沈陽(yáng)農(nóng)業(yè)大學(xué)博士英語(yǔ)課第3課中文翻譯.doc

Here Comes Korea, Inc.Like Japan in the 1960s, the old “Hermit Kingdom” is poised for將迎來(lái) an assault 沖擊on the worlds markets像20世紀(jì)60年代的日本一樣，一個(gè)古老的“閉關(guān)自守的國(guó)家”已準(zhǔn)備好向世界市場(chǎng)發(fā)起沖擊。The ritual begins shortly after dawn. As the early morning light filters through the windows of Lucky-Goldstars towering corporate headquarters in Seoul, Koo Cha-Kyung, chairman of the $8 billion conglomerate, issues instructions that echo around the world. In Huntsville, Ala., 200 factory workers are producing a million Goldstar color televisions yearly. In Californias Silicon Valley Koos white-frocked research scientists delve into the mysteries of state-of-the-art semiconductor technology. In Jubail, Saudi Arabia, the company is putting the final touches on a sprawling new petrochemical complex. It is an impressive display of global reach, and a harbinger of things to come. As one of Koos lieutenants puts it: “Our future lies in becoming a truly global company.”黎明后，儀式開(kāi)始。當(dāng)晨光透過(guò)漢城樂(lè)喜金星公司高聳的總部大廈的窗戶(hù)時(shí)，這家擁有80億美元資本的跨行業(yè)公司董事長(zhǎng)具滋暻向全世界發(fā)布了引起反響的指示。在阿拉巴馬州的亨茨維爾，200名產(chǎn)業(yè)工人每年生產(chǎn)100萬(wàn)臺(tái)“金星”彩電。在加利福尼亞的硅谷，身著白色工裝的研究人員在探索目前最先進(jìn)的半導(dǎo)體技術(shù)的秘密。在沙特阿拉伯的著拜爾，該公司正在進(jìn)行一個(gè)新的寵大石油化學(xué)企業(yè)的最后試驗(yàn)。這充分顯示了其全球的勢(shì)力范圍，也是即發(fā)生的許多事情的預(yù)兆。正如具滋暻的一名下屬所言：“我們的未來(lái)就是成為一個(gè)真正的全球性公司。”For South Korea as a whole, that seems as much a prophecy as an ambition. Like Japan in the 1960s, the country is poised for an assault on the worlds export markets. Its surging $81 billion economy is churning out a flood of increasingly sophisticated products, from shoes, toys and telephones to video recorders and microprocessors. Koreas mighty conglomerates dominate Middle East construction, and they command key shares of the worlds shipbuilding, textile and steel industries. Their affiliates, joint ventures and subsidiaries girdle the globe, stretching from Australia, Indonesia and India to Norway, Spain and Gabon, Hyundai and Daewoo, with annual sales of $10 billion and $6 billion respectively, are pushing into the U.S. auto market, riveting the attention of American and Japanese manufacturers. Another colossus, the $9 billion Samsung, has started marketing a “super-tech” 256K computer chipencouraging some Koreans to speak confidently of the day when they will become the worlds second largest manufacturer of basic electronic components, outstripping America and running just behind Japan.對(duì)整個(gè)韓國(guó)來(lái)說(shuō)，那似乎不僅是個(gè)預(yù)言，也是個(gè)理想；像20世紀(jì)60年代的日本一樣，這個(gè)國(guó)家準(zhǔn)備向世界出口市場(chǎng)發(fā)起攻擊。它迅速崛起的規(guī)模達(dá)810億美元的經(jīng)濟(jì)體正大量生產(chǎn)越來(lái)越先進(jìn)的產(chǎn)品，從鞋、玩具和電話(huà)到錄像機(jī)和微處理器無(wú)所不包。韓國(guó)實(shí)力雄厚的跨行業(yè)公司支配著中東地區(qū)的建筑業(yè)，并控制著世界造船業(yè)、紡織業(yè)和鋼鐵工業(yè)的主要份額。這些公司的附屬企業(yè)、合資公司和子公司遍布全球，從澳大利亞、印度尼西亞、印度到挪威、西班牙和加蓬都有；年銷(xiāo)售額分別為100億美元和60億美元的現(xiàn)代公司和大宇公司正在進(jìn)入美國(guó)的汽車(chē)市場(chǎng)，這引起了美國(guó)和日本廠(chǎng)商的注意。另外一個(gè)大企業(yè)，年銷(xiāo)售額90億美元的三星公司，已開(kāi)始推銷(xiāo)一種“超高科” 256K計(jì)算機(jī)芯片這使一些韓國(guó)人自信他們有一天將超過(guò)美國(guó)，成為僅次于日本的世界上第二大基礎(chǔ)電子元件生產(chǎn)國(guó)。Might: Korea, once known as the “Hermit Kingdom,” is plainly on the move. As with “Japan, Inc.” before it, the new label “Korea, Inc.” may be no more than a trendy buzzword. But South Korea aims to forge just such a national economic machine, using the might of its established giants backed by centralized planners who can mobilize- the countrys banks and industrial infrastructure. The heady dreams of actually rivaling Japan may never come within reach; Koreas economy, while large by Asian standards, is barely one-fifteenth the size of its island neighbor. And it faces a gantlet of other obstacles, ranging from an unwieldy bureaucracy and a volatile political climate to a chronic shortage of investment capital and heavy commitments to military spending. Still, the comparisons with Japan, Inc. are more than empty flattery; in fact, they signal Koreas gathering clout.力量：曾被稱(chēng)為“隱士王國(guó)”的韓國(guó)正在闊步前行。可能“韓國(guó)公司”會(huì)像此前的“日本公司”一樣僅僅是一個(gè)時(shí)髦詞。但韓國(guó)的目的就是利用其地位穩(wěn)固的大企業(yè)的力量來(lái)建成強(qiáng)大的國(guó)家經(jīng)濟(jì)機(jī)器，而大企業(yè)又都是由那些能動(dòng)員國(guó)家銀行和工業(yè)基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施的中央集權(quán)的計(jì)劃者所支持的。實(shí)際上那種可與日本媲美的夢(mèng)想或許永遠(yuǎn)也無(wú)法實(shí)現(xiàn)；以亞洲的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)來(lái)衡量，韓國(guó)的經(jīng)濟(jì)規(guī)模不算小，但僅是其島國(guó)鄰居日本經(jīng)濟(jì)規(guī)模的十五分之一。而且還面臨著其他重重困難，從難操作的官僚機(jī)構(gòu)和多變的政治氣候到長(zhǎng)期的投資資本短缺和大量的軍備開(kāi)支。盡管如此，與“日本有限公司”相提并論并不是空洞的恭維話(huà)；事實(shí)上，這標(biāo)志著韓國(guó)不斷擴(kuò)大的影響力。Those signs have not been lost on the West. From Washington to Tokyo, Bonn to Rome, governments are eying Koreas challenge with unease. Justified or not, the view is that the Koreans are aggressively targeting Western markets for an all-out export blitz. Already there are hints of a protectionist backlash. European manufacturers shuddered as $4.1 billion worth of Korean goods flowed into their home markets last year. And in the United States, 13 antidumping suits were brought against Korean firms. The doubling of countrys trade deficit with South Koreato a conspicuous, if still relatively modest, $3.5 billiontouched off a groundswell of concern in Congress and the White House.西方世界并沒(méi)有忽視這些跡象。從華盛頓到東京，從波恩到羅馬，各國(guó)政府都在不安地盯著韓國(guó)的挑戰(zhàn)。不管是真是假，韓國(guó)似乎正在虎視眈眈地瞄準(zhǔn)西方市場(chǎng)，以開(kāi)始其全面的出口閃電式行動(dòng)。目前已出現(xiàn)了保護(hù)主義強(qiáng)烈抵制的跡象。去年，價(jià)值41億美元的韓國(guó)商品涌入歐洲市場(chǎng)，歐洲廠(chǎng)商戰(zhàn)栗了。在美國(guó)有13起針對(duì)韓國(guó)公司的反傾銷(xiāo)起訴。美國(guó)和韓國(guó)之間的貿(mào)易赤字增加了1倍達(dá)到35億美元，雖然還算適度，但已經(jīng)足夠引起人們注意了這使國(guó)會(huì)和白宮的擔(dān)憂(yōu)日益增長(zhǎng)。Not surprisingly, no country is more worried than Japan. Fearful that rapidly modernizing Korean rival will intrude on its foreign and domestic markets, Japan has fought to keep the Koreans from appropriating its technologies. Koreas entry into the global video market, for instance, has been delayed for years by an embargo enforced by Japanese licensers. But the Japanese will not be able to keep a lid on their high-tech know-how forever. Sooner or later they will begin to lose their edge, much as the United States did against Japan. “History is repeating itself,” says Eji Yamashita, general manager of the Daiwa Securities Research Institute in Tokyo. Adds another Japanese executive: “There is still a 10-year gap (between out countries), but it is quickly eroding.”當(dāng)然，沒(méi)有哪個(gè)國(guó)家比日本更擔(dān)憂(yōu)了。日本害怕迅速現(xiàn)代化的對(duì)手韓國(guó)會(huì)侵占其國(guó)內(nèi)外市場(chǎng)，所以極力阻止韓國(guó)獲得其先進(jìn)技術(shù)。例如由于日本技術(shù)擁有者禁止對(duì)韓國(guó)企業(yè)轉(zhuǎn)讓相關(guān)技術(shù)，韓國(guó)進(jìn)入全球音像市場(chǎng)被推遲了好幾年。但日本不可能永遠(yuǎn)使其高科技保密，正如過(guò)去美國(guó)和日本的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)一樣，日本也遲早會(huì)失去其優(yōu)勢(shì)。東京的大和證券研究所的總經(jīng)理山下榮思說(shuō)：“歷史總在重演”另外一個(gè)日本企業(yè)高層也指出：“我們兩國(guó)之間還有十年的差距，但它正在一點(diǎn)點(diǎn)地消失?！盨trategy: South Koreas emergence as a world-class economic power has been startlingly rapid. Four decades of Japanese colonial rule, followed by the bloody Korean War, left the country psychologically scarred and economically bereft. In 1961, when Gen. Park Chung Hee seized power in a military coup, yearly per capita income hovered at a barebones $100. Park committed Korea to exporting its way out of poverty, and his strategy was as simple as it was effective: shower the countrys fledging conglomerates with huge subsidies, government-backed loans and official favors and turn them into the worlds suppliers of bargain-basement textiles, footwear and light industrial goods.策略：韓國(guó)以令人驚訝的速度成為世界級(jí)經(jīng)濟(jì)強(qiáng)國(guó)。在經(jīng)受日本40年的殖民統(tǒng)治和隨后的殘酷朝鮮戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)之后，該國(guó)在心理上傷痕累累，經(jīng)濟(jì)上一貧如洗。1961年，當(dāng)樸正熙將軍在一次軍事政變中奪取政權(quán)時(shí)，其年人均收人一直在少得不能再少的100美元左右徘徊。樸正熙決定要通過(guò)出口使韓國(guó)擺脫貧困，他的策略既簡(jiǎn)單又有效：給本國(guó)新興的跨行業(yè)公司以大量的補(bǔ)助金、政府擔(dān)保的貸款和官方的優(yōu)惠政策，使其成為世界上價(jià)格低廉的紡織品、鞋類(lèi)和輕工業(yè)品的供應(yīng)國(guó)。More recently, Korea has benefited from some unabashed borrowing of Japanese business practices. At the Han Ryuk Electronics Co. on the outskirts of Seoul, for example, all 350 employees wear uniforms, the color and style depending on the job. The plant recently held a competition to come up with a company song, and wall placards exhort workers to “Improve Quality,” “Boost Exports.” And true to their which meet after work once a week to discuss ways to improve productivity.最近，韓國(guó)毫不掩飾地借用了日本企業(yè)的做法并從中受益。例如在漢城郊區(qū)的韓六電子公司，350名員工都穿著制服，顏色和式樣因工種不同而不同。工廠(chǎng)近來(lái)又通過(guò)比賽選出了公司之歌；墻上的標(biāo)語(yǔ)牌敦促工人“提高質(zhì)量”，“促進(jìn)出口”，并要求銘記“勤奮和忠實(shí)”的重要性。而且，與日本公司一樣，員工們被編為“質(zhì)量小組”，每周在工作之余聚會(huì)一次，討論提高生產(chǎn)率的途徑。The results have been dazzling. For two decades, year in and year out, Korea has sizzled along at an 8 per cent annual growth rate. Exports have surged from $119 million in 1964 to $29 billion last year. Per capita income, now $2,000, could reach $5,000 by the end of the century. All this has been accompanied by a near-revolutionary improvement in living standards. Korea boasts a literacy rate of 95 per cent, a standard met by only a few of the most advanced Western nations, and a recent poll showed that nearly two-thirds of all Koreans provincial capital of Seoul teems with energy and sophistication. Beyond any doubt, Koreas expectations for a better life are high and rising fast.效果是非凡的。連續(xù)20年，韓國(guó)的經(jīng)濟(jì)一直以8的年增長(zhǎng)率在增長(zhǎng)；出口額已從1964年的1.19億美元猛增到去年的290億美元。人均收人現(xiàn)在是2,000美元，到本世紀(jì)末可能會(huì)達(dá)到5,000美元。所有這些都伴隨著生活水平近乎革命性的提高。韓國(guó)宣稱(chēng)其脫盲率已達(dá)到95，這個(gè)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)只有少數(shù)最發(fā)達(dá)的西方國(guó)家才能達(dá)到；最近的一次民意測(cè)驗(yàn)顯示，三分之二的韓國(guó)人認(rèn)為他們自己屬于中產(chǎn)階級(jí)。漢城這個(gè)曾帶有不少鄉(xiāng)村氣的首都，如今卻充滿(mǎn)活力和繁榮。毫無(wú)疑問(wèn)，他們?cè)絹?lái)越期盼更好的生活，而且要求也越來(lái)越高。Income Gap: In fulfilling those hopes, however, Korea faces some potentially disruptive problems. Some are social. For all the progress, deep pockets of poverty exist throughout the country. In Seoul, glistening high-rise apartment houses jostle with warrens of slum housing; in remote rural communities people are still eking out subsistence livings. As a result, conspicuous consumption by a nouveau rich elite has become a real source of friction. In contrast to Japan, which has managed to spread its postwar wealth relatively evenly, Korea is beset by a widening income gap between rich and poor. Prosperity has flowed most readily to the large cities, and to those who foundedor work forthe countrys largest industrial companies. Small businessmen and their employees are still waiting for a bigger cut of Koreas new-found bonanza.收入差距：然而，在實(shí)現(xiàn)這些希望的過(guò)程中，韓國(guó)面臨著一些嚴(yán)峻的問(wèn)題，其中一些屬于社會(huì)問(wèn)題。盡管取得了一些進(jìn)步，但各處都存在貧困現(xiàn)象。在漢城，閃閃發(fā)光的高樓大廈與破舊擁擠的貧民區(qū)毗鄰；在偏遠(yuǎn)的鄉(xiāng)村地區(qū)，人們?nèi)栽谄D苦地維持勉強(qiáng)糊口的生活。結(jié)果，新生暴發(fā)戶(hù)奢侈的消費(fèi)成了沖突的一個(gè)真正的根源。日本設(shè)法使其戰(zhàn)后的財(cái)富分配得較為均衡，相反，韓國(guó)卻在為貧富之間日益擴(kuò)大的收人差距困擾。大城市最容易在經(jīng)濟(jì)上走向繁榮，還有那些創(chuàng)立了該國(guó)最大實(shí)業(yè)公司的人們或?yàn)榇斯ぷ鞯娜藗円埠芨挥?。而小商人及其雇員仍在等待著大范圍的削減韓國(guó)新建立的財(cái)源。分享韓國(guó)新得財(cái)源方面依然所得微薄。Equally unsettling has been the political price paid for economic progress. For much of its postwar history, South Korea has been governed by authoritarian figures who seized power by force. And while Koreans today have more money and more leisure time than ever before, they are also pressing for greater democratic freedoms. President Chun Doo Hwan recently eased human-rights restrictions and adopted a less heavy-handed attitude toward his political apposition. He has also repeated his pledge to step down from office in 1988, just before Seoul hosts the Olympic Games. But these signs of political liberalization pose another dilemma. South Koreas short history has been long on turbulence; while most Koreans welcome the new moves toward democracy, they worry that a major political change could upset their economic apple cart.同樣令人不安的是韓國(guó)為經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展所付出的政治代價(jià)。在戰(zhàn)后的大部分時(shí)間里，韓國(guó)一直由通過(guò)武力奪取政權(quán)的獨(dú)裁者統(tǒng)治著。雖然人們比以前有了更多的錢(qián)和閑暇時(shí)間，但他們?nèi)栽谝蟾嗟拿裰骱妥杂伞Ｈ窡偨y(tǒng)最近放松了人權(quán)限制，對(duì)他的政治反對(duì)派也采取了略微寬松的態(tài)度。他還重申了他將在1988年漢城主辦奧運(yùn)會(huì)之前離任的承諾。但這些政治自由化的跡象又提出了一個(gè)難題。韓國(guó)歷史較短，但長(zhǎng)期騷亂；雖然大多數(shù)人歡迎走向民主的新舉措，但他們卻擔(dān)心大的政治變革可能損害其經(jīng)濟(jì)成果。Defense: That picture is complicated by South Koreas huge military commitments. Unlike Japan, which spends less than 1 per cent of its gross national product on defense, South Korea has committed more than 6 per cent of its GNP to military expendituresprimarily to meet the threat of an unremittingly hostile North Korea. But while that has bolstered the Souths security, it has also detracted from its economic growth. For now, South Korea can only hope that its border with the North will remain tranquil; if so, the countrys attention can continue to be focused mainly on growth and material prosperity.防務(wù)：韓國(guó)巨額的軍費(fèi)開(kāi)支使情況更加復(fù)雜。日本國(guó)防開(kāi)支不到其國(guó)民生產(chǎn)總值的1，韓國(guó)則要花掉6以上主要是為了對(duì)付一直敵意的朝鮮的威脅。這雖然保障了安全，卻也拖累了經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展。目前，韓國(guó)希望與朝鮮的邊界保持平靜；如果這樣，他它就能集中精力發(fā)展經(jīng)濟(jì)和物質(zhì)繁榮。If South Korea is to carry its momentum into the next decade, however, it will have to achieve a huge economic leap forward. For years, relatively cheap labor has been the driving force behind Koreas export boom. Today, with wages rising, the price advantage that Korean products enjoy world wide is shrinking. To preserve its markets and continue to grow, Korea must now change gears by moving up the high-tech ladder, much as Japan did when its labor-cost advantage began to erode in the 1970s. it must improve the quality and sophistication of its products, and in many cases, compete toe-to-toe with the United States, Western Europe and Japan. If it does not, Korea risks being overtaken by new low-wage rivals, including China, Pakistan and Malaysia.但是，如果韓國(guó)想把其發(fā)展勢(shì)頭帶入90年代，它就必須實(shí)現(xiàn)一個(gè)經(jīng)濟(jì)上的大飛躍。數(shù)年來(lái)，相對(duì)廉價(jià)的勞動(dòng)力一直是韓國(guó)出口增長(zhǎng)的推動(dòng)力。如今，隨著工資的提高，韓國(guó)產(chǎn)品在全世界所享有的價(jià)格優(yōu)勢(shì)正在減弱。正如日本在70年代開(kāi)始失去勞動(dòng)力成本優(yōu)勢(shì)一樣，為了保住市場(chǎng)繼續(xù)發(fā)展，韓國(guó)必須發(fā)展高科技來(lái)提高其產(chǎn)品的質(zhì)量和檔次，在許多情況下，必須直接與美國(guó)、西歐和日本進(jìn)行競(jìng)爭(zhēng)。否則，它就有可能被新的具有低工資優(yōu)勢(shì)的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)者，包括中國(guó)、巴基斯坦和馬來(lái)西亞所趕超。Such challenges and opportunities are to be expected as Korea enters a new era. To negotiate the transition, President Chuns brain trust of American-trained technocrats is busily charting a new economic course. The goal: to leapfrog many of the traditional bottlenecks to development, to begin with, the advisers aim to catapult the countrys still-fledgling electronics industry into the outer frontiers of high technology. Over the next five years, say South Korean officials, the countrys 50 largest companies will spend more than $3.5 billion to develop everything from state-of-the-art microprocessors and video recorders to advanced telecommunications equipment. That figure is dwarfed by the $28 billion that Japan spends each year on research and development, but it is a start. And the commitments made by Koreas largest industrial groups are much more competitive than the countrywide figures would indicate. For example, Hyundai, the countrys largest company, has been spending $700 million a year on electronics factories and research facilities. In time, company executives hope, the company and its sisters will be as widely known and respected as Sony or Mitsubishi.韓國(guó)進(jìn)入一個(gè)新時(shí)代時(shí)應(yīng)該預(yù)料到這樣的挑戰(zhàn)和機(jī)遇。為了順利過(guò)度，韓國(guó)總統(tǒng)的那些在美國(guó)留學(xué)的高參正忙于制定一套新的經(jīng)濟(jì)路線(xiàn)。其目標(biāo)是：逾越阻礙發(fā)展的傳統(tǒng)瓶頸問(wèn)題。首先，他們想把該國(guó)尚處于發(fā)展初期的電子工業(yè)推到高科技的前沿。韓國(guó)的官員們說(shuō)，在未來(lái)的5年中，該國(guó)50家最大的公司將花費(fèi)35億多美元來(lái)開(kāi)發(fā)從最先進(jìn)的微處理器和攝像機(jī)到高級(jí)電信設(shè)備等各種產(chǎn)品。與日本每年花在研究和開(kāi)發(fā)上的280億美元相比，這個(gè)數(shù)目顯得微乎其微，但這僅僅是開(kāi)始。而且韓國(guó)主要工業(yè)集團(tuán)發(fā)展高科技的決心可能比數(shù)字更能說(shuō)明問(wèn)題。例如韓國(guó)最大企業(yè)現(xiàn)代公司每年花在電子工廠(chǎng)和研究設(shè)備上的資金達(dá)7億美元。公司的管理人員希望，總有一天，該公司及其姊妹公司將會(huì)像索尼公司和三菱財(cái)團(tuán)一樣廣為人知并獲得普遍的尊重。Revamping: Seouls ambitious planners have other changes in mind. In fact, they envision nothing less than a wholesale revamping of the countrys basic industries. Their main target is the chaebol, the closely held businesses that, like Japans leviathan zaibatsu, have long powered Koreas growth. While such companies as Daewoo, Samsung and Dong Ah helped put Korea on the words corporate map, many Koreans view their unbridled growth with misgivings. “We wont advance unless we change our industrial structure.” explains Lee Kyu Uck of the Korea Development Institute. “The real question is whether the conglomerates can cope with the world economy in the coming century.”改組：漢城雄心勃勃的計(jì)劃者還構(gòu)思著新的變革。事實(shí)上，他們已經(jīng)預(yù)想到了大規(guī)模地改組該國(guó)的基礎(chǔ)工業(yè)。他們的主要目標(biāo)是財(cái)閥，即那些像日本的大財(cái)團(tuán)那樣為少數(shù)人所有的企業(yè)，而且是長(zhǎng)期為韓國(guó)的發(fā)展提供動(dòng)力的公司和企業(yè)。雖然大宇、三星和東亞等公司促使韓國(guó)進(jìn)入世界貿(mào)易大國(guó)行列，但許多韓國(guó)人對(duì)它們沒(méi)有節(jié)制的擴(kuò)大已有不滿(mǎn)。“除非改變我們的工業(yè)結(jié)構(gòu)，否則我們將不會(huì)前進(jìn)，”韓國(guó)發(fā)展協(xié)會(huì)的李六克說(shuō)，“真正的問(wèn)題在于集團(tuán)公司能否適應(yīng)新世紀(jì)的世界經(jīng)濟(jì)”。The debate boils down to whether Koreas industrial giants wield too much power and influence, both for their own and their countrys good. They are clearly an awesome force. Last year sales from the 50 largest chaebol equaled more than a half of South Koreas gross national product. They account for an overwhelmingly large share of both the countrys exports and its $46 billion foreign debt. Their often helterskelter expansion has created monopolies in many industries and resulted in widespread inefficiency; some companies are run by managers whose qualifications are limited to their family ties to the founder. And because most of this expansion has been financed through borrowed money, the chaebol have grown increasingly vulnerable to business setbacks and changes of economic climate. As a Western banker in Seoul bluntly puts it: “Its a house of cards.”爭(zhēng)論的焦點(diǎn)最后集中到韓國(guó)的工業(yè)巨頭對(duì)自己和國(guó)家的利益行使的權(quán)利和施加的影響是否太大了。它們顯然是一種令人敬畏的力量，去年，50家最大企業(yè)集團(tuán)的銷(xiāo)售額相當(dāng)于韓國(guó)國(guó)民生產(chǎn)總值的一半以上。在該國(guó)的出口額和460億美元的外債中占有相當(dāng)大的份額。它們倉(cāng)促地?cái)U(kuò)大規(guī)模在許多行業(yè)產(chǎn)生了壟斷，并導(dǎo)致了普遍的低效；某些公司在任命高管時(shí)任人唯親。而且，由于擴(kuò)大規(guī)模的資金大都是借來(lái)的，大企業(yè)集團(tuán)越來(lái)越容易受到經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退和經(jīng)濟(jì)氣候變化的影響。正如漢城一個(gè)西方銀行家坦言的：“這種擴(kuò)展是不可靠的?！盨takes: The challenge for Chun is to rein in the chaebol without damaging their absolutely essential contribution to the Korean economyand without stepping on the toes of the chaebols enormously powerful chieftains. Among them: such rugged empire builders as Hyundais Chung JuYoung Samsungs Lee Byung Chull. Given the stakes involved, its not surprising that the issue has become politically volatile. The outspoken opposition leaders of the National Asembly routinely criticize the government for granting special tax breaks to the chaebol, which they argue have impeded the growth of small businesses and stymied entrepreneurship. Even worse, they say, the lions share of the nations new wealth has gone to the chaebola charge that even the conglomerates owners find hard to deny. “We have to change,” acknowledges one senior chaebol executive. “If we dont share the fruits of our success better, the system wont survive.”風(fēng)險(xiǎn)：全斗煥所面臨的挑戰(zhàn)是，控制大企業(yè)集團(tuán)擴(kuò)大規(guī)模的速度而又不妨礙其對(duì)韓國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)做出必要貢獻(xiàn)并且不觸怒大企業(yè)集團(tuán)勢(shì)力極大的首領(lǐng)，其中包括：現(xiàn)代公司的鄭周永和三星公司的李秉哲等大企業(yè)強(qiáng)有力的創(chuàng)建者。由于牽涉極大，因此變革可能會(huì)引起政局不穩(wěn)也就不足為奇了。國(guó)會(huì)中言詞不羈的反對(duì)黨領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人時(shí)常批評(píng)政府給予大企業(yè)集團(tuán)特殊稅務(wù)優(yōu)惠，他們認(rèn)為，這妨礙了小企業(yè)的發(fā)展和創(chuàng)業(yè)精神。他們認(rèn)為更糟的是，國(guó)家新的財(cái)富大部分都流人了大企業(yè)集團(tuán)這一指責(zé)連跨行業(yè)公司的老板們也難以否認(rèn)。一位大企業(yè)集團(tuán)的高級(jí)管理人員承認(rèn)，“我們必須變革，如果我們不更好地分配自己的成功果實(shí)，我們的制度就會(huì)垮掉?！盉ut Seoul is proceeding cautiously in hunting a remedy. The government has already eliminated direct subsidies for such industries as steel and shipbuilding. It has also imposed a partial freeze on new loans to the chaebol, mainly in a bid to channel more bank credits to small and medium-size businesses. In addition, South Korean bureaucrats pointedly declined to bail out the Kukje industrial group, the countrys sixth largest chaebol, when it was declared insolvent three months ago. The giant footwear, textile and construction conglomerate had been battered by losses on its Middle East building projects, and Chinese and Pakistani textile makers had begun to eat into its markets elsewhere. Since those problems were by no means unique to Kukje, the lesson of the bankruptcy was clear: South Koreas chaebol had better learn to swim on their ownor sink. “Wed like to see the big conglomerates concentrate their activities rather than extend everywhere,” says Sakong II, President Chuns chief economic adviser. “They are getting the message.”但漢城在很謹(jǐn)慎地尋找解決辦法。政府已取消了對(duì)鋼鐵和造船業(yè)的直接補(bǔ)貼，還凍結(jié)了部分對(duì)大企業(yè)集團(tuán)的新貸