2024半導(dǎo)體供應(yīng)鏈中新興的彈性-BCG+SIA

BCG+

EMERGING

RESILIENCE

INTHESEMICONDUCTORSUPPLYCHAIN

MAY2024

RAJVARADARAJAN/IACOBKOCH-WESER/CHRISRICHARD/JOSEPHFITZGERALD/JASKARANSINGH/MARYTHORNTON/ROBERTCASANOVA/DAVIDISAACS

2

AboutBostonConsultingGroup(BCG)

BostonConsultingGroup(BCG)isaleadingglobalmanagementconsultingfrm,with

offcesinover50countries.BCGpartnerswithleadersinbusinessandsocietytotackle

theirmostimportantchallengesandcapturetheirgreatestopportunities.BCGwasthe

pioneerinbusinessstrategywhenitwasfoundedin1963.Today,wehelpclientswithtotal

transformation—inspiringcomplexchange,enablingorganizationstogrow,buildingcompetitiveadvantage,anddrivingbottom-lineimpact.

AbouttheSemiconductorIndustryAssociation(SIA)

TheSemiconductorIndustryAssociation(SIA)isthevoiceofthesemiconductorindustryintheUS,oneofAmerica’stopexportindustriesandakeydriverofAmerica’seconomicstrength,

nationalsecurity,andglobalcompetitiveness.Thesemiconductorindustrydirectlyemploys

morethan300,000workersintheUnitedStates,andUSsemiconductorcompanysalestotaled$264billionin2023.SIArepresents99percentoftheUSsemiconductorindustrybyrevenueandnearlytwo-thirdsofnon-USchipfrms.Throughthiscoalition,SIAseekstostrengthen

leadershipofsemiconductormanufacturing,design,andresearchbyworkingwithCongress,theAdministration,andkeyindustrystakeholdersaroundtheworldtoencouragepoliciesthatfuelinnovation,propelbusiness,anddriveinternationalcompetition.

AbouttheAuthors

RajVaradarajanisaSeniorPartnerEmeritusofBostonConsultingGroup.Hehasauthored

severalreportsonthesemiconductorindustryatBCGandincollaborationwiththeSIA.Youmaycontacthimasthecorrespondingauthorbyemailat

Varadarajan.Raj@

.

IacobKoch-WeserisanAssociateDirectorforGlobalTradeandInvestmentintheBostonoffceofBostonConsultingGroup.Youmaycontacthimbyemailat

koch-weser.iacob@

.

ChrisRichardisaPartnerandManagingDirectorintheDenveroffceofBostonConsultingGroupandisacorememberofitsTechnology,Media&Telecommunicationspractice.

Youmaycontacthimbyemailat

richard.christopher@

.

JosephFitzgeraldisaPartnerandManagingDirectorintheSanFranciscooffceofBostonConsultingGroupandisacorememberofitsTechnology,Media&Telecommunications

practice.Youmaycontacthimbyemailat

ftzgerald.joseph@

.

JaskaranSinghisanAssociateintheDallasoffceofBostonConsultingGroup.Youmaycontacthimbyemailat

singh.jaskaran@

.

MaryThorntonistheVicePresidentofGlobalPolicyattheSemiconductorIndustryAssociation.Youmaycontactherat

mthornton@

.

RobertCasanovaistheDirectorofIndustryStatisticsandEconomicPolicyatthe

SemiconductorIndustryAssociation.Youmaycontacthimat

rcasanova@

.

DavidIsaacsistheVicePresidentofGovernmentAffairsattheSemiconductorIndustryAssociation.Youmaycontacthimat

disaacs@

.

Acknowledgments

ThisreportwouldnothavebeenpossiblewithoutthecontributionsofourBCGColleaguesRamiroPalma,ThomasLopez,TreySexton,CeciJoyPerez,andPeiluChen,andourSIAcolleaguesJenniferMengandAlexGordon.

Contents

4

ExecutiveSummary

6

Introduction

8

TheExpansionof

GovernmentIncentives

10

Resilienceinthe

SemiconductorSupplyChain

22

LookingAhead—thePathwaytoGreaterResilience

27

FutureNeedsoftheIndustry

28

Appendix

3

ExecutiveSummary

T

herearestrengthsandvulnerabilitiesin

theglobalsemiconductorsupplychain.

OurApril2021report1illustratedthatthe

globallyintegratednatureofthesemiconductor

supplychainhasrealized$45billion–$125billionincosteffciencieseachyear,contributingtoprices

35%–65%lowerthantheywouldotherwisebewithfullylocalizedsupplychains,resultinginenhanced

adoptionofdownstreamproductsandservices.

Butwealsoshowedthattheindustryhasbecome

vulnerabletogeographicconcentration—withatleast50pointsacrossthesupplychainwhereoneregionheldover65%ofglobalmarketshare.Disruptions,suchaspandemics,naturaldisasters,materials

shortages,orconficts,couldsubstantiallyimpacttheglobalchipsupplychain.

Governmentsandcompaniesaretakingconcertedactiontoincreaseresilience.TheUSCHIPSAct,

signedintolawinAugust2022,committed$39

billioningrantincentivesanda25%investmenttaxcredit(ITC)forsemiconductormanufacturing.

TheEuropeanUnion(EU)unveiledtheEuropean

ChipsAct,MainlandChinainitiatedthethirdphaseofitsIntegratedCircuit(IC)IndustryInvestmentFund,andvariousotherincentiveprogramsemergedor

expandedinTaiwan,SouthKorea,Japan,India,andothercountries.Inparallel,companieshavemade

signifcantinvestments,inbothestablishedandnewregions.Weprojectaround$2.3trillioninprivate

sectorinvestmentinwaferfabricationin2024–2032,comparedwith$720billioninthe10yearsprior

toenactmentoftheCHIPSAct(2013–2022).The

USisprojectedtocapture28%ofthesecapital

expenditures,asopposedtothepre-CHIPSActpaceofinvestment,inwhichtheUSwouldhavecapturedjust9%ofglobalcapitalexpenditures.

Waferfabricationwillbecomemoreresilient.By

2032,wepredictleading-edgewaferfabrication

capacitytodiversifybeyondTaiwanandSouthKoreatoincludetheUS,Europe,andJapan.WeexpecttheUStoincreaseitsfabcapacityby203%between

2022and2032,thelargestincreaseintheworld.Asaresult,theUnitedStateswillreverseadecades-

longdownwardtrajectoryandraiseitsshareof

globalaggregatefabcapacityfrom10%todayto

14%in2032.Intheabsenceofaction,theUSsharewouldhaveslippedfurtherto8%by2032.

Newmarketsandinnovativetechnologycansupportresilienceinassembly,test,andpackaging(ATP).

InATP,MainlandChinaandTaiwanwillcontinuetoholdthelargestshareofglobalcapacity.Butwith

supportfromgovernmentsandforeigninvestors,weexpectcountriesinSoutheastAsia,LatinAmerica,andEasternEuropetoexpandATPactivity.The

USStateDepartmentissupportingtheseefforts

throughInternationalTechnologySecurityand

Innovation(ITSI)fundingundertheCHIPSAct.

EmergingmarketgovernmentsareactivelypursuingtheirownstrategiestoattractATPinvestment.In

parallel,thedevelopmentofadvancedpackaging—andassociatedinnovationsinchiplets—isalso

drivingleadingplayerstobuildATPcapacityintheUnitedStatesandEurope,proximatetonewwaferfabricationcapacity.

4

Otherpartsofthesupplychainarealsoachievingabetterbalance.Indesign,coreIP,and

ElectronicDesignAutomation(EDA),companiesarediversifyingwheretheyhire,locate,and

traintalent.Insemiconductormanufacturing

equipment(“tools”),currentindustryleadersareestablishingR&Dandtrainingcentersindifferentregions.AlthoughmaterialsproductionremainsconcentratedinEastAsia,weexpectittofollowfuturefabcapacitytotheUnitedStatesand

EuropetorealizecostandR&Dbenefts.

Astrongglobaltalentpipelineisasimportant

asever.Assemiconductorcompaniespursue

ambitiousdevelopmentplansinthecontext

ofatightlabormarket,theyrelyonaccess

toengineersandtechnicianstofllbothhigh-

andmid-skillpositions.Improvingworkforce

developmentacrossestablishedandemergingregions,whilealsoadvancingimmigration

policiestofosterglobaltalentfows,willbevitaltothesemiconductorindustry’sfutureresilience.

Industrialpolicieshavethepotentialtocreate

additionalbottlenecksthatincreasesupplychain

risk.Certainsegmentsofthesemiconductorsupplychainareatriskifincentiveprogramsandlarge-

scaleindustrialpoliciesleadtonon-market-basedinvestment,whichcanresultinoverconcentrationoroversupply.Governmentincentivesshouldfocusonenablingtargeted,distributed,market-based

investments.

Sustainedsupportforresilienceisneeded.Over

thecomingdecade,thesemiconductorsupply

chainwillcontinuetofacechallenges,including

industrycyclicalityandtherapidevolutionof

downstreamdemand(forexample,inAI,EVs,

industrialautomation,androbotics).Supply-demandimbalancesinmaturenodecapacitycouldbecomemoreevident.Itwillbecriticalforpolicymakersin

theUnitedStatesandelsewhereto“staythecourse”byextendingcurrentsupportaswellasconsideringadditionalmeasurestostrengthenresilience.

Scaleandopennessarecriticalforresilience.

Toensurenewanddiversifedsemiconductorfacilitiescanoperateatoptimalcapacity

utilizationratestogenerateapositivereturnoninvestment,itisvitalforchipcompaniesto

maintaincontinuedaccesstoglobalcustomers

andaglobalnetworkofsuppliers.Governmentsareincreasinglyimposingconstraintsonwherechipcompaniescanselltheirproductsand

services,orwheretheycansourceinputs

andequipment.Fortunately,globaltradein

semiconductorscontinuestogrowatarapid

pace,refectingtheglobalinterconnectedness

oftheindustry.TheUnitedStatesandallied

governmentsneedtomaintainopentrade

andcooperationbyrecognizingthatextreme

industrialpolicies,suchasfullcountry-level“self-suffciency,”willundermineresilience,addcost,andstifeinnovation.

5

Introduction

S

emiconductorspowertoday’seconomy,

fromvehiclesandmobiledevicesto

datacenters,medicalequipment,clean

technologies,and,ofcourse,theupcoming

AIrevolution.Theinventionoftheintegrated

circuit(IC)startedtheUnitedStatesonapathtoearlyleadershipindesignandmanufacturing.

Beginninginthe1980s,chipmanufacturing

rapidlyshiftedfromNorthAmericatoJapanandEastAsia.WhiletheUnitedStatesremained

preeminentinequipmentandchipdesign,

EastAsianeconomiesincreasedtheirshareofwaferfabricationcapacity,highlightedbytheriseofSouthKoreainmemoryandTaiwaninthepure-playfoundrybusinessforallothersemiconductors.Thisconfgurationenabledrapidadvancesandspecialization,butover

time,ledtosupplychainconcentration.2

InStrengtheningtheGlobalSemiconductorSupplyChaininanUncertainEra(April

2021),weanalyzedthesemiconductorsupplychaintounderstanditsvaluefortheglobal

economy,whilealsoidentifyingpointsof

vulnerability.Werecommendedpoliciesand

otheractionstoimprovesupplychainresiliencethroughgreatergeographicdiversifcation.

Sincethen,theglobal

supplychainhasevolvedrapidly,withmajorprivatesectorinvestmentsin

multiplegeographiesand

publicsectorpoliciesandsupportprograms

directedattheindustry.

TheUSCHIPSAct,signedintolawinAugust

2022,committed$39billioningrantsandloansforsemiconductormanufacturing.Likewise,

theEuropeanUnionunveiledtheEuropean

CHIPSAct,MainlandChinainitiatedthethirdvintageofitsICIndustryInvestmentFund,andvariousotherincentiveprogramsemerged

acrossAsiaandotherregions.Inparallel,over100newsemiconductormanufacturing

investmentshavebeenannouncedto

meetincreasedmarketdemand,dispersedworldwideacrosseverymajorregion.

6

Inthisreport,weprovideanupdatedview

ontheimpactofpoliciestodayonfuture

investmentintheglobalsemiconductorsupplychainandtheimplicationsforresilience.We

defneresilience,broadlyspeaking,asimprovedgeographicdiversifcationofthesupplychain.Webeginbyreviewingpublicandprivate

sectorstrategiesacrossmajorgeographies,

withadditionaldetailprovidedintheAppendix.Wethenassessthelikelyeffectsofthese

trendsoverthecomingdecade,specifcally

forecastingchangesindistributionofwafer

fabricationandATPcapacity.Wealsoconsidergeographicdiversifcationinothersegments

ofthesupplychain,3includingdesign,coreIP,andEDA,equipment,andmaterials.

Ourreportthenhighlightsthepathtoward

greaterresilience,includingsustaining

governmentsupport,guardingagainstsupply-demandimbalances,integratingnewcountries,maintainingvibrantglobaltrade,andfosteringglobaltalent.Asgeopoliticalfrictionspersist,itisimportanttomaintainaglobalsupplychainandsupportamorediverseglobalproductionfootprint.Accordingly,wecloseourreportbyhighlightingfutureneedsoftheindustry.

7

TheExpansionof

GovernmentIncentives

S

emiconductorcompaniesweighmany

factorswhenmakinginvestmentdecisions,includingoverallbusinessconditions,

suppliernetworks,siteavailability,infrastructure,andworkforce—butasignifcantoverarching

factorisgovernmentpolicy.Well-craftedand

durableincentiveprograms,alongwithan

enablingregulatoryenvironmentandeffective

talentdevelopmentinitiatives,alsosignala

government’scommitmenttotheindustry’s

long-termsuccess.Forindividualcompanies,

effectivepoliciescanimprovethecostand

effciencyofconstructingandoperatingafacility.

SinceourreportinApril2021,governmentsaroundtheworldhavemadesubstantial

effortstoincreasetheirsupportforthesemiconductorindustry(seeExhibit1;formoreinformationonincentiveprogramsineachkeyregion,seetheAppendix).

TheUnitedStatespassedtheCHIPSActto

incentivizegrowthofthesemiconductorecosystemthroughbothdirectgrantsanda25%ITCfor

semiconductormanufacturing,andseveralstates

haveenactedincentiveprogramstosupplement

thefederalefforts.$11billionofthe$52billion

appropriatedintheCHIPSActistobeusedto

developUSleadershipinsemiconductorR&D,

emphasizingtheimportanceofanall-encompassingindustrialpolicytosuccess.IntheEUandJapan,

governmentshaveappropriatedlargegrantfundstobeallocatedonanationalandproject-specifcbasis,coupledwithtaxincentives.TheSouth

KoreanandTaiwanesegovernmentsareofferingcomparativelylargertaxincentiveprogramsand

R&Dsupport—forexample,intheTaiwanChipInnovationProgramandSouthKorea’sK-CHIPSAct.Thesedirectincentivesarecomplementedbyindirecttoolstoattractinvestment,suchasinfrastructuresupport,low-costaccesstoland,andstreamlininggovernmentapprovals.

8

9

MainlandChina’slargeandwide-rangingsupportforthesemiconductorindustryalsowillimpact

theglobalsupplychaininthecomingyears.

AlargeportionofMainlandChina’ssupporthascomeintheformofequityinfusionsandtheoperationoffundsthatmixgovernmentandprivatecapital.Otherfactors,suchasoverseastalentacquisition,theformulationofdomesticstandards,stateownership,

andthepreferencegiventodomesticallyproducedchips,furtheracttosupport

MainlandChina’ssemiconductorindustry.

EXHIBIT1

Governmentincentivesbymajorregion(lefttorightbysizeofGDP)

US

China

South

EU

Japan

Korea

Taiwan

Mainland

Guidance

Gain20%globalshareby2030

SecurefootholdinLogic,bolsterfableadership

Earn$112B

salesby2030

Reach70%

Breakthrough

1nmby2030

TargetAchieveresiliency

insemiconductor

supplychain

self-suffciencyby2025

Strategyfor

SemisandtheDigitalIndustry

CHIPSand

ScienceAct,

100-DaySupplyChainReview

DigitalCompass2030

Guidingpolicy

K-Belt

SemiconductorStrategy

Angstrom

SemiconductorInitiative,

NationalIC

Outline,14thFiveYearPlan

Moonshotprogram

Measures

$39B

ingrants1

Key

Incentiveamounts

$47B

ingrants

$17.5B

ingrants

$142B

inequityfunds

$55B

intaxincentives

$16B

intaxincentives4

25%investment

taxcredit

Grantsunder

theCHIPSAct

State-level

support

Taxincentives

underK-ChipsActPrivate-public

educationprograms

Nationalfscal

funding

Leading-EdgeSemiconductor

Technology

Center

BigFundI,II,III

andlocalfunds

State-owned

enterpriseleaders

National

sciencefund

Grantsand

loansunderEUChipsAct

TaxcreditsStateaid

allowances2

Key

Initiatives

FinancialsubsidiesundertheChip

InnovationProgram

Industry-

academiaco-op,taxcredits

Impact

Newfab

&ATP

investmentssince20203

26

~305

8

4

3

7

1.$39Bformanufacturing;$13.2BforR&Dandworkforcedevelopment

2.ImportantProjectsofCommonEuropeanInterest(IPCEI)

3.ComprisesfabandATPprojectsthathavebeenannounced,started,orcompletedsince2020

4.25%taxcreditpledgingtogiveback$2.25Bperannumover7years.

5.MayundercountthetotalnumberofsitesinChina.

Source:Gartner;SIA;Pressreleases;Companydisclosures;Governmentwebsites;BCGanalysis

Resilienceinthe

SemiconductorSupplyChain

diversifcation,mainlyintwoareastostartwith:(i)waferfabrication,particularlyinadvancedlogicand(ii)ATP,withadiversifcationofactivitiesoutside

T

Forexample,US-headquarteredcompaniesleadindesign,coreIP,andEDA;theUnitedStates,EU,

andJapanjointlyleadinequipment;companiesheadquarteredinMainlandChina,Japan,

Taiwan,andSouthKorealeadinmaterials;SouthKorea-andTaiwan-headquarteredcompanies

leadtheworldinadvancednodefabrication(sub-10nanometerchips);andATPfootprintisconcentratedinMainlandChinaandTaiwan.

Specializationbyregionhasbeenenabledbythe

globallyintegratednatureofthesupplychain,

whichhasallowedeachspecializedcompanyto

accesstheglobalmarket.Butithasalsocreated

vulnerabilitiesintermsofgeographicconcentration.Lookingahead,weexpectsignifcantgeographic

heglobalsemiconductorsupplychainishighlyspecialized(seeExhibit2).Differentregionshavestrengthsindifferentareas.

MainlandChinaandTaiwantoincludesubstantial

gainsfornewmarkets.ItisunlikelythatATPwill

locateintheUnitedStates,duetocostpressures,theexceptionbeingcertainadvancedpackaging

facilitiesnearnewfabsites.Toalesserextent,wealsoexpectgreaterdiversifcationindesign,as

marketleaderssourcetalentglobally,andmaterials,asvendorsfollownewfabcapacitytodifferent

regions(seeExhibit3).InequipmentaswellasEDAandcoreIP,meaningfuldiversifcationwillprove

challenginggiventhehighdegreeofspecializationandvendorconcentrationtoday,aswellasthe

lessernecessityofco-locatingwithfabsites.

Belowwediscussthesetrendsindepthforeachsegmentofthesupplychain.

EXHIBIT2

Semiconductorindustryvalue-addedbyactivityandregion,2022(%)

PrecompetitiveResearch

Design

?Logic?DAO

?Memory

Manufacturing

?Wafer

fabrication

?Assembly,testandpackaging

EquipmentMaterials

EDA

CoreIP

EDA&

CoreIP3%Logic30%

DAO17%

Memory9%

3%3%

68%25%

65%9%4%3%11%5%4%

41%17%18%4%5%9%6%

25%

60%

7%

4%3%

Mfg

equipment

12%

Materials5%

Wafer

fabrication

19%

ATP6%

47%18%26%3%3%2%

9%6%12%18%28%18%10%

10%8%17%17%18%24%7%

9%

28%

30%

20%

3%3%6%

Overallvaluechain100%

38%11%12%12%11%11%5%

SouthKorea

Taiwan

MainlandRoW

USAEUJapan

China

Notesonregionalbreakdown:EDA,design,manufacturingequipment,andrawmaterialsbasedoncompanyrevenuesandcompanyheadquarterslocation.WaferfabricationandAssembly&testingbasedoninstalledcapacityandgeographiclocationofthefacilities.1.IncludesIsrael,Singapore,andtherestoftheworld

Source:IPnest;WolfeResearch;Gartner;SEMI;BCGanalysis

10

11

EXHIBIT3

Diversi?cationbySupplyChainSegment

MethodDistribution,2022Geodiversifcation

4%

1

HQ

revenue

Design1

51%10%9%13%8%6%

?BarrierstoentryduetohighR&Dspend

3%

?Diversifcationofwherecompanieshire,locate,andtraintalentforR&Dandengineering

2

EDA&coreIP

HQ

revenue

?UseofAIindesignprocessforeffciency

25%

68%

?Growingdomain-specifcarchitecture

3%

?Focusonpower,performance,andarea

3%

3

HQ

revenue

Equipment&tools

47%18%26%

?BarrierstoentryduetospecializationandR&Dintensity

?ModeratediversifcationofgeographicfootprintofR&Dandtrainingcentersbycurrentmarketleaders

3%

9%6%12%18%28%18%10%

4

HQ

revenue

Materials

?Increasedco-locationnearnewfabs

?Continualvulnerabilitiesinspecifcmaterialscategoriesandrelatedcriticalminerals

10%8%17%17%18%24%7%

5

Site

capacity

Wafer

Fabrication

?Governmentincentiveprogramstoattractfabinvestment

?SubstantialCapExacrossdestinationregionsbymajorcompanies,withthebulkinadvancedlogic

3%

6%9%28%30%20%

6

Site

capacity

ATP

?PolicysupportforconventionalpackaginginnewmarketsinSoutheastAsia,LatinAmerica,andEurope

?Disruptiveimpactofchipletsinadvancedpackaging

3%

USJapanTaiwanEU

KoreaMainlandChinaOthers

Unchanged

ModerateSubstantial

1.RepresentsbothfablessandIDMdesignSource:SEMI;YoleGroup;BCGAnalysis

WaferFabrication

Webeginwithwaferfabrication,whichexertsa“pull”effectoninvestmentinothersegmentsofthesupplychain.Giventhecapitalrequirements

andsubstantialleadtimetobringprojectsonline

(upwardsoffveyearsinsomecases),waferfabricationiswheregovernmentandindustryeffortshavefocusedsubstantiallytodate.

Weprojectaround$2.3trillioninprivatesectorinvestmentinwaferfabricationin2024–2032,comparedwith$720billioninthe10years

priortoenactmentoftheCHIPSAct(2013–2022).Theover100majorsemiconductor

manufacturingecosystemprojectsthathave

beenannouncedsinceourpriorreportarespread

out—botharoundtheglobeandtonewlocationswithineachmajorregion(seeExhibit4).

Asia:

Investmentscontinueatpaceacrosstheregion.

LocalcompaniesinTaiwanhaveannouncedplansto

standupsevennewfabsontheislanditself.TSMC

isalsopartneringwithSony,DENSO,andToyota

toboostmanufacturingcapabilitiesinKumamoto,

Japan,andJapaneseoffcialsarehelpingdomestic

startupRapidussetupproductionlinesforcutting-

edge2nanometerchipsatanewsiteinHokkaido.

SouthKoreahasannouncedaplantoinvest$471

billionthrough2047tobuild16newfabsinamega

chipclusterinGyeonggiProvince,involvingSamsung,SKHynix,andotherchipcompanies.4InMainland

China,domesticChinesecompaniesaremakingnew

investmentsinfabsinShenzhen,Tianjin,andShanghai.

UnitedStates:

Between2020andyear-end2023,80new

semiconductormanufacturingprojectswereannouncedacrosstheUnitedStatesalone,projectedtocreate

50,000directnewjobs.5Aportionoftheseinvestmentsisgoingtoareaswithamaturesemiconductor

footprint,suchasTexas,Arizona,NewYork,and

California.Buttherehavealsobeensubstantial

investmentsinGreenfeldsandcapacityexpansionsinnewerregions,suchasNewAlbany,Ohio.

Europe:

TherehasbeensubstantialinvestmentinnewcapacityinEurope,withsevenmajorwafer

fabinvestmentsannouncedsince2020.The

lion’sshareofthiscapacityisbeingbuiltin

easternGermany,includingIntel’sinvestmentinMagdeburgandTSMC’sjointinvestmentwith

andyear-endsemiconductor

projects

across

alone

2020new

manufacturing

Between2023,80

leadingEuropeansemiconductormanufacturerstoconstructanewfacilityinDresden.Still,themomentumisnotlimitedtoGermany;inthe

southofFrance,GlobalFoundrieshaspartneredwithSTMicroelectronicstobuilda$3.1billion

fabinCrolles,andPolandispoisedtohostanewInteladvancedpackagingfacility.

announcedUnitedStates

were

the

Inconsequence,weexpectsignifcantinvestmenttofowbetweenregions

betweennowand2032(seeExhibit5).

EXHIBIT4

MajornewfabandATPinvestmentsannouncedacrosstheworldsince2020

USA

EUROPE

ASIA

SKHynixFabSonyFab5

(Yongin,KR)

(Isahaya,JP)

PolarSemiFab

(Bloomington,MN)

IntelATPFactory

(Wroclaw,PL)

STMicroelectronicsSiCFactory

(Catania,IT)

GlobalFoundriesFab

(Dresden,DE)

SKHynixM15XFab

SKHynixATP

(Cheogju,KR)

TSMC,SonyFab

(WLafayette,IN)

Nhanced

SemiconductorsATP

(Odon,IN)

IntelFab

(NewAlbany,OH)

MicronFab

(Clay,NY)

Global

FoundriesFab

(Malta,NY)

(Kumamoto,JP)

MicronFab

(Boise,Idaho)

Texas

InstrumentsFab

(Lehi,UT)

MicrochipFab

(COSprings,CO)

SamsungP3Fab

(Pyeongtaek,KR)

SMICFab

IntelFab

(Magdeburg,DE)

MicrochipFab

(Gresham,OR)

AnalogDevicesFab

(Beaverton,OR)

BoschFab

(Roseville,CA)

Western

DigitalFab

RenesasKofuFactory

(KaiCity,JP)

(Tianjin,CN)

WolfspeedFab

(Saarland,DE)

SMICFab

(Shanghai,CN)

Kioxia,WesternDigitalFab

(Yokkaichi,JP)

MicronATPFactory

(Xi’an,CN)

Fab

HuaHongSemiconductor

(Wuxi,CN)

(Fremont,CA)

STMicroelectronics,SananFab

(Chongqing,CN)

SMICFab

(Shenzhen,CN)

ChinaResources

MicroelectronicsFab

(Shenzhen,CN)

PSMCP5Fab

(Maoli,TW)

WolfspeedFab

NanyaFab4

(SilverCity,NC)

PallidusFab

(RockHill,SC)

(NewTaipei,TW)

TSMCFab

(Kaohsiung,TW)

Fab

ISMC

Intel

Fab52Fab62

(Chandler,AZ)

TSMCFab21

(Phoenix,AZ)

Amkor

ATPFactory

(Peoria,AZ)

IntelFab

(RioRancho,NM)

(Karnataka,IN)

InfneonSiC

PowerFab

(Kulim,MY)

ASEATP

Plants4and5

(Penang,MY)

IntelATPFactory

UMCFab12P6

(Kaohsiung,TW)

EMPShieldFab

(Burlington,KS)

GlobalWaferFab

(Sherman,TX)

TexasInstruments

FabsSM1,SM2,SM3,SM4

WinSemiFab

(Kaohsiung,TW)

X-Fab

(Lubbock,TX)

Integra

Technologies

Fab(Wichita,KS)

Samsung