監(jiān)管科技對美國銀行業(yè)金融不端行為合規(guī)風險的影響-英

Jeyasingh

DigitalEconomyandSustainableDevelopment

/10.1007/s44265-023-00024-z

(2023)1:24

DigitalEconomyandSustainableDevelopment

REVIEWOpenAccess

ImpactofRegTechoncomplianceriskduetofnancialmisconductintheUnitedStatesbankingindustry

BenitaBommiFeliciaJeyasingh1*

Abstract

Financialmisconductisagrowingissueinthefnancialsector,leadingtoincreasedregulations.Theincreasedneed

tocomplywiththeseregulationsprecededtheneedforregulatorytechnology.Regulatorytechnology(RegTech)

helpsthefnancialindustrycomplywithregulations.Thisstudyaimstoidentifyregulatorytechnology’simpact

onfnancialmisconductwithintheUnitedStatesbankingindustry.Thisstudyusesanevidence-basedapproach

tohelpmakeinformeddecisionsonadoptingregulatorytechnologytocontrolfnancialmisconduct.Theresearcherusedthequalitative,RapidEvidenceAssessmentmethodologytofndtenarticles(quantitativeandqualitative),criti-callyappraise,code,andsynthesizethemtoprovidefndingsandrecommendationstotheUnitedStatesbanking

industry,regulatoryagencies,andregulatorytechnologysolutionproviders.DatafromtheFinancialIndustryRegula-toryAuthorityannualreportsandFinancialCrimeEnforcementstatisticshelpedtriangulatethefndingsfromtheevi-dencesynthesistoincreasethestudy’svalidity.TheresultsindicatedthattheadoptionofRegTechprovidedadvancedriskassessmentandmonitoringcapabilitiesthatincreasedcompliancewithregulations,minimizedfnancialmiscon-duct,andimprovedthestabilityandproftabilityoftheUnitedStatesbankingsystemthoughitintroducedinforma-tionprivacyrisk.

KeywordsBanking,Financialinstitutions,RegTech,Regulatorytechnology,SupTech,Supervisorytechnology

Te2008bankingcrisisexposedfnancialmisconductintheindustryandresultedinnewregulationswithinthefnancialsector.McGrathandWalker(

2022

)indicatedthatmisconductisagrowingissueinthefnancialsector.Tismisconducthasincreasedregulationsintheindus-try,leadingtotheemergenceofregulatorytechnology(Lynnetal.

2019

).TeDodd-FrankActandConsumerProtectionActwereenactedwithintheUnitedStatestoprotectfnancialinstitutionsfromfurthercrisesduetofnancialmisconduct.Toughtheseregulationshelpminimizeriskstofnancialinstitutions,implement-ingtheseregulationswasexpensive.EllisGutshall,CEO

*Correspondence:

BenitaBommiFeliciaJeyasingh

benitabommi@

1DoctoralStudent,UniversityofMarylandGlobalCampus,Maryland,USA

(ChiefExecutiveOfcer)ofValleyBank,indicatedthatitcostsbankscloseto12%oftheoperatingcostsorapprox-imately$50billionannuallytocomplywiththeregula-tions(Dodd-FrankAct’sEfectsonFinancialServicesCompetition

2012

).Tisincreaseinoperationalexpensesburdenssmallerbanks,causingsmallerbankstohavealessercompetitiveadvantageoverlargerbanks.Inasur-veyconductedbytheWorldBank,researcherssuggestedthatatleasthalfofthefnancialinstitutionssurveyedworldwidenotedthatregulatoryandsupervisorycom-pliancewasoneoftheirtopthreechallenges(Feyenetal.

2022

).RegulatorycomplianceisenforcedusingRegTech,orregulatorytechnology,solutions.Supervisorycompli-ancebysupervisoryauthoritiesisenforcedbySupTech,orsupervisorytechnology,whichisnothingbutRegTechforsupervisoryauthorities.

springer

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JeyasinghDigitalEconomyandSustainableDevelopment(2023)1:24Page2of15

RegTechandSupTecharesoftwaretechnologiesthathaveemergedtoeaseregulatoryandsupervisorycompli-ancebyminimizingoperationcosts.Takor(

2020

)indi-catedthatUnitedStatesbankshadpaidover$200billioninfnesforfnancialmisconductpost-2009.RegTechhelpsidentifyinstancesoffnancialmisconductandsavesbanksthecostofpenaltiesduetofnancialmiscon-duct(diCastrietal.

2018

).MultiplesurveysbymarketresearchcompaniesindicatedthatRegTechisontracktoshowacompoundgrowthrateofover20%between2023–2027(RegTechMarket—GlobalForecastto

2026

,

2022

).TispaperexploredtheimpactofRegTechinaddressingcomplianceriskduetofnancialmisconductwithintheUSbankingsystem,whereriskisdefnedbytheFederalBankofNewYorkas“thepotentialforbehav-iorsorbusinesspracticesthatareillegal,unethical,orcontrarytoafrm’sstatedbeliefs,values,policies,andprocedures”(Chalyetal.

2017

,pp.5).

1Problemstatement

TebankingindustryintheUnitedStatesisregulatedmainlybyprudentialorconsumerprotectionregulations.Prudentialregulationsensureafnancialinstitution’sfnancialsoundnessandstability;consumerprotectionregulationsprotectconsumers.Teseregulationsareinplacetomonitorandpreventfnancialmisconduct.Failuretocomplywiththeseregulationsresultsinheftybankingfnes.Financialmisconductcanfallundertwobroadclassifcations:

1.Misconductbyconsumerswhichincludesmoneylaundering,identitytheft,fraud,andfnanceofter-rorism.

2.Misconductbybanksincludesmonopolizingthemarket,lackofconsumerdataprotection,discrimi-natorypractices,risk-takingthatafectsthebank’sstability,andinsidertrading.

Forthisstudy,fnancialmisconductincludesbothmis-conductbyconsumersandmisconductbybanks.ManylawshelpcurbfnancialmisconductbyconsumersandbankswithintheUnitedStates.Tefundamentallawsare:

1.Dodd-FrankAct–Tisactmonitoredthefnancialstabilityofmajorfnancialinstitutionswhosefail-urecouldimpacttheeconomy,preventedpreda-torylendingpractices,settheVolckerrulewhichrestrictedhowbankscaninvest,monitoredtheissuanceofreliablecreditratings,andestablishedawhistleblowerprogramthathelpsreportsecuritiesfraud.Tislawwaspartiallyrolledbackin2018toexemptsmallbanks.

2.BankSecrecyAct(BSA)(U.S.C

1970

)–Tisactpre- ventslaunderingmonetaryinvestments,engaging infnancialtransactionsinpropertyderivedfrom unlawfulactivities,andstructuringtransactionsto evadereportingrequirements.Accordingtothisact, anytransactionoverUS$10,000shouldbereported.3.FederalDepositInsurance(FDI)(U.S.C

1950

)–Te FDIActdeemscertainpracticeslikeoperatingwith inadequatecapital,engaginginhazardouslending andlaxcollectionpractices,engaginginspeculative investments,failingtomaintaincontrolledaccount- ingpractices,havingexcessiveloanlosses,ornon-earningassetsasunsafeandunsoundanddeemsany

bankinginstitutionthatengagesinthesepracticesasdisplayingfnancialmisconduct(FDIC

2023

).

4.BaselIII(Ferreiraetal.

2019

)–Tisglobalframe-worksetsregulationstoenhancetheshock-absorb-ingcapabilitiesofbanksbyspecifyingcapitalade-quacyandliquidityratiosandconductingperiodicstresstests.TeseruleswereimplementedintheUSbankingindustrystartingin2013.

TereareseveralregulatoryagencieswithintheUnitedStatestoenforcetheselaws.Itisdifcultforbankstoassessiftheycomplywiththeseregulationssincetheywouldneedtosiftthroughmassivedata,whichcanbetimeandresource-consuming,butnotdoingsomayresultinheftyfnes.RegTechisusedtohelpbankssiftthroughdataandmanagecomplianceregulations.RegTechisasoftwaresolutionthatlever-agesartifcialintelligence,machinelearning,block-chain,API(ApplicationProgrammingInterface),orothertechnologiestomonitorforfnancialmisconductinthefollowingareas:RiskandComplianceManage-ment,IdentityManagement,RegulatoryReporting,Anti-MoneyLaundering(AML)andFraudManage-ment,andRegulatoryIntelligence.EarlieridentifcationofmisconductusingRegTechsolutionssavesbanksfromreputationaldamagesandfnes.

RegTechhasgainedpopularityafterthe2008bankingcrisiswithmanyregulatoryagenciesandbanksusingRegTech,however,thereisstillahighrateoffnancialmisconductreported,someofwhichhaveledtobank-ingfailures.So,didRegTechhelptoreducefnancialmisconduct?Tisquerymotivatedtheresearchques-tion:WhatistheimpactofRegTechoncomplianceriskduetofnancialmisconductwithintheUSbankingindustry?

TeCIMO(Context,Intervention.Mechanism,Out-come)frameworkaidedinframingtheresearchques-tion,asshowninTable

1

,sincetheframeworkfacilitatesadesign-orientedresearchquestion,whichhelpsoferpracticalinterventions/solutionstoissuesfacedby

JeyasinghDigitalEconomyandSustainableDevelopment(2023)1:24Page3of15

Table1FramingtheresearchquestionusingtheCIMOframework

CIMOframework

REAScope

Context

TheUSbankingindustry

Intervention

Regulatorytechnology

Mechanism

DetectAML/counterfnancingofterrorists(CFT),regulatoryreporting,

fraud,identitytheft,insidertrading,suspiciousactivity,monopolizingmar-ket,lackofconsumerdataprotection,discriminatorypractices,risk-takingthatafectsthebank’sstability,

Outcome

Bankingindustry—Positiveoutcome—CompliantbankingindustryNegativeoutcome—anindustrywithrampantfnancialmisconduct

policymakers,managementprofessionals,andorganiza-tionsacrossdiferentcontexts(Costaetal.

2018

).

2Signifcanceofthestudy

RegTechisanextensivelyresearchedtopic.However,morestudiesdiscussthepotentialimpactsofRegTechratherthanthecurrentorpastimpact.Also,mostsystematicreviewsinthisfeldevaluatethediferentRegTechtechnologiesandregulationsanddiscusspossi-bleapplicationareasforRegTech(TsangandYang

2018

).Inrecentmonths,manynewsarticleshavereportedUSbanksshuttingdownduetobankruns(Smolenski

2023

).KnowingwhetherRegTechwouldhavepreventedtheseshutdownsbyfaggingthebanks’fnancialmisconductaheadofasolvencyissuewouldprovidevaluableinfor-mationtothemanagementoftheUSbankingindustry,theregulatorypolicymakers,andplayersintheRegTechindustry.AfewcasestudiesevaluatedtheimpactofRegTechforaparticularapplicationlikeAMLor‘KnowYourCustomer’(KYC)intheUSbankingindustry.How-ever,thereneededtobeamorecumulativeevidence-basedreviewoftheimpactofRegTechacrossdiferentapplicationslikeunifedreportingofcompliancereportstodetectmisconduct,riskassessmentandmonitoringtodetectmisconductandenforcementofcomplianceregu-lationsintheUSbankingindustry.Tisstudyfllsthelit-eraturegapandprovidesinsightstothebankingindustryregardingthebeneftsofinvestmentsinRegTech,whichcontributetoacompliantandsafeUSbankingsystem.

3Literaturelandscape

Regulatingagenciesshowedrenewedinterestinregula-torytechnologyafterthe9/11attacksandthebubblein2001(Arneretal.

2017

).Regulatingagenciesandthebankingindustryfocusedondetectingfnancialmisconductrelatedtoterroristfunding,moneylaunder-ingactivities,andrampantspeculationinthesecuritymarketthatledtoeconomicinstability.Tisfocusledtotheinitialgrowthofregulatorytechnology.Regulatingagenciessoonrealizedthatfnancialinstitutionshadno

uniformreportingstandardsandbeganimplementingandmandatingeXtensibleBusinessReportingLanguage(XBRL).

Between2001and2014,therewereseveralarticlesrelatedtotheimplementationofXBRL(eXtensibleBusinessReportingLanguage).SomearticlesdiscussedXBRLcasestudies(Chen

2010

),andsomediscussedtheimpactsofXBRL(Blankespooretal.

2014

;HaoandKohlbeck

2013

).Itwasonlyin2015thatthetermRegTechwascoinedbytheUnitedKingdom’sFinancialConductAuthority(FCA)(Turkietal.

2020

).

Between2015and2023,therehasbeenanincreaseinpublicationsrelatedtoRegTech.Tisspurtcoin-cideswithRegTechinvestmentswhichhaveoctupledfromUS$1.1billionin2015toUS$8.5billionin2019(Howell,

2022

).TepublicationsduringthistimemainlyfocusedontheavailableRegTechsolutionsandapplica-tions(Drgonetal.

2021

;Fletcheretal.

2021

;VonSolms2021),frauddetection(Kurum

2023

;PhillipsandMcDer-mid

2021

;Sater

2020

),unifedreporting(MousaandPinsker

2020

;SuwardiandTohang

2017

),andfuturisticdatacollectionandprocessingusingartifcialintelligence(AI)andNaturalLanguageProcessing(NLP)(MarinaA.Aksenova

2022

;MichelerandWhaley

2020

;SoldatosandKyriazis

2022

).

4Theoreticalframework

Teagencytheoryoriginatedinthe1970sandiscom-monlyusedineconomicandmanagementliteraturetoaddressgovernancemechanismsthatregulateconfictofinterest(Chenetal.

2012

).Teauthorshipoftheagencytheoryiscontendedbetweentwotheorists,StephenRossandBarryMitnick(Mitnick

2006

).Teagencytheoryattemptstodefnetherelationshipbetweentheprinci-palandtheagent,wheretheprincipalreliesontheagenttoexecutespecifctasks.Tetheoryassumesthattheprincipalandtheagentoperatetowardstheirself-inter-estswhichmightbeconficting,andthattheagenthasmoreaccesstodataandabettercapacitytomakedeci-sions.Tetheoryalsopostulatesthatregulatingconfict

JeyasinghDigitalEconomyandSustainableDevelopment(2023)1:24Page4of15

betweentheprincipalandtheagentreducestheagency’sloss.

Lookingattheresearchquestionthroughthelensoftheagencytheory,theprincipalcanbetheregulatoryagencywhentheagentisthefnancialinstitutionortheprincipalcanbethefnancialinstitutionwhentheagentistheconsumer(seeFig.

1

).Teregulatingagencyisinterestedinfnancialstabilityandimprovingthenation’ssecuritypostureandeconomicstance.Tebankingindustryisinterestedinmaximizingproftatthecostofhigherrisksleadingtofnancialmisconduct(Iqbaletal.

2015

)whichcanpotentiallydestabilizethenation’secon-omyleadingtoagencyconfict.Consumersdrivenbytheirneedsalsoindulgeinfnancialmisconduct(Karpof

2021

)whichlowersthebankingindustry’sproftcausingaconfictwiththefnancialinstitution’sgoal.RegulatorylawsenforcedusingRegTechmanagetheseconfictsofinterestbyenforcingcompliancetohelpalignthedifer-entstakeholders’interestsandreduceagencyproblems.

Inadditiontoregulatingconfictsofinterestbetweenregulatoryagenciesandfnancialinstitutions,andcon-sumersandfnancialinstitutions,thebankingindustryusesRegTechtoself-regulate.Largeamountsofdataareaccessibletoeachfnancialinstitutionandminedforself-regulation(Tuch

2018

).Examplesareminingcon-sumercomplaintstoidentifydiscriminatorypractices(Siering

2022

)andminingconsumerdatatoidentifyriskyconsumers(GrassiandLanfranchi

2022

).Regulat-ingagenciesreceivevastamountsofdatafromnumerous

fnancialinstitutions.Tisdatahelpsregulateandaddresspotentialconfictsofinterestbetweentheregu-latingagencyandthebankingindustry.Resolutionofalldisputesresultsinacompliantbankingindustryandreduceslosstothebankingindustry.Incontrast,con-fictsdestabilizethebankingindustryandpossiblythenation’seconomy.

5Methodology

Tisstudyusesanevidence-basedmethodology.Rous-seau(

2006

)suggestedthatusingempiricalevidencetomakemanagementdecisionsisbetterthanusingper-sonalpreferences.Toaddressthereviewquestion,theapproachemployedwastherapidevidenceassessment(REA)methodology,whichreliesonsolidevidence.Sys-tematicreviews(SR)areefectiveinsynthesizingevi-dence;however,ittypicallytakes6–24monthstogetresultsfromasystematicreview(Moonsetal.

2021

).Tebankingindustryisdynamicandrapidlychanging,sothetimetogeneratesystematicreviewsimpedesmakingquickevidence-baseddecisions.Also,systematicreviewsintroducebiasintothestudyduetotheirsubjectivenature(Crawfordetal.

2015

).However,theREAtakesbetween4–8weeksandprovideshigh-qualityevidenceprovidingsimilarresultstosystematicreviews,makingitamoreviablechoicetoproviderapidevidence(Moonsetal.

2021

).

Goughetal.(

2012

)suggestedthatconfgurativereviewsusingthematicsynthesisaimatfndingpatterns

INTEREST

INTEREST

Fig.1Thetheoreticalframeworkofagencytheory

JeyasinghDigitalEconomyandSustainableDevelopment(2023)1:24Page5of15

thatanswerthereviewquestionfttingly.Tisstudyisexploratory;hence,aqualitative,confgurativereviewapproachwasusedalongwithdatatriangulation.Datawasselectedbasedonitsrelevanceandcontributiontothestudyandsynthesizedusingathematicapproachtoarriveatthefndings.

6Searchstrategy

Teauthorimplementedastructuredsearchstrategy,assuggestedbyGoughetal.(

2017

).Teinclusion/exclusioncriteriaweredefned.Tisstudyusedpeer-reviewed,primaryresearchandempiricalstudies,pri-marilypublishedinscholarlyjournals,inEnglish,from2008—2023.BustinandNolan(

2016

)suggestedthatpeer-reviewed,scholarlyjournalshavehightranspar-encyandreliability.Testudiesselectedwerefrom2008–2023sincethebankingregulationschangeddras-ticallyafterthebankingcrisisin2008andcausedthespurtofmanyRegTechcompanies.

TesearchquerywasbasedonsearchstringsdesignedusingtheCIMOframework,asshowninTable

2

.Booleanandwildcardoperatorswereusedinthesearchstringstoincreasethespecifcityandsen-sitivityofthesearch.Increasingthesearchspecifcityandsensitivityalsopreventsbiasinresearchandhelpslocaterelevantstudies(Barendsetal.

2017

;HaynesandWilczynski

2004

).Grewaletal.(

2016

)suggestedthatthekeytoproperresearchisanextensivedatasearch;therefore,searchquerieswereexecutedonmultipledatabasesusingfoursearchstrings.TedatabasesusedforthesearchwereBusinessSourceUltimate,Scien-ceDirect,DirectoryofOpenAccess,AcademicSearchUltimate,EmeraldInsight,ABI/Inform,JournalStor-age(JSTOR),Scopus,GoogleScholar,SocialScienceResearchNetwork(SSRN),andSecuritiesandExchangeCommission(SEC)publications.Buildingblocksandsnowballsearchtechniqueswereusedformorecom-prehensiveresults(Goodmanetal.,

2014

).

Table2FramingthesearchstringsusingtheCIMOframework

CIMOframework

REAscope

Searchstrings

Context

TheUSbankingindustry

Bank*ORfnance*n2institution*

Intervention

Regulatorytechnology

RegTech*OR(regulat*n3tech*)ORXBRL

Mechanism

DetectAML,Counterfnancingofterrorism(CFT),regulatory

reporting,fraud,identitytheft,insidertrading,suspiciousactivity

AML*OR(mone*n3launder*)ORCFTOR(terroris*n3fnanc*)OR(fnancia*n3misconduct*)OR(identity*theft)ORKYC

OR(inside*n2trad*)OR(regulatoryn3report*)

Table3Searchdatabasesandresultclassifcation

Databases

Numberof

Results

Articlefound

ArticleType

Geography

BusinessSourceUltimate

24

ComplementaryIndex

18

DirectoryofOpenAccessJournals

7

(HaoandKohlbeck

2013

)

Quantitative

USA

Backwardsnowballon(HaoandKohlbeck

2013)

(MousaandPinsker

2020

)

Qualitative

USA

AcademicSearchUltimate

7

ScienceDirect

3

EmeraldInsight

3

Mixed

USA

Scopus

124

(Tuch

2018

)

(Jayasuriyaetal.

2023

)

(SefriedandRiepe

2023

)

Qualitative

Quantitative

Quantitative

USA

USA

USA

ABI/INFORM

1537

Qualitative

USA

ScienceDirect

29

(Anagnostopoulos

2018

)

Qualitative

USA

Forwardsnowballon(Anagnostopoulos

2018)

20

(Siering

2022

)

Quantitative

USA

GoogleScholar

3186

(SuwardiandTohang

2017

)

(Barefoot

2020

)

(Arneretal.

2017

)

Quantitative

Qualitative

Qualitative

USA

USA

USA

SEC

1

(McGlossonandEnriquez

2023

)

Qualitative

USA

JSTOR

5

Qualitative

USA

SSRN

1

(Rapp

2018

)

Qualitative

USA

JeyasinghDigitalEconomyandSustainableDevelopment(2023)1:24Page6of15

Table

3

displaysthesearchresultsandprovidesinfor-mationabouteachstudy’smethodologyandgeogra-phy.Acriticalappraisalofthetwelvearticlesretrievedfromthesearchresultedinthefnalsampleusedforthestudy.Tesearchstrategywasdocumentedwitha

PRISMA,asshowninFig.

2

.PRISMAisanevidence-basedmethodofreportingstudyselectiontoavoidpublicationbias(BrooksandMcNeely

2013

).

Fig.2PRISMAforsearchstrategyNote.ThisfgurewasconstructedusingaPRISMAfowdiagramgenerator(Haddawayetal.

2022

)

JeyasinghDigitalEconomyandSustainableDevelopment(2023)1:24Page7of15

7Criticalappraisal

CriticalappraisalofthestudiesisacrucialstepsinceKepesetal.(

2014

)suggestthatestablishingthetrust-worthinessoftheevidenceyieldsmeaningfulresults.Multipletoolsareavailabletoappraiseastudycritically.Teappraisaltoolswereevaluatedbasedontherecom-mendationsofBhattacherjee(

2012

),Kepesetal.(

2014

),Rousseau(

2006

),andGough(

2007

)toappraiserigor,transparency,signifcance,andrelevance.Eachcriterionusedascaleofthree,withthehighestpossiblescoreof12andthelowestscoreofzero.TeMixedMethodsAppraisalTool(MMAT)variationtool(Munroetal.

2021

)scoredlowontransparencybuthighonrigor,sig-nifcance,andrelevance.TeTAPUPASMtool(RyanandRutty

2019

)scoredhighontransparency.TeMMATvariationtoolhadclearlydefnedquestionsevaluatinganarticle.However,sincetheTAPUPASMtoolwassubjec-tive,objectivequestionswereframedforthetranspar-encytenetwithintheTAPUPASMframeworkbasedoninsightsfromRyanandRutty(

2019

).Hence,bothtoolswerecombinedtocreateanewappraisaltoolthatkeepstherigor,signifcance,andrelevanceelementsoftheMMATvariationtoolandaddstheelementoftrans-parencytothetool.TecombinedMMATandTrans-parencyframeworkevaluatedtheinitial12articlesidentifed.

IfthescreeningquestionsintheMMATappraisaltoolhadaresponseof“No”or“Can’ttell,”itwasdeemedthatfurtherappraisalwasnotappropriate(Hongetal.

2018

,p.5).TecombinedMMATandTransparencyframe-workassignedascaleofthreeforeachcriterion,withthehighestpossiblescoreof24andthelowestscoreofzero.Testudyonlyselectedarticlesthathadascoreof12orhigher.Terefore,articlesbySiering(

2022

)andTuch(

2018

)werenotincluded,leavingatotalof10articles

selectedbasedontheselectioncriterion.Table

4

displaystheappraisalscoresforall12articles.

Acrucialcriticismoftherapidevidencemethodologyisthatitlackstransparencyandrigor(Varkeretal.2015).UsingtoolslikePRISMAandMMATtoreporttranspar-entlyonthesearchstrategyandcriticallyappraisetheevidenceensuresthestudy’shightransparency,quality,andrigor(Varkeretal.2015).

8Dataextraction

Adataextractionprocesswasusedtominimizebiasandassessthestudiesfortherelevanceofthesample(Munnetal.,2014).Tedataextractedincludedtheauthor,title,sampledescription,methodology,hypothesis,pri-maryfndings,andstudylimitationsdescribedbyeachauthor.Afterdataextraction,adatadescriptordescrib-ingthedatasetwasconstructed,asshowninTable

5

.

Table5Datasetdescriptor

Descriptor

Sub-DescriptorArticleCount

TargetReaderPopulation

Bankingregulators,RegTechsolutionproviders,Bankmanagement

NumberofArticles

Yearofpublication

10

2008–2017

2018–2023

3

7

ResearchDesign

Qualitative

Quantitative

Mixed-Methods

5

5

0

Sampledistribution

USABanks

5

Outcomes

USARegulators

Positiveimpact

Negativeimpact

Positiveandnegativeimpacts

5

10

4

4

Table4Appraisalresults

ScholarlyArticle

Journal

MMAT+Transparency(Maxscore:24)

(HaoandKohlbeck

2013

)

JournalofEmergingTechnologiesinAccounting

23

(Siering

2022

)

DecisionSupportSystems

4

(SuwardiandTohang

2017

)

AustralasianAccounting,BusinessandFinanceJournal

20

(McGlossonandEnriquez

2023

)

JournalofFinancialCompliance

12

(MousaandPinsker

2020

)

QualitativeResearchinAccounting&Management

19

(Tuch

2018

)

TheGeorgeWashingtonLawReview

3

(Jayasuriyaetal.

2023

)