自由現(xiàn)金流量的過度投資外文翻譯

1、本科畢業(yè)論文設(shè)計(jì)外 文 翻 譯原文：Over-investment of free cash flowIntroductionThis paper examines firm investing decisions in the presence of free cash flow. In theory, firm level investment should not be related to internally generated cash flows (Modigliani and Miller, 1958). However, prior research has document

2、ed a positive relation between investment expenditure and cash flow (e.g., Hubbard, 1998). There are two interpretations for this positive relation. First, the positive relation is a manifestation of an agency problem, where managers in firms with free cash flow engage in wasteful expenditure (e.g.,

3、 Jensen 1986 and Stutz 1990). When managers objectives differ from those of shareholders, the presence of internally generated cash flow in excess of that required to maintain existing assets in place and finance new positive NPV projects creates the potential for those funds to be squandered. Secon

4、d, the positive relation reflects capital market imperfections, where costly external financing creates the potential for internally generated cash flows to expand the feasible investment opportunity set (e.g., Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen 1988 and Hubbard, 1998).The empirical analysis proceeds in

5、two stages. First, the paper uses an accounting based framework to measure both free cash flow and over-investment. Free cash flow is cash flow beyond what is necessary to maintain assets in place and to finance expected new investments. Over-investment is defined as investment expenditure beyond th

6、at required to maintain assets in place and to finance expected new investments in positive NPV projects. To measure over- investment, I decompose total investment expenditure into two components: (i) required investment expenditure to maintain assets in place, and (ii) new investment expenditure. I

7、 then decompose new investment expenditure into over-investment in negative NPV projects and expected investment expenditure, where the latter varies with the firms growth opportunities, financing constraints, industry affiliation and other factors.Explanations for a positive relation between invest

8、ment expenditure and cash flowThis section describes in detail the various theories supporting a positive relation between investment expenditure and cash flow and then develops measures of free cash flow and over- investment that can be used to test the agency based explanation.In a world of perfec

9、t capital markets there would be no association between firm level investing activities and internally generated cash flows. If a firm needed additional cash to finance an investment activity it would simply raise that cash from external capital markets. If the firm had excess cash beyond that neede

10、d to fund available positive NPV projects (including options on future investment) it would distribute free cash flow to external markets. Firms do not, however, operate in such a world. There are a variety of capital market frictions that impede the ability of management to raise cash from external

11、 capital markets. In addition, there are significant transaction costs associated with monitoring management to ensure that free cash flow is indeed distributed to external capital markets. In equilibrium, these capital market frictions can serve as a support for a positive association between firm

12、investing activities and internally generated cash flow.Primary hypothesisAs described in the earlier section, in a world of perfect capital markets (no frictions for raising external finance, no information asymmetries and associated moral hazard problems, no taxes etc.), there should be no associa

13、tion between firm level investment and internally generated cash flows. However, when it is costly for external capital providers to monitor management, and it is costly for the firm to raise external finance, an association is expected. Specifically, there should be a positive relation between firm

14、 level investment expenditure and internally generated cash flows.This relation, however, could be due to several factors. It could reflect management engaging in additional investment on self-serving projects rather than distribute the cash to shareholders. Such decisions can include: (i) empire bu

15、ilding, (ii) perquisite consumption, (iii) diversifying acquisitions, and (iv) subsidizing poorly performing divisions using the cash generated from successful ones instead of returning the cash to shareholders. Alternatively, it could reflect the increased investment opportunity set from (relativel

16、y less costly) internal financing sources.Uses of free cash flowThe focus of this paper is the over-investment of free cash flow. However, over- investment is but one of many alternate uses of free cash flow. Using information obtained from the statement of cash flows, I am able to allocate free cas

17、h flow flows into six categories. This is simply a re-characterization of the statement of cash flows, where cash generated must equal cash used. The six categories are: (i) over-investment, , (ii) net payments to shareholders, Equity, (iii) net principal payments to debt-holders, Debt, (iv) net cha

18、nge in financial assets, Financial Asset, (v) Other Investments and (vi) miscellaneous cash flows, Other. This is represented by the following identity: FCF I + Equity + Debt + Financial Asset + Other Investments + Other The final two categories contain miscellaneous reconciling items that are not i

19、mportant empirically (very little variation in the sample). The main concern from the perspective of shareholders is the first category, over-investment, because this imposes substantial agency costs on shareholders. However, it is less clear what the best use of free cash flow is beyond avoiding ov

20、er-investment. Payments to shareholders will be affected by the tax status of the firms investor base (Allen and Michaely, 2003). In addition payments to both shareholders and debt- holders will impact the capital structure of the firm. To the extent that management has an optimal capital structure

21、in mind. It is not clear what the optimal distribution of free cash flow will be. Retention of free cash flow in the form of financial assets is also an option available to management. The optimal level of free cash flow to be retained will be a function of firm specific characteristics such as vari

22、ability of cash flow and ability to access external capital markets (e.g., Harford, 1999). Firms with more volatile cash flows will want to retain cash for the periods when cash flow is low, and firms who find it more difficult to raise external capital will desire larger cash holdings (e.g., Opler

23、et al., 1999). My primary focus is on the extent of over-investment and the role that governance structures can play in mitigating over-investment. I leave detailed examination of how firms use free cash flow (other than over-investing) to future research.Data and sample selectionThe main empirical

24、tests employ financial statement data from the Compustat annual database (inclusive of active and inactive securities). I exclude financial institutions from my analysis (SIC codes between 6000 and 6999) because the demarcation between operating, investing, and financing activities is ambiguous for

25、these firms. The sample period covers the fiscal years 1988-2002 with 58,053 firm-year observations.In the empirical analysis that follows I scale all financial variables by average total assets (results are similar using sales as an alternative deflator). To minimize the influence of outliers I del

26、ete firms where the deflated value of free cash flow or any of the potential uses of free cash flow exceeds one in absolute value. Analysis of investment expenditure and free cash flowTable 1Analysis of investment expenditure.This table examines the properties of investing cash flows as a function o

27、f growth opportunities. The sample covers 58,053 firm years with available data on Compustat for the period 1988-2002. Panel A: Descriptive statistics for investment expenditure = + + = MeanStd Dev P1Q1MedianQ3P990.094 CAPEX 00.047 Acquistions000 RD0.088 000SalePPE00000.048 0.134 -0.001 Table 1 repo

28、rts details on investment expenditure and the determination of free cash flow. The average firm undertakes investment activity equal to 13.1 percent of its asset base. The major component of investment is capital expenditure, followed by research and development expenditure. Of the total investment

29、expenditure 44 percent is spent maintaining existing assets in place and the remaining 56 percent is spent on new investments.Table 2Analysis of free cash flow and over-investmentThe table examines the properties of free cash flow and how it relates to over-investment. All variables are scaled by av

30、erage total assets. The sample covers 58,053 firm years with available data on Compustat for the period 1988-2002. Panel A: Descriptive statistics for free cash flow = ( is the fitted value from: = + + + + + + + )MeanStd DevP1Q1MedianQ3P99-0.019 0.075 0FCF 0.153 -0.012 Panel B: Relation between over

31、-investment () and free cash flow (FCF) =+ FCF + ModelAdjusted PooledF-statistic for test =: 40.87*Fama-MacBeth(15 years)(1.54)(9.47)(12.13)T-statistic from annual coefficient estimates for test: = 2.35*Table 2 panel A provides descriptive statistics for the free cash flow measure. The average firm

32、in my sample has cash flow from assets in place equal to 3.8 percent of its asset base. After subtracting expected investment on new projects (7.5 percent of asset base for the average firm), the average firm has a cash shortfall (i.e., negative free cash flow) equal to 3.6 percent of its asset base

33、. 44.6 percent of sample firms have positive values of free cash flow. Panel B of table 2 contains the key result that over-investment is a function of free cash flow. I run the following regression:=+ FCF + FCF0) is equal to FCF for values of FCF less (greater than) zero and zero otherwise. This al

34、lows the relation between over-investment and free cash flow to be asymmetric. In particular, allowing the slope coefficient to vary based on the sign of free cash flow reveals that over-investment is concentrated in firms with positive free cash flow (the estimate of is 0.111 and the estimate of is

35、 0.171, significantly different at the 1% level). Panel B reports both pooled regression estimates (using robust standard errors) as well as average estimates from annual regressions. Out of the fifteen annual regressions, the estimate for is statistically greater than the estimate for in eleven yea

36、rs. When firms do not have free cash flow, (i.e., FCF 0) the possibility of over-investment is mitigated as the firm is forced to access external markets to raise funds necessary for any additional investment. Capital markets serve an additional monitoring role in disciplining managerial use of fund

37、s. The regression results in table 2 support H1 by showing that firms with positive free cash flow are more likely to over-invest on average and then for each additional dollar of free cash flow they over-invest more. It is important to note the relatively low explanatory power from this regression

38、specification. The model describing free cash flow as the determinant of over- investment only explains 3.2 percent of the variation. However, this explanatory power is incremental to the set of other determinants of firm level investment expenditure. So, the combined framework is able to explain a

39、significant portion of the cross-sectional variation in investment expenditure and find a statistically significant relation between over-investment and free cash flow.While not the focus of my paper, the regression results in table 2 also relate to under- investment. The positive coefficient on ind

40、icates that firms with negative free cash flow experience less over-investment. This relation is consistent with the notion that firms subject to cash short falls from operating activities scale back on investment activity. But it is important to note that the strength of the relation between abnorm

41、al investment and free cash flow is muted for firms with negative free cash (i.e., is much smaller than ) because these firms are able to raise additional cash from external financial markets.Source: Scott A.Richardson,2006. “Over-investment of free cash flow .Review of Accounting Studies, vol.11, n

42、o.2-3,Novemer,pp.159-189.譯文：自由現(xiàn)金流量的過度投資引言本文探討存在自由現(xiàn)金流量的公司投資決策。從理論上講，企業(yè)層次的投資，不應(yīng)與內(nèi)部產(chǎn)生的現(xiàn)金流量有聯(lián)系莫迪利亞和米勒，1958年。然而，以前的研究已證明投資支出和現(xiàn)金流量之間有著正相關(guān)的關(guān)系例如，哈伯德，1998年。有兩種解釋來解釋這種正相關(guān)的關(guān)系。第一，正相關(guān)的關(guān)系是一個(gè)機(jī)構(gòu)的問題，有自由現(xiàn)金流量的公司管理者總是傾向于浪費(fèi)開支如，1986年的詹森和1990年的斯圖斯。當(dāng)經(jīng)理人的目標(biāo)與股東的不同，超過維持現(xiàn)有資產(chǎn)和新的正凈現(xiàn)值工程所需經(jīng)費(fèi)的內(nèi)部現(xiàn)金流量的存在，為這些本來會(huì)被浪費(fèi)的現(xiàn)金創(chuàng)造了潛在的價(jià)值。第二，這兩者的正

43、相關(guān)反映了資本市場(chǎng)的不完善，昂貴的外部融資本錢為內(nèi)部產(chǎn)生現(xiàn)金流量以擴(kuò)大潛在可行的投資時(shí)機(jī)集創(chuàng)造了可能性例如，法那么瑞、哈伯特和彼得森，1988；哈伯特，1998。實(shí)證分析通過兩個(gè)階段進(jìn)行。首先，本文采用會(huì)計(jì)根底的框架來衡量自由現(xiàn)金流量和過度投資。自由現(xiàn)金流量，是指超過了維持現(xiàn)有資產(chǎn)和新的投資所需費(fèi)用的現(xiàn)金流量。過度投資，被定義為超過維持現(xiàn)有資產(chǎn)和新的正凈現(xiàn)值投資工程所需費(fèi)用的投資開支。為了測(cè)量過度投資，我把總投資支出分解成兩個(gè)局部：1維持現(xiàn)有資產(chǎn)所需的投資支出，以及2新的投資開支。然后，我將新的投資支出分解成對(duì)負(fù)凈現(xiàn)值工程的過度投資和預(yù)期投資支出，后者因公司的成長(zhǎng)時(shí)機(jī)，融資約束，行業(yè)隸屬關(guān)系和

44、其他因素不同而不同。企業(yè)投資與現(xiàn)金流量正相關(guān)關(guān)系的解釋 本節(jié)詳細(xì)介紹各種支持投資支出和現(xiàn)金流量呈正相關(guān)關(guān)系的理論，然后開發(fā)自由現(xiàn)金流量和過度投資的測(cè)量方法，以用于依據(jù)這個(gè)理論來測(cè)試機(jī)構(gòu)。在一個(gè)完美的資本市場(chǎng)上，公司的投資活動(dòng)與其內(nèi)部生成的現(xiàn)金流量是沒有關(guān)聯(lián)的。如果一個(gè)公司需要更多的現(xiàn)金為投資活動(dòng)提供經(jīng)費(fèi)，它只會(huì)到外部資本市場(chǎng)籌集現(xiàn)金。如果企業(yè)擁有的現(xiàn)金超過現(xiàn)有正凈現(xiàn)值工程包括對(duì)未來的投資的期權(quán)所需的資金，它將把自由現(xiàn)金分配到外部市場(chǎng)。但是，企業(yè)不是在這樣一個(gè)世界運(yùn)作，資本市場(chǎng)的各種摩擦阻礙了管理者從外部資本市場(chǎng)籌集資金。此外，為確保自由現(xiàn)金流量確實(shí)分配給外部資本市場(chǎng)，還有相當(dāng)可觀的交易與監(jiān)督管

45、理費(fèi)用。在均衡狀態(tài)，這些資本市場(chǎng)的摩擦可以作為公司的投資活動(dòng)與內(nèi)部現(xiàn)金流量正相關(guān)的支持。主要假設(shè) 正如前面一節(jié)所描述的，一套完善的資本市場(chǎng)沒有對(duì)外籌集資金的摩擦，沒有信息不對(duì)稱和道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)相關(guān)的問題，沒有稅收等下，不應(yīng)該有企業(yè)層面的投資和內(nèi)部產(chǎn)生的現(xiàn)金流量的關(guān)系。然而，當(dāng)外部資本提供者的監(jiān)測(cè)管理本錢過高，并且企業(yè)的外部籌資本錢過高時(shí)，它們之間的聯(lián)系就可以預(yù)期了。具體而言，企業(yè)層面的投資支出和內(nèi)部產(chǎn)生的現(xiàn)金流量應(yīng)該呈正相關(guān)。 這種關(guān)系，然而，可能是基于以下幾個(gè)因素。這可能反映了管理層做自我效勞工程的額外投資，而不是向股東派發(fā)現(xiàn)金股利。這些決定包括：1帝國(guó)大廈；2額外補(bǔ)貼消費(fèi)；3多元化收購(gòu)；4利用差

46、補(bǔ)貼的現(xiàn)金，而不是將現(xiàn)金返還給股東，成功地執(zhí)行產(chǎn)生的分歧。另外，它可以反映增加的投資時(shí)機(jī)，從相對(duì)較廉價(jià)的內(nèi)部資金。自由現(xiàn)金流量的用處本文的重點(diǎn)是自由現(xiàn)金流量的過度投資。然而，過度投資只是自由現(xiàn)金流量很多可選用途中的一種。利用從現(xiàn)金流量表獲得的信息，我可以將自由現(xiàn)金流量分配到六個(gè)類別中。這只是對(duì)現(xiàn)金流量表的一種重新描述，其中產(chǎn)生的現(xiàn)金必須等于用掉的現(xiàn)金。這六大類是：1超額投資，；2股東的凈支付，Equity；3債務(wù)持有人的凈本金支付，Debt；4金融資產(chǎn)的凈變動(dòng)，F(xiàn)inancial Asset；5其他投資， Other Investments；6混雜的現(xiàn)金流量，Other。用下面的恒等式來表示：

47、FCFEquityDebtFinancial AssetOther Investments Other最后兩個(gè)類別包含了各種各樣的調(diào)節(jié)工程，根據(jù)經(jīng)驗(yàn)判斷是不太重要的非常小的樣本變動(dòng)。從股東的角度來看，主要關(guān)注的是第一類，過度投資，因?yàn)檫@會(huì)為股東帶來大量的代理本錢。不過，目前還不太清楚，什么是最好的自由現(xiàn)金流量用途，超過防止過度投資。向股東支付的股利將受到與該公司投資者相關(guān)的稅收狀況的影響阿倫和米夏埃利，2003。另外，支付給股東和債權(quán)人款項(xiàng)將影響到公司的資本結(jié)構(gòu)。在某種程度上，管理層在心中有一個(gè)最正確的資本結(jié)構(gòu)。目前還不清楚什么是自由現(xiàn)金流量的最優(yōu)配置。對(duì)管理層來說，以金融資產(chǎn)的形式保存自由現(xiàn)

48、金流也是一個(gè)有效的選擇。需要持有自由現(xiàn)金流量的理想水平，是根據(jù)公司的特征來決定的，例如現(xiàn)金流的可變性和能夠到達(dá)外部資本市場(chǎng)的途徑例如，哈福德，1999?，F(xiàn)金流不穩(wěn)定的公司傾向于在現(xiàn)金流少的時(shí)期保存現(xiàn)金，更難籌集外部資本的公司將會(huì)渴望較大的現(xiàn)金持有量例如，奧普勒等，1999。我的主要焦點(diǎn)是過度投資的程度和治理結(jié)構(gòu)在緩解過度投資中的作用。我把企業(yè)如何使用自由現(xiàn)金流量不包括過度投資的詳細(xì)審查留到未來的研究中去。數(shù)據(jù)和樣本選擇主要的實(shí)證分析采用標(biāo)準(zhǔn)普爾年度數(shù)據(jù)庫包括活潑和呆滯的證券的財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表數(shù)據(jù)。我把金融機(jī)構(gòu)SIC代碼在6000至6999之間從我的分析中排除，因?yàn)檫@些企業(yè)的經(jīng)營(yíng)、投資和融資活動(dòng)界限不明確。樣本期間涵蓋19882002會(huì)計(jì)年度，取得58053