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柯孔林浙江工商大學(xué)金融學(xué)院1Chapter21POLITICALECONOMICS柯孔林浙江工商大學(xué)金融學(xué)院2SocialWelfareCriteriaAnalyzingthechoiceamongfeasibleallocationsofresourcesisdifficultitinvolvesmakingchoicesabouttheutilitylevelsofdifferentindividualsinchoosingbetweentwoallocations(AandB)theproblemarisesthatsomeindividualspreferAwhileotherspreferB柯孔林浙江工商大學(xué)金融學(xué)院3SocialWelfareCriteriaWecanusetheEdgeworthboxdiagramtoshowtheproblemsinvolvedinestablishingsocialwelfarecriteriaonlypointsonthecontractcurveareconsideredaspossiblecandidatesforasocialoptimumalongthecontractcurve,theutilitiesofthetwoindividualsvary,andtheseutilitiesaredirectlycompetitive柯孔林浙江工商大學(xué)金融學(xué)院4SocialWelfareCriteriaOJOSUJ4UJ3UJ2UJ1US4US3US2US1Contractcurve柯孔林浙江工商大學(xué)金融學(xué)院5SocialWelfareCriteriaIfwearewillingtoassumethatutilitycanbecomparedamongindividuals,wecanusethecontractcurvetoconstructtheutilitypossibilityfrontier柯孔林浙江工商大學(xué)金融學(xué)院6SocialWelfareCriteriaSmith’sutilityJones’sutilityOJOSTheutilitypossibilityfrontiershowsthoseutilitylevelsforSmithandJonesthatareobtainablefromthefixedquantityofgoodsavailableAnypointinsidethecurveisPareto-inefficient
C柯孔林浙江工商大學(xué)金融學(xué)院7EqualityCriterionSmith’sutilityJones’sutilityOJOSOnepossiblecriterioncouldrequirecompleteequitygivingSmithandJonesthesamelevelofwelfare45°Utilityisequalinthiscase,butthequantitiesofxandymaynotbeThisoccursatUJAandUSAUSAUJA
A柯孔林浙江工商大學(xué)金融學(xué)院8ContractcurveEqualityCriterionOJOSUJ2UJAUJ1US2USAUS1A
XSA
XJAYSAYSA柯孔林浙江工商大學(xué)金融學(xué)院9UtilitarianCriterionAsimilarcriterionwouldbetochoosetheallocationontheutilitypossibilityfrontiersothatthesumofSmith’sandJones’sutilitiesisthegreatestthispointwouldimplyacertainallocationofxandybetweenSmithandJones柯孔林浙江工商大學(xué)金融學(xué)院10TheRawlsCriterionThiswasfirstposedbyphilosopherJohnRawlsSupposethateachindividualbeginsinaninitialpositioninwhichnooneknowswhathisfinalpositionwillbeindividualsareriskaversesocietywillonlymoveawayfromperfectequalitywhentheworstoffpersonwouldbebetteroffunderinequalitythanequality柯孔林浙江工商大學(xué)金融學(xué)院11TheRawlsCriterionSmith’sutilityJones’sutilityOJOSUnequaldistributionssuchasBwouldbepermittedwhentheonlyattainableequaldistributionsarebelowD45°DBAEqualdistributionsthatliebetweenDandAaresuperiortoBbecausetheworse-offindividualisbetterofftherethanatB
柯孔林浙江工商大學(xué)金融學(xué)院12SocialWelfareFunctionsAsocialwelfarefunctionmaydependonSmith’sandJones’sutilitylevelssuchassocialwelfare=w(US,UJ)ThesocialproblemistoallocatexandybetweenSmithandJonesastomaximizew柯孔林浙江工商大學(xué)金融學(xué)院13Theoptimalpointofsocialwelfareiswherewismaximizedgiventheutilitypossibilityfrontierw1w2SocialWelfareFunctionsSmith’sutilityJones’sutilityOJOSEThisoccursatUJEandUSEUSEUJE
柯孔林浙江工商大學(xué)金融學(xué)院14w1w2SocialWelfareFunctionsSmith’sutilityJones’sutilityOJOSEventhoughpointFisPareto-inefficient,itisstillpreferredtopointDNotethetradeoffbetweenequityandefficiencyD
F柯孔林浙江工商大學(xué)金融學(xué)院15EquitableSharingAfatherarriveshomewithan8-piecepizzaandmustdecidehowtoshareitbetweenhistwosonsTeen1hasautilityfunctionoftheformTeen2hasautilityfunctionoftheform柯孔林浙江工商大學(xué)金融學(xué)院16EquitableSharingTheleastresistanceoptionwouldbetogiveeachteen4slicesU1=4,U2=2Thefathermaywanttomakesuretheteenshaveequalutilityx1=1.6,x2=6.4,U1=U2=2.53Thefathermaywanttomaximizethesumofhissonsutilityx1=6.4,x2=1.6,U1=5.06,U2=1.26柯孔林浙江工商大學(xué)金融學(xué)院17EquitableSharingSupposethefathersuggeststhathewillflipacointodeterminewhogetswhichportionlistedunderthethreeallocationsTheexpectedutilitiesofthetwoteensfromacoinflipthatyieldseither1.6or6.4slicesisE(U1)=0.5(2.53)+0.5(5.06)=3.80E(U2)=0.5(2.53)+0.5(1.26)=1.90柯孔林浙江工商大學(xué)金融學(xué)院18EquitableSharingGiventhischoice,theteenswilloptfortheequaldistributionbecauseeachgetshigherexpectedutilityfromitthanfromthecoinflip柯孔林浙江工商大學(xué)金融學(xué)院19EquitableSharingIfthefathercouldsubjecttheteenstoa“veilofignorance”sothatneitherwouldknowhisidentityuntilthepizzaisserved,thevotingmightstillbedifferentifeachteenfocusesonaworst-casescenario,hewilloptfortheequalutilityallocationinsuresthatutilitywillnotfallbelow2.53柯孔林浙江工商大學(xué)金融學(xué)院20EquitableSharingSupposethateachteenbelievesthathehasa50-50chanceofbeinglabeledas“teen1”or“teen2”Expectedutilitiesare
x1=x2=4E(U1)=0.5(4)+0.5(2)=3x1=1.6,x2=6.4E(U1)=0.5(2.53)+0.5(2.53)=2.53x1=6.4,x2=1.6E(U1)=0.5(5.06)+0.5(1.26)=3.16Theteenswilloptfortheutilitariansolution柯孔林浙江工商大學(xué)金融學(xué)院21TheArrowImpossibilityTheoremArrowviewsthegeneralsocialwelfareproblemasoneofchoosingamongseveralfeasible“socialstates”itisassumedthateachindividualcanrankthesestatesaccordingtotheirdesirabilityArrowraisesthefollowingquestion:doesthereexistarankingonasociety-widescalethatfairlyrecordsthesepreferences?柯孔林浙江工商大學(xué)金融學(xué)院22TheArrowImpossibilityTheoremAssumethatthereare3socialstates(A,B,andC)and2individuals(SmithandJones)SmithprefersAtoBandBtoCAPSBandBPSCandAPSCJonesprefersCtoAandAtoBCPJAandAPJBandCPJB柯孔林浙江工商大學(xué)金融學(xué)院23TheArrowImpossibilityTheoremArrow’simpossibilitytheoremconsistsofshowingthatareasonablesocialrankingofthesethreestatescannotexistArrowassumesthatanysocialrankingshouldobeysixseeminglyunobjectionableaxioms“P”shouldberead“issociallypreferredto”柯孔林浙江工商大學(xué)金融學(xué)院24TheArrowAxiomsItmustrankallsocialstateseitherAPB,BPA,orAandBareequallydesirable(AIB)foranytwostatesAandBTherankingmustbetransitiveifAPBandBPC(orBIC),thenAPCTherankingmustbepositivelyrelatedtoindividualpreferencesifAisunanimouslypreferredbySmithandJones,thenAPB柯孔林浙江工商大學(xué)金融學(xué)院25TheArrowAxiomsIfnewsocialstatesefeasible,thisfactshouldnotaffecttherankingoftheoriginalstatesIfAPB,thenthiswillremaintrueifsomenewstate(D)esfeasibleThesocialpreferencefunctionshouldnotbeimposedbycustomitshouldnotbethecasethatAPBregardlessofthetastesofindividualsinsociety柯孔林浙江工商大學(xué)金融學(xué)院26TheArrowAxiomsTherelationshipshouldbenondictatorialoneperson’spreferencesshouldnotdeterminesociety’spreferences柯孔林浙江工商大學(xué)金融學(xué)院27Arrow’sProofArrowwasabletoshowthatthesesixconditionsarenotcompatiblewithoneanotherbecauseBPSCandCPJB,itmustbethecasethatBIConeperson’spreferencescannotdominatebothAPSBandAPJB,soAPBtransitivityimpliesthatAPCthiscannotbetruebecauseAPSCbutCPJA柯孔林浙江工商大學(xué)金融學(xué)院28Significanceofthe
ArrowTheoremIngeneral,Arrow’sresultappearstoberobusttoevenmodestchangesinthesetofbasicpostulatesThus,economistshavemovedawayfromthenormativequestionofhowchoicescanbemadeinasociallyoptimalwayandhavefocusedonthepositiveanalysisofhowsocialchoicesareactuallymade柯孔林浙江工商大學(xué)金融學(xué)院29DirectVotingVotingisusedasasocialdecisionprocessinmanyinstitutionsdirectvotingisusedinmanycasesfromstatewidereferendatosmallergroupsandclubsinothercases,societieshavefounditmoreconvenienttousearepresentativeformofgovernment柯孔林浙江工商大學(xué)金融學(xué)院30MajorityRuleThroughoutourdiscussionofvoting,wewillassumethatdecisionswillbemadebymajorityrulethereisnothingparticularlysacredaboutarulerequiringthatapolicyobtain50percentofthevotetobeadopted柯孔林浙江工商大學(xué)金融學(xué)院31TheParadoxofVotingInthe1780s,socialtheoristM.deCondorcetnotedthatmajorityrulevotingsystemsmaynotarriveatanequilibriuminstead,theymaycycleamongalternativeoptions柯孔林浙江工商大學(xué)金融學(xué)院32TheParadoxofVotingSupposetherearethreevoters(Smith,Jones,andFudd)choosingamongthreepolicyoptionswecanassumethatthesepolicyoptionsrepresentthreelevelsofspendingonaparticularpublicgood[(A)low,(B)medium,and(C)high]Condorcet’sparadoxwouldariseevenwithoutthisordering柯孔林浙江工商大學(xué)金融學(xué)院33TheParadoxofVotingPreferencesamongthethreepolicyoptionsforthethreevotersare:柯孔林浙江工商大學(xué)金融學(xué)院34TheParadoxofVotingConsideravotebetweenAandBAwouldwinInavotebetweenAandCCwouldwinInavotebetweenBandCBwouldwinNoequilibriumwilleverbereached柯孔林浙江工商大學(xué)金融學(xué)院35Single-PeakedPreferencesEquilibriumvotingesalwaysoccurincaseswheretheissuebeingvoteduponisone-dimensionalandwherevoterpreferencesare“single-peaked”柯孔林浙江工商大學(xué)金融學(xué)院36Single-PeakedPreferencesQuantityofpublicgoodUtilityABC
SmithWecanshoweachvoterspreferencesintermsofutilitylevels
Jones
FuddForSmithandJones,preferencesaresingle-peakedFudd’spreferenceshavetwolocalmaxima柯孔林浙江工商大學(xué)金融學(xué)院37Single-PeakedPreferencesQuantityofpublicgoodUtilityABC
Smith
JonesOptionBwillbechosenbecauseitwilldefeatbothAandCbyvotes2to1IfFuddhadalternativepreferenceswithasinglepeak,therewouldbenoparadox
Fudd柯孔林浙江工商大學(xué)金融學(xué)院38TheMedianVoterTheoremWiththealteredpreferencesofFudd,Bwillbechosenbecauseitisthepreferredchoiceofthemedianvoter(Jones)Jones’spreferencesarebetweenthepreferencesofSmithandtherevisedpreferencesofFudd柯孔林浙江工商大學(xué)金融學(xué)院39TheMedianVoterTheoremIfchoicesareunidimensionalandpreferencesaresingle-peaked,majorityrulewillresultintheselectionoftheprojectthatismostfavoredbythemedianvoterthatvoter’spreferenceswilldeterminewhatpublicchoicesaremade柯孔林浙江工商大學(xué)金融學(xué)院40ASimplePoliticalModelSupposeacommunityischaracterizedbyalargenumberofvoters(n)eachwitheofyiTheutilityofeachvoterdependsonhisconsumptionofaprivategood(ci)andofapublicgood(g)accordingtoutilityofpersoni=Ui=ci+f(g)wherefg>0andfgg<0柯孔林浙江工商大學(xué)金融學(xué)院41ASimplePoliticalModelEachvotermustpaytaxestofinancegTaxesareproportionaltoeandareimposedatarateoftEachperson’sbudgetconstraintisci=(1-t)yiThegovernmentalsofacesabudgetconstraint柯孔林浙江工商大學(xué)金融學(xué)院42ASimplePoliticalModelGiventheseconstraints,theutilityfunctionofindividualiisUi(g)=[yA-(g/n)]yi/yA+f(g)UtilitymaximizationoccurswhendUi/dg=-yi/(nyA)+fg(g)=0g=fg-1[yi/(nyA)]Desiredspendingongisinverselyrelatedtoe柯孔林浙江工商大學(xué)金融學(xué)院43ASimplePoliticalModelIfGisdeterminedthroughmajorityrule,itslevelwillbethatlevelfavoredbythemedianvotersincevoters’preferencesaredeterminedsolelybye,gwillbesetatthelevelpreferredbythevoterwiththemedianlevelofe(ym)g*=fg-1[ym/(nyA)]=fg-1[(1/n)(ym/yA)]柯孔林浙江工商大學(xué)金融學(xué)院44ASimplePoliticalModelUnderautilitariansocialwelfarecriterion,gwouldbechosensoastomaximizethesumofutilities:Theoptimalchoiceforgthenisg*=fg-1(1/n)=fg-1[(1/n)(yA/yA)]thelevelofgfavoredbythevoterwithaveragee柯孔林浙江工商大學(xué)金融學(xué)院45VotingforRedistributiveTaxationSupposevotersareconsideringalump-sumtransfertobepaidtoeverypersonandfinancedthroughproportionaltaxationIfwedenotetheper-persontransferb,eachindividual’sutilityisnowgivenbyUi=ci+b柯孔林浙江工商大學(xué)金融學(xué)院46VotingforRedistributiveTaxationThegovernment’sbudgetconstraintisnb=tnyAb=tyAForavoterwithyi>yA,utilityismaximizedbychoosingb=0Anyvoterwithyi<yAwillchooset=1andb=yAwouldfullyequalizees柯孔林浙江工商大學(xué)金融學(xué)院47VotingforRedistributiveTaxationNotethata100percenttaxratewouldloweraverageeAssumethateachindividual’sehastwocomponents,oneresponsivetotaxrates[yi(t)]andonenotresponsive(ni)alsoassumethattheaverageofniiszero,butitsdistributionisskewedrightsonm<0柯孔林浙江工商大學(xué)金融學(xué)院48VotingforRedistributiveTaxationNow,utilityisgivenbyUi=(1-t)[yi(t)+ni]+bTheindividual’sfirst-orderconditionforamaximuminhischoiceoftandgisnowdUi/dt=-ni+t(dyA/dt)=0ti=ni/(dyA/dt)Undermajorityrule,theequilibriumconditionwillbet*=nm/(dyA/dt)柯孔林浙江工商大學(xué)金融學(xué)院49RepresentativeGovernmentInrepresentativegovernments,peoplevoteforcandidates,notpoliciesPoliticians’policypreferencesareaffectedbyavarietyoffactorstheirperceptionsofwhattheirconstituentswanttheirviewofthe“publicgood”theforcefulnessof“specialinterests”theirdesireforreelection柯孔林浙江工商大學(xué)金融學(xué)院50ProbabilisticVotingAssumethereareonlytwocandidatesforapoliticalofficeeachcandidiateannounceshisplatform(
1and2)alsoassumethatthecandidate,onceelected,willactuallyseektoimplementtheplatformhehasstatedEachofthenvotersobservethetwoplatformsandchoosehowtovote柯孔林浙江工商大學(xué)金融學(xué)院51ProbabilisticVotingTheprobabilitythatvoteriwillvoteforcandidate1is
i=fi[Ui(1)-Ui(2)]wheref’>0andUi(j)istheutilitythatvoteriexpectstoreceivefromplatformjTheprobabilitythatvoteriwillvoteforcandidate1is1-
i柯孔林浙江工商大學(xué)金融學(xué)院52TheCandidateGameCandidate1chooses
1tomaximizetheprobabilityofhiselectionCandidate2chooses
2tomaximizehisexpectedvotes柯孔林浙江工商大學(xué)金融學(xué)院53TheCandidateGameOurvotinggameisazero-sumgamewithcontinuousstrategies(
1and2)Thus,thisgamewillhaveaNashequilibriumsetofstrategiesforwhichEV1(1,2*)EV1(1*,2*)EV1(1*,2)
Candidate1doesbestagainst2*bychoosing1*Candidate2doesbestagainst1*bychoosing2*柯孔林浙江工商大學(xué)金融學(xué)院54NetValuePlatformsA“netvalue”platformisoneunderwhichacandidatepromisesauniquedollarbenefittoeachvoterSupposecandidate1promisesanetdollarbenefitof
1itoeachvoterThecandidateisboundbyagovernmentbudgetconstraint:柯孔林浙江工商大學(xué)金融學(xué)院55NetValuePlatformsThecandidates’goalistochoose
1ithatmaximizesEV1against2*SettinguptheLagrangianyields柯孔林浙江工商大學(xué)金融學(xué)院56NetValuePlatformsThefirst-orderconditionforthenetbenefitpromisedtovoteriisgivenbyL/1i=fi’Ui’+=0Ifthefunctionfiisthesameforallvoters,thismeansthatthecandidateshouldchoose1isothatUi’isthesameforallvotersautilitariane柯孔林浙江工商大學(xué)金融學(xué)院57Rent-SeekingBehaviorElectedpoliticiansperformtheroleofagentschoosepoliciesfavoredbyprincipals(voters)Aperfectagentwouldchoosepoliciesthatthefullyinformedmedianvoterwouldchoosearepoliticianssoselfless?柯孔林浙江工商大學(xué)金融學(xué)院58Rent-SeekingBehaviorPoliticiansmightengageinrent-seekingactivitiesactivitiest
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