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PEP2040:Progress

ordisappointment?PolandcoulddoublerenewablesambitionandhalvegasexpansioninitsupcomingPEP2040energystrategy.Publisheddate:6.02.2023Leadauthors:DrPawe?Czy?ak,Aleksander?niegockiOtherauthors:Zo?aWetmańska1ContentsExecutivesummaryPoland’snewenergystrategyPolandcurrentplansputitatriskofbeingthelastEUeconomybasedonfossilfuelsPolandcoulddeliverdoubleitsrenewablesambitionAnactionplanforrenewablesdeploymentisnecessaryPrioritisingrenewablesmakesthecoalvsgasdebateobsoleteConclusionAboutArevisionofthePolishenergystrategyto

2040(PEP2040)wasannouncedinMarch2022,predominantlyto

addressenergysecurityconcerns.

Thisreportanalysesthegovernment’sdraftplansforrenewableenergyexpansion,showingthattheyaresigni?cantlyunder-ambitious.

ThelowshareofrenewablesputsPolandonapathto

beingthelastEUeconomyproducingthemajorityofitspowerfromfossilfuelsby2030,endangeringthecountry’ssecurityandprosperity.Highlights22GW

1/2

100GWPolandreached22GWof

Polandrequiresonlyhalfits

Polandcouldreach100GWrenewablecapacityin2022,

plannedgas-?redelectricity

ofrenewablescapacitybymeetingthe2030governmenttargeteightyearsearlygenerationto

cover2030powerdemand2040,doublethetargetproposedbythegovernment2ExecutiveSummaryWillPolandtaketheopportunitytostepupitsrenewablestargets?ThePolishgovernmenthasachanceto

setnew,

ambitioustargetsfollowingadisappointingenergystrategylaunchedin2021.Willitseizetheopportunity?ArevisionofthePolishenergystrategy,

PEP2040,isaboutto

bepublished.Draftassumptions

werepublishedin2022,butthesefailedto

addressbothenergysecurityandclimateconcerns.Underthisproposedpath,by2030PolandwillbethelastEUeconomyproducingthemajorityofitspowerfromfossilfuels.Arevisedplanto

insteadrapidlyexpandrenewableswouldavoidthe

negativeconsequencesofcontinuedfossilfuelreliancethatposesrisksto

energysecurity,pricesandthecompetitivenessofPoland’seconomy.01Polandcoulddeliverdoubletherenewablesby

2040comparedtocurrentambitionRecentstudiesshowthatPolandcouldaimfor100GWofrenewablescapacitywithoutexceedinghistoricaltrends.

Thedraftenergypolicyassumptionsproposeonlya50%shareofrenewablesinthepowersectorin2040,resultinginaround50-60GWofcapacityby2040.

By2040,thePolishpowersectorwillneedto

achievemorethan90%emissionreductionscomparedto

2015,signi?cantlymorethanthecurrentlyplanned58%.30203PolandrisksbeingthelastEUeconomybasedonfossilfuelsBythe2030s,mostcountriesintheEUwillgetthevastmajorityoftheirelectricityfromcleanenergysources,withthewholeEUaimingforanet-zeropowersystemby2040.AsitstandsPolandwillbethelastmajorEUeconomygeneratingover50%ofitselectricityfromcoalandgas(alongsideMalta,amuchsmallereconomywithminorpowerdemand).WiththisPolandrisksdependenceonforeignimports,exposureto

volatileprices,highin?ationandvanishingcompetitivenessonglobalmarkets.Expandingrenewablesmakesthecoalvs.gasdebateobsoleteTheenergypolicydebateinPolandisfocusedonchoosingbetweentwocostlyoptions:extendingoperationsofcoalplantsorreplacingthemwithnewgasplants.Instead,thefocusshouldbeonensuringtherapiddeploymentofwindandsolar,

whichwillpermanentlyreducecostsfromfossilfuelsastheroleofcoalandgasbecomeslimitedto

reservecapacities.

To

unlockthatgrowth,Polandwillneedto

addressbarriersinpermittingandgriddevelopment.To

deliveroncommitmentsto

increaseenergysecurity,thePolishgovernmentneedstosubstantiallyincreaserenewablesambition,enableconditionsforrapidrenewablesdeploymentandreducegasexpansionplans.Forthesegoals,thenewPEP2040documentshouldaimforabove50%ofrenewableelectricitygenerationby2030aswellas100GWofrenewablescapacityandanetzeropowersystemby2040.4RapidlyincreasingrenewableelectricityproductioninPolandistheonlywayoutofthefossilfuelcrisis.Withoutastrongpushto

removeformalandinfrastructuralbarriersto

windandsolarinvestments,wewillbelockedinfutiledebatesonwhichfossilfuelislessharmfulforPolishcompetitivenessandsecurity.Aleksander?niegockiCEOReformInstitute5Poland’s

newenergystrategyPolandcurrentplansputitatriskofbeingthelastEUeconomybasedonfossilfuelsPolandisamongthelastEuropeancountriesthathavenotsigni?cantlyaccelerateddeploymentofrenewablesfollowingRussia’s

invasionofUkraine.

Thisposesathreatto

thecountry’ssecurity.

Thelastyearhasillustratedhowrelianceoncoalandgasforpowerleavescountriesvulnerableto

volatilepricesandshortagesoffossilfuels.6Withoutfurtheractionfromthegovernmentto

removebarriersholdingbackinvestmentsintorenewables,PolandwillbetheonlycountryintheEUotherthanMaltageneratingabove50%ofitselectricityfromfossilfuelsin2030,withothercountriesaimingfor65-100%cleanpowerandanetzeropowersectorby2040atthelatest.Underthedraftplan,Polandwillgeneratebetween32-50%ofpowerfromcleansourcesby2030.Accordingto

EUclimatelaw,

greenhousegasemissionsintheEUshoulddropby55%by2030comparedto

1990.

ThiswillmeanthatEUpowersectoremissionsshouldbereducedby69-76%comparedto2015;andtheshareofrenewablesinelectricityproductionshouldreachatleast65-66%

andupto

69%

accordingto

theEuropeanCommission’sRePowerEUproposal.By2040,theEUshouldachievea96%

reductioninpowersectoremissionscomparedto

2015,essentiallyrequiringanetzeropowersystemacrossallMemberStatesbythattime.PowersystemmodelsinlinewithEUemissionsreductiontargetsshowPolandachievinganearlynetzeropowersystemby2040,withemissionsreductionsof90%ormorecomparedto

2015.

Thisstandsincontrastto

thecurrentPEP2040thatreachesonly58%emissionsreductionsoverthesameperiod.7Maintaininghighemissionsandanexcessiverelianceonfossilenergyinthe2030swillcontinueto

exposePolandto

coal,gasandoilpricevolatilityandsupplydisruptionrisks.Inturn,thisisathreatto

Poland’seconomy.Alongsidehighenergypricesputtingpressureondomesticcompaniesandinvestmentdecisions,manybusinessesarealreadydemandinggreenenergy

to

delivertheirowndecarbonisationplans.

Thistrendwillonlyaccelerate,andbytheearly2030smostcompanieswillbeunableorunwillingto

locatenewinvestmentsinPolandasneighbouringcountriesprovidecheaperandcleanerpower.PolandcoulddeliverdoubleitsrenewablesambitionThePolishgovernmentisdueto

publishanupdatetothenationalenergystrategy,PEP2040.ThecurrentversionofPEP2040publishedin2021fallsshortofmappingoutanenergypathwaythatmeetsclimatetargetsandensuresPoland’senergysecurity,withunambitiousrenewablestargets,andthelargestincreaseofgasinpowerintheEU.8Consideringthecurrentgeopoliticallandscape,includingRussia’s

halttogasexports

andcontinuedglobalgaspriceandsupplyvolatility,swappingtheproposedgasexpansionwithmorerenewablesambitionwillhelpPolandensureastableandsecureelectricitysystem.ThePEP2040draftassumptionspublishedlastyearonlyincreasetherenewablesshareinpowergenerationfrom40%to

50%by2040.

Thiswouldmeanaimingforjust50-60GWofrenewablesin2040.Evenaccordingtoo?cials,thisnumbercouldbeachievedby2030anddoubledby2040withoutexceedinghistoricaldeploymentlevels.

Thecurrent2040targetisjust28.7GW.

Thiswillmostlikelybemetin2023.9Instead,

Poland

could

realistically

plan

to

reach

100

GW

of

renewable

capacity

by

2040.According

to

think-tank

Instrat,

if

policy

barriers

are

lifted

and

grids

are

modernised,

a

100GW

renewables

capacityin2040ispossible,with36GWofonshorewind,18GWofoffshorewind,

44GWofsolarPVandtheexistinghydroandbioenergycapacityofaround1GWeach.Similar

results

were

achieved

in

Ember’s

New

Generation

modelling

in

2022,

with

therenewables

capacity

reaching

103

GW

in

2040.

Even

more

conservative

pathways

reach

asimilar

conclusion:

a

late

2022

report

from

the

World

Bank

projects88GWofrenewablesin2040,

another

2022

publicationbythegovernmentalCenterforClimateandEnergyAnalysesindicates

84

GW

of

renewables

in

2040

as

optimal

under

the

climate

neutrality

(NEU)scenario,

under

the

assumption

that

nuclear

and

carbon

capture

and

storage

technologieswill

also

be

available

to

complement

the

energymix.Nearing100GWofrenewablecapacityby

2040

is

slowly

becoming

a

consensus

among

institutions

interested

both

in

Poland’seconomic

growth

and

how

to

reduce

emissions.

Poland’s

renewables

capacityexceeded22GW

in

2022,

already

meeting

the

current

PEP2040

target

for

2030,

showing

just

how

lowambitionisinthePolishstrategy.Polandhasfailedto

proposeambitioustargetsforrenewableenergydeploymentinthepast.Withthecountry’s

securityontheline,itisnowtimetostepupandjointhemajorEuropeaneconomiesinbuildingacleanenergybasedfuture.DrPawe?Czy?akSeniorEnergy&ClimateDataAnalyst,EmberPolandiscurrentlytargetinga32%shareofrenewablesinelectricitygeneration

by2030.AmongrecentpowersectortransformationpathwaysforPolandanalysedbyEmberandReformInstitute,theaverageproposedrenewablessharein2030is50%.

Themostambitiouspathwaysaimfor65-71%ofrenewablesindomesticelectricitygenerationin2030,whichisupto

twicewhatwouldbeachievedbytheupdatedPEP2040.Accordingto

theanalysedscenarios,by2040renewablesshouldaccountfor67-83%ofpowergeneration,againdoublingthecurrentPEP2040targetandsigni?cantlyexceedingthe50%proposedintheupdatedPEP2040assumptions.Crucially,thishigherlevelofrenewableenergywouldleadto

lowerhouseholdelectricitytariffs,whilesimultaneouslyincreasingenergysystemsecurity-throughhigherdispatchablecapacityandloweredimports.10AnactionplanforrenewablesdeploymentisnecessaryWhile

fast

renewables

expansion

in

Poland

is

feasible,

it

will

not

happen

without

thegovernment

delivering

enabling

conditions

in

two

areas:

permitting

procedures

and

griddevelopment.A

major

remaining

barrier

is

the

restrictive

spatial

planning

rule

(10H)

which

effectivelyblocks

onshore

wind

potential.

Revisions

are

under

discussion,

but

the

process

of

relaxingthese

rules

is

not

yet

?nalised.

The

last-minute

changes

to

the

wind

law

amendmentintroduced

by

the

Polish

parliament

in

January

2022willreduceitspotentialpositiveimpactby

half,

which

is

yet

another

example

of

the

weakness

of

energy

policy

that

lacks

clearlyde?ned

targets

and

evidence

base.

However,

Poland’s

permitting

challenges

extend

beyondthis.

The

current

length

of

permitting

procedures

does

not

meet

the

24

month

standard

setby

the

2018

EU

renewables

directive,

even

before

accounting

for

the

upcoming

push

to11accelerate

the

process

within

the

REPowerEU

plan.

The

government

has

not

yet

signalledany

intention

to

work

on

this

issue,

which

may

leave

the

renewables

industry

with

too

littletimeto

delivertheprojectsneededfor2030targets.To

harnessthefullpotentialofwindandsolarinPoland,thegovernmentwillneedto

delivertherightconditions.Short-termimprovementsto

thepermittingandgridconnectionprocesscouldimmediatelyunlockcapacity.

And

alongtermenergytransitionplanwouldbeasteptowardspreparingournetworkinfrastructureformassivegrowthincheaprenewables.Aleksander?niegockiCEOReformInstituteAnotherobstacleisPolishgridinfrastructure,whichisrapidlybecomingabottleneckforrenewablesexpansion.

Thevolumeofpotentialrenewableprojectswhichhavebeendeniedgridconnectionisgrowingrapidly,reachingnearly15GWin2021alone.Addressingthisbarrierrequiresmore?exibleandtransparentgridconnection

proceduresaswellasbetterlong-termgridexpansionplanning,whichhaspreviouslyfailedto

anticipatetherenewablesboom.Ensuringthedeliveryof50GWormoreofrenewablesby2030requiresreformstogridmanagement,includingclearrulesforcablepoolinganddirectlineconnectionbetweenrenewableelectricitysuppliersandenergyconsumers.Despitetheurgency,

thegovernmentisproceedingslowlywithanychanges,whicharealsoconsideredinadequate

bytheindustry.RecentstepstakenbytheEUto

addresstheenergycrisisprovidetheperfectleveragefordomesticenergypolicyto

acceleraterenewablesdeployment.InDecember2022,EUinstitutionsagreedtoprovideadditionaldedicatedfunding

to

theMemberStatesto

addressthecrisis.

Thesefundsrequireanupdateto

nationalRecoveryPlanswithanewREPowerEUchapter,whichshouldincludeaconcretelistofreformsandinvestmentsdesignedto

tacklebarriersto

cleaninvestments.EUpoliciesformaclearframeworkwhichbothencouragesandenablesamajorshiftinPolishenergypolicytowardsrenewables.

TheFitfor55planoffersincentives

andtoolsto

delivercleaninvestments.Necessarypermittingandgrid12developmentreformsareagood?tto

beincludedinthePolishREPowerEUchapter.Andmoreambitioustargetswillneedto

beprovidedinPoland’srevisedNationalEnergyandClimatePlans,whicharerequiredin2023to

re?ectnewEuropeantargetsfor2030.PrioritisingrenewablesmakesthecoalvsgasdebateobsoleteWithlimitedrenewablesexpansionplans,thecurrentPEP2040assumesaslowdecreaseincoalsharefromaround70%in2022to

37%in2030(underthehighCO2pricesscenario)andafour-foldincreaseoffossilgas

inpowergenerationby2030.Sincearound87%ofnaturalgascomesfromimports

thisisasigni?cantthreatto

energysecurity,evenifthedependenceonRussiaisreplacedwithothersuppliers.13Atthesametime,revertingto

productionfromcoalpowerplantswillnotsolvetheenergydependenceissue.

Thedomestichardcoalminingcontinuesitslong-termdecline(3.9%dropinproductionin2022

despiterecordprices)andseesasharpincreaseinitsproductioncosts(nearlytripling

in2021-2023forthelargestminingcompany,PGG),whichwillfurtherdeteriorateitscompetitiveness

againstimportsinthecomingyears.Inthissituation,thecontinuedutilisationoffossilfuelplantsisakeysecurityconcern,andrenewablesaretheonlyoptionto

reduceimportdependenceandensurestableeconomicgrowth

inthecomingyears.Whilesomecombinationofcoalandgascapacitieswillbenecessary

to

balancethesysteminthecomingyears,renewablescanhelpminimise

howmuchofthosefuelsisactuallyburned.Asshownbyarecentmodellingstudy,Polandcouldbalanceitspowersystemwith29

TWhofgasgenerationin2030,halfofthe53

TWhassumedinthePEP2040,whilealsolimitingtheshareofcoalelectricityto

12%.

Thus,whilepolicydebatesareinPolandhavefocusedonwhichfossiltechnologyto

chooseintheshorttermto

ensuresu?cientdispatchablecapacitiesinthesystem,thekeypriorityforthePolishEnergyPolicyshouldbeto

ensurerapidrenewablesexpansionsothattheactualfueluseintheseplantsdecreasesrapidly.Theplannedgas?eetexpansionwillhavedireconsequencesforelectricityconsumers.Over10GWofgasplantprojectsarecurrentlyunderdiscussion,with4-5GWalreadyhavingsecuredcapacitycontracts.Withtherecord-highcapacitymarketpricesin2021and2022,theseprojectswillcostbillionsintaxpayermoney,whileproducingveryexpensiveelectricity.Thiswillresultinpowerpriceincreasesby2-4timescomparedto

2021(dependingongasTTFpricesvaryingbetween50-100EUR/MWh),andwillnegativelyimpactthecompetitivenessofPoland’seconomy.14ConclusionPolandneedsamoreambitiousenergystrategyTargets

forrenewablesexpansionintheupcomingPEP2040couldbedoubledwithgaselectricitygenerationhalved,increasingenergysecurityandthecompetitivenessofPoland’s

economy.Poland’senergystrategywaswidelycriticisedforbeingoutdatedandunambitiousatthetimewhenitwaspublished.Anupdateiscoming,givingthegovernmentauniqueopportunityto

stepuprenewablesambitionandwithdrawfromriskygasexpansionplans,answeringthepan-EUcallto

reducefossilfueldependency.Studiesshowthatby2030Polandcouldaimforover50GWofrenewablescapacityanda50%+shareofRESinpowergeneration.By2040,Polandcouldaimfor100GWofrenewables,triplingthecurrentPEP2040targetanddoublingwhatwasannouncedfortheupcomingupdate.WithmostofEurope’s

powersectorsetto

become100%cleaninthe2030s,itisinPoland’sinterestto

decarbonizeasquicklyaspossibleto

avoidthenegativeeconomicandsecurityimplicationsofbeingleftbehind.15SupportingMaterialsMethodologyRecenttrendsinrenewableenergydeploymentSince2018Polandhasbeenexperiencingasolarenergyboom-from1.5GWin2019,thecapacityincreasedto

4GWin2020and12GWin2022,noticingadditionsof2.5-5GWyearly.The10GWmilestonewasmetmid-2022,doublingthe2030goalfromthecurrentPEP2040.Whilea3-4GW/yearPVincreasemightbedi?cultto

sustaindueto

gridconnectionissues,evenkeepingamodest2GW/yearpacewouldmeanreachingaround30GW

ofsolarcapacityby2030andupto

50GWby2040.An

increase

in

ambition

is

also

possible

in

the

onshore

wind

segment.

Due

to

some

of

themost

restrictive

spatial

planning

rules

in

Europe,

onshore

wind

capacity

additions

in

Polandslowed

down

recently

after

a

period

of

strong

growth

between

2010

and

2015,

when

up

to1.2

GW

were

added

per

year.

Removing

the

policy

restrictions

could

open

up

a

potential

of15-18

GW

in

2030

and

over

30

GW

of

onshore

windcapacityby2040.Anamendmentto

thecurrent

onshore

law

is

ready

and

should

be

passedbytheparliamentimmediatelyto

ensureenergysecurity,lowerprices,andcompliancewithclimatetargets.TheareawherethePolishgovernment’sambitiondoesmatchtechnicalandsocialpotentialisoffshorewind,with5.9GWofprojectsalreadyunderwayandexpectedto

bedeployedby2030.Anotherroundofprojectsispreparingforauctionsin2025.Still,thegovernmentestimatesthatthetotaloffshorewindpotentialisaround10GW,

whileananalysisofthemaritimeplanningdocuments,windconditionsandseabeddepthshowsthatover30GWofoffshorewindcould

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