生成式人工智能與未來(lái)的工作+Generative+AI+and+The+Future+of+Work

McKinseyCenterforGovernment

Generative

AIandthe

futureofwork

inAmerica

July2023

Authors

KweilinEllingrud

SaurabhSanghvi

GurneetSinghDandona

AnuMadgavkar

MichaelChui

OliviaWhite

PaigeHasebe

Editor

LisaRenaud

CoverillustrationbyMattMurphy

AbouttheMcKinseyGlobalInstitute

TheMcKinseyGlobalInstitutewasestablishedin1990.Ourmissionistoprovideafactbaseto

aiddecisionmakingontheeconomicandbusinessissuesmostcriticaltotheworld’scompaniesandpolicyleaders.WebenefitfromthefullrangeofMcKinsey’sregional,sectoral,andfunctionalknowledge,skills,andexpertise,buteditorialdirectionanddecisionsaresolelytheresponsibilityofMGIdirectorsandpartners.

Ourresearchisgroupedintofivemajorthemes:

—Productivityandprosperity:Creatingandharnessingtheworld’sassetsmostproductively

—Resourcesoftheworld:Building,powering,andfeedingtheworldsustainably

—Humanpotential:Maximizingandachievingthepotentialofhumantalent

—Globalconnections:Exploringhowflowsofgoods,people,andideasshapeeconomies

—Technologiesandmarketsofthefuture:Discussingthenextbigarenasofvalueandcompetition

Weaimforindependentandfact-basedresearch.Noneofourworkiscommissionedorpaidforbyanybusiness,government,orotherinstitution;weshareourresultspubliclyfreeofcharge;

andweareentirelyfundedbythepartnersofMcKinsey.Whileweengagemultipledistinguishedexternaladviserstocontributetoourwork,theanalysespresentedinourpublicationsareMGI’salone,andanyerrorsareourown.

YoucanfindoutmoreaboutMGIandourresearchat/mgi.

MGIDirectors

MGIPartners

SvenSmit(chair)

MarcoPiccitto

MichaelChui

JanMischke

ChrisBradley

OliviaWhite

MekalaKrishnan

JeongminSeong

KweilinEllingrud

JonathanWoetzel

AnuMadgavkar

TilmanTacke

AbouttheMcKinseyCenter

forGovernment

Withitsindependentandanalyticalapproach,theMcKinseyCenterforGovernment(MCG)isadedicatedcenterofexcellencethathelpsgovernmentleadersdeliverbetteroutcomesandexperiencesfortheirpeople.

Backedbyanetworkofglobalexperts,MCGworksalongsidemanyoftheworld’sleadingpublicsectorstakeholdersandorganizationstoenablethemtooperateatthehighestlevel.

?EloiOmella/Getty

Contents

Ataglanceiv

Executivesummary1

Introduction13

1.Arobustrecoverymarkedbyjobswitching

andlaborshortages15

2.Jobgainsandlossesthrough203023

3.Newforceschanginglabordemand:

GenerativeAIandfederalinvestment31

4.Who’svulnerable?43

5.Preparingforthefutureofwork53

Methodologybrief63

Acknowledgments67

Ataglance

—Duringthepandemic(2019–22),theUSlabormarketsaw8.6millionoccupationalshifts,50percentmorethaninthepreviousthree-yearperiod.Mostinvolvedpeopleleavingfoodservices,in-personsales,andofficesupportfordifferentoccupations.

—By2030,activitiesthataccountforupto30percentofhourscurrentlyworkedacross

theUSeconomycouldbeautomated—atrendacceleratedbygenerativeAI.However,weseegenerativeAIenhancingthewaySTEM,creative,andbusinessandlegalprofessionals

workratherthaneliminatingasignificantnumberofjobsoutright.Automation’sbiggesteffectsarelikelytohitotherjobcategories.Officesupport,customerservice,andfoodserviceemploymentcouldcontinuetodecline.

—Federalinvestmenttoaddressclimateandinfrastructure,aswellasstructuralshifts,willalsoalterlabordemand.Thenet-zerotransitionwillshiftemploymentawayfrom

oil,gas,andautomotivemanufacturingandintogreenindustriesforamodestnetgainin

employment.Infrastructureprojectswillincreasedemandinconstruction,whichisalready

shortalmost400,000workerstoday.Wealsoseeincreaseddemandforhealthcareworkersasthepopulationages,plusgainsintransportationservicesduetoe-commerce.

—Anadditional12millionoccupationaltransitionsmaybeneededby2030.Aspeople

leaveshrinkingoccupations,theeconomycouldreweighttowardhigher-wagejobs.Workersinlower-wagejobsareupto14timesmorelikelytoneedtochangeoccupationsthanthoseinhighest-wagepositions,andmostwillneedadditionalskillstodososuccessfully.Womenare1.5timesmorelikelytoneedtomoveintonewoccupationsthanmen.

—TheUnitedStateswillneedworkforcedevelopmentonafarlargerscaleaswellas

moreexpansivehiringapproachesfromemployers.Employerswillneedtohireforskillsandcompetenciesratherthancredentials,recruitfromoverlookedpopulations(suchas

ruralworkersandpeoplewithdisabilities),anddelivertrainingthatkeepspacewiththeirevolvingneeds.

McKinseyGlobalInstitute|GenerativeAIandthefutureofworkinAmericaiv

+17%9.9Mjobs

Stalledbutrisingoccupations2

+7%2.8Mjobs

–10%–6.0Mjobs

Hitanddecliningoccupations3

Weexpectanadditional12millionoccupationaltransitionsthrough2030.

USjobgrowth,index(0=2016levels)

Resilientandgrowing

occupations1

2016

2019

2022

2030

40

30

20

10

0

–10

Growth

trajectorydrivenby

Projected

transitions?tonew

occupations,?2022–30

?Healthcaredemandincreaseasthepopulationages

?Thepushtowarddigitizationandtechnology

?Demandforlast-miledelivery

1M

Froma

resilientandgrowing

occupationtoanyotheroccupation

?Investmentsin

infrastructureandthenet-zerotransition

?Demandforreskillingandlifelonglearning

?Automationadoption

?Sustainede-commercetrend

?Reducedneedfor

customer-facingroles

1M

10M

Occupationalcategories

withineachproile

Occupationswhere

generativeAI

couldaccelerateautomation

signiicantly

36%ofUSworkersin2022:

?Healthprofessionals

?Healthaides,technicians,andwellness

?STEMprofessionals

?Managers

?Transportationservices

?Businessandlegal

professionals

25%ofworkers:

?Builders

?Creativesandartsmanagement

?Propertymaintenance

?Mechanicalinstallationandrepair

?Communityservices

?Educationandworkforce

training

?Agriculture

39%ofworkers:

?Productionwork

?Foodservices

?Customerserviceandsales

?Oicesupport

1Resilientduringthepandemic,2019–22,andexpectedtogrowbetween2022and2030.

2Stalledduringthepandemic,2019–22,andexpectedtorisebetween2022and2030.

3Hitduringthepandemic,2019–22,andcontinuingtodeclinebetween2022and2030.

4Jobtransitionsaredeinedasjobsinnetdecliningoccupationsacrosssectorscomparedwiththe2030baseline.

5Evenincategoriesthataregrowingoverall,employmentmaydecreaseinspeciicoccupations,requiringsomeworkerstoindnewroles.Source:O*NET;USBureauofLaborStatistics;CurrentPopulationSurvey,USCensusBureau;McKinseyGlobalInstituteanalysis

McKinseyGlobalInstitute|GenerativeAIandthefutureofworkinAmericav

?NitatTermmee/Getty

Executivesummary

TheUSlabormarketisgoingthrougharapidevolutioninthewaypeopleworkandthework

peopledo.MonthsafterMGIreleaseditslastreportonthefutureofworkinAmerica,theworldfounditselfbattlingaglobalpandemic.1Sincethen,theUSjobmarkethascomeroaringback

fromitssuddendrop.Thenatureofworkhaschangedasmanyworkershavestuckwithremoteorhybridmodelsandemployershavespeduptheiradoptionofautomationtechnologies.Morerecently,theaccelerateddevelopmentofgenerativeAI,withitsadvancednaturallanguage

capabilities,hasextendedthepossibilitiesforautomationtoamuchwidersetofoccupations.

Amidthisdisruption,workerschangedjobsataremarkablepace—andasubsetmadebiggerleapsandmovedintoentirelydifferentoccupations.Some8.6millionoccupationalshiftstookplacefrom2019through2022.Nowevenmorechangeisinstore.Weexpectanadditional

12millionoccupationalshiftsby2030.Thetotalnumberoftransitionsthrough2030couldbe25percenthigherthanweprojectedalittleovertwoyearsago.2

Multipleforcesaresettofuelgrowthincertainoccupationsanderodejobsinothers.They

generallyfallintothreecategories:automation,includinggenerativeAI;aninjectionoffederal

investmentintoinfrastructureandthenet-zerotransition;andlong-termstructuraltrendssuchasaging,continuinginvestmentintechnology,andthegrowthofe-commerceandremotework.Wedonotforecasthowaggregatedemploymentmaybeaffectedbythebusinesscycleinthe

shortterm;instead,wefocusonhowtheseforcesmayreshapethecompositionoflabordemandoverthelongterm.

Acrossamajorityofoccupations(employing75percentoftheworkforce),thepandemic

acceleratedtrendsthatcouldpersistthroughtheendofthedecade.Occupationsthattookahitduringthedownturnarelikelytocontinueshrinkingovertime.Theseincludecustomer-facing

rolesaffectedbytheshifttoe-commerceandofficesupportrolesthatcouldbeeliminated

eitherbyautomationorbyfewerpeoplecomingintophysicaloffices.Declinesinfoodservices,customerserviceandsales,officesupport,andproductionworkcouldaccountforalmost

tenmillion(morethan84percent)ofthe12millionoccupationalshiftsexpectedby2030.

Multipleforcesaresettofuelgrowthincertainoccupationsanderodejobsinothers.

1ThefutureofworkinAmerica:Peopleandplaces,todayandtomorrow,McKinseyGlobalInstitute,July2019.2ThefutureofworkafterCOVID-19,McKinseyGlobalInstitute,February2021.

McKinseyGlobalInstitute|GenerativeAIandthefutureofworkinAmerica1

Bycontrast,occupationsinbusinessandlegalprofessions,management,healthcare,

transportation,andSTEMwereresilientduringthepandemicandarepoisedforcontinuedgrowth.Thesecategoriesareexpectedtoseefewerthanonemillionoccupationalshifts

by2030.

Fortheothercategoriesthataccountfortheremainingonemillionoccupationalshiftsstillto

come,thepandemicwasatemporaryheadwind.Employmentinfieldslikeeducationandtrainingshouldriseintheyearsaheadamidacontinuousneedforearlyeducationandlifelonglearning.

Demandforconstructionworkersalsostalledduringtheheightofthepandemicbutisexpectedtoreboundstrongly.

Thechangesestimatedinourearlierresearcharehappeningevenfasterandonanevenbiggerscalethanexpected.Itisbecomingevenmoreurgenttosolveoccupationalandgeographic

mismatchesandconnectworkerswiththetrainingtheyneedtolandjobswithbetterprospects.Thefactthatworkershavebeenwillingtopivotandchangecareerpaths,whileatighterlabor

marketencouragedcompaniestohirefrombroaderapplicantpools,givescauseforoptimism—butnotcomplacency.Thefutureofworkisalreadyhere,andit’smovingfast.

Inatighterlabormarket,workershavebeenmoving

intonewroles,acceleratingoccupationalshifts

Bytheendof2022,employmenthadbouncedbacktoits2019level.Butagreatdealwasinflux.

Arepandemic-eralaborshortagesheretostay?

Thequitsratesoaredtonewheightsduringthepandemic,withroughly48millionAmericans

leavingtheirjobsin2021and51millionin2022.Whatpeopledidnextisnotfullyevidentfrom

thedata.Somemovedintobetterjobswithhigherpay.Othersleftthelaborforce,whetheroutofdiscouragementorforpersonalorhealthreasons,anditisuncleariforwhentheywillreturn.

Totalemploymenthitanall-timehighafterthepandemic,withmanyemployersencountering

hiringdifficulties.AsofApril2023,sometenmillionpositionsremainedvacant;laborforce

participationhadtickedupbutwas0.7percentagepointbelowitsprepandemiclevel.That

translatesintoroughly1.9millionworkerswhoareneitheremployednoractivelylookingforjobs.Thiserosioncomesafteranextended20-yeartrendofsteadilyfallingparticipation.

Laborsupplymaycontinuetobeconstrained,giventhatoneinfourAmericanswillbeof

retirementageorolderby2030.Withouthigherparticipationrates,increasedimmigration,ormeaningfulproductivitygrowth,laborshortagescouldbealastingissueastheeconomyandthepopulationgrow.Thisremainsanopenquestionconfrontingmarkets,economists,andemployers.

Workershaveshownawillingness

tochangecareerpaths,whileatighterlabormarkethas

encouragedcompaniestohirefrombroaderapplicantpools.

McKinseyGlobalInstitute|GenerativeAIandthefutureofworkinAmerica2

>75%low-wagejobs

>75%workerswithoutcollegedegree

Resilient

andgrowing

Hitand

declining

occupations

occupations

ResilientduringCOVID-19andcontinuingtogrow

93K

Nursingassistants

5

Business

andlegal

professionals

87K

HitduringCOVID-19andcontinuingto

decline

Recreationworkers

85K

Childcareworkers

legalprofessionals(600K)

Businessand

STEM

professionals

14

<25%low-wagejobs

25–50%workerswithoutcollegedegree

5

total

~8.6M

occupationalshifts

110K100K

38K

Projectmanagementspecialists

Salesrepresentatives

Businessoperationsspecialists

7Others

STEMprofessionals(400K)

<25%low-wagejobs

25–50%workerswithoutcollegedegree

50%fasterrateofchange

thaninprevious3years

Educators

4

Computersystemsanalysts

Computerprogrammers

Electricalandelectronicengineeringtechnologistsandtechnicians

66K56K

21K

Builders

Communityservices

Others(600K)

<25%low-wagejobs

25–50%workerswithoutcollegedegree

Stalled

butrising

occupations

62K

35K

LighttruckdriversBusdrivers,transit

andintercity

StalledduringCOVID-19butstartingtorise

Schoolpsychologists

25K

Healthaides

Food

services

8

16

6

Customer

serviceand15

sales

3

7

10

Others

Production

work

Oice

support

ExhibitE1

Foodservices(1.3M)

>75%low-wagejobs

>75%workerswithoutcollegedegree

Numberofshifts

Top3occupationsover2019–22

Fastfoodandcounterworkers

529K

Waitersandwaitresses

397K

96K

Cooks

Customerserviceandsales(1.3M)

>75%low-wagejobs

>75%workerswithoutcollegedegree

Retailsalespersons447K

158K

Cashiers

96K

Hairdressers,hairstylists,

andcosmetologists

Omcesupport(1.2M)

>75%low-wagejobs

>70%workerswithoutcollegedegree

Oiceclerks,general443K

Secretariesandadministrative96K

assistants

70K

First-linesupervisorsofoiceandadministrativesupportworkers

Productionwork(900K)

>75%low-wagejobs

>75%workerswithoutcollegedegree

126K

Laborersandfreight,stock,

andmaterialmovers

Productionhelpers68K

66K

Machinists

Morethan50percentofrecentoccupationalshiftsintheUnitedStatesinvolvedworkers

leavingrolesinfoodservices,customerservice,omcesupport,andproduction.

Estimatedshiftstoanotheroccupation,

(XX)—Numberofoccupationalshiftsineachoccupationalcategory,2019–22

Healthaides,technicians,

andwellness(700K)

bycategory,12019–22,%

Othercategoriesincludehealthprofessionals,managers,andtransportationservices.

Educationandworkforcetraining(400K)Builders(300K)Communityservices(300K)Others(600K)

Note:Figuresmaynotsumto100%,duetorounding.

1“Occupationalshifts”referstonetdeclinesinemploymentinspeciicoccupations

between2019and2022.However,wedonotknowexactlyhowindividualsmovedfrom

oneoccupationtoanotheroriftheymademultiplemoves;forthatreason,werefertothenumberofoccupationalshiftsratherthanspecifyingthenumberofworkersmakingthosechanges.

Source:O*NET;USBureauofLaborStatistics;CurrentPopulationSurvey,USCensus

Bureau;McKinseyGlobalInstituteanalysis

25–50%low-wagejobs

<25%workerswithoutcollegedegree

Substituteteachers154K

81K

Tutors

25K

Preschoolteachers

25–50%low-wagejobs

>75%workerswithoutcollegedegree

40K

Carpenters

Painters,constructionandmaintenance25K

Drywallandceilingtileinstallers14K

25–50%low-wagejobs

50–75%workerswithoutcollegedegree

Correctionaloicersandjailers65K

36K

Lifeguards,skipatrol,and

otherrecreationalprotective

serviceworkers

Rehabilitationcounselors25K

50–75%low-wagejobs

>75%workerswithoutcollegedegree

Maidsandhousekeepingcleaners134K

26K

Coachesandscouts

Computer,automatedteller,23K

andoicemachinerepairers

Othercategoriesincludeagriculture,creativesandartmanagement,mechanicalinstallationandrepair,andpropertymaintenance.

McKinseyGlobalInstitute|GenerativeAIandthefutureofworkinAmerica3

TheGreatAttritionobscureddeepershifts

Whilemostattentionwasfocusedonsoaringquitsratesduringthepandemic,somethingmorestructuralwasalsooccurring.Asubsetofpeopledidmorethanchangeemployers;theymovedintodifferentoccupationsaltogether.Basedonnetincreasesanddecreasesinemployment,

some8.6millionoccupationalshiftstookplacefrom2019through2022—50percentmorethaninthepreviousthree-yearperiod(ExhibitE1).3Whileitisimpossibletotraceindividualmoves,

manypeoplelefttheirpreviousrolesandlandedbetter-payingjobsinotheroccupations.

Themajorityoftheseshiftscamefrompeopleleavingjobsinfoodservices,customerserviceandsales,officesupport,andproductionwork(suchasmanufacturing).Atthesametime,managerialandprofessionalrolesplustransportationservicescollectivelyaddedclosetofourmillionjobs

from2019to2022.Ourpreviousresearchhadanticipatedthesetypesofchangesoveralongertimeframe,butthepandemicsuddenlyacceleratedmatters.Thepastfewyearshavebeena

previewoftrendsweexpecttocontinuethroughtheendofthedecade.

Morehigh-wagejobs—andfewerworkerstakinglower-wageservicejobs

Overallemploymentinlow-andmiddle-wageoccupationshasfallenfromprepandemiclevels,

whileoccupationsthatpaymorethan$57,000annuallyaddedabout3.5millionjobs.However,itisunclearhowmanyhigher-payingroleswerefilledbypeoplewhomovedupandhowmanywerefilledbynewentrantstothelaborforce.Meanwhile,thenumberoflower-wagejobopeningshasnotdeclined.Demandforlower-wageserviceworkremains,butfewerworkersareaccepting

theseroles.

WhatisclearfromthejobswitchingandoccupationalshiftsofthepastthreeyearsisthattheUSlabormarketaccommodatedahigherlevelofdynamicmovement.Spikingdemandand

laborscarcityforcedmanyemployerstoconsidernontraditionalcandidateswithpotentialandtrainthemiftheylackeddirectexperience.Whilethismaynotholdinthefuture,employersandworkersalikecandrawonwhattheyhavelearnedaboutthepotentialforpeopletomakequickpivotsandaddnewskills.

Automationandotherforceswillcontinuetoreshapethelabormarket

Automation,fromindustrialrobotstoautomateddocumentprocessingsystems,continuestobethebiggestfactorinchangingthedemandforvariousoccupations.GenerativeAIisbothacceleratingautomationandextendingittoanentirelynewsetofoccupations.Whilethis

technologyisadvancingrapidly,otherforcesarealsoaffectinglabordemand.Overall,weexpectsignificantshiftsintheoccupationalmixintheUnitedStatesthroughtheendofthedecade.

TheeffectsofautomationandgenerativeAI

AutomationhastakenaleapforwardwiththerecentintroductionofgenerativeAItools.

“Generative”referstothefactthatthesetoolscanidentifypatternsacrossenormoussetsofdataandgeneratenewcontent—anabilitythathasoftenbeenconsidereduniquelyhuman.Theirmoststrikingadvanceisinnaturallanguagecapabilities,whicharerequiredforalargenumberofworkactivities.WhileChatGPTisfocusedontext,otherAIsystemsfrommajorplatformscangenerateimages,video,andaudio.

AlthoughgenerativeAIisstillintheearlystages,thepotentialapplicationsforbusinessesare

significantandwide-ranging.GenerativeAIcanbeusedtowritecode,designproducts,create

marketingcontentandstrategies,streamlineoperations,analyzelegaldocuments,provide

customerserviceviachatbots,andevenacceleratescientificdiscovery.Itcanbeusedonitsownorwith“humansintheloop”;thelatterismorelikelyatpresent,givenitscurrentlevelofmaturity.

3

Measuredasnetjoblossesforindividualoccupationsacrosssectors,netofestimatedretirements;derivedfromUSBureauofLaborStatistics(BLS)data.Anadministrativeassistantwhotakesasimilarpositionwithanotheremployerhassimply

switchedjobsandisnotpartofthisanalysis.Ifthatpersonbecomesanofficemanager,theyhavechangedoccupations

withinthesamecategory(officesupport).Iftheybecomeacomputersystemsanalyst,theyhavemovedintoadifferent

occupationalcategory(STEMprofessionals).Thelattertwomovesarethekindofoccupationalshiftsthatwemeasure.Sinceweareunabletotraceexactlyhowindividualworkersmoved,weusenetdeclinesasabroadproxy.Inourforward-looking

scenario,werefertopeopleneedingtomaketransitionsifdemandisprojectedtodeclineintheircurrentoccupation.

McKinseyGlobalInstitute|GenerativeAIandthefutureofworkinAmerica4

Allofthismeansthatautomationisabouttoaffectawidersetofworkactivitiesinvolving

expertise,interactionwithpeople,andcreativity.Thetimelineforautomationadoptioncouldbesharplyaccelerated.WithoutgenerativeAI,ourresearchestimated,automationcouldtakeovertasksaccountingfor21.5percentofthehoursworkedintheUSeconomyby2030.Withit,thatsharehasnowjumpedto29.5percent(ExhibitE2).4

4Notethatthisisthemidpoint,representingtheaverageofaverywiderange,from3.7to55.3percent.

ExhibitE2

WithgenerativeAIaddedtothepicture,30percentofhoursworkedtodaycouldbeautomatedby2030.

Midpointautomationadoption1by2030asashareoftimespentonworkactivities,US,%

AutomationadoptionwithoutgenerativeAIacceleration

AutomationadoptionwithgenerativeAIacceleration

XX—Percentage-pointaccelerationinautomationadoptionfromgenerativeAI

010203040

STEMprofessionals

16

Educationandworkforcetraining

16

Creativesandartsmanagement

15

Businessandlegalprofessionals

14

Managers

9

Communityservices

9

Oicesupport

7

Healthprofessionals

6

Builders

6

Propertymaintenance

6

Customerserviceandsales

6

Foodservices

5

Transportationservices

5

Mechanicalinstallationandrepair

5

Productionwork

4

Healthaides,technicians,andwellness

4

Agriculture

3

Allsectors2

8

1MidpointautomationadoptionistheaverageofearlyandlateautomationadoptionscenariosasreferencedinTheeconomicpotentialofgenerativeAI:Thenextproductivityfrontier,McKinsey&Company,June2023.

2Totalsareweightedby2022employmentineachoccupation.

Source:O*NET;USBureauofLaborStatistics;McKinseyGlobalInstituteanalysis

McKinseyGlobalInstitute|GenerativeAIandthefutureofworkinAmerica5

Otherforcesaffectingfuturelabordemand

Automationisnotoccurringinavacuum,ofcourse.Othertrendsareaffectingthedemandfor

certainoccupations,andweexpecttheemploymentmixtochangesignificantlythrough2030,

withmorehealthcare,STEM,andmanagerialpositionsandfewerjobsincustomerservice,officesupport,andfoodservices.

—Federalinvestment:Recentfederallegislationisdrivingmomentumandinvestmentin

otherareasthatwillaffectjobs.5Reachingthenet-zeroemissionsgoalisoneofthese

priorities.Some3.5millionjobscouldbedisplacedthroughdirectandindirecteffectsacrosstheeconomy.Butatthemacrolevel,theselossesshouldbemorethanoffsetbygainsof

4.2millionjobs,primarilyledbycapitalexpendituresonrenewableenergy.Thenet-zero

transitionwilllikelybeanetpositiveforjobs,butthosejobsmaybelocatedindifferentplacesandrequiredifferentskills.

Similarly,majorinvestmentininfrastructureprojectsacrossthecountrywillbolster

constructionjobs,whichcouldseeemploymentgrowthof12percentfrom2022through

2030.However,thesectoralreadyhadsome383,000unfilledpositionsinApril2023.This

shortagewillhavetobeaddressedtobringinfrastructureprojectstolifefromcoasttocoast.6

TheCHIPSandScienceActisputtingadditionalfundingintosemiconductormanufacturingaswellasR&Dandscientificresearch.7Thiscomesatatimewhensomecompanieshave

beenadjustingtheirsupplychains,leadingtoanuptickindomesticmanufacturing.While

manufacturingislikelytoboostemploymentdemandoverallintheyearsahead,thesectorisbecomingmorehigh-tech.ItwillinvolvefewertraditionalproductionjobsthaninthepastbutmoreworkerswithtechnicalandSTEMskills.8

—Otherstructuraltrends:Atthesametime,othertrendslikerisingincomesandeducationlevelswillsustainjobs.Anagingpopulationwillneedmorehealthcareworkersinmultipleroles,whiletheongoingprocessofdigitizingtheeconomywillrequireadding