyondebtmuchmorethanequitytofinancetheirinvestmentMoreover,theyrelyonshort-termdebt,evenwhentheyengageinlong-terminvestmentBanks,notcapitalmarkets,aretheprimarysourcesoffundsforfirmsindevelopingcountriesSYSU-minghai93Cross-countrypatternoffinancialleverageSYSU-minghai94Cross-countrypatternofdebtmaturitySYSU-minghai95ResearchQuestionsinThisStudyToinvestigatetheimpactofpoliticalrentseekingoncorporatefinancingbehaviorsinChinaResearchquestionsHowdorentseekingandcorruptionaffectcapitalstructure,debtmaturity,andlong-termdebtfinancingoftheChinesefirms?Inretrospect,whetherpoliticalconnectionsprovidethefirmsfinancingadvantages?Arethefinancingadvantagesofthepoliticallyconnectedfirmsreflectedintheirstockprices?Doescorruptionaffectcapitalallocationefficiency?SYSU-minghai96WhyChina?

PervasivecorruptionOneoftheworld’shighlycorruptedcountriesAccordingtoChina’sofficialrecord,during1997-2002,therearetotally861917corruptioncasesunderinvestigation842760corruptioncasesconcluded846150peoplepunishedbycommunistlaws,ofwhich137711expelledfromthecommunistpartyAmongthepunishedcommunistpartymembers,28996county〔縣〕level2422intermediate〔廳,局〕level98provincial〔省,部〕leveloraboveSYSU-minghai97CorruptioninAsianEconomies

(Source:TransparencyInternational:meanCorruptionPerceptionIndex1992-2000)SYSU-minghai98EmpiricalDesignIdentifying23high(provincial)levelgovernmentofficercorruptioncasesduring1995-2003TrackingpubliclylistedcompaniesinChinathatarebribersorareconnectedwiththecorruptedbureaucratsTrackchangesinfinancialleverageanddebtmaturitiesoftheevent(bribingorconnected)firmsfrom3yearsbeforeto3yearsafterthecorruptioneventSYSU-minghai99EmpiricalDesignComparedwiththepriorstudies,thissingle-economytime-serialempiricaldesignprovidesadvantagesFocusingonaspecificinstitutionalfactor–rentseekingProvidingmoredirectlylinkbetweencorporatefinancingdecisionswithrentseekingandcorruptionMitigatingendogeneityissuesThecorruptioneventsarelikelyshockstoconnectedfirms.Theconnectedfirmsarenon-bribers,hencetheirfinancingpolicychangesuponthecorruptioneventsarelikelycausedbylostconnectionsSYSU-minghai100ACorruptedBureaucratand