股市金融全球化中英文對照外文翻譯文獻(xiàn)

股市金融全球化中英文對照外文翻譯文獻(xiàn)股市金融全球化中英文對照外文翻譯文獻(xiàn)(文檔含英文原文和中文翻譯)外文:TakingStockSeriously:Equity-MarketPerformance,GovernmentPolicy,andFinancialGlobalizationMosley,LaynaSinger,DavidAndrewAreequitymarketsjustanotherfacetofglobalfinance,oraretheyuniqueintheirresponsesto—andinfluenceson—governmentpoliciesandinstitutions?Recentworkhasexploredtheimpactofpoliticalfactorsonbondmarketbehaviorandforeigndirectinvestment,butlittleattentionhasbeenpaidtostockmarkets.Onthebasisoftheparticularconcernsofequityinvestors,wehypothesizeapositiveassociationbetweenstock-marketvaluationsandlevelsofdemocracy,shareholderrights,legaltraditions,andcapital-accountliberalization,anegativeassociationwithrealinterestrates,andnoassociationwithfiscaldeficitsorsurpluses.Weassessourexpectationsbyanalyzingthepoliticalandinstitutionaldeterminantsofaggregateprice-to-earningsratiosforasampleofupto37countriesfrom1985to2004,usingbothcross-sectionalandtime-seriescross-sectionalanalyses.Wefindsupportformost,butnotall,ofourhypotheses.Ourfindingssuggestthatwemustdisaggregatetheeffectsofdifferentassetmarketstounderstandtheimpactofeconomicglobalizationongovernmentpolicies.Howdogovernmentpoliciesandinstitutionsaffectequity-marketperformanceacrosscountries?Asstockmarketsgrowbroaderanddeeperinboththedevelopedanddevelopingworlds,thisquestionbecomesmorecritical.In2004,globalstock-marketcapitalizationstoodat$37.2trillion,comparedtoglobalGDPof$41.3trillion.Whilethisfigurewasslightlylessthanglobalcommercialbankassets,itmarkedlyexceededthetotalsizeofoutstandingpublicdebtsecurities,whichwere$23.1trillion.1Thebulkofglobalstock-marketcapitalizationrepresentsdeveloped-countryequitymarkets,butlessdevelopedcountrymarkets—whichaccountedfor14percentoftotalcapitalizationin2004—arequicklygainingground.Someemergingmarketcountries,suchasMalaysia,Singapore,andSouthAfrica,havetotalstock-marketcapitalizationsthatexceedtheirrespectivegrossdomesticproducts.Equitymarketsenhancecorporateefficiency,spurinnovation,andprovideavaluablesourceofcapitalforlong-termeconomicdevelopment.Theyalsoprovideausefulmechanismforgovernmentstoraisecapitalthroughthesaleofstate-ownedenterprises.Moreover,equity-marketinvestmentsconstituteanimportantelementofindividuals’assets,particularlyasgovernmentsshifttheirpensionsystemstowardtheprivatesector.Inshort,itisclearthatequitiesconstituteanincreasinglyimportantcapitalmarketintheworldeconomy.However,wecurrentlyknowverylittleabouthowgovernmentpolicychoicesandpoliticalinstitutionsinfluenceequityinvestors’decisions.Thefewextantanalysesofstockmarketsandpoliticstendtofocusononeortwodevelopedcountries,oronsectoralvariationwithinaparticularmarket,ratherthanonthedeterminantsofnational-levelmarketoutcomesinabroadercross-countrycontext.Forinstance,DavidLeblangandBumbaMukherjeeconsidertheimpactofgovernmentpartisanshipandelectionsonstockmarketoutcomesintheUnitedStatesandGreatBritain.Inawiderstudy,FionaMcGillivray(2003)considerstheimpactofpartisanchangesandelectoralinstitutionsonstock-marketoutcomesinfourteenadvanceddemocracies.Heranalyses,however,focuslargelyonindustry-levelvariation,arguingthatshiftsinpoliticalconstellationschangeinvestors’expectationsregardingwhichsectorswillbenefitfrompublicpolicies.Indeed,McGillivrayisinterestedlessinequity-marketoutcomespersethaninusingsuchoutcomesasaproxymeasureoftheexpectationsofeconomicactorsregardingpoliticaldecisions.Similarly,WilliamBernhardandDavidLeblangconsidertheimpactofpoliticsandpoliticaluncertaintyondailymarketbehaviorinseveraladvanceddemocracies.Unlikemostanalyses,theirsconsidersoutcomesinmultipleassetmarkets,includingcurrencies,equities,andgovernmentbonds.BernhardandLeblang’saim,however,istoexploretheconsequencesofdiscretepoliticalevents—suchaselectionsandcabinetformations—oncapitalmarkets,ratherthantoassessthebroaderimpactofpublicpolicyandinstitutionsoncapitalmarketoutcomes.Thisarticleseekstoroundouttheliteratureonfinancialglobalizationbyexploringthelinkagesbetweenequity-marketoutcomesandnationalgovernmentpoliciesandinstitutions.Itscontributionisboththeoreticalandempirical.Theoretically,weelaborateonthepoliticsofequity-marketperformance,focusinginparticularontheeffectsofgovernmentpoliciesandinstitutionsonstockmarketvaluations.Werelyontherelativelydevelopedliteratureonforeigndirectinvestmentandsovereignbondmarketstounderscorethedistinctivenessofequity-marketreactionstogovernmentpolicies.Empirically,weconductanovelevaluationofthecorrelatesoftotal-market,price-to-earningsratios(P?E)forasampleofupto37developedandemergingmarketcountriesduringthe1985–2004period.Cross-sectionalandtime-seriescross-sectional(TSCS)analysesrevealthatlevelsofdemocracy,marketliquidity,shareholderrights,andcapital-accountliberalizationarepositivelyassociatedwithequity-marketvaluations,whilerealinterestratesarenegativelyassociated.Wealsofindthatinvestorsarepositivelydisposedtowardequitymarketsinemerging-marketcountries,andnegativelydisposedtowardmarketswithhighdividendpayoutratios.Interestingly,manyofthepoliticalandeconomicfactors—includinginflation,andfiscalpolicy—deemedhighlysalienttoinvestorsinotherfinancialmarketsarenotstatisticallyassociatedwithstock-marketvaluations.Theseresultsarerobusttotheinclusionofanumberofcontrolvariables,includingcapital-assetpricingmodel(CAPM)factorsandalternativepricingmodelconsiderations.Notethattheresponsesofinvestorstopoliciesandinstitutionsalsohaveimplicationsforfuturegovernmentpolicychoices.Forinstance,ifanation’seconomyreliesmoreheavilyonFDIthanonsovereignlendingorbankfinancing,itsgovernmentmayfacefewpressurestoreducepublicspending.Ontheotherhand,ifagovernmentreliesheavilyonthebondmarkettofinanceitsexpenditures,buthasarelativelylowlevelofstock-marketcapitalization,itmayfacegreaterpressuresforfiscalandmonetarytightening.Andifacountryreliesonavariedmenuoffinancialinflows,asmostdo,assetholderswillexpressdiversepreferencesoverpublicpolicy.Untanglingthevariousfinancial-marketinfluencesongovernmentpolicymakingisclearlyalongtermresearchproject.Thisarticle,whichfocusesonthepoliticaldeterminantsofequityinvestors’behavior,complementssimilaranalysesofsovereignbondmarketsandforeigndirectinvestment.Onceweunderstandhowinvestorsineachmarketreacttogovernmentpoliciesandinstitutions,wecanthenadvancetoabroaderanalysisoftheimpactoffinancialmarkets—alongwithdomesticinstitutions,interestgroups,andotherfactors—ongovernmentpolicymakingandinstitutionaldesign.Stock-marketperformanceisincreasinglyatargetofanalysisbypoliticalscientists,becauseequityinvestorsmaybehighlysensitivetotheeffectsofcertaingovernmentpoliciesandinstitutionsontheirinvestments.Equityinvestmentsaregenerallyveryliquid,andthetimehorizonsofequityinvestorsareoftenrelativelyshort.Asaresult,changesingovernmentpoliciescantriggeraswiftresponsebyinvestors.Governmentpoliciesthatenhanceinvestorconfidence—eitherdirectly,byprovidingshareholderprotectionsandeaseofexit,orindirectly,byexpandingtheeconomyandimprovingcorporateearnings—willberewardedbyhigherstockpricesandmarketvaluations.Ontheotherhand,investorscanquicklywithdrawtheirfundsifgovernmentschoosemarket-unfriendlypolicies,therebygeneratingdownwardpressureonstockpricesandvaluations.Stockmarkets,inshort,areavaluableindicatoroffinancialactors’preferencesovergovernmentinstitutionsandpolicyoutcomes.Afittingalternativemeasureofperformanceistheratioofthestockpricetocompanyearnings—or,inotherwords,thepricethatequityinvestorsarewillingtopayforanexpectedstreamofprofits.Aswithstockprices,theseratiosreflectinvestors’expectationsaboutfutureearnings,buttheyalsosignalinvestors’preferencesovertime-varyinggovernmentpolicyandlargelyinvariantpoliticalinstitutions.Becauseofthelatter,cross-nationalvariationinP?Eratiospersistsevenwhennationalstockmarketsarehitsimultaneouslybyglobalpriceshocks.Theextantliteratureonthelinkagesbetweenglobalizationanddomesticpoliticshaspaidscantattentiontothediversewaysinwhichcountriesareintegratedintotheworldeconomy.Byassumingthatfinancialmarketsimposeaunifiedinfluenceongovernmentpolicies,priorstudieshaveoverlookedthestarkvariationinthepreferencesofinvestorsacrossdifferenttypesoffinancialassets.Inthisarticle,wearguethatequityinvestorsarebecominganincreasinglyinfluentialforceintheglobaleconomy,andthattheirpreferencesdivergefromthoseofotherfinancialactorsinimportantways.Toillustratethisdivergence,wepresentempiricalanalysesofthepoliticalandinstitutionaldeterminantsofequitymarketperformanceacrossasampleofdevelopedanddevelopingcountries.Amongthemostinterestingfindingsarethatmarketvaluationsaresignificantlyassociatedwithcapital-accountopenness,shareholderprotections,levelsofdevelopment,andalternativedomesticinvestments.Inaddition,equityinvestorsappearindifferenttowardgovernmentfiscalbalancesandthepartisanorientationsofgovernmentleaders.Giventhatcountriesareintegratedintotheglobalfinancialsystemindifferentways,thesefindingsleadtothequestionofhowgovernmentpolicymakersmightreconcilethecompetinginterestsofdifferenttypesoffinancialinvestors.譯文：股市嚴(yán)重性討論：股權(quán)市場現(xiàn)象，政府政策與金融全球化在政府的政策和體制影響中，股市是另一個全球金融市場，還是有其獨(dú)特的反應(yīng)？最近的工作探討了政治因素對債券市場的行為和外國直接投資的影響，但很少注意到股票市場。在股票投資者特別關(guān)注問題的基礎(chǔ)上，我們假設(shè)股市估值與它的平均水平之間呈正相關(guān)，股東權(quán)利，傳統(tǒng)法律，以及資本賬戶自由化，與實(shí)際利率之間呈負(fù)相關(guān)，無財政赤字和盈余。通過我們評估的政治和體制因素的期望值分析，從1985年到2004年，以37個國家的總價格為樣本，橫軸為時間序列，縱軸為市盈率。我們發(fā)現(xiàn)這支持大多數(shù)人的說法，但不是所有的。我們的研究結(jié)果表明，我們必須集合不同資產(chǎn)市場的影響來了解經(jīng)濟(jì)全球化對政府政策的影響。通過各國股票市場的政策和機(jī)制表現(xiàn)，它是如何影響政府的？隨著市場更廣泛的發(fā)展，股票在發(fā)達(dá)國家和發(fā)展中國家的逐漸深入，這個問題變得更加重要。2004年全球股票市值為38.4億萬美元，全球國內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值為41.3億萬美元。雖然這一數(shù)字略低于全球商業(yè)銀行資產(chǎn)，但他明顯超過了其他公共債券的總規(guī)模23.1億萬美元。全球股票市值占大部分發(fā)達(dá)國家的股票市場，但欠發(fā)達(dá)的國家市場也取得很大的進(jìn)展，其中在2004年占總市值得14%。股票市場提升企業(yè)的效率，鼓勵創(chuàng)新，是提供資金的長期經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展的重要來源。他們還使各國政府通過提高國有企業(yè)銷售資金的有效機(jī)制。此外，股票市場的投資構(gòu)成是個人資產(chǎn)的重要組成部分，特別是各國政府轉(zhuǎn)向私營部門的養(yǎng)老金制度?？傊?，很顯然的，股票構(gòu)成在世界經(jīng)濟(jì)中是一個日益重要的資本市場。不過，我們目前所知甚少，對于政府如何選擇政策和政治體制是由股票投資者決定的。對股市和一些現(xiàn)實(shí)政治的分析往往集中在一個或兩個發(fā)達(dá)國家，那是某一特定市場部門內(nèi)部的變化，而不是在更廣泛的范圍內(nèi)國家一級市場因素決定的結(jié)果。例如，在美國和英國DavidLeblang和BumbaMukherjee考慮到政府的黨派和選舉對股市影響的結(jié)果。在更廣泛的研究中，菲奧娜麥克基利夫雷（2003）認(rèn)為，先進(jìn)的民主國家選舉機(jī)構(gòu)黨派變化對股市的影響。然而，她的分析在很大程度上基于行業(yè)水平的變化，她認(rèn)為政治群體的變化，改變了投資者對哪些行業(yè)受益于公共政策的預(yù)期。事實(shí)上，麥克基利夫雷很感興趣，作為對決定政治經(jīng)濟(jì)行為者的期望的結(jié)果沒有比股票本身的市場效果大。同樣的，在一些先進(jìn)的民主國家的正常政治上，威廉和大衛(wèi)考慮到政治的影響和市場的行為是不穩(wěn)定的。不同于大多數(shù)分析的結(jié)果，他們認(rèn)為是在多個資產(chǎn)市場的，包括貨幣，股票和政府債券市場。然而，Bernhard和Leblang旨在探討的是政治事件，如選舉和內(nèi)閣離散的后果，，而不是更廣泛的評估資本市場公共政策和機(jī)構(gòu)影響的結(jié)果。在國家政府的政策和機(jī)構(gòu)中，本文旨在探討金融全球化的文獻(xiàn)與完善股票的市場的成果之間的聯(lián)系。它的貢獻(xiàn)是理論和實(shí)證兩個方面。從理論上講，我們詳細(xì)說明股票的市場對政治的表現(xiàn)，特別是側(cè)重于股市估值對政府政策和體制的影響。我們依靠豐富的文獻(xiàn)對外國直接投資和主權(quán)債券市場的比較，強(qiáng)調(diào)了股票的市場