管理學(xué)與組織學(xué)國際主流理論梳理匯編總結(jié)課件

MainstreamTheoriesin

ManagementandOrganization

YADONGLUO1組織與管理研究的主流理論陸亞東中山大學(xué)管理學(xué)院

MainstreamTheoriesiTheoriesofExchange關(guān)于交換的理論EconomicPerspectives經(jīng)濟學(xué)視角SocialExchangePerspectives社會交換視角SocioeconomicPerspectives社會經(jīng)濟學(xué)視角

2TheoriesofEnvironmentAlignment關(guān)于環(huán)境應(yīng)配的理論

InstitutionalViews制度觀點StrategicViews戰(zhàn)略觀點Co-evolvingViews共演觀點EcologicalViews生態(tài)觀點TheoriesofBoundarySpanning關(guān)于跨越邊界的理論Boundaryspanningtheory跨邊界理論Loosecouplingtheory松散耦合理論Informationprocessingtheory信息處理理論TheoriesofFirmGrowth關(guān)于企業(yè)成長的理論ClassicalTheoryofFirmGrowth企業(yè)成長的古典理論Resource-basedview資源基礎(chǔ)觀Knowledge-basedview知識基礎(chǔ)觀Organizationallearningtheory組織學(xué)習(xí)理論DynamiccapabilityTheory動態(tài)能力理論MainstreamTheoriesinManagement&Organization組織與管理學(xué)中的主流理論TheoriesofExchange2TheoriesTheoriesofExchange關(guān)于交換的理論3EconomicPerspectives經(jīng)濟學(xué)視角TransactionCostTheory交易成本理論Ind.Org.Theory

產(chǎn)業(yè)組織理論GameTheory博弈論AgencyTheory代理理論ContractTheory契約理論SocialExchangePerspectives社會交換視角EquityTheory公平理論SocialPsychology社會心理學(xué)SocialIdentityTheory社會認(rèn)同理論SocialExchangeTheory社會交換理論SocialCapitalTheory社會資本理論SocioeconomicPerspectives社會經(jīng)濟學(xué)視角EconomicSociologyTheory經(jīng)濟社會學(xué)理論NetworkTheory網(wǎng)絡(luò)理論Co-opetitionTheory競合理論BoundarySpanningTheories跨邊界理論TheoriesofExchange3Boundary4TheoriesofEnvironmentAlignment(orTheoriesofExternalRelationsTheoriesofChange/Evolution)關(guān)于環(huán)境應(yīng)配的理論（或關(guān)于外部聯(lián)系的理論、關(guān)于變革/進化的理論）

InstitutionalViews制度觀點--InstitutionalTheory制度理論--ContingencyTheory權(quán)變理論

StrategicViews戰(zhàn)略觀點--StrategicChoiceTheory戰(zhàn)略選擇理論--ResourceDependenceTheory資源依賴?yán)碚?-OptionTheory(alsotheoryoffirmgrowth)期權(quán)理論（同時也是關(guān)于企業(yè)成長的理論）

Co-evolvingViews共演觀點--StructurationTheory結(jié)構(gòu)化理論--Co-evolutionTheory共演理論

EcologicalViews生態(tài)觀點--PopulationEcology種群生態(tài)4TheoriesofEnvironmentAlignHighlightofMainstreamTheories

(TheoriesofExchange–EconomicTheories)

（關(guān)于交換的理論——經(jīng)濟學(xué)理論）TransactionCostEconomics(TCE)交易成本經(jīng)濟學(xué)RonaldCoasesetouthisTCEtheoryofthefirmin1937,makingitoneofthefirst(neo-classical)attemptstodefinethefirmtheoreticallyinrelationtothemarket;butOliverWilliamson’sworkismuchmoredistinctive科斯（RonaldCoase）在1937年提出了關(guān)于企業(yè)的交易成本經(jīng)濟學(xué)理論，他是最早（從新古典的角度）定義企業(yè)與市場在理論上聯(lián)系的學(xué)者之一；但奧利佛?威廉姆森（OliverWilliamson）的作品則更加出彩。Atransactioncostisacostincurredinmakinganeconomicexchange.Itincludes(a)searchandinformationcosts(b)bargaininganddecisioncostsand(c)policingandenforcementcosts.Itwaslaterextendedtocoordinationcost,governancecost,andopportunismbetweenexchangemembers(intraandinter-organizational)交易成本是指經(jīng)濟交換過程中產(chǎn)生的成本。它包括(a)搜尋和信息成本、(b)議價和決策成本以及(c)執(zhí)行成本。之后，該定義擴展至協(xié)調(diào)成本、治理成本和（發(fā)生在組織內(nèi)部和組織之間的）交換成員間的機會主義。TCE’stwoassumptions:Boundedrationalityandopportunismwhichcanbecurbedbyreputation(ratherthanthelaw,becauseofthedifficultyofnegotiating,writingandenforcementofcontracts)交易成本經(jīng)濟學(xué)的兩大假設(shè)為：有限理性和受到聲譽（而非法律，因為契約的談判、草擬和執(zhí)行都存在困難）約束的機會主義5HighlightofMainstreamTheoriTransactionCostEconomics(TCE)

交易成本經(jīng)濟學(xué)（TCE）Threedimensionstocharacterizeanytransactions:Frequency,uncertainty,andassetspecificity,whichjointlydeterminethestructureorchoiceofefficientgovernance描述交易的三大維度：交易頻率、不確定性和資產(chǎn)專用性，它們共同決定了有效治理模式的結(jié)構(gòu)和選擇TCEsuggeststhatthecostsanddifficultiesassociatedwithmarkettransactionssometimesfavorhierarchies(orin-houseproduction)andsometimesmarketsasaneconomicgovernancestructure.Anintermediatemechanismiscalledhybridorrelational交易成本經(jīng)濟學(xué)認(rèn)為，市場交易的成本和困難決定了有時候選擇層級治理（機構(gòu)內(nèi)部生產(chǎn)）作為經(jīng)濟治理結(jié)構(gòu)更好，有時候則選擇市場更佳。兩者之間存在著混合機制，也稱相關(guān)機制。6TransactionCostEconomics(TCTransactionCostEconomics(TCE):交易成本經(jīng)濟學(xué)（TCE）

GovernanceChoice治理模式的選擇

MarketGovernance市場治理BilateralGovernance雙邊治理TrilateralGovernance三邊治理UnifiedGovernance單邊治理InvestmentCharacteristics(AssetSpecificity)投資的特性（資產(chǎn)專用性）Nonspecific非專用的Mixed混合的Idiosyncratic特殊專用的Occasional偶爾的Recurrent經(jīng)常的Frequency頻率EfficientGovernance有效的治理模式7TransactionCostEconomics(TCWhatTCEIsandIsNot

交易成本經(jīng)濟學(xué)并非Explainswhatmostefficientformofgovernanceshouldbe,givencertaintransactionalattributes afunctionalist

argument給出在特定的交易屬性下最有效的治理模式實用主義的爭論Whatismissing?

Politics:Whoaretheactors?Whataretheirinterests?Whatistheirpower?缺了什么？

政治：誰是參與者？他們的利益是什么？他們的權(quán)力是什么？8WhatTCEIsandIsNot

交易成本經(jīng)濟FurtherReadingsonTCE

交易成本經(jīng)濟學(xué)的拓展閱讀Williamson,O.E.1979.Transactioncosteconomics:Thegovernanceofcontractualrelations.J.ofLawandEconomics,22:233-261Williamson,O.E.1985.Economicinstitutionsofcapitalism.NewYork:FreePressWilliamson,O.E.1991.Comparativeeconomicorganization:Theanalysisofdiscretestructuralalternatives.AdministrativeScienceQuarterly,36:269-296Williamson,O.E.1993.Calculativeness,trust,andeconomicorganization.J.ofLawandEconomics,36:453-4869FurtherReadingsonTCE

交易成本經(jīng)濟(TheoriesofExchange–EconomicTheories)

（關(guān)于交換的理論——經(jīng)濟學(xué)理論）IndustrialOrganization(IO)Theory產(chǎn)業(yè)組織理論Industrialorganizationisafieldofeconomicsthatstudiesthestrategicbehavioroffirms,thestructureofmarketandtheirinteractions(EconomicsofImperfectCompetition)產(chǎn)業(yè)組織是一門研究企業(yè)的戰(zhàn)略行為、市場結(jié)構(gòu)和它們之間互動關(guān)系的經(jīng)濟學(xué)。（不完全競爭經(jīng)濟學(xué)）Afirm’sperformanceinthemarketplacedependscriticallyonthecharacteristicsoftheindustryenvironmentinwhichitcompetes企業(yè)在市場中的表現(xiàn)很大程度上取決于它所在產(chǎn)業(yè)環(huán)境的特征。Industrystructuredeterminesthebehaviororconductoffirms,whosejointconductthendeterminesthecollectiveperformanceofthefirmsinthemarketplace產(chǎn)業(yè)結(jié)構(gòu)決定了企業(yè)的行為，市場中所有企業(yè)的行為共同決定了這些企業(yè)的整體績效。AnimportantbranchofIOresearchisOligopolyTheoryseekingtospecifythelinkbetweenindustrystructureandfirm-to-firmrivalry寡頭理論是產(chǎn)業(yè)組織研究中的一個重要分支，主要研究產(chǎn)業(yè)結(jié)構(gòu)和企業(yè)與企業(yè)間競爭的關(guān)系。10(TheoriesofExchange–EconomIndustrialOrganization(IO)Theory

產(chǎn)業(yè)組織理論

IOhasmanylimitations產(chǎn)業(yè)組織理論有很多的局限性

IOhasastaticperspective產(chǎn)業(yè)組織理論是一種靜態(tài)的觀點

IOviewsthefirmasafree-standingandpassiveentity

產(chǎn)業(yè)組織理論認(rèn)為企業(yè)是獨立和被動的

Structure-conduct-performanceisnotonewaybuttwoways

結(jié)構(gòu)-行為-績效（SCP）間的關(guān)系并非單向的，而是雙向的

11IndustrialOrganization(IO)TFurtherReadingsonIOTheory

產(chǎn)業(yè)組織理論的拓展閱讀Bain,Joe.1968.Industrialorganization.NY:WileyCaves,R.E.1980:Industrialorganization,corporatestrategy,andstructure.JournalofEconomicLiterature,18(1):64-92Caves,R.E.,Porter,M.E.&Spence,A.M.1980.Competitionintheopeneconomy.Cambridge:HarvardUniversityPressPorter,M.E.1979.Thestructurewithinindustriesandcompanies’performance.ReviewofEconomics&Statistics,61(May):214-227.Scherer,F.M.1970.Industrialmarketstructureandeconomicperformance.Chicago:RandMcNally12FurtherReadingsonIOTheory

(TheoriesofExchange–EconomicTheories)

（關(guān)于交換的理論-經(jīng)濟學(xué)理論）GameTheory博弈論Gametheoryattemptstomathematicallycapturebehaviorinstrategicsituations,inwhichanindividual'ssuccessinmakingchoicesdependsonthechoicesofothers博弈論試圖使用數(shù)學(xué)的方法捕捉戰(zhàn)略態(tài)勢下的行為，在戰(zhàn)略態(tài)勢下，個體決策的成敗取決于他人的選擇。Traditionalapplicationsofgametheoryattempttofindequilibriainthesegames.Inanequilibrium,eachplayerofthegamehasadoptedastrategythattheyareunlikelytochange博弈論一般應(yīng)用于尋找博弈中的均衡。在均衡情況下，每個參與者都選擇了在一般情況下不會改變的策略。AsetofstrategiesisaNashequilibriumifeachrepresentsabestresponsetotheotherstrategies.So,ifalltheplayersareplayingthestrategiesinaNashequilibrium,theyhavenounilateralincentivetodeviate,sincetheirstrategyisthebesttheycandogivenwhatothersaredoing如果一次博弈中所有參與者都選擇了個人最優(yōu)策略，這些策略的組合就稱為納什均衡。在納什均衡中，無論其他參與者的策略是什么，每個局中人選擇的都是個人最優(yōu)策略，所以所有局中人都沒有單方偏離的激勵。13(TheoriesofExchange–EconomGameTheory博弈論

Prisoner'sdilemmaformsanon-zero-sumgameinwhichtwoplayersmayeachcooperatewithordefectfrom(betray)theotherplayer.UnderaPareto-suboptimalsolution,rationalchoiceleadsthetwoplayerstobothplaydefect,eventhougheachplayer'sindividualrewardwouldbegreateriftheybothplayedcooperatively囚徒困境屬于非零和博弈。在囚徒困境中，博弈雙方可能相互合作，也可能相互背叛。在帕累托次優(yōu)的解決方案下，理性決策將促使博弈雙方選擇相互背叛，即便在相互合作的情況下雙方都能獲得更大的報酬。Derivingtheoptimalstrategyisgenerallydoneintwoways:(1)BayesianNashequilibriumand(2)MonteCarlosimulations(individualswithlowscoresdieoff,andthosewithhighscoresreproduce)一般來說，有兩種獲得最優(yōu)策略的方法：(1)貝葉斯納什均衡及(2)蒙特卡洛模擬（即得分較低的個體相繼出局，而得分較高的個體不斷復(fù)制再生）Agameiscooperative(vs.non-cooperative)iftheplayersareabletoformbindingcommitments如果博弈參與者之間可以達成約束承諾，則稱之為合作博弈（相對于非合作博弈）Asymmetric(vs.asymmetric)gameisagamewherethepayoffsforplayingaparticularstrategydependonlyontheotherstrategiesemployed,notonwhoisplayingthem(e.g.,prisoner'sdilemma)對稱博弈（相對于非對稱博弈）是指在博弈中，一個特定策略的報酬僅由其他參與者選擇的策略決定，而與其他參與者的身份無關(guān)（例如囚徒困境）14GameTheory博弈論

Prisoner'sdilGameTheory博弈論Zero-sumgames(vs.non-zero-sumgame)areaspecialcaseofconstant-sumgames,inwhichchoicesbyplayerscanneitherincreasenordecreasetheavailableresources零和博弈（相對于非零和博弈）是常和博弈的一種特殊情況。在零和博弈中，參與者的策略選擇不會增加或者減少可用資源的總量。Sequential(vs.simultaneous)games(ordynamicgames)aregameswherelaterplayershavesomeknowledgeaboutearlieractions在序貫博弈（又稱為動態(tài)博弈，相對于同時博弈）中，行動在后者可以了解行動在先者采取的行動。Agameisoneofperfectinformation(vs.imperfectinformationgame)ifallplayersknowthemovespreviouslymadebyallotherplayers信息完全博弈（相對于信息不完全博弈）是指博弈中的所有參與者都擁有其他參與者先前行動的信息。Continuousgames(vs.discretegames)allowplayerstochooseastrategyfromacontinuousstrategyset連續(xù)博弈（相對于非連續(xù)博弈）允許參與者在一組連續(xù)策略集合中進行選擇。EightgametheoristshavewonNobelprizesineconomics!至今已有八位研究博弈論的學(xué)者獲得諾貝爾經(jīng)濟學(xué)獎！15GameTheory博弈論Zero-sumgamesFurtherReadingsonGameTheory

博弈論的拓展閱讀Friedman,J.1990.Gametheorywithapplicationstoeconomics.London:OxfordUniversityPressGibbons,R.1992.Gametheoryforappliedeconomists.Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPressFudenberg,D.&Tirole,J.1991.PerfectBayesianequilibriumandsequentialequilibrium.JournalofEconomicTheory,53:236-260.Samuelson,W.1984.Bargainingunderasymmetricinformation.Econometrica,52:995-1005Axelrod,R.1984.Theevolutionofcooperation.NewYork:BasicBooks

RobertE.LucasThomasC.SchellingRobertJ.Aumann,1930-

RobertAumannJohnNashWilliamVickrey16FurtherReadingsonGameTheor(TheoriesofExchange–EconomicTheories)

（關(guān)于交換的理論——經(jīng)濟理論）AgencyTheory代理理論Atheoryconcernstherelationshipbetweenaprincipal(e.g.,shareholder)andanagentoftheprincipal(e.g.,managers).Itinvolvesthecostsofresolvingconflictsbetweentheprincipalsandagentsandaligninginterestsofthetwogroups代理理論研究的是委托人（即股東）和其委托的代理人（即經(jīng)理）之間的關(guān)系。它涉及解決委托人和代理人二者沖突和聯(lián)合二者利益的成本問題。Theprincipal-agentproblemariseswhenaprincipalcompensatesanagentforperformingcertainactsthatareusefultotheprincipalandcostlytotheagent,andwherethereareelementsoftheperformancethatarecostlytoobserve當(dāng)委托人因為代理人執(zhí)行的某些特定行為而給予其補償，而這些特定的行為對委托人有利而對代理人來說成本很高、并且對這些行為的執(zhí)行情況有很高的觀察成本時，就會產(chǎn)生委托-代理問題。Principalsdonotknowenoughaboutwhether(ortowhatextent)acontracthasbeensatisfied.Thesolutiontothisinformationproblem—closelyrelatedtothemoralhazardproblem—istoensuretheprovisionofappropriateincentivessoagentsactinthewayprincipalswish委托人對于契約是否被很好地執(zhí)行沒有足夠的了解。解決這個信息問題的方法，與道德風(fēng)險問題密切相關(guān)，那就是確保提供適當(dāng)?shù)募顝亩勾砣税凑瘴腥说囊庠感惺?。Levinthal(1988)maintainsthattheriskimposedonanagentcanbereducedbybasingindividualperformancerelativetothatofotheragents,whofacesimilarstatesofnature.Levinthal(1988)指出可以通過把代理人個人表現(xiàn)跟其他面對著相似性質(zhì)工作的代理人進行比較，可以減輕代理的風(fēng)險。17(TheoriesofExchange–EconomAgencyTheory代理理論

Agencytheorytriestoresolvetwoproblemsthatcanoccurinagencyrelationships.Thefirstistheagencyproblemthatariseswhen(a)thedesiresorgoalsoftheprincipalandagentconflictand(b)itisdifficultorexpensivefortheprincipletoverifywhattheagentisactuallydoing.Theprincipalcannotverifythattheagenthasbehavedappropriately代理理論嘗試解決代理關(guān)系中存在的兩類問題。(a)當(dāng)委托人與代理人的利益與目標(biāo)出現(xiàn)沖突或(b)當(dāng)委托人對代理人行為的監(jiān)督很困難或者需要很高的成本時，第一類代理問題就會產(chǎn)生。委托人很難核實代理人的行為是否恰當(dāng)。Thesecondistheproblemofrisksharingthatariseswhentheprincipalandagenthavedifferentattitudestowardsrisk.Theproblemhereisthattheprincipleandtheagentmaypreferdifferentactionsbecauseofthedifferentriskpreferences當(dāng)委托人和代理人對風(fēng)險持有不同態(tài)度時，就會出現(xiàn)第二類代理問題，即風(fēng)險分擔(dān)的問題。由于委托人和代理人持有不同的風(fēng)險偏好，他們可能會采取不同的行動。Principalscandotwothings:compensationmechanisms(‘thecarrot’)andsupervisoryschemes(‘thestick’)委托人可以做兩件事情：激勵機制（“蘿卜”）和監(jiān)督方案（“大棒”）Agencytheorytodayisusedinbroadercontexts(e.g.,parent-subsidiaryrelations;headquarters-offshoreunits;franchising;outsourcing;client-professionalserviceprovider,etc)現(xiàn)在，人們在更多的場合中使用代理理論（例如：母公司與子公司關(guān)系；總部與海外分部；連鎖；外包；客戶與專業(yè)服務(wù)公司等）18AgencyTheory代理理論

AgencytheoAgencyTheory代理理論

JensenandMeckling(1976)integrateelementsfromagency,thetheoryofpropertyrightsandthetheoryoffinancetodevelopatheoryoftheownershipstructureofthefirmJensen和Meckling（1976）整合了代理理論的原理、產(chǎn)權(quán)理論和金融理論，提出了關(guān)于企業(yè)所有權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)的理論。JensenandMeckling(1976)arguethatcontractualrelationsaretheessenceofthefirm,notonlywithemployeesbutalsowithsuppliers,customers,creditors,andsoonJensen和Meckling（1976）認(rèn)為契約關(guān)系是企業(yè)的核心，契約關(guān)系不僅包括與員工之間的，還包括與供應(yīng)商、消費者、債權(quán)人等之間的JensenandMeckling(1976)arguethatmostorganizationsserveasanexusforasetofcontractingrelationshipsamongindividualsJensen和Meckling（1976）認(rèn)為絕大多數(shù)的組織都是以個體之間契約關(guān)系的連結(jié)這一形式存在的。JensenandMeckling(1976)concludethatthelevelofagencycostdepends,amongotherthings,onstatutoryandcommonlaw,andhumancreativityindevisingbettercontractsJensen和Meckling（1976）得出的結(jié)論是，代理成本的大小，除了其他方面以外，還受到成文法和習(xí)慣法以及人類在制定更好契約方面的創(chuàng)造性的影響。Levinthal(1988)notesthattherepetitionofanagencyrelationshipovertimetendstoimproveitsefficiency.Levinthal（1988）發(fā)現(xiàn)一組代理關(guān)系的不斷重復(fù)可以提高其效率。19AgencyTheory代理理論

JensenandAgencyTheory代理理論

Ineconomiclanguage,sincethefirst-bestoutcomecouldonlybeachievedintheunrealisticworldofcostlessinformationflow,ourgoalmustbetodothebestwecan,toachievewhatissometimescalledthesecond-bestsolution用經(jīng)濟學(xué)的話說，既然最優(yōu)結(jié)果只有在信息可以無成本流動的非現(xiàn)實情況下獲得，我們的目標(biāo)必然是盡我們最大的努力，以獲得所謂的次優(yōu)解決方案。Thebuildingblocksofagencytheoryareinformationandeconomicincentives信息和經(jīng)濟激勵是代理理論的重要組成部分Agencylossismoreseverewhentheeconomicinterestsoreconomicvaluesoftheprincipalandagentdivergesubstantially,andinformationmonitoringiscostly;當(dāng)委托人與代理人的經(jīng)濟利益和經(jīng)濟價值從本質(zhì)上出現(xiàn)偏離時，代理損失就會更加嚴(yán)重，信息監(jiān)控的成本也會很高。Theeconomicbenefitsofanyreductioninagencylosswillbesharedbyprincipalandagentinmostmarketsituations.在絕大多數(shù)的市場情況下，減少代理損失所帶來的經(jīng)濟利益都會由委托人和代理人共同分享。Itisusefultodistinguishtwotypesofagencyproblems:(1)Hiddenactionmodel(moralhazard)and(2)Hiddeninformationmodel(adverseselection)區(qū)分兩類代理問題是有意義的：(1)隱藏行動模型（道德風(fēng)險）和(2)隱藏信息模型（逆向選擇）Moralhazard:apartyinsulatedfromriskmaybehavedifferentlyfromthewayitwouldbehaveifitwerefullyexposedtotherisk.Adverseselection:"bad"resultsoccurwhenbuyersandsellershaveasymmetricinformation道德風(fēng)險：當(dāng)事人在免遭風(fēng)險時采取的行為會與其在完全風(fēng)險暴露下的行為截然不同。逆向選擇：當(dāng)買者與賣者信息不對稱時出現(xiàn)的“不好”的結(jié)果。20AgencyTheory代理理論

20FurtherReadingsonAgencyTheory

代理理論的拓展閱讀Fama,E.1980.Agencyproblemsandthetheoryofthefirm.JournalofPoliticalEconomy,88:288-307Fama,E.&Jensen,M.1983.Separationofownershipandcontrol.JournalofLawandEconomics,26:301-325Jensen,M.&Meckling,W.1976.Theoryofthefirm:Managerialbehavior,agencycostsandownershipstructure.JournalofFinancialEconomics,3:305-360Eisenhardt,K.1989.Agencytheory:Anassessmentandreview.AcademyofManagementReview,14:57-74EugeneFamaMichaelJensen21FurtherReadingsonAgencyThe(TheoriesofExchange–EconomicTheories)

（關(guān)于交換的理論——經(jīng)濟理論）ContractTheory契約理論Ineconomics,contracttheorystudieshoweconomicactorscananddoconstructcontractualarrangements,generallyinthepresenceofasymmetricinformation在經(jīng)濟學(xué)中，契約理論主要研究經(jīng)濟參與者如何制定契約安排，一般是在信息不對稱的情況下。Contracttheoryalsoutilizesthenotionofacompletecontract,whichisthoughtofasacontractthatspecifiesthelegalconsequencesofeverypossiblestateoftheworld契約理論使用了完全契約的概念，完全契約是指已經(jīng)規(guī)定清楚所有可能情況的法律后果的契約。Morerecentdevelopmentsknownasthetheoryofincompletecontracts,pioneeredbyOliverHart,studytheincentiveeffectsofparties'inabilitytowritecompletecontingentcontracts,e.g.concerningrelationship-specificinvestments不完全契約理論是本理論的最新進展，由OliverHart最早提出，研究當(dāng)事人無法制定完全契約對于契約雙方的激勵效果，例如有關(guān)專用性投資的理論。Becauseitwouldbeimpossiblycomplexandcostlyforthepartiestoanagreementtomaketheircontractcomplete,thelawprovidesdefaultruleswhichfillinthegapsintheactualagreementoftheparties由于合同當(dāng)事人無法把合同條目設(shè)計完美，法律規(guī)定默認(rèn)規(guī)則以填補實際合約中的空白。22(TheoriesofExchange–EconomContractTheory契約理論Socialcontracttheoryisquitedifferentfromeconomics/lawbasedcontracttheory社會契約理論和以經(jīng)濟/法律為基礎(chǔ)的契約理論有很大的差異。Socialcontractdescribesabroadclassoftheoriesthattrytoexplainthewaysinwhichpeopleformstatesand/ormaintainsocialorder社會契約包括了一系列解釋人們?nèi)绾谓液?或維持社會秩序的理論。Thenotionofthesocialcontractimpliesthatthepeoplegiveupsomerightstoagovernmentorotherauthorityinordertoreceiveormaintainsocialorder社會契約的概念暗示人們?yōu)榱双@得和維持社會秩序愿意向政府或其他權(quán)威放棄一部分權(quán)力。Socialcontracttheoryformedacentralpillarinthehistoricallyimportantnotionthatlegitimatestateauthoritymustbederivedfromtheconsentofthegoverned社會契約理論形成了一個具有歷史重要性的概念的核心支柱，那就是合法的國家權(quán)力一定源于被統(tǒng)治階級的同意。Variousproponentsofsocialcontracttheoryattempttoexplain,indifferentways,whyitisinanindividual’srationalself-interesttovoluntarilygiveupthefreedomonehasinthestateofnatureinordertoobtainthebenefitsofpoliticalorder社會契約理論的支持者試圖用不同的方法說明自愿放棄與生俱來的自由以獲得政治秩序是理性和符合個體私利的。23(TheoriesofExchange–EconomicTheories)

（關(guān)于交換的理論——經(jīng)濟理論）ContractTheory契約理論23(TheorieFurtherReadingsonContractTheory

契約理論的拓展閱讀

Hart,OliverandMoore,J.1988:Incompletecontractsandrenegotiation.Econometrica,56:755-785Huberman,G.&Kahn,C.1988.Limitedcontractenforcementandstrategicrenegotiation.AmericanEconomicReview,78(3):471-485Bernheim,B.D.&Whinston,M.D.1998.Incompletecontractsandstrategicambiguity.AmericanEconomicReview,88(4):902-932Cheung,S.1983.Thecontractualnatureofthefirm.JournalofLawandEconomics,26(April):1-21Klein,B.&Leffler,K.B.1981.Theroleofmarketforcesinassuringcontractualperformance.JournalofPoliticalEconomy,89(4):615-641OliverHartGurHuberman24FurtherReadingsonContractTHighlightofMainstreamTheories

(TheoriesofExchange–SocialExchange)EquityTheory公平理論EquityTheoryattemptstoexplainrelationalsatisfactionintermsofperceptionsoffair/unfairdistributionsofresourceswithininterpersonalrelationships-firstdevelopedin1962byJohnAdams公平理論由美國心理學(xué)家約翰?亞當(dāng)斯（JohnAdams)于1962年首先提出。該理論試圖用人們對人際交往范圍內(nèi)資源分配是否公平的感知，來解釋他們對人際關(guān)系的滿意度。Itfocusesondeterminingwhetherthedistributionofresourcesisfairtobothrelationalpartners.Equityismeasuredbycomparingtheratiosofcontributionsandbenefitsofeachpersonwithintherelationship這一理論關(guān)注資源的分配對于關(guān)系的雙方是否公平。是否公平是通過比較雙方在這段關(guān)系中所做貢獻和所獲收益的比率得到的。Muchlikeotherprevalenttheoriesofmotivation,suchasMaslow’shierarchyofneeds,equityTheoryacknowledgesthatsubtleandvariableindividualfactorsaffecteachperson’sassessmentandperceptionoftheirrelationshipwiththeirrelationalpartners公平理論與之前的其他激勵理論（如馬斯洛的需求層次理論）一樣，認(rèn)為微妙的、可變的個人因素影響著每個人對自身與他人關(guān)系的感知和評價。25HighlightofMainstreamTheori

EquityTheory公平理論Equitytheoryargues:公平理論認(rèn)為：Employeesexpectafairreturnforwhattheycontributetotheirjobs,aconceptreferredtoasthe“equitynorm”員工期望獲得與他們的工作貢獻相匹配的收入，這一概念被稱為“公平原則”。Employeesdeterminewhattheirequitablereturnshouldbeaftercomparingtheirinputsandoutcomeswiththoseoftheircoworkers.Thisconceptisreferredtoas“socialcomparison”員工通過與其他同事的投入和產(chǎn)出進行比較決定他們認(rèn)為公平的收入水平。這一概念被稱為“社會比較”。Employeeswhoperceivethemselvesasbeinginaninequitablesituationwillseektoreducetheinequityeitherbydistortinginputsand/oroutcomesintheirownminds(“cognitivedistortion”),bydirectlyalteringinputsand/oroutputs,orbyleavingtheorganization認(rèn)為自己受到不公平對待的員工會通過在自己的意識中扭曲投入和/或產(chǎn)出（“認(rèn)知曲解”）、直接改變投入和/或產(chǎn)出、或者離職的方式，減輕不公平。26EquityTheory公平理論EquitytFurtherReadingsonEquityTheory

公平理論的拓展理論

Adams,J.S.1965.Inequityinsocialexchange.InL.Berkowitz(ed.),Advancesinexperimentalsocialpsychology,Vol.2:267-299.NewYork:AcademicPressAdams,J.S.&Freedman,S.1976.Equitytheoryrevisited.InL.Berkowitz(ed.).Advancesinexperimentalsocialpsychology.Vol.9:43-90.NewYork:AcademicPressHatfield,E.&Sprecher,S.1984.Equitytheoryandbehaviorinorganizations.ResearchintheSociologyofOrganizations.3:95-112Carrell,M.R.&Dittrich,J.E.1978.Equitytheory:Therecentliterature,methodologicalconsiderationsandnewdirections.AcademyofManagementReview,3(2):202-211Boris,K.1991.Equity,equality,powerandconflict.AcademyofManagementReview,16(2):416-44127FurtherReadingsonEquityTheTheoriesofExchange–SocialExchange

關(guān)于交換的理論—社會交換SocialPsychologyTheory社會心理學(xué)理論Socialpsychologystudieshowpeopleandgroupsinteract.Scholarsinthisinterdisciplinaryareaaretypicallyeitherpsychologistsorsociologists,thoughallsocialpsychologistsemployboththeindividualandthegroupastheirunitofanalysis社會心理學(xué)研究群體和個人的互動。這一交叉領(lǐng)域的學(xué)者一般是心理學(xué)家或社會學(xué)家，不過所有的社會心理學(xué)者都將個人和群體作為他們研究的單元。Psychologicallyorientedresearchersemphasizetheimmediatesocialsituationandtheinteractionbetweenpersonandsituationvariables.Theyfocusontheindividualandattemptstoexplainhowthethoughts,feelings,andbehaviorsofindividualsareinfluencedbyotherpeople偏心理學(xué)的研究者強調(diào)直接的社會情境，以及人與情境變量之間的互動關(guān)系。他們關(guān)注個體，并試圖解釋人們的思想、情感和行為是如何受到其他人影響的。Sociologistsareinterestedintheindividualandgroup,butgenerallywithinthecontextoflargersocialstructuresandprocesses,suchassocialroles,race,class,gender,ethnicity,andsocialization.Someoftheirmajorresearchareasaresocialinequality,groupdynamics,socialchange,socialization,socialidentity,andsymbolicinteractionism社會學(xué)家也對個體和群體感興趣，但一般著眼于更宏大的社會結(jié)構(gòu)和社會過程，例如社會角色、人種、階級、性別、民族和社會化。社會不公現(xiàn)象、群體動力學(xué)、社會變革、社會化、社會認(rèn)同以及符號互動是其中一些主要的研究領(lǐng)域。28TheoriesofExchange–SocialTheoriesofExchange–SocialExchange

關(guān)于交換的理論—社會交換SocialPsychologyTheories社會心理學(xué)理論Socialpsychologistsutilizeawiderangeofspecifictheoriesforvariouskindsofsocialandcognitivephenomena:在社會心理學(xué)中，有一系列的理論被用以解釋紛繁的社會與認(rèn)知現(xiàn)象：AttributionTheory(thewaysinwhichpeopleexplainthebehaviorofothers:Externalorsituationalattributesandinternalordispositionalattributes)歸因理論（人們解釋他人行為的方式：外部或情景歸因與內(nèi)部或素質(zhì)歸因）SchemataTheory(generalizedbeliefsorcognitivestructuresthatorganizeknowledgeandguideinformationprocessing)圖示理論（概括了組織認(rèn)識和指導(dǎo)信息處理的觀點和認(rèn)知結(jié)構(gòu)）Self-PerceptionTheory(weobserveourselvesinthesamemannerthatweobserveothers)自我知覺理論（我們用自身觀察他人的方式觀察自己）SocialComparisonTheory(humansknowthemselvesbycomparisontorelevantothers)社會比較理論（人們通過與相關(guān)的其他人的比較來了解自己）SocialExchangeTheory(humanrelationsarebasedonrationalchoice)社會交換理論（人際關(guān)系建立在理性選擇的基礎(chǔ)之上）SocialIdentityTheory(HenriTajfel–howingroupsoroutgroupsaffectperceptions,attitudesandbehavior)社會認(rèn)同理論（HenriTajfel–內(nèi)部群體或外圍群體如何影響認(rèn)知、態(tài)度和行為）SocialLearningTheory(Bandura:behaviorcanbeacquiredbyobservingandimitatingothers)社會學(xué)習(xí)理論（Bandura:行為可以通過觀察與模仿他人習(xí)得）29TheoriesofExchange–SocialFurtherReadingsonSocialPsychologyTheories

社會心理學(xué)理論拓展閱讀Rubin,J.&Brown,B.1975.Thesocialpsychologyofbargainingandnegotiations.NewYork:AcademicPressKatz,D.&Kahn,R.L.1978.Thesocialpsychologyoforganizations.NewYork:WileyWeick,K.E.1979.Thesocialpsychologyoforganizing.Reading,MA:Addison-WesleyMurnighan,J.K.1993.Socialpsychologyinorganizations:Advancesintheoryandresearch.EnglewoodCliffs,NJ:Prentice-HallTajfel,H.,Billig,M.G.,Bundy,R.P.andFlament,C.(1971)Socialcategorisationandintergroupbehaviour,EuropeanJournalofSocialPsychology1:148-78Bandura,A.1977.Sociallearningtheory.PrenticeHallEnglewoodCliffs,NJ

30FurtherReadingsonSocialPsyTheoriesofExchange–SocialExchange

關(guān)于交換的理論—社會交換SocialIdentityTheory社會認(rèn)同理論Whenpeopleareassignedtoagroup,theyimmediatelyandautomaticallythinkofthatgroup,andanin-groupforthem,asbetterthanthealternative,anout-groupforthembecausetheyaremotivatedtoachieveandmaintainapositiveself-image當(dāng)人們被分配到一個群體時，他們馬上自覺地認(rèn)為這一群體以及群體中的成員，優(yōu)于其他群體以及其他群體外的成員，他們能因此獲取和維持正面的自我形象。Socialidentitytheoryisadiffusebutinterrelatedgroupofsocialpsychologicaltheoriesconcernedwithwhenandwhyindividualsidentifywith,andbehaveaspartof,socialgroups,adoptingsharedattitudestooutsiders社會認(rèn)同理論是對一類發(fā)散但相互聯(lián)系的社會心理學(xué)理論的總結(jié)。該理論研究的是從何時開始個體沿用社會群體對局外人的共有的態(tài)度，認(rèn)同和表現(xiàn)為該群體中的一員以及產(chǎn)生這種現(xiàn)象的原因。Thistheoryiscomposedoffourelements:該理論由以下四部分組成：Categorization:Weoftenputothers(andourselves)intocategories分類：我們常常將別人（或我們自己）歸進不同類別的群體中。Identification:Weassociatewithcertaingroups(ouringroups),whichservestobolsterourself-esteem認(rèn)同：我們將自己與這些群體（我們的內(nèi)部集團）聯(lián)系在一起，這會增強我們的自尊心。Comparison:Wecompareourgroupswithothergroups,seeingafavorablebiastowardthegrouptowhichwebelong比較：我們將我們的群體和其他群體進行比較，往往得出一個對我們?nèi)后w有利的偏向。PsychologicalDistinctiveness:Wedesireouridentitytobebothdistinctfromandpositivelycomparedwithothergroups心理區(qū)分：我們喜歡我們與其他群體相比更加正面而且與眾不同的身份。31TheoriesofExchange–SocialTheoriesofExchange–SocialExchange

關(guān)于交換的理論—社會交換SocialCognition/LearningTheory社會認(rèn)知/學(xué)習(xí)理論Socialcognitive/learningtheorypositsthatportionsofanindividual'sknowledgeacquisitioncanbedirectlyrelatedtoobservingotherswithinthecontextofsocialinteractions,experiences,andoutsidemediainfluences社會認(rèn)知/學(xué)習(xí)理論認(rèn)為個體部分的知識獲取與社會交往、經(jīng)驗、以及外部媒介影響下對他人的觀察直接相關(guān)。Peopleareviewedasself-organizing,proactive,self-reflectingandself-regulatingratherthanasreactive