金融學(xué)（第四版）課件：Commercial Banking Structure,Regulation,and Performance

CommercialBankingStructure,Regulation,andPerformance

2IntroductionCommercialbanksmakeseveraldecisionstheinterestratestheywillpayto“hire”fundsthetypesofdepositstheywilloffertheinterestratestheywillchargetolendtheirfundsthetypesofloanstheywillmakethetypesofsecuritiestheywillacquireEachofthesedecisionsaffectsthesupplyanddemandforfunds3TheBankingRegulatoryStructureRegulationinvolvestheformulationandissuanceofspecificrulestogovernthestructureandconductofbanksTheprimaryreasonthebankingsystemisregulatedistopreserveitssafetyandsoundnessandensurethefairandefficientdeliveryofbankingservices4TheBankingRegulatoryStructureTheregulatorystructureinplaceatthebeginningofthe1970swascreatedduringthe1930sputinplaceasaresultofbankfailuresduringtheGreatDepressionthefailureofthesebankswasallegedtobedueto“excessiveanddestructive”competitionamongbanksleadingtoexcessivelyhighinterestratesthegrantingofoverlyriskyloans(particularlytostockmarketspeculators)5TheBankingRegulatoryStructureTheGlass-SteagallActof1933establishedmaximumceilingoninterestratespaidbybanksondeposits(knownasRegulationQ)interestpaymentsondemanddepositswereprohibitedestablishedtheFederalDepositInsuranceCorporation(FDIC)6TheBankingRegulatoryStructureTheGlass-SteagallActof1933separatedcommercialbankingfrominvestmentbankingbankscouldnotownorunderwritecorporatesecuritiestheassetsabankcouldholdwerelimitedtocash,governmentsecurities,andloans7TheBankingRegulatoryStructureTheFedisthemostimportantregulatorofcommercialbanks(thataremembersoftheFed)Fromthe1930stothe1980s,theFedsharedregulatoryresponsibilitieswithtwofederalbodiestheComptrolleroftheCurrencytheFDIC8TheBankingRegulatoryStructurePriortothe1980s,thescopeofregulationincludedrestrictionsonentrybranchingtypesofassetsandliabilitiespermittedfinancialservicesthatcouldbeofferedinterestthatcouldbepaidondepositsinterestthatcouldbechargedonloans9TheBankingRegulatoryStructureToday,bankshavefoundwaysaroundmanyoftheseregulationsManyoftheregulationshavealsobeenrelaxedoreliminated10DualBanking(Chartering)SystemCommercialbanksintheU.S.arecharteredtheyaregivenpermissiontoengageinthebusinessofbankingbyeitherthefederalorastategovernmentifthebank’scharterisgrantedbythefederalgovernment,itisanationalbanktheOfficeoftheComptrolleristhefederalagencythatchartersnationalbanks11NationalBanksBanksthatarefederallycharteredmustbemembersoftheFedandmustsubscribetofederaldepositinsurancewiththeFDICdepositsareinsuredupto$100,000premiumvarieswiththeinsurancefund’sreservesandriskofthebank12State-CharteredBankAstate-charteredbankwillberegulatedbyitsstatebankingauthorityIfitchoosetojointheFed,itmustalsosubscribetofederaldepositinsurancecanalsosubscribetofederaldepositinsurancewithoutjoiningtheFed13FDIC-InsuredBanks,June30,200414DualBanking(Chartering)SystemSomebankswillbesubjecttoregulationandsupervisionbyasmanyas3regulatoryauthoritiesPrimaryregulatoryresponsibilityisassignedtooneauthoritywhothensharestheinformationwiththeothers15DualBanking(Chartering)SystemRegulatoryresponsibilityfallsontheFDICforstate-chartered,insuredbanksthathavenotjoinedtheFedtheComptrolleroftheCurrencyfornationalbankstheFedforstate-charteredbanksthataremembersoftheFedandallbankandfinancialholdingscompaniesthestatesforstate-chartered,uninsuredbanks16RegulatoryResponsibilities17DualBanking(Chartering)SystemFederalFinancialInstitutionsExaminationsCouncil(FFIEC)createdin1979byCongressprescribesuniformprinciples,standards,andreportformsforthefederalexaminationoffinancialinstitutionsbytheFed,theFDIC,andtheOfficeoftheComptrollermakesrecommendationstopromoteuniformityinthesupervisionoffinancialinstitutions18BankFailuressincetheInceptionoftheFDIC,1934-200319TheStructureoftheBankingIndustrySupposethattheindustrywasservedbyalargenumberofsmallbanksthiswouldencouragecompetitionandefficiencythepublicwouldbeprovidedwiththelargestquantityoffinancialservicesatthelowestpricesthepressureofcompetitionwouldincreasetheriskoffailureofeachbank20TheStructureoftheBankingIndustrySupposethattheindustrywasservedbyasmallnumberoflargebanksthiswouldlimitcompetitionandefficiencythepublicwouldbeprovidedwithfeweroptionsfewerbankswouldfail21TheStructureoftheBankingIndustryBecauseoftheseissues,regulatorswereinterestedinmonitoringandinfluencingthestructureofthebankingmarketRegulatorsusedtheirpowerstocontrolentryintothemarket,mergersamongexistingfirms,andbranchingtomaintaincompetitionRegulatorsalsotriedtoprotectbanksfromexcessivecompetition22TheStructureoftheBankingIndustryAlocalenvironmentcanbecomemorecompetitiveinseveralwaysnewly-charteredbanknewbranchofficesofexistingbanksmoststatesallowedstatewidebranching23TheStructureoftheBankingIndustryTheMcFaddenActpassedbyCongressin1927prohibitedfederallycharterednationalbanksfrombranchingacrossstatelinesrequirednationalbankstoabidebystatebranchinglaws24TheStructureoftheBankingIndustryTheInterstateBankingandBranchingEfficiencyAct(IBBEA)passedin1994allowedunimpedednationwidebranchingbeginningmid-199725Size-DistributionofFDIC-InsuredBanksasofSeptember23,200326BankHoldingCompaniesAbankholdingcompanyisacorporationthatownsseveralfirms,atleastoneofwhichisabanktheremainingfirmsareengagedisactivitiesthatarecloselyrelatedtobankingthiscorporateformallowsbankstodiversifyintootherproductareaspriorto1997,bankholdingcompaniestocircumventrestrictionsoninterstatebranching27FinancialHoldingCompaniesAfinancialholdingcompanyisanorganizationthatengagesinabroadarrayoffinancial-relatedactivitiessecuritiesunderwritinganddealinginsuranceagencyandunderwritingactivitiesmerchantbankingactivitiesanyotheractivitythattheFeddeterminestobefinancialinnatureorcomplementarytofinancialactivity28FinancialHoldingCompaniesFinancialholdingcompanieswerefirstallowedundertheGramm-Leach-BlileyAct(GLBA)of1999thisactalsoallowstheseholdingcompaniestoownupto100%ofcommercial,nonfinancialbusinessesmustbeforinvestmentpurposesonlycannotbeinvolvedintheday-to-daymanagementtheinvestmentmustbefor10yearsorless29OngoingChanges–TheNumberofBanksBetween1980and2003over1,465banksfailed9,800mergersoccurred4,700newbankswerestartedTheresultisanetdeclineinthenumberofbanksfrom14,400toabout7,800thenumberofbrancheshasrisen30TheDecliningNumberofBanks31OngoingChanges–TheShareofBanksAssetsTherewasanincreaseintheconcentrationofbankingassetsfrom1980to2004in1980,the100largestbankingorganizationsaccountedof1/2oftotalbankingassetsbyearly2004,thelargest20bankingorganizationsaccountedforover1/2oftotalbankingassets32TheEvolutionofInternationalBankingAnincreaseininternationalborrowingandlendingbydomesticbanksbeganinthe1970sledbytheexpansioninworldtradethatoccurredshortlyaftertheOPECoilcrisis“petrodollars”flowedintotheOPECnationsinpaymentforoiltheOPECnationsdepositedthefundsinU.S.andEuropeanbanksmanybanksalsoloanedfundstoless-developednations33TheEvolutionofInternationalBankingBythe1980s,manyforeignbankswereoperatingintheU.S.Somebanksoperateagenciesratherthansetupbranchesanagencyofaforeignbankisamorerestrictiveformofoperationinthattheagencycanraisefundsonlyinthewholesaleandmoneymarkets34TheEvolutionofInternationalBankingAdvancesinelectronicsandtelecommunicationsallowdomesticandforeignbankstoparticipateinworldwidetransactionswithoutleavinghomefundscannowbeeasilytransmittedThisincreasedcompetitionhasresultedindisappointingprofits35RiskManagementBankmanagersfacemanydecisionswhatkindsofloansaretobemadewhattheprimeinterestrateshouldbewhatinterestratetoofferoneachtypeofdepositManagersmustconsiderthebank’sliquidity,safety,andearningsobjectivesalongwiththeenvironmentinwhichitoperates36RiskManagementBankmanagersfacemanydifferenttypesofriskthatmustbequantifiedcredit(default)riskinterestrateriskliquidityriskexchangeraterisk37RiskManagementLoanofficersmustalsobeawarethattheyaremakingdecisionsunderconditionsofasymmetricinformationapotentialborrowerknowsmoreabouttherisksandreturnsofaninvestmentprojectthanthebankloanofficerthosewiththemosttohideandthosemostwillingtotakerisksaremostlikelytobelessthanforthrighttheresultisanadverseselectionproblem38RiskManagementAftertheloanismade,itmaybedifficulttoguaranteethattheloanisusedforthestatedpurposeandnotforamoreriskyventurethisiscalledthemoralhazardproblem39RiskManagementBankscanusefinancialfutures,options,andswapstomanageinterestrateriskAdjustable(variable)rateloanscanalsobeusedtohedgeinterestraterisk40RiskManagementAlargeproportionofbankliabilitiesarepayableondemandimpliesthatliquiditymustbemanagedbankscanholdTreasurybillsorexcessreservesbankscanalsoborrowfromtheFedorinthefederalfundsmarket41BankPerformanceBanksarefacingincreasingcompetitionfromotherFIsandhaveconfrontedavolatileeconomicandregulatoryenvironmentProfitabilitywaslowinthe1980sbutincreasedsignificantlyinthe1990sBankswillfacemorecompetitioninthefuturefrom“nonbanks”thathavetakenanincreasingshareofintermediation42CommercialBanks’DecliningShareofIntermediation43SummaryofMajorPointsBankingisaheavilyregulatedindustryregulatorypolicyaimsatpromotingcompetitionandefficiency,whilepreservingthesafetyandsoundnessofinstitutionstheGlass-SteagallActof1933wasenactedinresponsetothefinancialcollapseintheGreatDepressionestablishedinterestrateceilingsseparatedinvestmentandcommercialbankingcreatedtheFDIC44SummaryofMajorPointsBanksintheU.S.arecharteredbyeitherthefederalgovernmentoroneofthe50stategovernmentsfederallycharteredbanksarecallednationalbanksandmustbelongtotheFedandsubscribetoFDICdepositinsurancestate-charteredbankscan,iftheychoose,belongtotheFedorsubscribetoFDICinsurancenearlyallbankssubscribetoFDICinsurance45SummaryofMajorPointsTheMcFaddenActoutlawedinterstatebranchingbynationalbankswithregardtointrastatebranching,theactrequirednationalbankstoabidebythebranchinglawsofthestateinwhichtheywerelocated46SummaryofMajorPointsRestrictionswereimposedonentryandbranchingasaresultoffearsthatmorecompetitioninlocalbankingmarketsmightleadtomorefailuresandthatlettingbigcitybanksentermarketsservedbysmallcommunitybanksmightresultinconcentration47SummaryofMajorPointsUndertheholdingcompanycorporateumbrella,bankshavebeenexpandingthegeographicalareastheyserveandthearrayoffinancialservicestheyoffertheexpansionbybanksintoareastraditionalse