貨幣金融學(xué)第米什金思考題目答案

1、Chapter 15ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS 1. The snowstorm would cause float to increase, which would increase the monetary base. To counteract this effect, the manager will undertake a defensive open market sale of securities using a reverse repo transaction. 這場(chǎng)暴風(fēng)雪將使浮款上升，這將增加貨幣基礎(chǔ)。為了抵消這種影響，經(jīng)理將采用逆回購(gòu)交易進(jìn)行防御性公開(kāi)市場(chǎng)銷(xiāo)

2、售。2. When the publics holding of currency increases during holiday periods, the currencycheckable deposits ratio increases and the money supply falls. To counteract this decline in the money supply, the Fed will conduct a defensive open market purchase of securities. 在節(jié)假日期間，當(dāng)公眾持有貨幣升值時(shí)，現(xiàn)金/存款比率增加，貨幣供應(yīng)

3、量下降。為了抵消貨幣供應(yīng)的下降，美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)將采取防御性的公開(kāi)市場(chǎng)購(gòu)買(mǎi)證券。3. As we saw in Chapter 14, when the Treasurys deposits at the Fed fall, the monetary base increases. To counteract this increase, the manager would undertake an open market sale of securities. 正如我們?cè)诘?4章所看到的，當(dāng)財(cái)政部的存款下降時(shí)，貨幣基礎(chǔ)會(huì)增加。為了抵消這種增長(zhǎng)，經(jīng)理將采取公開(kāi)市場(chǎng)出售證券。4. Because the

4、decrease in float is only temporary, the monetary base is expected to decline only temporarily. A repurchase agreement only temporarily injects reserves into the banking system, so it is a sensible way of counteracting the temporary decline in the monetary base due to the decline in float. 因?yàn)楦?dòng)的減少只是

5、暫時(shí)的，貨幣基礎(chǔ)只會(huì)暫時(shí)下降。回購(gòu)協(xié)議只是暫時(shí)將儲(chǔ)備注入銀行體系，因此，由于浮款的下降，這是抵消貨幣基礎(chǔ)暫時(shí)下降的一種明智的方式。5. False. The Fed also can affect the level of borrowed reserves by directly limiting the amount of loans to an individual bank or the broader financial system. 美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)還可以通過(guò)直接將貸款額度限制在單個(gè)銀行或更廣泛的金融體系，從而影響借入準(zhǔn)備金的水平。6. Uncertain. In theory, the

6、market for reserves model indicates that once the fed funds rate reaches the discount rate, it would never surpass the discount rate since banks would then borrow directly from the Fed, and not in the fed funds market, which would prevent the fed funds rate from ever rising above the discount rate.

7、However, in practice, the fed funds rate can (and has) been above the discount rate. This may occur due to the stigma associated with banks borrowing directly from the Fed; i.e., banks may prefer to pay a higher market rate than to borrow directly from the Fed and incur the perceived stigma. In addi

8、tion, nonbank financial institutions, which do not have access to the discount window, can and do participate in the federal funds market. The extent to which nonbank financial companies participate in the fed funds market may mean that the gap when the fed funds rate is above the discount rate may

9、not be arbitraged away.不確定。理論上,市場(chǎng)準(zhǔn)備金模型表明，一旦聯(lián)邦基金利率達(dá)到貼現(xiàn)率，它永遠(yuǎn)不會(huì)超越貼現(xiàn)率由于銀行會(huì)直接向美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)借錢(qián)，而不是在聯(lián)邦基金市場(chǎng)，這將阻止聯(lián)邦基金利率上升高于貼現(xiàn)率。然而，實(shí)際上，聯(lián)邦基金利率可以(也有)高于貼現(xiàn)率。這可能是由于銀行直接從美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)借款會(huì)留下污點(diǎn)；即銀行可能傾向于支付更高的市場(chǎng)利率，而不是直接從美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)借款而留下污點(diǎn)。此外，那些沒(méi)有貼現(xiàn)窗口渠道的非銀行金融機(jī)構(gòu)也可以并確實(shí)參與聯(lián)邦基金市場(chǎng)。非銀行金融公司參與美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)基金市場(chǎng)的程度可能意味著，當(dāng)聯(lián)邦基金利率高于貼現(xiàn)率的時(shí)候，這一差距可能不會(huì)被套利。7. Uncertain. In theo

10、ry, the market for reserves model indicates that once the fed funds rate reaches the interest rate on reserves, it would never go below this rate since banks could then earn a risk-free interest rate paid directly from the Fed, rather than loaning excess reserves in the more risky fed funds market a

11、t an equivalent or lower rate; this should prevent the fed funds rate from ever falling below the interest rate paid on reserves. However, in practice, the fed funds rate can (and has) been below the interest rate paid on reserves. This is because nonbank financial institutions, which cannot earn in

12、terest on reserves, participate in the federal funds market and provide a significant amount of funding to the market. The extent to which nonbank financial companies participate in the fed funds market may mean that the gap when the fed funds rate is below the interest rate on reserves may not be a

13、rbitraged away. 不確定。理論上，市場(chǎng)準(zhǔn)備金模型表明，一旦聯(lián)邦基金利率達(dá)到準(zhǔn)備金利率，它永遠(yuǎn)不會(huì)低于這個(gè)利率，由于銀行可以直接從美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)獲得無(wú)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)利率，而不是出借超額準(zhǔn)備金在風(fēng)險(xiǎn)更高的聯(lián)邦基金市場(chǎng)獲取同等或更低的利率；這將防止聯(lián)邦基金利率從低于準(zhǔn)備金率的水平下降。然而，在實(shí)踐中，聯(lián)邦基金利率可以(也有)低于準(zhǔn)備金支付的利率。這是因?yàn)槟切o(wú)法獲得準(zhǔn)備金利息的非銀行金融機(jī)構(gòu)參與聯(lián)邦基金市場(chǎng)，并向市場(chǎng)提供大量資金。非銀行金融公司參與美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)基金市場(chǎng)的程度可能意味著，當(dāng)聯(lián)邦基金利率低于準(zhǔn)備金利率時(shí)，這一差距可能不會(huì)被套利。8. During crises, the Fed may need

14、to provide a large amount of liquidity to the banking and financial system, which would reduce the fed funds rate. If the Fed needs to sterilize these effects, it would need to conduct open market sales of securities to maintain a given fed funds rate target. If the liquidity provision is large, the

15、n offsetting the liquidity could eventually result in the Fed running out of securities to sell. In this case, the interest rate on reserves can be raised to push the fed funds rate up, without having to conduct offsetting open market sales that decrease the holdings of government securities by the

16、Fed.在危機(jī)期間，美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)可能需要向銀行和金融體系提供大量流動(dòng)性，從而降低聯(lián)邦基金利率。如果美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)需要消除這些影響，就需要公開(kāi)市場(chǎng)銷(xiāo)售證券，以維持既定的聯(lián)邦基金利率目標(biāo)。如果流動(dòng)性供應(yīng)很大，那么抵消流動(dòng)性的影響最終可能會(huì)導(dǎo)致美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)沒(méi)有證券出售。在這種情況下，可以提高準(zhǔn)備金利率，以推動(dòng)聯(lián)邦基金利率上升，而不必采取抵消公開(kāi)市場(chǎng)銷(xiāo)售的方式，減少美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)持有的政府債券。9. Repurchase agreements are used because they are temporary, and allow the Fed to adjust open market operations relati

17、vely easy in response to day-to-day changes in conditions in the market for reserves. 之所以使用回購(gòu)協(xié)議，是因?yàn)樗鼈兪菚簳r(shí)的，并允許美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)調(diào)整公開(kāi)市場(chǎng)操作，相對(duì)容易地應(yīng)對(duì)準(zhǔn)備金市場(chǎng)的日常變化。10. It suggests that defensive open market operations are far more common than dynamic operations because repurchase agreements are used primarily to conduct def

18、ensive operations to counteract temporary changes in the monetary base. 這表明，防御性的公開(kāi)市場(chǎng)操作比能動(dòng)性操作更為常見(jiàn)，因?yàn)榛刭?gòu)協(xié)議主要用于進(jìn)行防御性的操作，以抵消貨幣基礎(chǔ)的臨時(shí)變化。11. Because of the large amount of liquidity in banks and the financial system, this could eventually lead to substantial inflation problems as liquidity in the form of ex

19、cess reserves leaves the banking system through bank lending and ends up as deposits or currency in the hands of the public. But because of the longer maturities of some of the assets held by the Fed, these assets may not be easily drawn off the balance sheet in order to remove liquidity from banks

20、and financial markets. As a result, reverse repos could be used to temporarily but continually remove reserves from the banking system until the longer maturity securities can be drawn off the balance sheet of the Fed. 由于銀行和金融體系中大量的流動(dòng)性，這最終可能會(huì)導(dǎo)致大量的通貨膨脹問(wèn)題，因?yàn)槌~準(zhǔn)備金的流動(dòng)性將使銀行系統(tǒng)通過(guò)銀行貸款，最終成為公眾手中的存款或貨幣。但由于美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)持

21、有的部分資產(chǎn)的期限較長(zhǎng)，這些資產(chǎn)可能不容易從資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表中提取出來(lái)，以消除銀行和金融市場(chǎng)的流動(dòng)性。因此，反向回購(gòu)可能暫時(shí)被用于銀行體系，直到期限較長(zhǎng)的證券從美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)的資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表中提取出來(lái)。12. This statement is false. The FDIC alone would likely be ineffective in eliminating bank panics without the Feds ability to provide discount loans to troubled banks to keep bank failures from spreading. In

22、 particular, the FDICs insurance only covers about 1% of total bank deposits. Since the Fed has unlimited ability to provide loans to the banking system, it can be much more effective in stabilizing the banking system in a panic. 這種說(shuō)法是錯(cuò)誤的。如果美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)沒(méi)有能力向陷入困境的銀行提供貼現(xiàn)貸款，以防止銀行倒閉，那么FDIC就可能在消除銀行恐慌方面無(wú)能為力。特別是，F(xiàn)D

23、IC的保險(xiǎn)只占銀行存款總額的1%。由于美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)有無(wú)限能力向銀行系統(tǒng)提供貸款，因此在恐慌中穩(wěn)定銀行系統(tǒng)會(huì)更加有效。13. Providing loans to financial institutions creates a moral hazard problem. If firms know that they will have access to Fed loans, they are more likely to take on risk, knowing that the Fed will bail them out if a panic should occur. As a resu

24、lt, banks that deserve to go out of business because of poor management may survive because of Fed liquidity provision to prevent panics. This might lead to an inefficient banking system with many poorly run banks. 向金融機(jī)構(gòu)提供貸款會(huì)造成道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。如果企業(yè)知道他們將獲得美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)貸款，他們就更有可能承擔(dān)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，因?yàn)樗麄冎廊绻霈F(xiàn)恐慌，美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)將會(huì)救助他們。其結(jié)果是，由于缺乏管理能力，那些

25、理應(yīng)破產(chǎn)的銀行可能會(huì)存活下來(lái)，原因是美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)提供了防止恐慌的流動(dòng)性。這可能導(dǎo)致銀行體系效率低下，許多經(jīng)營(yíng)不善的銀行。14. This statement is false. 15. Open market operations are more flexible, reversible, and faster to implement than the other two tools. Discount policy is more flexible, reversible, and faster to implement than changing reserve requirements,

26、but it is less effective than either of the other two tools. 16. It proved to be more widely used because the interest rate on these loans was set through a competitive process, and that interest rate was less (in some cases much less) than the discount rate. In addition, because of the structure of

27、 the Term Auction Facility there was some anonymity in the banks that were accessing these funds, which helped to avoid the stigma associated with discount window lending. 17. Since short-term interest rates cannot be lowered below the zero bound in this environment, conventional monetary policy wou

28、ld be ineffective. Thus, the main advantage of quantitative easing is that purchases of intermediate and longer term securities could reduce longer-term interest rates, increase the money supply further, and lead to expansion. One disadvantage of quantitative easing is that it may not actually have

29、the effect of increasing economic activity through greater loans and monetary expansion: If credit and financial markets are significantly damaged, banks may simply hold the extra liquidity as excess reserves, which would not lead to greater loans and monetary expansion. 18. By purchasing particular

30、 types of securities, the Fed can impact interest rates and liquidity in particular sectors of credit and financial markets, thereby providing a more surgical provision of liquidity where it may be needed the most (as opposed to typical open market purchases, which add reserves to the general bankin

31、g system). For example, as a result of the global financial crisis the Fed purchased a significant amount of mortgage-backed securities from government sponsored enterprises, which helped to lower mortgage rates and support the housing market.通過(guò)購(gòu)買(mǎi)特定類(lèi)型的證券，美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)可以影響特定行業(yè)的信貸和金融市場(chǎng)的利率和流動(dòng)性 ，而不是典型的公開(kāi)市場(chǎng)購(gòu)買(mǎi)，增加一般

32、銀行系統(tǒng)的準(zhǔn)備金。例如，由于全球金融危機(jī)，美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)從政府支持的企業(yè)購(gòu)買(mǎi)了大量抵押貸款支持證券，這有助于降低抵押貸款利率，支持住房市場(chǎng)。19. The main advantage to an unconditional policy commitment is that it provides a significant amount of transparency and certainty, which makes it easier for markets and households to make decisions about the future. The main disadva

33、ntage is that it represents a tacit commitment by the central bank; if conditions suddenly change where a change in the policy stance may be warranted, then holding to the commitment could be destabilizing. On the other hand, not strictly maintaining the commitment could then be viewed as reneging o

34、n a promise, and the central bank could lose significant credibility.無(wú)條件政策承諾的主要好處是，它提供了大量的透明度和確定性，這使得市場(chǎng)和家庭更容易對(duì)未來(lái)做出決定。主要的缺點(diǎn)是它代表了中央銀行的默認(rèn)承諾，如果條件突然改變，政策立場(chǎng)的改變可能是必要的，那么堅(jiān)持承諾可能會(huì)破壞穩(wěn)定。另一方面，如果不嚴(yán)格遵守承諾，那么就會(huì)被視為食言，而央行可能會(huì)失去相當(dāng)大的可信度。ANSWERS TO APPLIED PROBLEMS 20. The switch from deposits into currency lowers the amo

35、unt of reserves as was shown in the T-accounts of Chapter 14, and this lowers the supply of reserves at any given interest rate, thus shifting the supply curve to the left. The fall in deposits also leads to lower required reserves and hence a shift in the demand curve to the left. However, because

36、the fall in required reserves is only a fraction of the fall in the supply of reserves (because the required reserve ratio is much less than one), the supply curve shifts left by more than the demand curve. Thus if the discount rate is initially above the fed funds target, the fed funds rate will ri

37、se (as shown in the graph below). However, if the fed funds rate is at the discount rate, then the fed funds rate will remain at the discount rate.從存款到現(xiàn)金的轉(zhuǎn)換降低了準(zhǔn)備金的數(shù)量，正如第14章的t帳戶所顯示的那樣，這降低了任何給定利率下準(zhǔn)備金供給，從而使供給曲線向左平移。存款下降也會(huì)導(dǎo)致需求減少，因此需求曲線會(huì)向左移。然而，由于準(zhǔn)備金率的下降只是儲(chǔ)備貨幣供應(yīng)量下降的一小部分(因?yàn)闇?zhǔn)備金率遠(yuǎn)低于1)，因此供給曲線的變化幅度大于需求曲線。因此，如果

38、貼現(xiàn)率最初高于美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)基金目標(biāo)，美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)基金利率將上升(如下圖所示)。然而，如果聯(lián)邦基金利率處于貼現(xiàn)率，那么聯(lián)邦基金利率將保持在貼現(xiàn)率。21. In most cases, the discount rate is set far enough above the fed funds target rate such that, even if there was a reduction in the discount rate with no change in the target fed funds rate, the equilibrium rate would still be belo

39、w the discount rate, thus banks would still be better off borrowing at the market rate rather than the discount rate. In other words, even if the discount rate decreases, the amount of borrowed reserves may not change since the equilibrium will still fall below the discount rate, as shown in the gra

40、ph below.在大多數(shù)情況下，貼現(xiàn)率設(shè)置足夠遠(yuǎn)高于聯(lián)邦基金目標(biāo)利率，即使有降低貼現(xiàn)率而目標(biāo)聯(lián)邦基金利率沒(méi)有變化，均衡利率仍將低于貼現(xiàn)率，因此，銀行仍將偏好于以市場(chǎng)利率(而非貼現(xiàn)率) 借款。換句話說(shuō)，即使貼現(xiàn)率下降，由于均衡仍低于貼現(xiàn)率，借入準(zhǔn)備金的數(shù)額可能不會(huì)改變，如下圖所示。22. (a) A rise in checkable deposits leads to a rise in required reserves at any given interest rate, and thus shifts the demand curve to the right. If the fed

41、eral funds rate is initially below the discount rate, this then leads to a rise in the federal funds rate. As shown below, borrowed reserves and non-borrowed reserves do not change. If the federal funds rate is initially at the discount rate, then the federal funds rate will just remain at the disco

42、unt rate, but borrowed reserves will increase.支票存款的增加會(huì)導(dǎo)致任何給定利率的準(zhǔn)備金率的上升，從而使需求曲線向右平移。如果聯(lián)邦基金利率最初低于貼現(xiàn)率，那么這將導(dǎo)致聯(lián)邦基金利率的上升。如下所示，借入準(zhǔn)備金和非借入準(zhǔn)備金不變。如果聯(lián)邦基金利率最初是貼現(xiàn)率，那么聯(lián)邦基金利率將保持在貼現(xiàn)率，但借入準(zhǔn)備金會(huì)增加。(b) If banks expect that an unusually large increase in withdrawals will occur in the future, they will want to hold more ex

43、cess reserves today, meaning the demand for reserves will increase at any given interest rate. This will have the same effect on the fed funds rate, NBR, and BR as in part (a) above. 如果銀行預(yù)期未來(lái)會(huì)出現(xiàn)異常大規(guī)模的提款，他們將希望在今天持有更多的超額準(zhǔn)備金，這意味著對(duì)準(zhǔn)備金的需求將在任何給定的利率下增加。這將對(duì)聯(lián)邦基金利率、NBR和BR(a)部分產(chǎn)生同樣的影響。(c) To raise the target fed funds rate, the Fed will have to conduct an open market sale of securities, which will shift the supply of non-bor