DownloadI股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)現(xiàn)金流與資本投資

Law,CorporateGovernance,andCorporateScandalinChinaYiZhangPekingUniversityInternationalConferenceonCorporateGovernanceShanghaiMarch2005I.IntroductionIthasbeenovertenyearssincestockmarketsestablishedinChina.Chinastocksmarkethasbeenplayingarole.thereexistsomanylistedfirmscommittedfraudandscandalSince1992,about200listedfirmsamong1200havebeensubjecttosecurityenforcementactionbyChinaSecuritiesRegulationCommission(CSRC),ShenzhenStockExchange(SZSE)andShanghaiStockExchange(SSE).TheratiooffirmswithscandalisfarabovethelevelofothercountriesMotivationWhatcontributestofirm’sscandal?DoescorporategovernancematterinChina? Isthereasoundcorporategovernancemechanismcouldpreventscandal?Doeslegalandeconomicdevelopmentmatter? -Isthereadifferencebetweenfirmsinregionswithvariouslegaleffectiveness? -economicdevelopment?II.IssuesandHypothesis:

-Corporategovernance-legal-economic-finance1.

CorporateGovernance1.1.

ownershipOneofthemostessentialfeatureoftheownershipofChineselistedfirmsisthedominanceofthelargestshareholderTherehasnoeffectivemechanismtomonitorandrestrictthelargeshareholdersThelargeshareholdercanexpropriatetheminorityshareholdersforprivatebenefit1.

CorporateGovernance1.1.

ownershipJensen(1976)Stulz(1988)H1A:Astheownershipofthelargestshareholderincreasesfromzero,afirmismorelikelytobeassociatedwithscandalEntrenchmentoflargeshareholdersExpropriationbylargeshareholderLaPorta,Lopez-De-Silanes,Shleifer(1999)LaPorta,Lopez-De-Silanes,Shleifer(2002)Claessens,Djankov,Fan,andLang(2002)FanandWong(2002)H1B:Astheownershipofthelargestshareholderincreasesovercertainlevel,afirmismorelikelytobeassociatedwithscandal1.2

FirmControllerThereisfundamentaldifferencebetweenstateandnon-stateshareholdersThereishugedifferenceamongstateshareholdersininternalmonitoring,etc. -centralgovernment(bu/wei,中央部委）和-non-centralgovernment(非部委）LiandZhang（2005）LiandZhang（2004）LinandZhang（2004）1.2

FirmController-centralgovernment(bu/wei,中央部委）和-non-centralgovernment(非部委）centralgovernmentcontrolledlocalgovernmentcontrolledlocalStateEnterprises(SOE)controlledNon-statelegalpersoncontrolledNaturalpersonothers1.2

FirmControllerCentralgovernmentcontrolledfirmsareassociatedwithclearerownership,(alittle)moretransparency,moremonitoringmoresocialresponsibility， (maybe)betterprotectionofminorityshareholdersNon-centralSOEandnon-statelegalpersoncontrolledfirmsareassociatedwithlesstransparencyandlackofmonitoring uptolesssocialresponsibility lackofprotectionofminorityshareholdersH2:Firmscontrolledbycentral(/local)governmentarelesslikelytobeassociatedwithscandal

1.

CorporateGovernance1.3BoardFamaandJensen(1983)theorizethattheboardofdirectorsisthehighestinternalcontrolmechanismresponsibleformonitoringtheactionsoftopmanagement.-thecompositionofindividualswhoserveontheboardofdirectorsisanimportantfactorincreatingaboardthatisaneffectivemonitorofmanagementactionsFama’s(1980)andFamaandJensen’s(1983)theorywouldpredictthathigherpercentagesofindependentdirectorsincreasetheboard’seffectivenessasamonitorofmanagement.Jensen(1993)arguesthatboardsofdirectorareineffectivemonitorswhentheboardistoolarge,whentheboard’sequityownershipissmall,andwhentheCEOisalsotheChairmanoftheBpositionoftheboardofdirectorsdeterminesitseffectivenessDeFondandJiambalvo(1991)Beasley(1996)Dechow,SloanandSweeney(1996),etc.BoardcompositionanddisclosureChenandJaggi（2000）TheboardsizeH3A:FirmwithalargerboardsizeismorelikelytobeassociatedwithscandalTheboard-managementrelationshipTheCEO/ChairmanH3B:FirmwithaseparateCEOandChairmanislesslikelytobeassociatedwithscandalIndependentdirectorsIndependentdirectors,comparedwithinsidedirectors,arelesslikelytocolludewithmanagementH3C:Firmswithlowerproportion(seats)ofindependentdirectorontheboardofdirectorsaremorelikelytobeassociatedwithscandalDirectorholdingsH3D:Firmswithahigherratio(number)ofdirectorsholdfirmstockarelesslikelytobeassociatedwithscandalChairmanHoldingH3E:FirmswithhigherChairmanstockholdingarelesslikelytobeassociatedwithscandalDirectorCompensationH3F:Firmwithhigherratio(number)ofdirectorpaidarelesslikelytobeassociatedwithscandal1.4SupervisoryCommittee(BoardofSupervisors-監(jiān)事會(huì))SupervisoryCommitteesizeH4A:FirmswithalargerSupervisoryCommitteesizeismore(less?)likelytobeassociatedwithscandal1.4SupervisoryCommittee(BoardofSupervisors-監(jiān)事會(huì))SupervisoryCommitteememberholdingsH4B:Firmswithahigherratio(number)ofsupervisorsholdfirmstockislesslikelytobeassociatedwithscandalSupervisoryCommitteememberCompensationH4C:Firmwithhigherratio(number)ofSupervisoryCommitteememberpaidisless(ormore?)likelytobeassociatedwithscandal4．Institutioninvestors機(jī)構(gòu)投資者能能夠降低公司司內(nèi)部的代理理成本，減少少公司管理層層的不良行為為JarrellandPoulsen(1987)Brickley,Lease,andSmith(1988)機(jī)構(gòu)投資者更更傾向于反對(duì)對(duì)減少股東財(cái)財(cái)富的行為機(jī)構(gòu)投資者相相比其他類型型的投資者而而言更需要透透明度和信息息的披露Healyetal.(1999)Bushee和Noe(2000)機(jī)構(gòu)投資者更更偏好購(gòu)買那那些持續(xù)披露露信息的公司司的股票長(zhǎng)期持有公司司股票的機(jī)構(gòu)構(gòu)投資者，很很可能出于自自身的利益而而合謀進(jìn)行不不法行為機(jī)構(gòu)投資者可可以從中得到到的益處財(cái)務(wù)性的收益益，如低于市市價(jià)的轉(zhuǎn)讓價(jià)價(jià)格，阻止封封閉式基金的的贖回以及承承銷、財(cái)務(wù)顧顧問(wèn)方面的合合同（Barclay,Holderness,和Pontiff(1993)）非財(cái)務(wù)性的收收益，如影響響公司在政治治、經(jīng)濟(jì)或社社會(huì)方面的政政策就我國(guó)的實(shí)際際情況而言，，基金、證券券等機(jī)構(gòu)重倉(cāng)倉(cāng)持有上市公公司的股票，，利用內(nèi)部信信息進(jìn)行炒作作、牟取暴利利已不是秘密密因此，在我國(guó)國(guó)機(jī)構(gòu)投資者者的持股比例例同公司違規(guī)規(guī)行為是正相相關(guān)還是負(fù)相相關(guān)或不相關(guān)關(guān)需要實(shí)證檢檢驗(yàn)。H4：InstitutionholdingsarerelatedtothelikelihoodforfirmtocommitscandalFinancialdistressFirmsconfrontingwithfinancialdistressaremorelikelytocommitfinancialstatementfraudNeedcontrolforfinancials3.EconomicdevelopmentFirmsinmoreeconomydevelopedregionarelesslikelytobeassociatedwithscandal4.LawWrittenlawLLSV(1998)Allen,Qian,Qian(JFE,forthcoming)EffectivenessoflawismoreimportantthanthewrittenlawinatransitioneconomyBerkowitzetal(2003)Alford(2000)LuandYao(2004)China’’sprovincessignificantlydiffersintermsoflegaldevelopment.Whetherlaweffectivenessintheregionaffectsfirm’sdecisiontocommitfraud?MaybelawdoesnotmattersincelawisnoteffectiveoverallinChina?四、實(shí)證研究方法法（i）變量SCANDAL，公司是是否被監(jiān)管機(jī)機(jī)構(gòu)認(rèn)定為違違規(guī)并公開(kāi)批批評(píng),譴責(zé)或或處罰控制變量DEBT：公公司的資產(chǎn)負(fù)負(fù)債率ROA：公司司的資產(chǎn)收益益率LIQUIDITY：公公司的流動(dòng)比比率2．實(shí)證回歸模模型Matchingscandalfirmswithnon-scandalfirmsLogisticregressionExaminefirm’spropensitytocommitscandalSCANDAL=f(ββ0+β1GOVERN+β2INSTITUTE+β3BOARD+β4FSIZE+ββ5DEBT+β6ROA+β7LIQUIDITY+（OtherControls）)（（1）五、樣本與數(shù)據(jù)（一）數(shù)據(jù)Inordertoidentifyfirmsthatcommitscandal,werefertotheChinaSecuritiesJournal,ShanghaiSecuritiesJournalandtheGuotaianDatasetforfinancialscandals.ThetotalnumberoffirmssubjecttoenforcementactionsbytheCEC,SSE,andSZSEbetween1993and2003is178.Weeliminate12firmswhosegovernanceinformationinandbeforethefraudperiodarenotavailable,2firmslistedonB-StockMarketofChina,and4firmsthatcannotbematchedbyindustrycode,andthenthesamplesizeisreducedto160虛構(gòu)利潤(rùn)虛列資產(chǎn)虛假陳述重大遺漏擅自改變資金金用途大股東占用資資產(chǎn)違規(guī)擔(dān)保五、樣本與數(shù)據(jù)Eachofthescandalfirmismatchedwithano-scandalfirm,creatingachoice-basedsampleof160scandaland160no-scandalfirms.Thecontrolfirmisobtainedbythefollowingfour-stepprocess:(i)StockExchange(ii)Industry.3-digitindustrialcode.Ifthere’snofirmmatchingthethreedigits,thenselectthatofthesameprimarytwodigits(iii)FirmSize.53of160committedscandalinaperiodlasting2ormoreaccountingyears,andwedefinethefraudperiodofthesefirmsasthefirstdateoftheirfinancialstatementfraudWhenfirmscommittedscandalandwasdenounced/criticized/punishedmorethanonce,weonlyrecordthefirsttimeSampledescriptionlogistic回歸分析GovernanceandfinancialsAddmarketizationindexProxyforeconomicsdevelopmentProxyforlegaldevelopmentProxyforfinancialdevelopmentCorporateGovernanceOwnershipLARGEST回歸系數(shù)為負(fù)負(fù),在5%水平上顯著,LARGESTSQ的回歸系數(shù)為為正，在10%水平上顯著第一大股東持持股比例從零零開(kāi)始增大,公司越不不會(huì)commitscandal;當(dāng)?shù)谝淮蠊蓶|東持股比例達(dá)達(dá)到一定水平平,持股比例例越高,公司司越可能commitscandal;LOCAL和LEGALP的回歸系數(shù)為為正，LOCAL在5%水平上顯顯著，LEGALP在0.1%水平上顯顯著非國(guó)有法法人和地地方政府府控制的的公司更更有可能能違規(guī)董事會(huì)BOARDSIZE,INDEPENDENT均不顯著著董事會(huì)規(guī)規(guī)模和獨(dú)獨(dú)立董事事席位（（比例））CHAIRCEO不顯顯著CEO是是否兼任任董事持股董事事人數(shù)（（比例））和付報(bào)報(bào)酬董事事人數(shù)（（比例））均不顯顯著CHAIRHOLDING為為負(fù)，在在10％％水平上上顯著董事長(zhǎng)持持股比例例越高，，公司越越不會(huì)commitscandal監(jiān)事會(huì)監(jiān)事會(huì)規(guī)規(guī)模不顯顯著持股監(jiān)事事人數(shù)（（比例））不顯著著付報(bào)酬監(jiān)監(jiān)事比例例顯著為為正(10%水水平)取得報(bào)酬酬的監(jiān)事事比例越越高，公公司越可可能commitscandal機(jī)構(gòu)投資資者機(jī)構(gòu)投資資者持股股比例不不顯著分拆上市市或整體體上市分拆上市市或整體體上市沒(méi)沒(méi)有顯著著影響Controls流動(dòng)比率率的回歸歸系數(shù)顯顯著為負(fù)負(fù)流動(dòng)比率率越高的的公司，，financialdistress的可能能較小,違規(guī)可可能較小小DEBT的回歸系系數(shù)為正正，但統(tǒng)統(tǒng)計(jì)上不不顯著ROA的回歸系系數(shù)顯著著為負(fù)資產(chǎn)收益益率較高高的公司司違規(guī)可可能較小小RegiondevelopmentNortheast顯顯著為正正,公司發(fā)生生丑聞的的可能性性較高midyangtz顯顯著為正正,公司發(fā)生生丑聞的的可能性性較高Economicdevelopmentlgdppc，該省人人均GDP對(duì)數(shù)數(shù)值為負(fù)負(fù)，并在在統(tǒng)計(jì)上上顯著經(jīng)濟(jì)越發(fā)發(fā)達(dá)，公公司發(fā)生生丑聞的的可能性性越小LegaldevelopmentMeasureoflegaleffectiveness檢察院(procuratorialsystem)ProcuratorialCases_per_capita:立立案經(jīng)經(jīng)濟(jì)案件件ProcuratorialCases_gdpLoss_to_GDP:TheratioofsavedlossbyprocuratorialsuitstolocalGDPCadre_In_procurate:Thismeasuresthecorruptnessofofficials.Thenumberofcadresatcountylevelorabove(縣處級(jí)級(jí)以上)involvedinprocuratatedividedbythepopulationLegaldevelopment法院(courtsystem)Case_Close_RateRCMP:Thenumberofcommercialcasesreceivedbythecourtpermillionofpopulation律師協(xié)會(huì)會(huì)(lawyerassociation)Lawyer_per_capita