簡述現(xiàn)代經(jīng)濟學發(fā)展歷程--外文文獻翻譯

現(xiàn)代經(jīng)濟學在國內(nèi)發(fā)展現(xiàn)狀 現(xiàn)代經(jīng)濟學以市場為導向的經(jīng)濟改革和開放是二十多年來推動經(jīng)濟學作為一門社會科學在中國發(fā)生根本性變化的直接力量。 20 年來，中國的改革和發(fā)展取得了重大成就，市場經(jīng)濟體系正在全面建立。伴隨著這一過程，現(xiàn)代經(jīng)濟學科的各個分支領域逐步被介紹到中國，并在高校講授。今天，隨著加入世貿(mào)組織，我國經(jīng)濟必然要全方位地與國際接軌并融入經(jīng)濟全球化的浪潮，經(jīng)濟改革和開放也將上一個新的階梯。這一大趨勢呼喚著我們的經(jīng)濟學學科要適應經(jīng)濟發(fā)展的需要，與現(xiàn)代經(jīng)濟學接軌。為此，比較完整和準確地理解什么是現(xiàn)代經(jīng)濟學就恰逢其 時。 發(fā)展過程 現(xiàn)代經(jīng)濟學經(jīng)過這幾十年的發(fā)展，已經(jīng)擴展到經(jīng)濟問題的幾乎所有領域。我們從當前國際經(jīng)濟學界的一些熱門研究課題便可見一斑，比如，公司內(nèi)部組織結構的設計、經(jīng)濟政策的形成與政治利益集團的關系、經(jīng)濟發(fā)展與政治制度演變的關系、社會資本（ social capital）對經(jīng)濟行為的作用、收入分配如何影響效率等等。下面舉兩個例子來具體說明現(xiàn)代經(jīng)濟學的研究范圍正在迅速擴充。 第一個例子有關公司金融學（ corporate finance）內(nèi)容的大幅度擴展。在50 年代中的默迪格利安尼米勒定理之后的二十多年里，公司金 融學中的主要內(nèi)容 公司融資結構的確定 不外乎是取決于公司和個人的不同稅率以及公司破產(chǎn)（包括瀕臨破產(chǎn)）成本。直到 70 年代中，詹森和梅克林從公司經(jīng)理的激勵問題出發(fā)來研究公司股權和債權的結構問題，使得公司金融學的理論有了新的發(fā)展方向。這一方向性轉(zhuǎn)變的核心是經(jīng)濟學超越傳統(tǒng)上只研究市場的局限，把公司作為一種非市場的組織來進行研究。由此便引出一系列新的問題，比如代理人問題，激勵機制問題，公司治理結構問題，等等。在研究這些問題時，信息與合同理論就成為強有力的分析工具。到了 80 年代中，格羅斯曼、哈特和穆爾又進一步運用不 完全合同理論這一新的分析工具來研究公司融資和治理結構問題，取得了理論上的新突破。在經(jīng)驗實證方面，施萊佛（ Andrei Shleifer）和維什尼（ Robert Vishny）在八九十年代對公司的融資結構、經(jīng)理行為和公司業(yè)績之間的關系做了大量的研究，對實際中的公司治理結構提供了不少經(jīng)驗實證論據(jù)比如，他們發(fā)現(xiàn)，現(xiàn)實中重要的代理人問題并木是簡單地發(fā)生在股東和經(jīng)理之間，而是在于大股東伙同經(jīng)理一起侵犯小股東們的利益。 90 年代末，他們及其合作者又進一步從經(jīng)驗數(shù)據(jù)中比較世界各國的法律體系，研究各國公司法和證券法在保護小股 東方面的差別，并由此確定法律對公司融資的影響。他們正在比較法庭裁決和行政監(jiān)管這兩種執(zhí)行規(guī)則的方式在維護金融市場有效運作中的利弊。由此看出，近 20 年來，公司金融學深受微觀經(jīng)濟學發(fā)展的影響，其內(nèi)容已經(jīng)發(fā)生根本性的變化。 第二個例子是現(xiàn)代政治經(jīng)濟學（ political economics）作為經(jīng)濟學中一個獨立的研究領域正在興起。新古典經(jīng)濟學為了集中探討市場的資源配置問題，撇開了一切對政治因素的考慮。但是人們在實際中發(fā)現(xiàn)，脫離政治因素是無法解釋許多經(jīng)濟行為和現(xiàn)象的，特別是那些明顯低效率的經(jīng)濟政策和經(jīng)濟制度。比如，經(jīng) 濟學理論早已論證了關稅保護的低效率性，但是許多國家仍然高筑關稅壁壘。經(jīng)濟學家們很清楚通貨膨脹對宏觀經(jīng)濟造成不穩(wěn)定的危害性，但是不少國家的宏觀穩(wěn)定政策卻不斷被拖延。經(jīng)濟體制的改革、向市場經(jīng)濟的轉(zhuǎn)軌和經(jīng)濟結構的調(diào)整經(jīng)常出現(xiàn)的放慢、停滯甚至倒退，都很難從經(jīng)濟效率角度來理解。于是，經(jīng)濟學家們把政治因素引入他們的經(jīng)濟模型。值得注意的是，新政治經(jīng)濟學或稱現(xiàn)代政治經(jīng)濟學至少在兩點上不同于以往的政治經(jīng)濟學。第一，它的出發(fā)點不是 “ 規(guī)范的 ” （ normative），即研究 “ 應該怎樣 ” ，而是 “ 實證的 ” （ positive），即先研究 “ 是怎樣 ” 。具體地說，它的研究目的是為了理解在現(xiàn)實社會中政治對經(jīng)濟的影響，特別是政府的經(jīng)濟政策和經(jīng)濟改革決定的形成和實施。第二，它的分析方法就是現(xiàn)代經(jīng)濟學的分析方法。具體地說，它是在現(xiàn)代經(jīng)濟學的分析框架內(nèi)引入政治因素的。 相關案例 下面從市場、企業(yè)和政府這三個不斷深入的改革層面來具體說明運用現(xiàn)代經(jīng)濟學分析中國改革的有用性和必要性。第一個例子是市場作為資源配置機制的問題，它是改革中 “ 計劃 ” 與 “ 市場 ” 之爭中的基本問題。現(xiàn)代經(jīng)濟學的一般均衡理論是關于市場價格作為資源配置機制的最基本的理論參照系。這一理論讓我們理解 為什么不受管制的價格反映商品的稀缺程度并在市場經(jīng)濟中起到調(diào)節(jié)供需的作用，以及在什么情況下個人的自利經(jīng)濟行為通過沒有政府干預的市場可以達到社會的經(jīng)濟效率。它對于以市場取代計劃，讓市場在資源配置中起作用具有根本的理論意義。無論是評估以往改革的路徑和的改革措施，還是提出新的政策性建議，凡是探討資源配置問題，這一理論都是討論的基礎。我國在 50 年代中期的改革嘗試，由于缺乏對市場在資源配置上的作用的認知，單純強調(diào)行政性放權，結果導致改革嘗試的失敗。到了 80 年代，一般均衡理論被介紹到中國，市場價格和市場機制在資源配置中的 核心作用逐漸成為中國經(jīng)濟改革者們關注的焦點。但是，即使在市場經(jīng)濟的改革方向已經(jīng)確立之后的今天，各種扭曲價格、限制競爭、抑制市場在資源配置中起作用的政府政策仍然層出不窮。診斷這些政策的后果、提出改進的方法，都離不開基于一般均衡理論的分析。這一例子說明了現(xiàn)代經(jīng)濟學中那些看上去盡管很抽象和不現(xiàn)實的理論參照系，在研究中國的改革時卻具有重要的實用價值。 第二個例子是 90 年代成為中國深層次改革熱點問題的企業(yè)問題。一般均衡理論是關于價格的理論，不是關于企業(yè)的理論。 70 年代以來，特別是 80 年代和90 年代，隨著博弈論、信息經(jīng) 濟學、合同理論的發(fā)展，現(xiàn)代經(jīng)濟學對企業(yè)的產(chǎn)權、所有權和治理結構問題的研究有了突破。現(xiàn)代的企業(yè)理論以激勵問題為出發(fā)點展開對企業(yè)內(nèi)部經(jīng)理層、大小股東和其他利益相關者之間的利益沖突和調(diào)節(jié)機制的分析，而基于這一理論的實證研究發(fā)現(xiàn)了很多現(xiàn)實中的公司治理結構的規(guī)律。這些現(xiàn)代經(jīng)濟學中正在蓬勃發(fā)展的理論和實證結果以及分析方法在 80 年代末、 90 年代被及時地介紹到中國，對于研究中國的企業(yè)改革非常有用，至少表現(xiàn)在兩方面。一方面，中國的企業(yè)改革方向是同發(fā)達經(jīng)濟中的現(xiàn)代公司模式接軌，所以現(xiàn)代經(jīng)濟學對發(fā)達經(jīng)濟中公司的研究有助于在比較中 發(fā)現(xiàn)中國企業(yè)改革中的問題，并提出具有遠見的政策性建議。另一方面，考慮到轉(zhuǎn)軌中的企業(yè)與成熟市場經(jīng)濟中的企業(yè)在自身特性和所處環(huán)境上的重大差別，而這些差別又不易在短期內(nèi)消除，已有企業(yè)理論中的現(xiàn)成結論便不可直接套用了。但是其中的分析工具仍然有用，因為它們抓住了具有一般性的企業(yè)問題的本質(zhì)。運用這些工具，對已有的模型做出修改，加入特殊的歷史和制度因素（比如企業(yè)所有者不全是私人，產(chǎn)權的安全性得不到保障，合同和法律無法被有效率地和公正地執(zhí)行），就會得出既符合中國現(xiàn)實又有分析深度的結果。這樣就可把對轉(zhuǎn)軌中的企業(yè)的研究提到一個 新的高度，并對癥提出符合中國國情的政策性建議。這一例子說明了現(xiàn)代經(jīng)濟學中那些關于成熟市場經(jīng)濟的研究結果，對研究中國的改革或可被直接應用，或可被修改和發(fā)展后運用。 第三個例子是轉(zhuǎn)軌過程中政府的行為及對經(jīng)濟影響的問題。這是較前兩例 市場和企業(yè) 更為深層次的問題，因為政府的行為對市場功能的發(fā)揮和企業(yè)活力的展現(xiàn)都有著基本的（正面或負面的）影響。不同于前兩例的是，現(xiàn)代經(jīng)濟學對政府的經(jīng)濟行為的研究相對有限，遠不如對市場的資源分配和企業(yè)問題的研究那樣深入和成熟。根本原因是發(fā)達的市場經(jīng)濟以法治為基礎，政府的任意行為受到 法律約束，使得它不易侵犯產(chǎn)權和限制企業(yè)的自由組建和發(fā)展，而政府的主要經(jīng)濟職責是提供公共品，如基礎教育和公共衛(wèi)生服務。而轉(zhuǎn)軌經(jīng)濟和發(fā)展中經(jīng)濟的情況非常不同：通過建立法治來約束政府行為往往需要較長的時間才能實現(xiàn)。在完善法治之前，政府的行為，特別是地方政府的行為，對經(jīng)濟影響最大和最突出的方面還不在于提供傳統(tǒng)的公共品，而在于政府對待本地新興非國有企業(yè)的行為是 “ 養(yǎng)雞生蛋 ” 還是 “ 殺雞取卵 ” ，這往往決定了某地經(jīng)濟活力的程度。哪些因素決定地方政府的行為并進而決定地方經(jīng)濟的衰盛無疑是轉(zhuǎn)軌經(jīng)濟提出的新問題，而現(xiàn)代經(jīng)濟學并沒有現(xiàn) 成的答案。但是，現(xiàn)代經(jīng)濟學提供了有用的視角，即地方政府官員同其他經(jīng)濟人一樣其行為與所提供的激勵緊密相關。同時，現(xiàn)代經(jīng)濟學在研究其他問題時發(fā)展出來的分析工具可以被借用，比如，研究企業(yè)組織內(nèi)部管理中的集權、分權利弊的模型可以被用來研究政府組織內(nèi)部中央與地方政府權力配置關系，以及它如何影響地方政府的激勵和行為這一問題。因此，我們可以運用現(xiàn)代經(jīng)濟學的分析框架來評估地方政府行為的變化并進而解釋在轉(zhuǎn)軌過程中各地甚至各國經(jīng)濟表現(xiàn)的不同。 用這樣的方法可以深入研究中國在 80 年代實行的中央向地方放權和財政包干制對地方政府行為 和它們所管轄的地方經(jīng)濟的影響。一方面，眾所周知，財政包干制加劇地方保護主義，伴隨中央財政收入下降等問題。但另一方面，它給予地方政府很高的邊際財政留成率。實證研究發(fā)現(xiàn)，在實行財政包干制期間，地方政府的邊際財政留成率越高，其財政激勵就越高，它們的自身利益與本地的經(jīng)濟繁榮就越緊密地結合在一起，它們表現(xiàn)出更愿意幫助和支持而不是阻止和扼殺本地有活力的非國有經(jīng)濟，結果本地的非國有經(jīng)濟發(fā)展越快。這與 90 年代俄國的情況形成鮮明對比。由于俄國的地方政府的財稅收入與本地的經(jīng)濟發(fā)展幾乎不掛鉤，地方政府沒有財政激勵發(fā)展本地區(qū)經(jīng)濟， 相反卻不斷騷擾、掠奪新興的私有經(jīng)濟。俄國地方政府的這一行為被認為是阻礙新興私有經(jīng)濟發(fā)展的重要原因。 4 這一例子說明了即使是研究那些中國改革中特有的問題，也可以借用現(xiàn)代經(jīng)濟學中為研究其他問題而發(fā)展出來的分析工具。反過來，不僅轉(zhuǎn)軌經(jīng)濟和中國改革的現(xiàn)狀為現(xiàn)代經(jīng)濟學的研究提供了有意思的素材和經(jīng)驗數(shù)據(jù)，而且運用現(xiàn)代經(jīng)濟學的方法研究轉(zhuǎn)軌和中國改革還豐富和發(fā)展了現(xiàn)代經(jīng)濟學。由于政府行為及其對經(jīng)濟的影響是轉(zhuǎn)軌經(jīng)濟中最突出的和最受關注的問題，也是經(jīng)濟發(fā)展中帶有普遍性的深層次問題，對這一問題的研究自然而然地成為來轉(zhuǎn)軌經(jīng)濟學 的一個核心內(nèi)容。而轉(zhuǎn)軌經(jīng)濟學的這一研究也影響和刺激了經(jīng)濟學其他領域的研究。它對發(fā)展經(jīng)濟學有直接的影響 畢竟在制度環(huán)境方面發(fā)展中經(jīng)濟與轉(zhuǎn)軌經(jīng)濟有相似之處 比如推動了研究政府行為與民營經(jīng)濟發(fā)展的關系。它還引發(fā)了 90 年代形成的一些新的經(jīng)濟學（包括金融）的研究熱點，比如比較世界范圍內(nèi)（包括發(fā)達國家）的財政體制、法律體系和金融監(jiān)管體制并分析它們對政府行為、企業(yè)融資和經(jīng)濟表現(xiàn)的影響，而這些都不是以往研究的焦點。由此看出，對轉(zhuǎn)軌經(jīng)濟和對中國改革的研究的確也會為現(xiàn)代經(jīng)濟學的發(fā)展作出貢獻。 In the domestic current situation of the development of modern economics Modern economics of market-oriented economic reform and open for more than 20 years to promote economics as a social science in China direct power of fundamental change. Over the past 20 years, China has made remarkable achievements in reform and development of market economy system is established. With this process, each branch coverage of the modern economic science was introduced to China, and taught in colleges and universities. Today, with the accession to the wto, our countrys economy is bound to in line with international standards in all aspects and blend in the wave of economic globalization, economic reform and opening will be on a new step. This trend calling our economics disciplines to adapt to the needs of economic development, with modern economics. To this end, more complete and accurate understanding of what is just in the Nick of modern economics. The development process Modern economics through the decades of development, has been extended to almost all areas of economic problems. We from the current hot research topic in the international economics and can be seen, for example, internal organization structure design, the formation of economic policies and political interests relationship, the relationship between economic development and political system evolution, social capital, social capital) on the function of economic behavior and how it affects income distribution efficiency, and so on. The following two examples to elaborate the modern economics research scope is expanding rapidly. First example related to corporate finance (corporate finance) content to greatly expand. In the 50 s of the hammer di gayle Anne miller theorem after twenty years, the main content in the corporate finance, corporate financing structure determine, nothing more than is depending on the different tax rates of companies and individuals and corporate bankruptcy cost (including on the verge of bankruptcy). Until the middle of 70 s, Jensen and meckling from the incentive problems of company managers to study the structure of stock ownership and creditors rights, makes the corporate finance theory is a new development direction. The directional change is the core of economics go beyond the confines of the traditional only research on the market, the company as a kind of non-market organizations for research. This will lead to a series of new problems, such as agent problem, incentive mechanism problem, corporate governance structure problems, and so on. These problems in research, information and contract theory as the powerful analysis tool. In the 80 s, grossman, hart and Moore and further on the basis of the theory of incomplete contract and this new analysis tools to study corporate finance governance structure problems, has achieved a new breakthrough in theory. In terms of empirical experience, shriver (Andrei Shleifer) and attended (Robert Vishny) in the nineties to the companys financing structure, managers behavior and the relationship between the companys performance to do a lot of research, the corporate governance structure provides a lot of experience in actual empirical argument, for example, they found that in reality the important agent problem and wood is simply take place between shareholders and managers, but in big shareholders infringe upon the interests of small shareholders together with managers. Again in the late 90 s, they and their partners are from empirical data to compare the legal system of countries all over the world, the national company law and securities law in protecting minority shareholders, and thus determine the laws impact on corporate finance. They are comparing court and administrative supervision both executed rules in the maintenance of financial market effective operation of the pros and cons. Thus, over the past 20 years, the company finance is under the influence of microcosmic economics development, has been fundamental changes in its content. The second example is the modern political economics (here economics) as an independent field of study in economics is on the rise. New classical economics in order to focus on market resource allocation problems, put aside all of political factors to consider. But people found in the actual, from political factor is unable to explain many economic behaviors and phenomena, especially those who obviously inefficient economic policy and economic system. Economic theory, for example, has demonstrated that tariff protection of inefficient willfulness, but many countries still high tariff barriers. Economists know the dangers of inflation to macroeconomic instability caused by, but macro stability policies of many countries have been delayed. The reform of economic system, transition to a market economy and the adjustment of the economic structure often appear slow, stagnation and even backwards, it is difficult to from the perspective of economic efficiency to understand. So economists put the political factors in their economic model. It is important to note that the new political economics or modern political economy in at least two different political economics. First, its starting point is not standard (normative), namely the how, but empirical,), the first study of how. Specifically, its research purpose is to understand the political and economic impact in the real society, especially the governments economic policies and determine the formation and implementation of economic reform. Second, it is analysis methods of modern economics analysis method. Specifically, it is in the modern economics analysis within the framework of political factors. Related to the case Below from the market, enterprises and government reform is unceasingly thorough along with the three aspects to elaborate using the modern economics analysis of the usefulness and necessity of reform in China. As the first example is market mechanism of resource allocation problems, it is plan and market in the reform of the basic problems in dispute. General equilibrium theory of modern economics is the market price as resource allocation mechanism of the basic theory frame of reference. This theory allows us to understand why the unregulated prices reflect the degree of scarce goods and have the effect of adjustment of supply and demand in a market economy, and under what circumstances of individual self-interest economic behavior through market without government intervention can achieve social economic efficiency. It in the market instead of the plan, let the market play a role in the allocation of resources is of fundamental significance. Whether evaluation reform path and the reform measures, and put forward the new policy advice, all resource allocation problem is discussed, and the foundations of this theory are discussed. In the 50 s attempt at reform in our country, due to the lack of market in resource allocation on the role of cognitive, simple emphasis on administrative decentralization, the results lead to the failure of the reform attempt. In the 80 s, general equilibrium theory was introduced to China, the market price and the core role of market mechanism in the allocation of resources gradually become the focus of Chinas economic reformers. However, even after the reform direction of the market economy system established, various distort prices, restrict competition, inhibit market play a role in the allocation of resources of the government policy is still emerge in endlessly. Diagnosis of the consequences of these policies, put forward the improvement method, cannot leave based on the theory of general equilibrium analysis. This example illustrates the modern economics who looks although very abstract and impractical in theory frame of reference, in the research of Chinas reform, has important practical value. The second example is the 90 s as Chinas deep reform hot issues to business problems. General equilibrium theory is the theory of price, its not about the theory of the enterprise. Since the 70 s, especially in the 80 s and 90 s, with the development of game theory, information economics and contract theory, modern economics property rights, ownership and governance structure of enterprise is a breakthrough of research. Incentive problems of modern enterprise theory as the starting point for enterprise managers and the size of the conflicts of interest between shareholders and other stakeholders and the regulating mechanism in the analysis, and based on the theory of the empirical study found that a lot of real law of corporate governance structure. Is booming in the modern economics theory and the empirical results and analysis method in the late 80 s and 80 s was introduced to China in a timely manner, is very useful for the study of Chinas enterprise reform, reflected in two aspects at least. Direction on the one hand, Chinas enterprise reform is developed with economy in practice in modern company, so the modern economics research on companies in the developed economy helps in comparison found that the problems in the reform of Chinese enterprises, and far-sighted policy Suggestions are put forward. Considering the transition of the enterprise, on the other hand, with the enterprise in its own characteristics in mature market economy and a significant difference in the environment, and the difference is not easy to eliminate in the short term, ready-made conclusion cannot be directly applied in the existing enterprise theories. But the analysis tool is still useful because they captured the essence of enterprise with general problems. Using these tools, the existing model to modify, add the special historical and institutional factors (such as not all the private enterprise owners, the security of property rights can not get guarantee, contract and law cannot be efficiently and fairly execute), will be concluded in accordance with Chinese reality and has a depth analysis of the results. So you can put the study of transition of enterprises refers to a new level, and put forward policy Suggestions which accords with the situation of China. This example illustrates the modern economics in the research results about the mature market economy, the research of Chinas reform or can be used directly, or may be used after modification and development. A third example is the government behavior in the process of transition and impact on the economic problems. This is compared with the previous two cases, market and enterprises, a more deep-seated problems, because the government behavior on the market and enterprise vitality of the show have a basic impact (positive or negative). Is different from the first two cases, modern economics the study of the governments economic behavior is relatively limited, much less than the study of market allocation of resources and business problems that in-depth and mature. Root cause is developed on the basis of the rule of law, market economy arbitrary behavior of the government by law, makes it difficult to infringement of property rights and limit the freedom of form and development of the enterprise, and the governments main economic responsibility is to provide public goods, such as basic education and public health services. And transition economy and developing economy situation is very different: through the establishment of the rule of law to restrain the government behavior often require a longer time to achieve it. Before perfecting the rule of law, the behavior of the government, especially local governments behavior, the economic impact of the largest and most prominent aspects also is not with the traditional public goods, but the government treated the local emerging non-state-owned enterprises behavior is chicken eggs or kill, somewhere it often determines the level of economic activity. What factors determine the behavior of local government and to determine the local economy of failure sheng is in transition economy puts forward new problems, and modern economics are not readily definable. However, modern economics provides a useful perspective, namely, local government officials as well as other agent behavior is closely related to the incentives provided. At the same time, other problems in modern economics research developed analysis tools can be used when, for example, the centralization and decentralization of the pros and cons in the enterprise internal management model can be used to study the government organization, the relationship between central and local government power configuration and how it affect the motivation and behavior of local governments. Therefore, we can use modern economics analysis framework to assess changes in local government behavior and further explanation in the process of transition and even around the economic performance of different countries. In this way can be in-depth study of China in 80 s the central to local decentralization and fiscal and expenditure of local government behavior and they are under the jurisdiction of the local economy. Supply system on the one hand, as is known to all, finance deepening local protectionism, along with problems such as the central fiscal revenue decline. But on the other hand, it gives local government fiscal retained high marginal rates. Empirical study found that, during the practice fiscal and expenditure, the marginal finance of local government reserved rate is higher, the higher its fiscal incentives, their own interests and local economic prosperity is closely together, they show more willing to help and support, rather than block and kill the local dynamic non-state economy, as a result of local non-state economic development faster. The information in contrast with Russia in the 90 s. Because of the Russian local government financial in