Chapter6EconomiesofScale,ImperfectCompetitio

1、 Chapter 6 Economies of Scale, Imperfect Competition, and International Trade(continue)1 In last section, We neglect price discrimination (such as dumping) in the imperfect competitive model which give rise international trade. 2 Clips: 中國(guó)鞋如何迎戰(zhàn)反傾銷連環(huán)箭3一、Dumping(傾銷)The Economics of Dumping In reality,

2、 firms do not charge the same price for goods that are exported and sold domestically, it is the price discrimination.Price discrimination: The practice of charging different customers different prices. Dumping is the most common form of price discrimination in international trade.4Definition of Dum

3、ping It is a pricing practice in which a firm charges a lower price for an exported good than it does for the same good sold domestically It is a controversial issue in trade policy and is widely regarded as an unfair practice in international trade.5Dumping can occur only if two conditions are met:

4、 First, the industry must be Imperfectly competitive industry, so that firms set prices rather than taking prices as given. Second, market must be segmented, so that domestic residents cannot easily purchase goods intended for export(transport costs and protectionist trade barriers). 6A monopolistic

5、 firm gets profits by dumping An example below help to show dumping can be a profit-maximizing strategy by Figure 6-8. To maximize profits, the firm must set marginal revenue equal to marginal cost in each market. We assume that the firm can sell as much as it wants at the PFOR in the foreign market

6、.7Figure 6-8: DumpingExportsDomestic salesCost, C andPrice, PQuantities producedand demanded, QMCDFOR = MRFORMRDOMDDOM2PFORPDOM QDOMQMONOPOLYTotal output138 The firm sell QDOM in the domestic market and sell QMONOPOLY - QDOM in the foreign market . The quantity QDOM will be demanded domestically at

7、price of PDOM , which is above the export price PFOR . Thus the firm is indeed dumping, selling more cheaply abroad than at Home. 9 The reason the firm chooses to dump is the difference in the responsiveness of sales to price in the export and domestic markets(P143). 10Reciprocal DumpingReciprocal D

8、umping is a situation in which dumping leads to two-way trade in the same product. The reason is that if it tries to sell more it will drive down the price on its existing domestic sales. But dumping has the negative effect on the price of existing sales in the foreign sales. 11It increases the volu

9、me of trade in goods that are not quite identical.Its net welfare effect is ambiguous: It wastes resources in transportation. It creates some competition.12 Case studyThe dumping cases against China in 2008. 13 2008年1-6月，16個(gè)世貿(mào)組織成員共啟動(dòng)85起反傾銷調(diào)查，比2007年同期的61起增加24起，增幅達(dá)39%.在2008年上半年新立案的85起反傾銷案中，由發(fā)達(dá)成員發(fā)起的31起

10、，同比（20起）增加11起；發(fā)展中成員為54起，同比（41起）增加13起。在54起采取最終反傾銷措施的案件中，發(fā)達(dá)成員占13起，與2007年同期持平；發(fā)展中成員為41起，同比（38起）增加3起。 14 中國(guó)仍是全球反傾銷調(diào)查最大的受害者。在85起反傾銷新立案中，涉及中國(guó)產(chǎn)品的位居首位，為37起，占比43.5%，同比增加16起，增幅達(dá)76.2%；其次是泰國(guó)，為7起；位居第三位的是歐盟和印尼，均為5起；位居第四位的韓國(guó)、馬來(lái)西亞和中國(guó)臺(tái)灣，均為4起；位居第五位的越南，為3起。此后依次為巴西（2起）、加拿大（2起）、印度（2起）、美國(guó)（2起）。 15 美國(guó)商務(wù)部2008年1月4日宣布對(duì)進(jìn)口自中國(guó)的一

11、種鋼管作出反傾銷初裁，認(rèn)定中國(guó)產(chǎn)鋼管在美傾銷，并初步確定對(duì)多家中國(guó)企業(yè)征收25.67%的反傾銷稅，中途撤出調(diào)查的雙街集團(tuán)稅率更被確定為51.34%。 2004年到2006年，中國(guó)對(duì)美國(guó)的環(huán)狀焊接碳素鋼管出口量激增143%，其中2006年，出口產(chǎn)品金額達(dá)3.32億美元，較上年增長(zhǎng)55.2%。16 美國(guó)商務(wù)部認(rèn)為，中國(guó)出口至美國(guó)的環(huán)狀焊接碳素鋼管低于市場(chǎng)公平價(jià)值最高達(dá)51.34%。作為上述裁定結(jié)果，美國(guó)商務(wù)部將通知其海關(guān)和邊境以此為基準(zhǔn)收取保證金。17二、The Theory of External Economies(外部經(jīng)濟(jì)理論) As we pointed out early in this

12、 chapter, not all scale economies apply at the level of the individual firm. When economies of scale apply at the level of the industry rather than the level of the individual firm, they called external economies.18What is the external economies Economies of scale that occur at the level of the indu

13、stry instead of the firm are called external economies.There are three main reasons why a cluster of firms may be more efficient than an individual firm in isolation:19 Specialized Suppliers（專業(yè)提供商） An individual company does not provide a large enough market for specialized equipment and services to

14、 keep the suppliers in business. A localized industrial cluster can solve this problem by bringing together many firms that provide a large enough market to support specialized suppliers.20 This phenomenon has been extensively documented in the semiconductor industry located in Silicon Valley.21 Lab

15、or Market Pooling（勞動(dòng)力共享市場(chǎng)） A cluster of firms can create a pooled market for workers with highly specialized skills. Advantage of a cluster of firms : First, Producers are less likely to suffer from labor shortages. Second, Workers are less likely to become unemployed.22Knowledge Spillovers（知識(shí)外溢） Kn

16、owledge is one of the important input factors in highly innovative industries. The specialized knowledge that is crucial to success in innovative industries comes from:23Research and development efforts; Reverse engineering; Informal exchange of information and ideas - external economies.24External

17、Economies and Increasing Returns External economies can give rise to increasing returns to scale at the level of the national industry. Increasing Returns can be showed by Forward-falling supply curve: The larger the industrys output, the lower the price at which firms are willing to sell their outp

18、ut.25 External Economies play an important role in international trade.External Economies and the Pattern of TradeCountries that start out as large producers in certain industries tend to remain large producers even if some other country could potentially produce the goods more cheaply.三、External Ec

19、onomies and International Trade26Figure 6-9 illustrates a case where a pattern of specialization established by historical accident is persistent, it tends to confirm existing patterns of interindustry trade. We assume that the Thai cost curve lies below the Swiss curve, this means that Thailand cou

20、ld manufacture watch is more cheaply than Switzerland. 27Figure 6-9: External Economies and SpecializationACSWISSQ1P1Price, cost (per watch)Quantity of watchesproduced and demandedACTHAI21C0D28 If the Swiss industry gets established first, it may be able to sell watches at the price P1 , which is be

21、low the cost C0 that an individual Thai firm would face if it began production on its own. So a pattern of specialization established by historical accident may persist even when new producers could potentially have lower cost. 29Trade and Welfare with External Economies Trade based on external econ

22、omies has more ambiguous effects on national welfare than either trade based on comparative advantage or trade based on economies of scale at the level of the firm. An example of how a country can actually be worse off with trade than without is shown in Figure 6-10.30Figure 6-10: External Economies

23、 and Losses from TradeACSWISSP1Price, cost (per watch)Quantity of watchesproduced and demandedACTHAI21C0DTHAIDWORLDP231 If no trade in watches were allowed and Thailand were forced to be self-sufficient, then the Thai equilibrium would be at the point 2, P2 , is actually lower than the price of Swiss-made watches at point 1, P1 . There is an incentive in this case for Thailand to protect its potential watch industry from foreign competition. 32Dynamic Increasing Returns(動(dòng)態(tài)收益遞增) Another issue