用于應(yīng)急響應(yīng)的數(shù)字現(xiàn)金轉(zhuǎn)賬：喀麥隆的經(jīng)驗(yàn)教訓(xùn)（英）

PublicDisclosureAuthorizedPublicDisclosureAuthorizedPublicDisclosureAuthorizedPublicDisclosureAuthorized

DigitalCashTransfersforEmergencyResponse:

LessonsfromCameroon

IoanaBoteaandOmarNdiaye1

ExecutiveSummary

InresponsetotheCOVID-19pandemic,thegovernmentofCameroonlaunchedanemergencycashtransfersprograminurbanareas.Itaimedtomitigatetheadverseeconomicimpactsbyprovidingtemporaryincomesupporttopoorinformalsectorworkersunabletoaccessothersocialprotectionbenefits.Eightythousandbeneficiaries,mostlywomen,wereselectedtoreceivethreetransfersamountingtoUSD275(FCFA180,000).

Aprocessevaluationwasconductedin2021todocumentlessonslearnedfromthisfirstexperiencewithdigitalgovernment-to-people(G2P)paymentsinCameroon.Theevaluationcombinedextensiveconsultationswithprojectimplementorsaswellasfocusgroupdiscussionsandphonesurveyswithbeneficiaries.

Theresearchrevealedastrongdemandformobilemoneypaymentsamongtheurbancashtransfersbeneficiaries.Asubstantialmajority(78percent)expressedapreferenceforpaymentsdirectlyintotheirmobilemoneyaccountsratherthanincashorthroughothermethods.Thispreferencecanbelinkedtothealreadyhighpenetrationrates:95percentofbeneficiarieshadmobilemoneyaccountsbeforetheproject.However,it'simportanttoacknowledgethatthispreferencemightnotentirelyrepresentthebroaderpopulation,particularlyinruralareas.Challengespersistintheseregionsconcerningnetworkcoverage,civilregistration,andfinancialliteracy.

1TheauthorsexpressgratitudetoHeriniainaAndrianasy,LauraBermeo,andGeorginaMarinfortheirinvaluablefeedback.Additionally,specialthankstotheSocialSafetyNetsProjectImplementationUnitfortheircomments,andtoAmbikaSharmaforherinputsandeditingsupport.ThisnoteisbasedonaprocessevaluationconductedbyAmaranteConsultingincollaborationwithFINACTUandSACInternational.

Threemainlessonsemerged:

First,digitalG2Ppaymentsrequireanenablinglegalandregulatoryenvironment.Asgovernmentsshifttolarge-scaledigitalcashtransfers,akey“teething”challengemayberegulatory.InCameroon,proofofpaymentrestrictionsforpublicfundspreventeddirectmobilemoneytransfers.Theprogramhadtoinsteadcontracteligiblefinancialinstitutions,whichinturnleveragedtheirpartnershipswithmobilenetworkoperatorstoprocessdigitaltransferstobeneficiaries.Thisrequirementaddedalayerinthepaymentprocesswhichcouldbeavoidedthroughregulatoryreform.

Second,digitalpaymentscallforrobustdatamanagementalongthedeliverychain.Theshiftfromcashtodigitaltransfersinvolvesmorethanmodernizingthepaymentmethods;itentailsinstitutingnovelprocessestoensureaccurateandconsistentbeneficiarydataacrossprogramactivities.InCameroon,inaccurateorincompletedataonID,SIMcard,andfinancialaccountownershipcollectedduringbeneficiaryregistrationledtomultiplevalidationcyclesandsubstantialdelays.Collectingreliableinformationonkeyinputsfordigitalpaymentsemergedasparticularlyimportantforwomenduetotheirlowercivilregistrationandfinancialinclusionrates.

Third,establishingastrongandeffectivetwo-waycommunicationwithbeneficiariesiskey.Awell-definedcommunicationstrategybetweenthegovernment,itsimplementingpartners,andbeneficiariesisinstrumentalforensuringtransparencyandexpeditingtheidentificationandresolutionofissues.Duetothemultiplelayersofactors,last-milecommunicationaroundtheemergencycashtransferswasnotalwaysefficientandledtoconfusionanddistrustamongsomebeneficiaries.Thechallengewasexacerbatedbythelimitedawarenessoftheexistenceofthecallcenterforreportingcomplaintsandpaymentincidents.Robustcommunicationandgrievanceredressmechanismsare,therefore,essentialformeaningfulbeneficiaryengagementandsuccessfulimplementation.

TherehavebeenseveraldevelopmentssincetheCOVID-19emergencyresponseandaccompanyingprocessevaluation.Crucially,thegovernmentissuedinSeptember2022adecreeallowingdigitalgovernment-to-peopleandpeople-to-governmentpayments.ThisrepresentsagamechangerfordigitalpaymentsinCameroonandsetsthestageforscalingupthemodeltoothersafetynetsbeneficiaries.

Overall,theCameroonexperienceillustratesthecommitmentofgovernmentstobringininnovativedigitalsolutionstotraditionaldeliverysystems.ItfurtherdemonstratesthefeasibilityofdigitalG2Ppaymentsonceinitial“teething”challengesassociatedwiththistransitionareaddressed.Combinedwiththestrongpreferenceamongrecipientstoreceivesafetynetsbenefitsdirectlyintoamobileaccount(vs.cashorothermeans),theexperiencepointstotheCOVID-19crisisasaninflectionpointfordigitalpaymentsinCameroonandtheAfricaregionmorebroadly.Publicauthoritiesshouldleveragetheongoingadvancementsinmobilemoneyservicestoexpandtheireffortsindigitizingsocialsafetynetpayments.

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TheCOVID-19EmergencyCashTransfersinCameroon

InresponsetoeconomicshocksfromtheCOVID-19pandemic,theCamerooniangovernmentlaunchedtheCOVID-19EmergencyCashTransferProgram(ECT-COVID-19)forpoorurbanhouseholds.TheECT-COVID-19wasdesignedasanemergencycomponentoftheWorldBank-financedSocialSafetyNetProject(SSNP).Launchedattheendof2020,theECT-COVID-19provided80,000householdsinthetenregionalcapitalswithUSD275equivalent(FCFA180,000)overthreetranches.2Thecashtransfersweredelivereddigitally,aninnovativeapproachthatwasafirstforthegovernmentofCameroon.

TheECT-COVID-19paymentswereprocessedbetweenAprilandNovember2021.AprocessevaluationoftheECT-COVID-19programwasconductedbetweenJulyandDecember2021toassesstheimplementationofdigitalpaymentsundertheECT-COVID-19program,identifychallengesandgoodpractices,andproviderecommendationsforscalingup.Theevaluationconsistedofapreliminarydeskreviewoftheprogram;consultationswithkeystakeholdersincludingtheMinistryofFinance,theWorldBankteam,financialserviceproviders,andtargetingagents;andamixedmethodsdatacollectionexerciseincludingsemi-structuredinterviewswith50beneficiariesandaphonesurveywith502beneficiariesabouttheirexperiencewiththeprogram.

DIGITALPAYMENTSSYSTEM

AkeychallengewithmakingthetransfersdigitallywasthatCameroondidnothavealegalframeworkauthorizingthedisbursementofpaymentsfromthepublicpursetoindividualsthroughmobilemoney.3Apaperproofofpaymentwasrequiredfortransfersmadebythegovernment,whichonlycommercialbanksandmicrofinanceinstitutions,dulyregulatedbytheCentralBank(Banquedesétatsdel’AfriqueCentrale,BEAC),couldprovide.Mobilemoneyoperatorswere,therefore,excluded.Toworkaroundthischallenge,theprojectcreativelydevisedapaymentsystemusingeligiblefinancialinstitutionsasintermediaries.

TheECT-COVID-19paymentarchitectureinvolvedfivecategoriesofactors,whoseresponsibilitiesinthepaymentchainaredescribedbelow:

?TheProjectImplementationUnit(PIU).ThePIUactedatthreelevelsinthepaymentprocess.First,itcontactedtheAutonomousSinkingFund(CaisseAutonomed'Amortissement,CAA)torequestthattheCentralBankreleasethefundstotheselectedfinancialserviceproviders(FSPs).Second,itsentthelistsofbeneficiariestothefinancialserviceproviders(FSPs)toprepareandexecutethetransferstobeneficiaries.Finally,itnotifiedthebeneficiariesofthepaymentschedulebySMS;

?TheAutonomousSinkingFund(CAA).TheCAAgavetheordertotheCentralBank—wherethefundsforcashtransferswerehoused—totransferthefundstotheFSPsintheamountrequestedbythePIU;

?TheCentralBank(BEAC).AttherequestoftheCAA,theBEACtransferredthefundstotheFSPs;

2FCFA45,000forthefirsttranche,FCFA45,000forthesecondtrancheandFCFA90,000forthethirdtranche

3The

RegulationN°04/18/CEMAC/UMAC/COBACrelatingtopaymentservicesintheE

conomicandMonetaryCommunityofCentralAfrica,

ofDecember2018,governedbytheBankofCentralAfricanStates(BEAC),specifiesinitsarticle45that:"thewritingindigitalform,canreplacethewritingonpaperandrecognizedasequivalent,inparticularwithregardtoitslegalvalidityanditsprobatoryforce,...".However,alegalframeworkfordoingsodoesnotexistinCameroon.

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?TheFinancialServiceProviders(FSP).TheFSPsmadethetransferstobeneficiaries’accounts.Oncetheyreceivedthetransfers,beneficiarieswereabletomakewithdrawalseitherattheFSP’sbranchesorthroughthepartnermobilemoneyoperator.

?Acallcenter.Atoll-freenumberwasmadeavailabletobeneficiariestoreportcomplaints.

Theinteractionbetweendifferentactorsinthepaymentprocessareillustratedinthediagrambelow:

Figure1:ECT-COVID-19ProgramPaymentSystem

FINANCIALSERVICEPROVIDERS

ThegovernmenthiredFSPsfortheECT-COVID-19throughpublictender.TheFSPswereselectedbasedonpreviousexperience,theabilitytoopenabankaccountforeachbeneficiaryandtolinkthisaccounttoadigitalwallet(mobilemoney),andgeographiccoverage.Onceselected,theFSPswerepaidalumpsumcorrespondingtothenumberofbeneficiarieslistedintheircontracts.

Throughthepublictender,twoFSPswereselected:

?YUP,themobilemoneyissuerserviceofSociétéGénéraleBank;

?CameroonCooperativeCreditUnionLeague(CamCCUL),amicrofinanceinstitution.

TheprocurementprocessincludedthedecisionontheregionsandnumberofbeneficiariestobecoveredbyeachFSP,basedonthetechnicalandfinancialproposalsreceivedduringthebiddingprocess.Thus,theFSPswereassignedregions(andbeneficiaries)bytheprogramratherthanbeingchosenbybeneficiaries.

The80,000beneficiariesweredividedbetweenthetwoFSPsasfollows:

?YUPcovered6ofthe10regions(Adamaoua,North,FarNorth,Centre,South,East)foratotalof45,000beneficiariesacross21municipalities;

?CamCCULcoveredtheremaining4regions(Littoral,West,Northwest,Southwest)foratotalof35,000beneficiariesacross15municipalities.

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TheFSPsperformedseveralkeyroles:

?Openingafinancialbankaccountforeachbeneficiaryinaccordancewithlegalregulations;

?Connectingthebankaccountofeachbeneficiarytoher/hismobilemoneywallet;

?Trainingbeneficiariesonhowtoaccesstheiraccountsusingtheirphones:enrollmentcentersweresetupineachurbanarea,wherebeneficiariesreceivedface-to-facetrainingonhowtosecurethemobilemoneyaccount,howtowithdrawmoney,andhowtouseothermobilemoneyservices;

?Facilitatingsecureaccesstoaccountsthroughthephone,includingbyassistingbeneficiariestoregisterSIMcardsandretrievetheirmobilemoneyPINcode;

?TransferringthefundstobeneficiaryaccountsaccordingtoascheduledefinedbythePIU;

?SendingtothePIUtheproofofpayment,i.e.,computerizedlistingsandtransferordersdated,signed,andsealedbytheFSP;

?SharingwiththePIUapaymentreportaftereachpaymenttranche,indicatinganydifficultiesandasummarystatementoftheamountreceivedbytheFSP,theamounttransferredtothebeneficiaries,theamountnottransferred,andthelistofbeneficiariestowhomthemoneywasnottransferred;

?SharingwiththePIU,afterthecompletionofallthreetranches,afinalfinancialreportindicatingthetotalamountreceived,thetotalamounttransferredtothebeneficiaries,thetotalamountnotreceived,andthelistofbeneficiarieswhodidnotreceivetheirtransfers;

?ReturningtotheCAAanymoneyfrombeneficiaryaccountsthathadnowithdrawalsortransactionsfortwomonthsafterthetransfer.Giventhelevelofpovertyandvulnerabilityofthehouseholds,alackofanytransactionuponreceivingthetransferwouldwasconsideredhighlyunlikely.

OVERVIEWOFTHEIMPLEMENTATIONCYCLE

TheECT-COVID-19implementationcycleconsistedofthefollowingfivesteps:

1)Sensitization:Theprogramstartedbyraisingawarenessamongthetargetpopulationonkeyobjectives,eligibilitycriteria,andactivities.

2)Targeting:EmergencyTargetingAgents(ETAs)identified120,000potentialbeneficiaryhouseholds,whowerethenadministeredashortquestionnairetoestimatepovertystatus.Allinterviewedhouseholdsreceivedarandomlygeneratedalphanumericidentificationcode.The80,000householdsselectedasbeneficiariesweretheninvitedtoregisterusingtheiruniquecode.

3)Registration:Anadult,usuallyawoman,fromeachhouseholdwasregisteredastherecipientbyprovidingbasicinformation,includingnationalIDcardnumberandphonenumber.

4)Enrollment:TheFSPsopenedanaccountforeachregisteredcashtransferrecipientusingtheirnationalIDcard.Theaccountwasthenlinkedtoamobilemoneywallet.

5)Payment:ThefundsweretransferredtobeneficiaryaccountsandcouldbewithdrawneitherdirectlyattheFSPbranchesorthrough—thelargernetworkof—mobilemoneyagents.

Theregistration,enrollment,andpaymentphasesmostdirectlyrelatedtodigitaltransfersarediscussedinmoredetailbelow.

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BENEFICIARYREGISTRATIONANDENROLLMENT

ThebeneficiaryregistrationandenrollmentprocesswasdevelopedandimplementedjointlybythePIUandFSPteams.Enrollmentcentersweresetupineachurbanareatolimittraveltimeforbeneficiariesandtoexpediteprocessingtimes.Fourworkstationsweresetupateachenrollmentcenter,asfollows:

?AnidentificationstationmanagedbythePIU,wheretheidentityofselectedbeneficiarywasverifiedusingtheirnationalIDcard.Confirmedbeneficiarieswerethenprovidedwithanidentificationformtopresentattheregistrationstation.

?AregistrationstationmanagedbythePIU,wherethebeneficiarywasregisteredintotheprogram.Thebeneficiary’sinformationwascollectedandrecordedintheSSNP'sManagementInformationSystem(MIS)andassignedauniqueprogramIDcode.

?AcommitmentstationmanagedbythePIU,wherethebeneficiaryreceivedadditionalinformationabouttheECT-COVID-19programandsigneda“moralcontract”.4

?AnenrollmentstationmanagedbytheFSP,whichcollectedthebeneficiary'sidentificationinformationtocreatethefinancialaccount.BeneficiarieswererequiredtoshowaformofvalidnationalIDtoopenanaccount.5Beneficiarieswerealsoguidedonhowtousetheaccountandthedigitalwalletusingtheirphones(mobilemoney).TheaccountcreationprocesswassimilaratYUPandCamCCUL,withonedifference:

oAtYUP,theaccountnumbercorrespondstothe12-digittelephonenumberofthebeneficiaryandisassociatedwithamobilemoneywallet;

oAtCamCCUL,theaccountisanMFIaccountnumberwhichisconnected/linkedtotherecipient’smobilephonenumber.

ToensuresafemanagementoftheinfluxofbeneficiariesattheenrollmentcentersandtolimitphysicalcontactinaccordancewiththerequirementsoftheCOVID-19pandemic,theenrollmentschedulewascommunicatedbytheSSNPtobeneficiaryhouseholdsinadvanceviaSMS.

DIGITALPAYMENTS

Paymentswereprocessedwasasfollows:

?TheFSPsreceivedtheallocatedfundsfromtheBEAC.

?TheFSPsreceivedalistofbeneficiariesfromthePIUinapre-agreedformat.

?Followingbeneficiaryenrollment,theFSPscreatedanExcelfilecontainingthefirstname,lastname,theuniqueprogramIDcode,telephonenumberorbankaccountnumber,andamounttobetransferredforeachbeneficiary.

4The"moralcontract"issignedbythebeneficiariesuponregistrationintotheSSNP.Itspecifieswhatisexpectedofbeneficiaries,includinghowthefundsweretobeused(schoolingofchildren,creationofanincome-generatingactivity,etc.).

5Fromaregulatorypointofview,intermsoftheKnowYourCustomer(KYC)procedure,RegulationN°04/18/CEMAC/UMAC/COBAC,relatingtopaymentservicesintheEconomicandMonetaryCommunityofCentralAfrica,governedbytheBEAC,stipulatesinitsarticle38that:"Theopeningofapaymentaccountorthesubscriptiontoapaymentserviceissubjecttotheconclusionbythepaymentserviceprovideroritsdistributor,whereapplicable,andthecustomer,ofacontractwhichclearlyestablishes,inalegiblemanner,underpenaltyofnullity:theidentificationofthepaymentserviceprovider;theidentityofthecustomerinaccordancewithavalidofficialdocumentpresentedbythecustomer;...".

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?TheconsolidatedExcelfilewasloadedintotheFSPpaymentplatform.Uponvalidation,beneficiaryaccountswereinstantlycreditedwiththespecifiedtransferamount.InthecaseofYUP,thefundsweretransferreddirectlyintothemobilemoneywalletofeachbeneficiary.InthecaseofCamCCUL,thefinancialprovidermadeasimpletransfertothemicrofinanceaccountofeachbeneficiary.Beneficiariesthenreceivednotificationsontheirphonesindicatingthatthemoneyhadbeentransferred.

?YUPbeneficiariescouldwithdrawtheirmoneyatYUPmobilemoneydistributionpoints.

?CamCCULbeneficiariescouldeitherwithdrawmoneyatthelocalCamCCULbranchor,iftheyoptedtolinktheirbankaccountstoane-walletduringenrollment,withdrawtheirmoneyatMTNmobilemoneydistributionnetworkspoints.

MANAGINGCOMPLAINTSANDPAYMENTINCIDENTS

TheSSNPsetupacallcenterwithatoll-freelinetocollectandprocessbeneficiaryinquiriesandcomplaints.However,rolloutofthecallcenterwasdelayed,andmanybeneficiarieswerenotawareofthecallcenteranddidnotuseit.Thebeneficiariescomplainedaboutthelackofinformationontheprocedureandthemeansofreportingcomplaintsduringthefocusgroupsintheprocessevaluation.Atthesametime,somebeneficiariesacknowledgedthattheyhadreceivedanincidentreportingnumberorhadbeentrainedinthecomplaintreportingprocedurebutcomplainedaboutthequalityofthetrainingandtechnicalmalfunctionsofthecallplatform.

Atthecallcenterlevel,"non-payment"wasthemostcommontypeofcompliant,followedby"requestforinformation”.Thediagrambelow,takenfromtheinformationsystemofthecallcentercontractor(Lamatel,LMT)inJuly2021,showsthedifferentrequestsandcomplaintsatthecallcenter.

Figure2Distributionofreasonsforcallsreceivedatthecallcenterlevel

Source:LamatelMISreport,July2021

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LessonsfromtheEmergencyCashTransfer–COVID19

Themainchallenges,impacts,andbeneficiaryfeedbackfromtheprocessevaluationarepresentedbelow.

CHALLENGES

Keychallenges

TheprogramfacedthreekeychallengestowhichthePIUadaptedthroughdesignandimplementation:

?LackofaregulatoryandlegalframeworkfordigitalG2Ppayments.InCameroon,theMinistryofFinancedidnotacceptdigitalproofofpayments,whichexcludedmobilemoneyoperators.Theabsenceofalegalframeworkauthorizingthetransferofstatefundstoindividualsthroughmobilemoneywas,therefore,akey“teethingchallenge”fortheECT-COVID-19andtheadoptionofdigitalG2Ppaymentsmorebroadly.Toaddressthischallenge,theSSNPcontractedinsteadFSPsregulatedbytheCentralBankwhich,inturn,partneredwithmobilemoneyoperators.Thislegallimitationintroducedanewlayerinthepaymentprocessthataddedcomplexitytotheimplementationoftheprogram.

?LackofnationalIDcardsamongbeneficiaries.BeneficiarieshadtopresentproofofidentitytoopenbankaccountswiththeFSPs.ThosewhohadtoapplyfornewIDcardswereissuedwith3-monthreceiptswhilethecardswerebeingprocessed.FSPsacceptedthetemporaryreceiptasproofofidentification,butbeneficiariesfacedthesameissueafterthethreemonthsexpiredandtheywereunabletoaccesssubsequentpayments.OtherchallengesincludedalackofrequireddocumentationtoapplyforthenationalIDcardanddamagetoexistingIDcardsortemporaryreceipts.Becausewomenfacedthesechallengesdisproportionately,theprogramhadtoregisterarelativelyhighshareofmen(28percent).

?IDmismatchesbetweenSIMcards,mobilemoneyaccounts,andfinancialaccounts.Beneficiarieswereoftennotabletoprovidephonenumbersormobilemoneyaccountnumbersatthetimeofenrollment.Amongthosewhowere,manydidnothavetheSIMcardormobilemoneyaccountregisteredintheirname.TheSIMcardswereregisteredeitherinanotherhouseholdmember’snameorhadbeenacquiredfrominformalmarketswithoutaformalIDregistrationprocess.Asaresult,manybeneficiarieshadtoobtainnewSIMcardsand/orcreatenewmobilemoneyaccountsusingthesamenationalIDcard.Inaddition,therewerediscrepanciesonbeneficiaryinformationbetweentheSSNPandFSPdatabases.Reconcilingthesemismatchesandinconsistenciesrequiredrepeatedvalidationeffortsandcausedsignificantimplementationdelays.6

6Duringthefirstattempt,only38,133outofthe80,000beneficiarieswereidentifiedandhadaccountscreatedbyApril2021.Threesubsequentvalidationeffortswereconducted:29,000additionalbeneficiarieswereidentifiedandenrolledinJuly2021,another9,000beneficiarieswereaddedinSeptember2021,andafinalbatchof3,867beneficiarieswasincludedinNovember2021.

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Otherchallenges

SSNP

?Communicationchallenges:Difficultiesrelatedtothemessageandthechannelsusedtocommunicatewithbeneficiarieswerenoted.Somebeneficiaries,althoughinformedbySMSandthroughspotsbroadcastedonnationalradio,didnotshowupduringtheenrollmentphasesplannedwiththeFSPs.

FinancialServiceProviders

?Organizationallimitations:Otherchallengesincludedthefactthatenrollmentagentswereoftenlate,theenrollmentprocessmovedslowly,andtherewereerrorsintheenrollmentdatathatdelayedthecontrolandreconciliationbetweenthebeneficiarydatabasesofSSNPandtheFSPs.

?IDchallenges:Duringbeneficiaryenrollment,FSPsfacedadministrativedifficultiessuchasinvalidnationalIDcards,mismatchesbetweentheSIMcardandtheIDcard,errorsintheSSNPuniqueIDcodes,duplicatesinthebeneficiarydatabaseprovidedbytheSSNP,etc.

?Unanticipatedexpenses:TheneedtomultiplefieldoperationsduetotheIDchallengesmentionedabovegeneratedadditionalcostsfortheFSPs.

?Unreliablenetworkreception:EnrollmentwascarriedoutbyagentsusingtabletsconnectedtotheFSPs’remoteserversviamobilenetworks.Asaresult,thelackofastable,high-qualitycellphonenetworkconnectiondelayedenrollmentoperationsinsomelocations.

?Reputationalrisk:SomebeneficiariesblamedtheFSPsforlatepaymentsevenwhenthedelayswereoutoftheircontrol.

?Requestsfromnon-beneficiaries:AspikeinactivityoverloadedtheclientnetworkandsloweddowntheaccessplatformforbeneficiarieswhoreceivedfailuremessagesafterenteringUSSDcodes.

Beneficiaries

?Longwaitinglines:BeneficiariessometimesexperiencedlongwaitinglinesatthepaymentpointsduetotechnicalmalfunctionsattheFSPpaymentplatform,lackofcashatthepaymentpoint,andarushofbeneficiariestocertainpaymentpoints.

?Unexpectedwithdrawalfees:Someagentschargedrecipientsadditionalamountstowithdrawmoneyfromtheiraccounts.While95percentofbeneficiariesreportedpayingunderUSD1.5(FCFA1000),4.8percentspentUSD1.5to4.5(FCFA1000to3000)and0.6percentpaiduptoUSD7.5(FCFA5000).

?NeedfornewSIMcards:SomebeneficiarieswhohadOrangeSIMcardshadtourgentlyacquireMTNSIMcardstoreceivepaymentswithCamCCUL.A"blackmarket"forSIMcardsdevelopedinsomeenrollmentcenters,whereSIMcardsweresoldatasteeppremium(e.g.,asmuchasFCFA1000insteadofthestandard

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FCFA100).Inaddition,theacquisitionofSIMcardsfrominformalmarkets(unidentifiedSIMcards)amplifiedtheproblemofIDmismatch.7

?Longpaymentdelays:Beneficiariesreportedasubstantiallagbetweenregistrationandthenotificationthatthefirsttransferwasavailable.ThesedelaysledsomebeneficiariestomistrusttheprogramandthusnotvisittheenrollmentcentersdespitetheinvitationSMS.

?Dormantaccounts:Severalbeneficiariesdidn’tmakeanywithdrawals,usuallybecausetheywerenotawarethatthetransfershadbeenmade.Inotherinstances,beneficiarieslosttheirphones,losttheircashwithdrawalPINcode,orchangedtheirphonenumbers.Theseissueswerepredominantlyrelatedtothefirsttransferandincreasedthenumberofcomplaintsrelatedtobeneficiaryselection.

Figure3:Challengesencounteredduringthepaymentphase

Source:Samplesurvey(basedonasampleof502randomlyselectedrecipients)

7TheissuehassincebeenresolvedthroughapartnershipbetweenCamCCULandOrangethatnowmakesitpossibleforCamCCULtoalsomakepaymentstobeneficiarieswithOrangephonenumbers.

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BENEFICIARYEXPERIENCEANDSATISFACTION

Beneficiariesfeltthatoverall,theECT-COVID19initiativewasadmirableandhelpful.Theyparticularlyappreciatedthefocusonlow-incomefamilies.Mostbeneficiariesweresatisfiedwiththemobilemoneycustomerexperienceandthequalityofserviceingeneral.However,therewerenotableconcernsamongasubstantialportionofbeneficiariesregardingthesystemforreceivingandaddressingcomplaintsandpaymentissues.

BeneficiariesreportedthattheFSPsresolvedtheirissuesdiligently.Incaseswhenbeneficiarieshadlostanessentialdocument,forgottenapassword,orunintentionallyerasedtheirPINcodecontainedintheSMStransmittedbythefinancialserviceprovider,theyhaddifficultyaccessingtheirpayments.8However,inmostcases,theFSPsfoundsolutionssothatthebeneficiariescouldreceivetheirmoney.Further,duringinformationsessionsheldforenrolledbeneficiaries,theFSPsclarifiedandemphasizedthatdigitalpaymentsweresecure.Thisseemstohavereassuredandconvincedbeneficiariesaboutthepaymentsystemandprocess.

Figure4:LevelofsatisfactionwiththeEC