會(huì)計(jì)外文翻譯

原文FinancialManagementofR&DFinancialthinkingaboutR&Dhasevolvedwellbeyondbasicdiscountedcashflowmodels.Bettertoolshavebeendevelopedtovalueintellectualcapital,includingthequantitativeassessmentofthevalueaddedbyR&D.ThedissectionoftheelementsofriskandtheapplicationofrealoptionstheoryarenewfeaturesoftheR&Dlandscape.Financingvehicleshavealsochangedwithanenormoussurgeofventurecapitalandprivateequityfunds.Theanalysestoolboxhasbeenenhancedbyelectronicspreadsheets,on-linedatabases,MonteCarlosoftware,theInternet,andtheubiquitouspersonalcomputer.IndustrialR&Discharacteristicallyahigh-riskinvestmentwithadeferredpayoff.Itsimportancetoindustrialsocieties,andtoindividualfirmswithintheseeconomies,isparamountLauhasestimatedthatmorethan50%ofthewealthcreationindevelopedcountriesoriginatesfromtechnology,whichistypicallyaproductofR&D.However,R&Dcomesatacost,anditisascapableofdestroyingvalueascreatingit.Knowingthedifferenceiscrucial;thepenaltiesforunderinvestmentcanbeadeterioratingcompetitivepositionandlostopportunity;foroverinvestmentitwillbeaslowerosionofthefirm‘scapitalbase.Butmeasuringthedifferencebetweenvaluecreationandvaluedestructionisnoteasy.OnesourceofconfusionisthataccountingconventionstreatR&Dasanexpense,notaninvestment.Anevenmorefundamentalissueisthatpastperformanceisnotareliableguidetofutureperformance.Facedbyameasurementproblemthatisbothdifficultandimportant,thebusinessfinancialandacademiccommunitieshavecontinuedimprovingtheirtools.Asaresult,R&Danalysisandmanagementhasevolveddramaticallyinthepastfiftyyears(3),andthatevolutionisfarfromover.Initsfirstpostwarphase,industrialR&DwasviewedasacreativeenterpriseandIts‘managementwaslefttotheR&Ddirectors.Theirmainfinancialmetricwasanannualbudget(atoolbasicallyinadequatetoevaluateaninvestment).Thebudgetwasinpartdeterminedbyindustrybenchmarks,suchasR&Dexpenseasapercentageofrevenues.Accordingly,thefinancialskillsofR&Dexecutiveswerelargelyfocusedoncostaccountingandcostcontrol(4).Inmanycompanies,topmanagement(oftenlackingpersonalexperienceinR&D)didn‘thaveaclueabouttherelationshipofvaluetocost,andattemptedtomanagethefunctionbyaprocessthathasbeenpithilydescribed(5)as''managingthemanager".Inotherwords,poorR&Dreturnswereviewedmoreasaproductofpoormanagementthanaconsequenceofafirm'sstrategy.Thesolutionwasoftentohirea'newboy."Thesecondphase,inthe1970s,wastheintroductionofincreasinglypowerfultoolsforevaluatinginvestmentsunderriskbeingadoptedbyfinancialanalyststoR&D,leadingtoacircumstanceIwoulddescribeas'theapparenttriumphofDCF(DiscountedCashFlow)."TheuseofDCFinevaluatinginvestmentswasanimportantstepforwardinthatitintroducedthedisciplineofbusinessplans,factoredintheconceptofrisk,andhelpedbridgethecommunicationsgapbetweentechnicalandnon-technicalexecutives.TheDCFtoolkitincludednetpresentvalue(NPV)internalrateofreturn(IRR)andriskweightedcostofcapital."Butasitwasappliedinpractice,theuseofexcessivediscountratesandoverlyconservativeterminalvaluescombinedtocondemnalmostanylong-termR&D.project.Thisresultcontradictedindustry'scommonexperiencethatmanyofthemostprofitableinnovationshadlonggestationperiods.Thewordvaluehasbecomeafixtureofthebusinesslexiconduringthepasttwodecades.Unfortunately,thisomnipresentwordisbeingusedintwoverydifferentcontexts:economicvalueandmarketvalue.Thetwoformsofvaluearenotatallthesame.ThedistinctionisprofoundforR&D,becauseinnovationinitiallycomesatacostioneconomicvalue,butisequallyoftenadriverformarketvalue!EconomicValueThetermEconomicValueisinvokedinmuchcurrentbusinessjargon,explicitlyInsuchconceptsasEconomicValueAdded(EVA),andimplicitlyindiscussionsof'valuechains,"and'valuepropositions."Theeconomicvalueofanenterpriseisdeterminedbytheprojectedsumofitsfreecashflows,discountedbyitscostofcapital.TheEVAconcept,althoughtraceabletoAlbertP.Sloan,thelegendaryCEOofGeneralMotors,wasreintroducedtothecorporatecommunitybythefirmSternStewartinthe1990s,withconsiderableimpact.EVAisdefinedasnetoperatingprofitminusanappropriatechargefortheopportunitycostofallcapitalinvestedintheEnterprise.(TherelationshipbetweenEVAandEconomicValueissimple:EconomicValueisjustthesumoftheEVA,saddedbytheenterpriseineachsuccessiveyear.)EVAisanestimateoftrue''economicprofit,"ortheamountbywhichearningsexceedorfallshortoftherequiredminimumrateofreturnthatshareholdersandlendersmightearnbyinvestinginalternativesecuritiesofcomparablerisk.TheCrisisinValuation;WhenMarketValueDidn,tTrackMarketValueForprofessionalinvestorsinsecurities,thebottomlineisnoteconomicreturn,itistotalshareholderreturn(TSR),definedastheappreciationofthestockpriceplusdividendpayments.Thisis'cashisking"reasoning,sinceliquidsecuritiesandcashdividendsmeancashtoaninvestor.Tomoneymanagers,totalreturnisalsotheirreportcard.Insuchaworld,theMarketValueofastockisthefinalmetric,andEconomicValueisbutonecomponentofit.Investorsalsogaugeeachfirm'sstrategicposition,plusotherfactorscontributingtoMarketValuesuchasinvestorsentimentandmacroeconomictrends.Shareholdervaluehaslargelycometobesynonymouswithcurrentmarketvalue-stockprice-andexecutivesordirectorswhoignorethisrealitydosoatconsiderableperil.EconomicValueApartofthecrisisinvaluationarosefromthegrowingdifferencesbetweenmarketvalueandtheaccountant'sperspectiveofvaluationbasedonhistoricalcost.Whilethiscircumstancecould,inprinciple,haveresultedfromsmartmanagementdeliveringsuperiorcashflows,thisexplanationdidnotholdupwhentheactualcashflowprojectionsofthecompanieswereconsidered.Youngisbasedoncashflowanticipatedinthenextfiveyears-theouterlimitoftheproverbial"short-term".Thus,morethan75percentofthevaluationofthetotalstockmarketmustberelatedtosomethingotherthanshort-termeconomicvalue.Inthisscenario,aslongasperceptionsofopportunitygrewfasterthaneconomiccapital,thegrowthsectorwouldoutperformthe"value"sector,andhencewouldattractmoreinvestment.Thiscascadeeffectwouldresultinhigherprice-earningsratios,sincetheprice-to-earningsmetricistiedtocurrenteconomicperformance.Thatiswhatoccurredinthemarketplaceduringthedecadeofthe1990s.Investorsineffectequatedinvestmentin"value"stocksasinvestmentinstockswithlimitedopportunities,andfavoredthe"growth"sector.Duringthe1990s,asthevaluationgapwasgrowing,ahostofarticlesbegantoextendthevenerableconceptofintellectualpropertytotheconceptofintellectualorKnowledgecapital,whichaddedanimportantnewdimensiontointangibleassets.Somewritersevenchoosetodefineintellectualcapitalasthedifferencebetweenmarketvalueandthevalueofthetangibleassets.Thisapproachisexemplifiedbythisquotation:Thegreatestchallengefacinganyorganizationtodayisinunderstandingthehugedifferentialbetweenitsbalancesheetandmarketvaluation.Thisgaprepresentsthecorevalueofthecompany—itsIntellectualCapital.Fromthistraditionalbase,theconceptwasnowextendedtoincludetheknowledgeoftheorganizationanditsemployees,anditsabilitytolearn.Itthuswentfarbeyondthemorelimitedconceptsofknow-howandtradesecrets.Mostimportantly,therewasrecognitionthatintellectualandhumancapitalcouldfaroutweightangiblecapitalforvaluationpurposes.Thisinsightwasimportant,butyetnotverydefinitive."Buttheideaofintellectualcapitalisanewone,"wroteP.H.Sullivan,"itbringstotheforegroundthebrainpowerassetsoftheorganization,recognizingthemashavingadegreeofimportancecomparabletothetraditionalland,labor,andtangibleassets.Ifasurveywereconducted,therewouldbeagreementthatmanymoderncompaniesarefilledwithintellectualcapital:lawfirms,consultingfirms,softwarecompanies,computercompaniestonamebutafew.Butifthesurveywentontoaskpeopletodefinewhatintellectualcapitalis,therewouldbeawiderangeofanswers.Theseanswerswouldnotconvergeontoonestraightforwarddefinitionofintellectualcapital,butratheronmany.Therangeofviewsandthenumberoftermsusedtodescribeanddefineintellectualcapitalarebroad,withoutaclearfocus,andoftenconfusing TechnologyappraisalApracticalapplicationoftheeconomicvalueapproachtointellectualpropertydevelopedconsiderablyduringthe1990s.Ithasbeentermedtechnologyappraisal.TheapproachisbasicallyaDCFvaluationofaproformabusinessplanincorporatingthetechnologybeingappraised.Technologyappraisalhasbeenusedprimarilyfortaxpurposes:forexample,thevaluationofpatentsdonatedtouniversitiesbycompaniessuchasDowChemicalorthevaluationofin-processR&Dinmergersandacquisitions.DuPontpublishedadetaileddescriptionoftypicaltechnologyappraisalmethodologyinconnectionwiththecompletionofitsacquisitionsofPioneerInternationalandDuPontMerck.Anumberofconsultantsandaccountingfirmsnowoffertechnologyappraisalservices.Newtrendsincorporatefinance,andanewtoolkit,arenaturallytobeexpectedtocausestructuralchangesinindustrialR&D.Infact,thechangesthathavetakenplaceinthepasttwodecadeshavebeenremarkablyfar-reaching.TheImpactofLeveragedBuyouts(LBO,s)The1980smarkedtheadventoftheleveragedbuyouteraanditssibling,thehigh-yieldor'—junk"bond.TheeraculminatedspectacularlyintheRJRbiddingwar,depictedinthebookandsubsequentmovie,BarbariansatTheGate(38),thebook,ThePredator,sBall(39),andtheimprisonmentofprominentparticipantsforinsidertradingandsecuritiesviolations.About$400billionofLBO,swerefinancedinthedecadeofthe1980s.Excessivebids,suchasforRJR,causedabroadcollapseofthefirstjunkbondmarket,butthetechniqueisaliveandwellasamoresophisticatedgenerationofLBOfirms,backedbyinstitutionalfunds,trawlstheindustrialmarketplacefornewbuyoutopportunities.LBO,sweregenerallyfinancedwith10percentorlessequityputupbylimitedpartnersand90percentbybankloansandsubordinateddebt,typicallyintheformofHighyieldbondsfloatedbyDrexelBurnhamLambertandothers.AnLBObecomesaPossibilitywhenthesharepriceofthetargetcompanyhasfallentoalevelwheretherequireddebttopurchasethecompanycanbepaiddownquicklybyacombinationofassetsalesandcashflowfromoperations.Ideally,thecompanyispurchasedwithitsownassets,leavingtheinvestorswithalargeprofitafterthedebtburdeniseliminated.TheLBOstrategyisnotoneofmaximizingvalue;itisoneofmaximizingcashflow.Thetargetcompanymaybesubstantiallydepletedofphysicalandintellectualcapitalattheendofthegame.Ironically,however,anLBOcomesintoplaywhenmanagementseffortstoenhancevaluehaveeitherfailed,orareperceivedbythemarketplacetobefailing.Therewerelastingeffectsfromthistraumaticperiod,somebeneficialandsomelessso.Managementsrapidlybecamemoredisciplinedaboutvaluecreationwhenitbecameapparentthattheywerevulnerabletoaraid,orweremissingopportunitiestoenhanceshareholdervalue.Thenotionwasthatifshareholderscouldbenefitfromstreamlining,downsizing,etc.managementwoulddoitbeforetheraidersarrivedtodoitforthem.Corporationsshedexpensivefrills,suchascostlyheadquarters,unprofitabledivisions,andpetprojects,tofocusoncoreoperations,andtoscrutinizenewacquisitionsandcapitalinvestmentsfromaneconomicvalueviewpoint.Thewell-publicizedreignofJackWelchatGeneralElectricsymbolizedmanyoftheelementsofthisapproach.TheeffectsonR&Dfinanceweresignificant:long-termR&D,andR&Dnottargetedtoexistingbusinesses,wasoftencurtailedtoshoreupshort-termcashflow.ThisprocesstookplacenotonlywithincompaniesthatwereinLBOmode,butalsoincompaniesthatconsideredthemselvesLBOtargets.Manylargecentralresearchcentersweredownsizedoreliminated,andthosethatremainedweretieddirectlytostrategicbusinessunits(Sub‘s),whichhadnowbecomethefocusofvaluecreation.Inaddition,atypicalcorporatereactiontoexternalthreatswastomergewithothersintheindustry,andcreatevaluebyeliminatingduplicateheadquarters,salesorganizations,andR&Doperations.Theeliminationofthesecostsclearlygeneratedeconomicvalue;theissuewouldbehowmuchofitcameatacostinstrategicvalue.Source:F.PeterBoer.FinancialManagementofR&D.ResearchTechnologyManagement,2002,pp1-28譯文:研發(fā)財(cái)務(wù)管理研發(fā)財(cái)務(wù)管理的思想演變發(fā)展遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)超過(guò)基本的現(xiàn)金貼現(xiàn)現(xiàn)金流模型，財(cái)務(wù)的研發(fā)工具中已經(jīng)發(fā)展到了智力資本的價(jià)值，其中包括定量?jī)r(jià)值的評(píng)估。解剖風(fēng)險(xiǎn)要素和實(shí)物期權(quán)理論的應(yīng)用是財(cái)務(wù)研發(fā)新的特點(diǎn)，同時(shí)融資工具也在發(fā)生變化，風(fēng)險(xiǎn)資本和私人股本資金大量激增。分析師的工具箱已經(jīng)被提高到了電子表格，網(wǎng)上數(shù)據(jù)庫(kù)，蒙特卡羅軟件，互聯(lián)網(wǎng)，以及無(wú)處不在的個(gè)人電腦。工業(yè)研發(fā)是典型的遞延收益與高風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資的項(xiàng)目，這個(gè)對(duì)工業(yè)社會(huì)的公司尤其至關(guān)重要，發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家50%的財(cái)富來(lái)自產(chǎn)品技術(shù)創(chuàng)造的研發(fā)。但是衡量?jī)r(jià)值創(chuàng)造和價(jià)值之間的差異是不容易區(qū)別的，其混亂的原因是在會(huì)計(jì)慣例中把這項(xiàng)財(cái)務(wù)費(fèi)用當(dāng)作一項(xiàng)開(kāi)支，而不是一項(xiàng)投資，不把它作為一個(gè)基本的研發(fā)問(wèn)題，也不把過(guò)去業(yè)績(jī)作為未來(lái)指標(biāo)。在過(guò)去的十五年，商業(yè)、金融和學(xué)術(shù)界在面對(duì)困難的測(cè)量問(wèn)題面前，不斷地改善和發(fā)展研發(fā)分析和管理的測(cè)量問(wèn)題，在戰(zhàn)后的第一階段，產(chǎn)業(yè)研發(fā)被認(rèn)為是一項(xiàng)具有研發(fā)創(chuàng)造性的管理事業(yè)。其中主要財(cái)務(wù)指標(biāo)是年度預(yù)算（一個(gè)工具基本上不足以評(píng)估一個(gè)投資）。預(yù)算是按行業(yè)基準(zhǔn)確定的，比如研發(fā)作為費(fèi)用占收入的比例來(lái)確定一部分的。因此研發(fā)人員的財(cái)務(wù)技能主要集中在成本會(huì)計(jì)和成本控制。在許多公司，高層管理人員（通常是缺乏研發(fā)人員的經(jīng)驗(yàn)）沒(méi)有對(duì)價(jià)值關(guān)系到成本進(jìn)行探索，并試圖以管理一個(gè)簡(jiǎn)潔描述為“管理經(jīng)驗(yàn)出來(lái)功能”的管理。換言之，窮人的研發(fā)返回被看做比對(duì)一個(gè)公司的戰(zhàn)略，這個(gè)解決方案導(dǎo)致的后果是產(chǎn)品的管理不善，更是經(jīng)常被形容為一個(gè)新聘請(qǐng)來(lái)的男孩。第二階段，在20世紀(jì)70年代，越來(lái)越多的投資風(fēng)險(xiǎn)評(píng)估被金融分析師引入研發(fā)，可以形容為“明顯的勝利DCF法（貼現(xiàn)現(xiàn)金流）。DCF法在評(píng)估投資的使用是一個(gè)重要的步驟，因?yàn)樗肓松虡I(yè)計(jì)劃紀(jì)律中的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)因素的概念，并幫助協(xié)調(diào)了技術(shù)和非技術(shù)人員的溝通分歧。工具包中包含凈現(xiàn)金流量折現(xiàn)現(xiàn)值（NPV）的回報(bào)率（內(nèi)部收益率）和風(fēng)險(xiǎn)加權(quán)資本成本內(nèi)部收益率。但它是在實(shí)踐過(guò)程中過(guò)度使用貼現(xiàn)率，以及過(guò)度和保守終值相結(jié)合，譴責(zé)任何長(zhǎng)期研發(fā)的項(xiàng)目。結(jié)果是違背了行業(yè)中認(rèn)為創(chuàng)新是長(zhǎng)期醞釀的最賺錢(qián)的這一共同經(jīng)驗(yàn)。在過(guò)去二十年，這個(gè)詞的價(jià)值已成為固定的業(yè)務(wù)詞匯。不幸的是，這倆個(gè)無(wú)所不在的詞語(yǔ)有很不同的背景：經(jīng)濟(jì)價(jià)值和市場(chǎng)價(jià)值。這倆種價(jià)值形式并不是完全相同的，這種區(qū)別是深刻的研發(fā)因?yàn)樽畛跏强扑雇?chuàng)新的經(jīng)濟(jì)價(jià)值，但它往往也是市場(chǎng)價(jià)值驅(qū)動(dòng)。經(jīng)濟(jì)價(jià)值明確經(jīng)濟(jì)價(jià)值這一詞的概念，調(diào)用商業(yè)行話，是作為經(jīng)濟(jì)增加值（EVA），并含蓄地對(duì)“價(jià)值鏈”和價(jià)值命題的討論。一個(gè)企業(yè)的經(jīng)濟(jì)價(jià)值是取決于它的自由現(xiàn)金流量預(yù)測(cè)總結(jié)其資本成本貼現(xiàn)。EVA的概念，雖然可以追溯到斯隆，通用汽車(chē)公司的傳奇總裁，但重新被引入到企業(yè)是在20世紀(jì)90年代的戴爾公司，具有相當(dāng)?shù)挠绊?。EVA是指凈營(yíng)業(yè)利潤(rùn)對(duì)在企業(yè)全部資本投資的機(jī)會(huì)成本的適當(dāng)收取。（EVA與經(jīng)濟(jì)之間的價(jià)值關(guān)系很簡(jiǎn)單：經(jīng)濟(jì)僅僅是價(jià)值的EVA的款項(xiàng)，則每連續(xù)三年在企業(yè)相加QEVA是一個(gè)真正的經(jīng)濟(jì)利潤(rùn)，或者死收入數(shù)額超過(guò)投資所要求的最低回報(bào)率，且與其他證券的投資風(fēng)險(xiǎn)相比，股東和貸款人的收入周期比較短。市場(chǎng)價(jià)值對(duì)于證券專(zhuān)業(yè)投資者來(lái)說(shuō)，底線不是經(jīng)濟(jì)回報(bào)，而是股東回報(bào)（TSR），即股價(jià)加分紅。這是“現(xiàn)金為王”的推理，因?yàn)橐后w證券和現(xiàn)金股利平均現(xiàn)金的總回報(bào)是基金經(jīng)理的成績(jī)單。在這樣的一個(gè)世界，股票的市場(chǎng)價(jià)值作為它的組成部分是最后的度量和經(jīng)濟(jì)價(jià)值。投資者同時(shí)還衡量每個(gè)企業(yè)的戰(zhàn)略地位，以及在加上其他因素造成的市場(chǎng)價(jià)值，如投資者情緒和宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)趨勢(shì)。股東價(jià)值在很大程度上與當(dāng)前的市場(chǎng)價(jià)值型股票價(jià)格是同義詞，無(wú)論是行政人員還是董事，誰(shuí)無(wú)視這個(gè)現(xiàn)實(shí)都有相當(dāng)大的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。經(jīng)濟(jì)價(jià)值價(jià)值危機(jī)的一部分源于歷史成本為基礎(chǔ)的市場(chǎng)價(jià)值與會(huì)計(jì)的估值角度日益增大的差別。從提供卓越的智能管理來(lái)看，在這種情況下有可能產(chǎn)生現(xiàn)金流量，但這種解釋并不能成立，需要公司對(duì)實(shí)際現(xiàn)金流量進(jìn)行預(yù)測(cè)和審議。年輕，是基于在未來(lái)5年中的眾所周知的“短期”，一次，超過(guò)75%的股票市值總額比其他外部界限預(yù)期的經(jīng)濟(jì)現(xiàn)金流價(jià)值要短。在這種情況下，只要認(rèn)識(shí)的機(jī)會(huì)增長(zhǎng)速度快于經(jīng)濟(jì)資本，“成長(zhǎng)部門(mén)”將跑贏“價(jià)值”產(chǎn)業(yè)，從而吸引更多的投資。這種連帶效應(yīng)將導(dǎo)致較高的市盈率，因?yàn)閮r(jià)格的市盈率指標(biāo)是聯(lián)系在一起的經(jīng)濟(jì)表現(xiàn)，這就是發(fā)生在上世紀(jì)90年代的十年間的市場(chǎng)。實(shí)際上，投資者等同于“價(jià)值”的股票投資，在有限的機(jī)會(huì)內(nèi)進(jìn)行股票投資并主張“增長(zhǎng)”部門(mén)。在20世紀(jì)90年代，隨著估值差距越來(lái)越大，主流文章開(kāi)始擴(kuò)大古老的知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)理念，增加了智力和知識(shí)資本這一重要的新層面，無(wú)形資產(chǎn)的概念。有些學(xué)者甚至選擇市場(chǎng)價(jià)值與有形資產(chǎn)的智力資本價(jià)值的差額作為定義。這種方法是報(bào)價(jià)來(lái)例證的：任何組織在今天面臨的最大挑戰(zhàn)是了解資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表之間的估值和市場(chǎng)的巨大差別，這個(gè)差別代表了公司的核心價(jià)值-智力資本。從這個(gè)傳統(tǒng)基礎(chǔ)上，現(xiàn)在這一概念已經(jīng)擴(kuò)大到了包括員工的組織能力和學(xué)習(xí)知識(shí)的能力。因此它遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)超過(guò)了技術(shù)訣竅和商業(yè)秘密這比較有限的概念。最重要的是，人們認(rèn)識(shí)到致死與人力資本可能遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)超過(guò)對(duì)有形資本估價(jià)的目的。這一見(jiàn)解是重要的，但不是很明確。“但是智力資本是個(gè)新的想法，”沙利文說(shuō)，它帶來(lái)的前景是承認(rèn)組織的智力資產(chǎn)比傳統(tǒng)的土地、勞動(dòng)力、有形資產(chǎn)重要。如果進(jìn)行一項(xiàng)調(diào)查，一致認(rèn)為會(huì)有許多現(xiàn)代公司與智力資本填補(bǔ)，比如律師事務(wù)所、咨詢公司、軟件公司，一些的電腦公司等。但是如果接著調(diào)查什么是知識(shí)資本的定義時(shí)，將會(huì)有廣泛的答案。這些答案不會(huì)收斂到一個(gè)簡(jiǎn)單的智力資本的定義，但存在著許多的比較。對(duì)于描述和界定智力資本方面數(shù)量存在著不同的意見(jiàn)且比較廣泛，沒(méi)有一個(gè)明確的重點(diǎn)，所以常常令人困惑??…技術(shù)鑒定在20世紀(jì)90年代，一種有關(guān)知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)的實(shí)際應(yīng)用的經(jīng)濟(jì)價(jià)值方法得到了很大的發(fā)展。它被稱(chēng)為技術(shù)鑒定，這種方法在備考業(yè)務(wù)計(jì)劃中被評(píng)為DCF估值。技術(shù)鑒定被用于稅收的主要目的有：專(zhuān)利估價(jià)捐贈(zèng)，兼并和收購(gòu)公司的研發(fā)估值。杜邦詳細(xì)描述了與先鋒海蘭國(guó)際公司的收購(gòu)連接時(shí)的典型技術(shù)鑒定方法。在過(guò)去二十年里，企業(yè)融資工具發(fā)生了深遠(yuǎn)的變化，可以預(yù)期導(dǎo)致工業(yè)研發(fā)結(jié)構(gòu)性變化這意義趨勢(shì)。杠桿收購(gòu)的影響（LBO）20世紀(jì)80年代標(biāo)志著杠桿收購(gòu)時(shí)代，高收益或“垃圾債券”的到來(lái)。尤其以雷諾競(jìng)購(gòu)戰(zhàn)這個(gè)案例，正如書(shū)籍和電影所描述的由于證券內(nèi)幕交易這一違法行為產(chǎn)生的影響尤為突出。雷諾在80年代投標(biāo)了約400億美元的杠桿收購(gòu)，雖然這十年的資助引起了廣泛的第一個(gè)垃圾債券市場(chǎng)的崩潰，但是這一杠桿收購(gòu)技術(shù)還活著，在一個(gè)更復(fù)雜的杠桿收購(gòu)企業(yè)的收購(gòu)資金支持下，產(chǎn)生了工業(yè)市場(chǎng)的新收購(gòu)機(jī)會(huì)。杠桿收購(gòu)的資金一般是通過(guò)百分之十或更少的股票賣(mài)給有限合伙，另外90%是銀行貸款及百分之次級(jí)貸款，通常的形式是高收益?zhèn)?。成為一個(gè)杠桿收購(gòu)的可能性時(shí)，目標(biāo)公司的股價(jià)下降到需要購(gòu)回本公司的債務(wù)來(lái)支付銷(xiāo)售下跌帶來(lái)的資產(chǎn)經(jīng)營(yíng)活動(dòng)所需的現(xiàn)金流量的支持的水平。杠桿收購(gòu)不是價(jià)值最大化的問(wèn)題，而是現(xiàn)金流量最大化。目標(biāo)公司可能耗費(fèi)了體力和智力在資本上，但是當(dāng)一個(gè)杠桿收購(gòu)進(jìn)入市場(chǎng)時(shí)，管理層努力提升價(jià)值可能會(huì)失敗或被市場(chǎng)視為失敗，這樣可能會(huì)對(duì)公司產(chǎn)生重創(chuàng)。因此，這個(gè)持久的效果可能會(huì)使管理層錯(cuò)過(guò)創(chuàng)造價(jià)值，提高股東價(jià)值的機(jī)會(huì)。這一概念是，如果股東能夠受益于精簡(jiǎn)，管理人員可能早就做了裁員之類(lèi)的事情。企業(yè)擺脫昂貴的裝飾，如昂貴的總部，無(wú)利可圖的項(xiàng)目，專(zhuān)注于核心業(yè)務(wù)，并審查經(jīng)濟(jì)價(jià)值觀的新收購(gòu)和資本投資。財(cái)務(wù)管理研發(fā)對(duì)資金的影響比較顯著：長(zhǎng)期研發(fā)，往往是縮減現(xiàn)有的業(yè)務(wù)，以支撐短期的現(xiàn)金流量。這一過(guò)程不僅發(fā)生在有杠桿收購(gòu)模式的公司內(nèi)部，也在債務(wù)杠桿收購(gòu)的公司。中央研究中心表示，縮減或淘汰規(guī)模來(lái)創(chuàng)造價(jià)值，已經(jīng)被直接運(yùn)用連接到那些戰(zhàn)略業(yè)務(wù)單位。此外，一個(gè)企業(yè)受到外部威脅典型的反應(yīng)是與行業(yè)的其他人合并，并消除重復(fù)創(chuàng)建總部帶來(lái)的資本消耗，提高銷(xiāo)售組織和研發(fā)業(yè)務(wù)的價(jià)值。這些費(fèi)用明顯消除了產(chǎn)生的經(jīng)濟(jì)價(jià)值，成為了戰(zhàn)略價(jià)值的一個(gè)很大的成本問(wèn)題。出處：彼得波爾，2002?財(cái)務(wù)管理的研發(fā)》.研究技術(shù)管理，《研究技術(shù)管理》，原文：R&DandFirmPerformanceinaTransitionEconomyINTRODUCTIONAccordingtointernationalcomparativestatisticstheEasternEuropeancountriesshowmuchlessinnovativeactivitythane.g.theEUaverageThismightbegoodorbad.IfthefirmsarenotcapableenoughtohandleR&Dprocessesitisgoodthattheyrecognizethis.Duringacountry,stransformationprocesstoamarketeconomy,adoptionofestablishedprocessesandproductsinconnectionwithproductvariationandcompetitiveproductionpossibilitiesareanattractivealternativetoinnovation.HowevermostobserversaskformoreR&Dinthesecountriesandforpolicieseasinginnovationinordertoincreasegrowth.Thosepolicyinterventionsarenotonlysubjectoftheoreticaldiscussions.SubsidiesgrantedbytheEuropeanCommissioninmembercountries,likethesixthframeworkprogram,arealsorelevantfortheaccessioncountriesoftheEuropeanUnion.PerhapsR&Dsubsidiesarepartlywastedifgrantedinanearlystageofthetransformationprocessandcouldbeusedinamoreproductiveway.ItmightbethecasethatinsteadofconductingresearchanddevelopmentfirmsintheseareasarebetteroffbytheproductionofestablishedproductsatlowercoststhanintheWesterncountries.Answerstothesequestionswouldsurelybehelpfulforthepolicydesignfortransformationprocesses.ThepurposeofourarticleistocomparethesuccessofinnovativeactivityinEasternandWesternGermanyinordertoinvestigatewhethertherearedifferenceswithrespecttoR&DperformancebetweenthetwopartsofreunifiedGermany.EasternGermanyisaveryspecialexampleofatransitioneconomy.ThemovementfromtheformerGermanDemocraticRepublictostatesoftheGermanFederalRepublicwasaccompaniedbytheintroductionofawellestablishedcurrency,astableandreliablelegalframeworkandahighlydevelopedsystemofindustrialrelations.AlthoughdifferencesbetweenbothpartsofthereunifiedGermanyaroseinthemeantime,thesearecertainlysmallerthanthosewithrespecttoothertransitioneconomics.Hencethisistheunparalleledopportunitytocompareanestablishedmarketeconomywithatransitioneconomyonthebasisofverysimilarenvironmentalconditions.Hence,theceterisparibusconditionapplies.R&DconductedbyEast-Germanfirmsisheavilysubsidizedasthepolicydecisionmakersregarditasbeingveryimportantthatthecompetitivenessofthesecompaniesisimprovedbytechnologicalleadership.Itremainstobeshownthatthesesubsidiesarenotwasted.WeintendtoanswerthisquestionbycomparingtheperformanceofEasternandWesternGermanenterprises.InnovationinatransitioneconomylikeEasternGermanymightsufferfromlackingexperiencewithboththecurrenttechnologicalfrontierandmechanismsatplaceinamarketeconomy.Forexample,outdatedhumancapitalmayoftenleadtoduplicateresearch(byaccident),orfirmscouldrelyonlyonimitation(onpurpose).Incombinationwithhighdemanduncertaintyandlackingexperienceinmarketingstrategy,investmentsinR&Dmaynotleadto(expected)returns.Reasonablereturnscouldbenecessarytosurviveforstartupfirms,though.Thepurposeofthispaperhastwodimensions:Ononehand,wecompareWesternandEasternGermanmanufacturingfirmsbyrelatingacreditratingindexasmeasureofperformancetoR&Dspendingandotherfirmcharacteristics.Ontheotherhand,weextendtheratingmodelbyasecondequationdealingwithfinancialdistressandbankruptcy.ThisisparticularlyinterestingbecauseEasternGermanmanufacturingispredominantlycomposedofsmallandmedium-sizedenterprisesthatwerenewlyfoundedaftertheGermanreunificationin1990.WeaskthequestionwhetherinvestmentinR&DisvaluedasinWesternGermany,orifagenciesratesuchfirmsmoreconservative,becauseyoungfirmslackacorrespondingtrackrecordonwhichtheratingcouldbebased.Thisstudycouldbehighlyrelevantforinnovationpolicy.EasternGermanfirmsreceiverelativelymoresubsidiesthantheirWesternGermancounterparts.TheGermangovernmentintendstofosterthetransformationprocessfromaplannedeconomytoaviablemarketeconomybyamongotherpolicies,anintensivesupportforinnovativeactivitiesinordertostrengthenthecompetitivenessoftheEasternGermanregions.If,however,innovationactivitiesintheEastdonotleadtosuccessfulproductsandmarketsuccess,butfailor,intheworstcase,putfirmsattheriskofbankruptcy,thispolicystrategymaybeaninefficientallocationofresources.Ourstudyisanextensionofthe(few)existingstudiesontheeffectsofinnovationsintransitioneconomies.Aghionetal.(2002)aswellasCarlinetal.(2004)investigatetheeffectofinnovationsongrowthofasampleof2,245respectively3,288firmsfrom24EasternEuropeancountriesandtheyfindthatsomecompetitivepressureisgoodforinnovativeness,buttoomuchcanbecounterproductive(Carlinetal.2004).Innovativenesshasapositiveimpactongrowth.However,itisnottestedwhetherinnovationshavealsoapositiveeffectonprofitability.KoningsandXavier(2002)utilizeinformationconcerninginnovationandusetheratioofintangibleassetstototalfixedassetsasanexogenousvariableexplainingsurvivalandgrowthforasampleof2,813Slovenianfirmsoverthetimeperiodfrom1994to1998.Itturnsoutthattheinnovationvariablehasnegative,yetinsignificant,coefficientsbothinthegrowthandthesurvivalequations.However,thisisafirstindicationthatinnovationmightnotsupportgrowthandsurvivaloffirmsinatransitioneconomy.Thisstandsincontrasttotheempiricalresultsestimatedforfirmsinnon-transitioncountries(seee.g.Hall1987,CefisandMarsili2006).Wearenotawareofastudythatdirectlycomparesnon-transitionandtransitioncountries.CONCEPTUALFRAMEWORKFirmperformancewithrespecttoR&Dhasbeenmeasuredbyavarietyofindicatorssuchasproductivity,profitability,andfirm,sstockmarketvaluations.Inthispaperweemployabroadmeasureencompassingproductivity,profitabilityandstockmarketvalue.Weapproximatetheoverallfirmvaluebyfirmscreditratings.Thefirmvalueisexpectedtoreflectthevalueofbothtangibleassetsandintangibleassets,inparticularknowledgecapital,theintangibleassetscreatedbyR&Dactivity.Itaccountsforbusinessandfinancialrisks,suchasindustrycharacteristics,competitiveposition,management,productivity,profitability,liquidityaswellasfinancialpolicyandflexibility.Thusitreflectsbothcurrentlyobservablefirmcharacteristicsandexpectationsregardingfuturedevelopments.Thestatementthatinnovativeactivityisariskyundertakingisclosetotriviality.Riskisexpectedtoaffectfirmvaluenegatively,astheprobabilityofabankruptcyoratleastpaymentdelayswillincrease.However,duetothefactthatinnovationisadrivingforceforeconomicsuccess,atrade-offbetweenriskandfuturesuccessexists.Theremightwellbeaninternaloptimumwhichmeansthat'some‘R&Disuseful,whilsttoomuchR&Ddoesnotmaximizethepresentfirmvalue.Thusa"moderately5successfullyR&Dperformingfirmisexpectedtohavehighrevenuesandagoodfinancialperformance.Inthelongrunaninnovativefirmmayhavebetterchancestosurvive,ifinvestmentsintotheseactivitiesarenottoolarge.AsideofthegeneralrelevanceofevaluatingtheeffectofR&Dactivityonfirmvalue,itisofspecificinterestinthecaseofEasternGermany.WeareabletocomparethemarketeconomyofWesternGermanywithaneconomyintransitionwherebothhavethesamecurrencyunit,thesamelegalsystem,thesameeconomicsystemandallotherimportantcontributionstothebusinessenvironment.Itshouldbenoted,though,thatinEasternGermanyamuchsmallershareofallworkersiscoveredbycollectivebargainingagreementsandthatmorethan15yearsaftertheunification,wagesarestilllowerinEasternGermany,onaverage.However,thisshouldimprovethecompetitivenessoftheaffectedcompanies.AftertheGermanreunificationin1990,theEastGermanindustrialsectormoreorlesscollapsed.Theexistinglargerfirmsweresoldtonewownersandarestructuringprocesstookplace.Amongintroductionsofotherpolicymeasures,R&Dhasbeenheavilysubsidizedinordertospeeduptheconvergenceprocess.Fosteringinnovationisclearlyintendedtoimprovethecompetitivenessofthecompaniesinquestionandthiswashighlyneededfortheformerproducersinacentrallygovernedplanningsociety.Inordertobeasuccessfulstimulustothecatching-upprocess,thesubsidiesmustbeusedefficientlywithinthefirm.Assaidaboveweusecreditratingsasthevariablereflectingeconomicperformanceofafirm.Inasecondstepofouranalysisweinvestigatewhethertheresultswefindwithrespecttotheratingarealsoreflectedinotherperformanceindicators.SinceEasternGermanfirmsare,onaverage,muchyoungerandsmallerthanWesternGermanfirms,theyfacehighermarketuncertainty.Thiscouldresultinmoreconservativeratingssimplyduetolackingtrackrecordsandexperiencewithsuchbusinesses.Inordertoassessapotentialdownwardbiasfornon-economicallymotivatedreasonsbytheratingagency,weverifyourfindingonthecreditratingbyanestimationofasecondequation.Asanalternativetotherating,weconsiderfinancialdistress.Althoughweobserveactualbankcruptcy,too,weprefertouseabroadermeasureoffinancialdistress,becausefirmbankruptciesarerareevents,andtheeconometricanalysisofsuchisdifficult.Financialdistressisdescribedbythepaymentbehavioroffirms.Adefaultiscertainlyanincidencethatalenderdefinitelywantstoavoid,butlatepaymentsarealsoaproblemandusuallyrelatedtofinanciallossesand,inaddition,itmaybeawarningthatmoreseriousproblemscouldariseinthenearfuture.Therefore,webelievethatpaymentbehaviorisanobjectivemeasureconcerningtheriskof