歐洲經濟分析：德國經濟的再平衡調整1126

1、高盛國際 高盛國際 2012 年 11 月 23 日 issue no: 12/31 歐洲經濟分析 研究報告 德國經濟的再平衡調整 德國經濟需要進行再平衡調整 收窄經常項目順差是德國經濟再平衡的一個方面。但與歐元區(qū)邊緣國家不同，德 國在短期內沒有什么外部動力來強行推進真正的再平衡調整。只要全球需求保持 旺盛，邊緣國家經濟疲軟和面向周邊出口下滑的局面就不足以促進德國的調整步 伐。此外，德國的競爭力不可能很快就出現(xiàn)明顯下降；而且，盡管德國內需應該 會繼續(xù)以強勁步伐增長，但增幅不會特別顯著。因此，我們預計德國的貿易順差 僅會以非常遲緩的速度回落。 德國貿易順差顯著回落需以什么為前提？ 需要滿足的前提

2、很多。我們評估了德國進出口對全球需求、實際有效匯率以及內 需變化的敏感度。我們發(fā)現(xiàn)只有在全球需求銳減、實際有效匯率飆升或德國內需 huw pill +44(20)7774-8736 kevin daly +44(20)7774-5908 高盛國際 dirk schumacher +49(69)7532-1210 高盛集團德國公司 顯著提高的情況下，德國的貿易順差才可能隨之大幅回落。 andrew benito 我們預計德國的貿易順差僅會小幅下滑 我們預測全球經濟增長將溫和加速。與此同時，德國的工資增速不可能較當前水 平大幅提高。因此，我們認為德國的國際競爭力不會下降，而且德國的進口也不 會因為

3、內需走強而顯著上升。 為邊緣國家?guī)淼木徑夥浅Ｓ邢?德國經濟失衡不只是邊緣國家經濟失衡一個鏡像對照，因此，德國的再平衡調整 未必會明顯緩和邊緣國家的調整進程。不論如何，自從危機爆發(fā)以來，德國相對 于邊緣國家的貿易順差已經出現(xiàn)了明顯下降。 +44(20)7051-4004 lasse holboell nielsen +44(20)7774-5205 高盛國際 natacha valla +33(1)4212-1343 高盛國際 antoine demongeot +44(20)7774-1169 高盛國際 sebastian graves +44(20)7552-5748 高盛國際 投資者不應

4、視本報告為作出投資決策的唯一因素。 有關分析師的申明和其他重要信息，見信息披露附錄，或參閱 高盛集團 1. 2. 3. 4. 2 2012 年 11 月 23 日european economics analyst rebalancing germany the main challenge for the euro area periphery continues to be the need to regain an external balance. but it is not just the peripheral countries that are not in equilibri

5、um. in some respects, germany exhibits a similar level of imbalance: its current account surplus will reach close to 6% of gdp this year and it has a rising net foreign asset position of nearly 1trn. a moderate rebalancing has taken place in germany compared with the pre-crisis situation: the curren

6、t account surplus has declined from around 8% of gdp in 2007 to below 6% this year. however, this adjustment has been measured so far compared with the situation in the euro area periphery. here we attempt to answer four key questions on germanys rebalancing: what could bring about a large decline i

7、n germanys trade surplus? germanys trade surplus depends on the relative price competitiveness of germany, and on domestic and external demand. we run different simulations in order to assess how sensitive german trade is to these three factors. we find that a sharp deterioration in german competiti

8、veness, a large decline in external demand or a significant increase in domestic demand would be needed to see a meaningful decline in the german trade balance. how likely is this to happen? are developments in competitiveness and domestic and external demand likely to lead to a meaningful correctio

9、n in the trade balance? our forecast for global growth, and domestic price and demand developments, suggests that we will see only a moderate decline in the trade balance. how damaging to growth would a rebalancing be? germanys net trade has contributed significantly to growth over the past 10 years

10、. a significant reduction in the trade surplus would, everything else equal, lead to substantially weaker growth. but not everything else is equal. the crucial issue is whether stronger domestic demand can also boost the production of non-tradeables sufficiently to allow a more or less smooth rebala

11、ncing. we see some evidence of this happening. would it help the periphery? the imbalances of the german economy are not simply a mirror image of the imbalances in the periphery; consequently, a rebalancing of germany would not necessarily ease the adjustment in the periphery in a meaningful way. tr

12、ade a main driver of german growth since 1999 as a starting point we look at how germanys trade balance has evolved. external trade has been a main driver of growth in germany since the introduction of the euro in 1999. indeed, net trade accounts for almost half of all the growth observed since then

13、, and the trade balance grew from around 17bn in 1999 (3.2% of gdp) to around 177bn in 2007 (8.1% of gdp). after peaking in 2007, the trade balance decreased somewhat to around 6% of gdp in 2011, but it remains very high (see exhibit 1). 高盛全球經濟、商品和策略研究 3 2012 年 11 月 23 日 exhibit 1: germanys trade an

14、d current account surplus reached a record high in 2007 european economics analyst exhibit 2: a sharp appreciation of the reer is needed to reduce germanys trade balance significantly 7.0 % of gdp current account trade balance 110 105 index real effective exchange rate (lhs) bn euro 60 50 5.0100 tra

15、de balance 40 95 3.0 90 30 1.0 -1.0 85 80 75 20 10 0 -3.0 197019751980198519901995200020052010 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 source: bundesbanksource: haver analytics, gs global ecs research. 1. not easy to reduce the trade balance essentially there are two ways, and a combination

16、of these, in which to achieve a rebalancing of germanys external surplus: export less and/or import more. given the drivers of german exports and imports, only a sharp deterioration in competitiveness and/or a collapse in global demand would lead to a significant reduction in germanys trade surplus.

17、 both seem rather unlikely in the medium term and we therefore expect only a moderate decline in the trade balance. german exports are determined by global demand and the relative competitiveness of german exporters as reflected in the trade-weighted exchange rate. german imports depend on domestic

18、demand and on relative price competitiveness: as foreign goods become cheaper relative to domestically produced goods, imports rise. but imports also depend on exports, as german companies import a significant amount of intermediate goods, which are further processed and than re-exported. so a decli

19、ne in exports, everything else equal, leads to a decline in imports. with this in mind we built a simple model for german exports and imports, where both depend on global demand, the real effective exchange rate and final domestic demand. we use our model to simulate the response of german exports a

20、nd imports to changes in global demand, the real effective exchange rate and final domestic demand. for these simulations we hold two of the three exogenous factors of our model constant at the current level. at least in the case of final domestic demand, this assumption may seem problematic, as a s

21、ignificant reduction in the trade balance should also affect investment spending and employment, and in turn domestic demand. but the aim of our exercise is only a partial equilibrium analysis, which does not incorporate all the feedback loops that exist between trade, domestic demand and price deve

22、lopments. the main reason for this is the easier tractability of the results and the fact that we are mainly interested in gaining an overall idea of the sensitivity of german trade, while bearing in mind that this is only an approximation. in terms of the concrete simulation exercise we are underta

23、king, we estimate how big a change in any of these factors would be needed in order to reduce by a half this years trade surplus of around 170bn by 2014. we calculate the response of exports and imports sequentially, given the sensitivity of imports to export growth. we first calculate the response

24、of exports and then use the model predicted values to calculate the response of imports. the calculated export and import figures then allow us to calculate the response of the trade balance. we find that: 高盛全球經濟、商品和策略研究 -10 -30 4 2012 年 11 月 23 日european economics analyst a 15% appreciation of the

25、real effective exchange rate would reduce the trade balance by a half. an increase in the effective exchange rate by around 15% over the next 24 months (assuming global growth of around 3% and final domestic demand of 1.5%) would lead to a decline in the trade balance of around 50% over the next two

26、 years (see exhibit 2). an acceleration of final domestic demand to 2.3% annual growth would reduce the trade balance by a half. an increase in the annual growth rate of final domestic demand to around 2.3%yoy (implying growth of 2.4% in 2013 and 2.8% in 2014) would lead to a strong increase in impo

27、rts and consequently a reduction in the trade balance (see exhibit 3). note that the average annual growth rate of final domestic demand since unification has been 1.2%yoy. growth in global demand would need to decline to zero in order to reduce the trade balance by a half. a stagnation of global de

28、mand over 2013-14 would also lead to a 50% reduction in germanys trade balance (see exhibit 4). 2. a substantial reduction in the trade balance looks unlikely all three scenarios we considered are extreme and unlikely to materialise. but even if we abstract from extreme scenarios, it is unlikely tha

29、t we will see a substantial reduction in germanys trade balance in the coming two years. exhibit 3: domestic demand would need to grow rapidly to produce a large decline in germanys trade balance exhibit 4: growth in global demand would need to fall to zero to reduce germanys trade balance by a half

30、 3 %, yoybn euro 606 %, yoy bn euro 60 2 final domestic demand (lhs) trade balance 50 40 5 4 3 50 40 2 130 20 1 0 30 20 0 10 -1 -2 global demand (lhs) trade balance 10 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 source: haver analytics, gs global ecs research. 高盛全球經濟、商品和策略研究 99 00 01 02 03 04 05

31、 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 source: haver analytics, gs global ecs research. 5 2012 年 11 月 23 日 exhibit 5: global demand (not necessarily european demand) is driving german exports european economics analyst exhibit 6: german exports are above the pre-crisis level despite weakness in the periphery 8

32、.0 6.0 4.0 %, yoy %, yoy 20 15 10 140 130 120 index 5 110 2.0 0.0 0 -5 100 90 -2.0 global demand (lhs) german exports -10 -15 80 total exports exports to periphery -4.0 00010203040506070809101112 -20 70 06070809101112 source: haver analytics, gs global ecs research.source: haver analytics, gs global

33、 ecs research global demand supports german exports. we do not foresee a sharp correction in global demand in the near term. indeed, we forecast global growth of more than 3% for next year, implying a moderate acceleration in global growth. and even if global growth were to turn out weaker than expe

34、cted, it would need to slow significantly to make a dent in the german trade balance, as our simulations have shown. therefore, unless the global economy experiences a major disruption similar to that of 2009, when global growth slowed to -1%, german exports should continue to grow at a healthy pace

35、. it is worth pointing out in this respect that continuing weakness in the periphery is not necessarily holding back german exports. important structural changes have taken place in the global economy, which have been very beneficial for german exporters. the integration of the brics and other devel

36、oping economies into the global economy led to a favourable shift of global demand towards german export goods. the share of german exports to china, for example, has increased over the last 10 years from around 2% to more than 6%. the rising income of commodity exporting countries on the back of hi

37、gher commodity prices has also led to increased demand for german exports. only a moderate rise in real effective exchange rate. a sharp appreciation of germanys real effective exchange rate in the near term also seems unlikely. there are two components in the real effective exchange rate: the nomin

38、al exchange rate and the inflation differentials between germany and its trading partners. as our simulations have shown, the exchange rate would need to appreciate by around 15% over the next two years in order to reduce the trade deficit by a half. an appreciation of that magnitude via the nominal

39、 exchange rate and an appreciation of the euro against the major currencies seems very unlikely given the difficult adjustment process the euro area has to undergo. moreover, an appreciation of the euro would be of no help when it comes to reducing intra-euro area imbalances. but neither is there an

40、y reason to expect a sharp appreciation of the real effective exchange rate via a rise in german inflation. again, for germanys real exchange rate to appreciate, the rise in inflation would need to be observed in germany only. a sharp increase in inflation on the back of energy-related price increas

41、es would therefore not lead to an appreciation of germanys real exchange rate assuming these price increases were global in nature. 高盛全球經濟、商品和策略研究 6 2012 年 11 月 23 日 exhibit 7: continuing divergence of price levels since the start of the crisis 120 european economics analyst exhibit 8: private house

42、holds income growth has lagged gdp growth in germany 118 115 110 105 index 116 114 112 110 108 106 104 index real disposable household income growth real gdp 100 greece portugal italy ireland spain germany 102 100 95 0506070809101112 98 00020406081012 source: haver analytics, gs global ecs researchs

43、ource: haver analytics, gs global ecs research this leaves an increase in wages, which would then lead to higher inflation, as the only potential driver of a german real appreciation. the annual growth rate of negotiated wages is currently running at 2.6%, which implies a clear acceleration compared

44、 with the same period in 2011, when the annual rate stood at 1.4%. at the same time, it is difficult to see how wages could accelerate significantly further from here onwards. the softening in the economy has now reached the labour market and unemployment has started to edge higher. the bargaining p

45、ower of unions is therefore unlikely to improve during 2013. that said, the labour market remains very tight and we expect eventually to see some overheating of the german economy on the back of very easy financial conditions. but we do not expect this to become visible until after 2014. finally, ev

46、en a pick-up in wages would not immediately lead to a decline in german competitiveness as, at least initially, some of the increase could be absorbed through lower margins. rising income growth and high savings. growth in real disposable income has lagged real gdp growth in germany for quite some t

47、ime now (see exhibit 8). wage moderation has been one factor behind this sluggishness, and a significant rise in the tax burden and social security contribution rates constitutes another. but both of these headwinds have dissipated and real disposable income has been growing more robustly over the p

48、ast two years. in order to compensate for the gap that has opened up between household income and gdp, wages would need to grow disproportionally stronger. as we have argued above, this is unlikely to happen, although we expect household income to grow in line with gdp. another source of stronger do

49、mestic spending in germany could be a reduction in private savings. net savings for german households and non-financial corporates increased during the period 1999- 2005 and have broadly moved sideways since unification (see exhibit 9). 高盛全球經濟、商品和策略研究 -150 800 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 7 2012 年 11 月 23 日 exhi

50、bit 9: high level of savings of german households and corporates european economics analyst exhibit 10: construction orders are trending upwards after years of stagnation 200 150 100 50 0 -50 -100 bn euro non-financial corporates 220 200 180 160 140 120 100 index total construction orders residentia

51、l construction orders 350 300 250 200 150 100 50 private households 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 source: haver analytics 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 source: bundesbank there are two potential explanations for high savings in the

52、 corporate sector. from the early part of the 2000s until the crisis, these savings ultimately reflected a general adjustment of the corporate sector to a change in corporate governance and globalisation . more recently, an increased sense of uncertainty about the economic outlook seems to be holdin

53、g back investment spending and keeping savings higher . 3. need for a rise in domestically produced non-tradeables while we think a significant reduction in the trade balance over the next two years is unlikely, some downward adjustment should nonetheless take place. domestic demand is on average gr

54、owing more robustly, similar to the pace during the pre-crisis years. but can other growth drivers compensate for the effects of this adjustment? a rise in imports on the back of stronger domestic demand would need to be compensated by a rise in domestically produced non-tradeables (basically, servi

55、ces) in order to maintain overall economic output unchanged. there are signs that such a shift in the composition of german output is indeed happening, albeit very slowly . the german construction sector should provide some support in this area. very favourable financial conditions and an extended p

56、eriod of low activity suggest that the medium-term outlook for the sector is likely to be one of robust demand . for a detailed analysis of these changes, see global economics paper 144 capital markets and the end of germany inc. see european economics analyst 10/18 uncertainty weighing on investmen

57、t spending. see european economics analyst 12/30. see european weekly analyst 12/09. 高盛全球經濟、商品和策略研究 8 2012 年 11 月 23 日 exhibit 11: productivity growth in the manufacturing sector remains strong real output per hour european economics analyst exhibit 12: trade surplus with southern periphery only a s

58、mall part of germanys total trade surplus 180 170 160 150 index financial, business services manufacturing public, personal services trade, hotels, transport 200 150 bn euro 12-mon cumulated 140 130 120 110 100 100 50 german trade balance german trade balance with gips 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99

59、00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 0 010203040506070809101112 source: destatis, gs global ecs researchsource: haver analytics but there are also more structural changes that could help to facilitate the rebalancing. productivity growth in the various sectors of the german economy has diverged substantially over time, with productivity in the manufacturing sector outstripping by far productivity growth in the services sector. this divergence is to some extent to be expected and can be observed in other countries too. what is striking in the case of germany is that productivity growth i