Bank reputation in the private debt market：在私人債務(wù)市場(chǎng)銀行聲譽(yù)

1、Bank reputation in the private debt market報(bào)告者：M9980104黃文仕 M9980206鍾翠綾Joseph McCathery&Armin SchwienbacherAbstractthe impact of lead arrangers reputation on the design of loan contracts such as spread and fees charged.the non-randomness of the lender-borrower match (self-selection bias).top tier arra

2、ngers leads to higher spreads; top tier arrangers retain larger fractions of their loans in their syndicates.IntroductionIDo reputable commercial banks that have better access to good borrowers signal quality through the same channel as bond underwriters?How does this affect the spread and fees char

3、ged ?Does reputation affect deal characteristics of private debt through other channels than simple pricing?How does reputation influence the structure and composition of loan syndicates? Introduction IIloan syndication is a major segment of the wholesale business of commercial banks in the United S

4、tates.more than two trillion dollars in commitment volume outstanding,the syndicated loan market is an increasingly important sourse of financing for corporations.a loan syndicate is formed by a mandated arranger, who is appointed by the borrower to bring together a group of institutional investors

5、and banks that are prepared to lend money on specific terms to the borrower.Introduction IIItop tier underwriters offer better terms to their best clients in order to certify to the market a quality assurance on the issue they underwrite.underwriter reputation affect IPO underpricing and price revis

6、ion.the most reputable loan arrangers may have the capability to sherry-pick the best borrowers.reputation arrangers self-select their borrowers.top tier banks exploit the informational advantage that gives them more market power to charge higher spreads, compared to what borrowers would get in the

7、absence of arranger reputation.Related literature I(Sufi，2007)監(jiān)督假說，假設(shè)借款人的聲譽(yù)與主辦行監(jiān)督之間呈現(xiàn)負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)係。小型的集團(tuán)貸款更需要加強(qiáng)監(jiān)督。(Smith and Warner，1979)代理本錢延伸出，債權(quán)稀釋、投資缺乏、資產(chǎn)撤出、資產(chǎn)替代的問題。為了解決代理問題，債務(wù)契約可提供事前的監(jiān)督裝置，以保護(hù)貸款人重新談判的立場(chǎng)。(Goyal，2005)研究人員認(rèn)為契約和合作代理彼此替代的效果，可紓緩聯(lián)貸銀行團(tuán)的訊息不對(duì)稱。(Boot, 2000; Boot and Thakor, 2000)文獻(xiàn)分析本錢和收益借貸關(guān)係。(Bran

8、dley and Roberts，2004)討論美國(guó)銀行的限制型條款，顯示出大量借款中有包涵保護(hù)性條款。Related literature II(Gilson and Warner，1998)少數(shù)的文獻(xiàn)指出在公開債券市場(chǎng)的監(jiān)督契約指出貸款市場(chǎng)的債券發(fā)行的限制較少。(Nash et al，2003)找到證據(jù)證明高成長(zhǎng)的公司在債券市場(chǎng)中包含了較少的股利契約，這也反映出財(cái)務(wù)上的彈性偏好而非受契約的實(shí)踐所限制。(Lee and Mullineaux，2001)實(shí)證證明主辦行的聲譽(yù)是有影響，有聲譽(yù)的主辦行會(huì)吸引較大的企業(yè)組織借款並持有部份的貸款。(Sufi，2007)從借款人和貸款銀行的組織結(jié)構(gòu)，Su

9、fi在研究?jī)烧唛g的訊息不對(duì)稱的影響。(Fang，2005)說明了一個(gè)有聲譽(yù)的銀行往往會(huì)有更有積極的選擇承保Related literature III(Puri，1996)評(píng)估在前格拉斯-絲蒂格爾法案承銷期間條件的影響，商業(yè)銀行像投資銀行一樣可以承銷債券。(Gatti et al，2007)發(fā)現(xiàn)有好聲譽(yù)的銀行提供所有的融資計(jì)畫有較低的利差，對(duì)於放款人有正面的影響。(Narayanan et al，2007)商業(yè)銀行可以利用在私人市場(chǎng)的聲譽(yù)，作債券的承銷。(Pichler and Wilhelm ，2001 )主辦行的監(jiān)督責(zé)任發(fā)揮了很大作用，消除了主辦銀行與集團(tuán)成員之間的利益衝突。(Panyag

10、ometh and Roberts，2003 )研究結(jié)果指出聲譽(yù)會(huì)影響主辦銀行每年的平均貸放金額，但實(shí)際的金額多少卻沒有數(shù)據(jù)可考證。(Jones et al，2005 )其他的文獻(xiàn)重點(diǎn)影響資本約束、赤字的規(guī)模、企業(yè)股權(quán)的分布。經(jīng)濟(jì)計(jì)量角度觀測(cè)主要使用的方法是赫克曼二階估計(jì)法：這項(xiàng)估計(jì)法主要是防止掉因變數(shù)與因變數(shù)之間的內(nèi)生性，所謂的內(nèi)生性是指因變數(shù)與因變數(shù)之間會(huì)互相影響早成結(jié)果的偏差。參加了lambda主要是防止所謂的自我選擇所造成的偏誤，因?yàn)楸旧碓谂芑貧w的時(shí)候我們會(huì)將特定的虛擬變數(shù)去挑出來針對(duì)某些變數(shù)再跑OLS可能面臨到自我選擇。自我選擇偏差在這項(xiàng)研究裡面為了不去控制變數(shù)來源的自我選擇，只針對(duì)

11、衡量非隨機(jī)變數(shù)的客戶與聲譽(yù)好的安排銀行的效果。Conclusion本文研究有聲譽(yù)的top tier arrangers和聯(lián)合貸款集團(tuán)，其合約和結(jié)構(gòu)。使用一個(gè)模型用來控制安排者與借款者之間的關(guān)係，聯(lián)合貸款中有聲譽(yù)的top tier bank有著高的利差與借款人關(guān)係並不重要。top tier arranger提供了不一樣的差利，主要因?yàn)閠op tier arranger可以自行選擇最正確的借款者。如果修改自我選擇的偏差和借款人之間的關(guān)係，似乎可以顯著證明，但是那只有在沒有信用評(píng)等借款人上。研究結(jié)果表示top tier arranger增加貸款的選擇性與高利差是呈現(xiàn)正向影響，這與公共債劵市場(chǎng)有著不同的現(xiàn)象。我還還進(jìn)一步發(fā)現(xiàn)top tier arranger利用優(yōu)勢(shì)，選擇不具有投資級(jí)別的公司，主要是因?yàn)榫哂型顿Y級(jí)別的公司