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PerspectiveSAMUELCHARAP,MIRANDAPRIEBEH owdoesthisend?Increasingly,thisquestionisdominatingdiscussionoftheRussia-UkrainewarinWashingtonandotherWesterncapitals.AlthoughsuccessfulUkrainiancounteroffensivesinKharkivandKhersoninfall2022renewedoptimismaboutKyiv’sprospectsonthebattlefield,RussianPresidentVladimirPutin’sannouncementonSeptember21ofapartialmobilizationandannexationoffourUkrainianprovinceswasastarkreminderthatthiswarisnowhereneararesolution.Fightingstillragesacrossnearly1,000kmoffrontlines.NegotiationsonendingtheconflicthavebeensuspendedsinceMay.Thetrajectoryandultimateoutcomeofthewarwill,ofcourse,bedeterminedlargelybythepoliciesofUkraineandRussia.ButKyivandMoscowarenottheonlycapitalswithastakeinwhathappens.Thiswaristhemostsignificantinterstateconflictindecades,anditsevolutionwillhavemajorconsequencesfortheUnitedStates.Itisappropriatetoassesshowthisconflictmayevolve,whatalternativetra-jectoriesmightmeanforU.S.interests,andwhatWashingtoncandotopromoteatrajectorythatbestservesU.S.interests.2SomeanalystsmakethecasethatthewarisheadingtowardanoutcomethatwouldbenefittheUnitedStatesandUkraine.UkrainehadbattlefieldmomentumasofDecember2022andcouldconceivablyfightuntilitsuc-ceedsinpushingtheRussianmilitaryoutofthecountry.ProponentsofthisviewarguethattherisksofRussiannuclearuseorawarwiththeNorthAtlanticTreatyOrga-nization(NATO)willremainmanageable.1OnceitisforcedoutofUkraine,achastenedRussiawouldhavelittlechoicebuttoleaveitsneighborinpeace—andevenpayreparationsforthedamageitcaused.However,studiesofpastconflictsandacloselookatthecourseofthisonesug-gestthatthisoptimisticscenarioisimprobable.InthisPerspective,therefore,weexplorepossibletra-jectoriesthattheRussia-UkrainewarcouldtakeandhowtheymightaffectU.S.interests.WealsoconsiderwhattheUnitedStatescoulddotoinfluencethecourseoftheconflict.AnimportantcaveatThisPerspectivefocusesonU.S.enotsynonymouswithUkrainianinterests.WeacknowledgethatUkraini-countryagainstanunprovoked,illegal,andmorallyrepug-ircitieshavebeenflattenedrcrimesHowevertheUSluencingthecourseofsKeyDimensionsThatDefineAlternativeWarTrajectoriessuchscenariosareimportantconstructsforthinkingaboutlforUSpolicymakerstoconsiderctsoftheconflictsfuturedevelopmentwillhavethemostsignificantimpactonU.S.inter-osweexaminefive?possibleRussianuseofnuclearweapons?possibleescalationtoaRussia-NATOconflict?territorialcontrol?duration?formofwartermination.3sPossibleRussianUseofNuclearWeaponsThespecterofRussiannuclearusehashauntedthiscon-flictsinceitsearlydays.InannouncinghisinvasioninFebruary2022,PutinthreatenedanycountrythattriedtointerfereinUkrainewithconsequences“suchasyouhaveneverseeninyourentirehistory.”3Hewentontoordera“specialregimeofcombatduty”forRussia’snuclearforcesaweeklater.4InOctober2022,MoscowallegedthatKyivwasplanningtodetonatearadioactive“dirtybomb”inUkraineasafalseflagoperationandthenblameRussia.U.S.officialsworriedthatRussiawaspromotingthisstorytocreateapretextforusingnuclearweapons.5Andperhapsmostdisconcertingly,WesterngovernmentsappeartohavebecomeconvincedthatMoscowconsideredusingnonstra-tegicnuclearweapons(NSNW)asitsforceslostgroundinthefall.Russiahasdeniedtheseallegations,butnewsreportssuggestthattopRussiancommandersdiddiscussthisoption.6SomeanalystshavedismissedthepossibilityofNSNWuse,contendingthatRussiaknowsthatemploy-mentofnuclearweaponswouldbeself-defeating.Theypointtothelackofhigh-valuemilitarytargets(forexample,concentratedUkrainianforces)thatcouldbeeffectivelydestroyedwithsuchweaponsandtotheriskthattheseweaponsmightharmRussiantroopsdeployedinUkraine.UseoftheseweaponscouldprovokeNATO’sentryintothewar,erodeRussia’sremaininginternationalsupport,andsparkdomesticpoliticalbacklashfortheKremlin.Knowingthis,thelogicgoes,Russiawouldbedeterredfromusingnuclearweapons.7TheseargumentsignoreseveralissuesthatmakeRus-sianuseofnuclearweaponsbothaplausiblecontingencythatWashingtonneedstoaccountforandahugelyimpor-tantfactorindeterminingthefuturetrajectoryoftheconflict.First,thereisevidencethattheKremlinperceivesthiswartobenearexistential.UkrainehaslongbeeninacategoryofitsowninRussianforeignpolicypriorities;evenbeforethe2022war,Russiawaswillingtodevotesig-nificantresourcesandmakemajortrade-offstopursueitsobjectivesinUkraine.8Forexample,Moscowpaiddearlyforits2014annexationofCrimeaandinvasionofeasternUkraine.Westernsanctionscostanaverageof2percentinquarter-on-quarterdeclineinRussia’sgrossdomesticprod-uctbetweenmid-2014andmid-2015,aneffectthatcom-poundedasthesanctionscontinuedinsubsequentyears.9Putin’sdecisiontolaunchafull-scaleinvasioninFebruary2022,despiteclearwarningsfromtheUnitedStatesanditsalliesthathewouldpayamuchhigherpricethanin2014,showsthatheiswillingtogotoevenmore-extremelengthstopursuehisobjectivesinUkraine.Thedecisiontomobi-lize300,000RussiansinSeptember2022arguablyupendedadomesticsocialorderthatPutinspentnearly25yearsbuilding,whichalsosignalsahighlevelofresolve.10Thatorderwaspremisedonavoidingthekindsofsocialinsta-bilitythatmobilizationintroduced,particularlyforPutin’scoresupporters.Thedecisiontomobilizewaspostponeduntilitwaspastduefromamilitaryperspectivetoavoidthesedomesticpoliticalcosts—andtheperceivedrisksofpotentialunreststemmingfromanebbingofpopular4supportfortheregime.Putin’swillingnesstoacceptthesedomesticcostsandrisksunderscorestheimportanceheattachestoRussianinterestsinUkraine.Second,sinceRussia’sconventionalcapabilitieshavebeendecimatedinUkraine,Moscow’snonnuclearesca-latoryoptionsarelimited.IfRussiaexperiencesfurtherlarge-scalebattlefieldlosses,desperationcouldsetinamongseniorKremlindecisionmakers.Onceothercon-ventionalescalatoryoptionshavebeenexhausted,Moscowmayresorttonuclearweapons,andspecificallyNSNWuse,topreventacatastrophicdefeat.Third,RussianstrategistshavelonghighlightedtheutilityofNSNWforaccomplishingoperationalandtacticalgoalsinthecontextofaconventionalwarthatMoscowislosing.AndRussiahascapabilitiestocarryoutthesecon-cepts:ItsNSNWdeliverysystemsincludeartillery,short-rangeballisticmissiles,andcruisemissiles,allofwhichcouldbeemployedinUkraine.11RussianstrategistsalsoenvisionpreemptiveemploymentofNSNWagainstciviliantargets—cities,military-industrialcenters,andgovernmentfacilities—andagainstmilitaryones,atleastinthecontextofawarwithNATO.12MoscowalsocoulduseNSNWfordemonstrationstrikes,eitherintheatmosphereortar-getedatpopulationcenters.13ThemilitaryeffectivenessofNSNWemploymentinUkrainemightbesubjecttodebate,butitisaplausiblecontingencygivenwhatisknownaboutRussianplanningandcapabilities.AlthoughRussiannuclearuseinthiswarisplausible,wecannotdeterminepreciselyhowlikelysuchuseis.Whatwecansayisthattheriskofnuclearuseismuchgreaterthaninpeacetime.WecanalsosaythatnuclearusewouldbehighlyconsequentialfortheUnitedStates.TheUnitedStateshassignaledbothpubliclyand,reportedly,indirectcontactwiththeKremlinthatitwouldretaliateifRussiaweretoemploynuclearweaponsinUkraine.14U.S.officialshaveavoidedspecifyingtheexactnatureofapossibleresponse—insteadusingsuchphrasesas“catastrophicconsequences”—butoneNATOofficialsaiditwould“almostcertainly”entaila“physicalresponsefrommanyallies.”15Althoughthisformula-tiondoesnotexplicitlycommittoamilitaryresponse,evenanonmilitaryretaliationthatentails“catastrophicconsequences”forRussiamightleadtoatit-for-tatspiralthatproducesaNATO-Russiawar.RussianNSNWuseinUkrainecouldthereforeleadtoadirectU.S.conflictwithRussia,whichcouldultimatelyresultinastrategicnuclearexchange.16Buteveniftheescalatorychallengescouldbeman-aged,RussiannuclearuseinUkrainewouldbehighlyconsequentialfortheUnitedStates.IfRussiawoncon-cessionsormademilitarygainsthroughnuclearuse,thenormagainstnonusewouldbeweakenedandothercoun-triesmightbemorelikelytousesuchweaponsinfutureconflicts.Moreover,RussianuseofnuclearweaponsinUkrainewouldhavelargeandunpredictableeffectsonalliedpoliciestowardthewar,potentiallyleadingtoabreakdownintransatlanticunity.DeathanddestructioninUkraine,atragedyinitself,couldalsohaveamajorimpactonU.S.andalliedpublics.Inshort,theBidenadministrationhasamplereasontomakethepreventionofRussianuseofnuclearweaponsaparamountpriorityfortheUnitedStates.5PossibleEscalationtoaRussia-NATOConflictSinceOctober2021,whenhefirstbriefedPresidentJoeBidenonRussia’splanstoinvadeUkraine,ChairmanoftheJointChiefsofStaffMarkMilleyreportedlykeptalistof“U.S.interestsandstrategicobjectives”inthecrisis:“No.1”was“Don’thaveakineticconflictbetweentheU.S.militaryandNATOwithRussia.”Thesecond,closelyrelated,was“containwarinsidethegeographicalboundariesofUkraine.”17Todate,RussiaandUkraineremaintheonlycombatantsinthewar.ButthewarcouldstilldrawinU.S.allies.Combatistakingplaceinacoun-trythatbordersfourNATOmemberstatesonlandandsharestheBlackSealittoralwithtwoothers.TheextentofNATOallies’indirectinvolvementinthewarisbreath-takinginscope.Supportincludestensofbillionsofdol-lars’worthofweaponsandotheraidgiventoUkraine,tacticalintelligence,surveillanceandreconnaissancesupporttotheUkrainianmilitary,billionsofdollarsmonthlyindirectbudgetarysupporttoKyiv,andpainfuleconomicsanctionsimposedonRussia.ApreviousRANDCorporationreportoutlinedfourplausiblepathwaystoanintentionalRussiandecisiontostrikeNATOmemberstatesinthecontextofthewarinUkraine.Itidentifiedthefollowingreasons:18?PunishNATOmembersforpoliciesalreadyunder-waywiththeobjectiveofendingalliedsupportforUkraine.?StrikeNATOpreemptivelyifRussiaperceivesthatNATOinterventioninUkraineisimminent.?InterdictthetransferofarmstoUkrainethatRussiabelievesmightcauseitsdefeat.ateagainstNATOforperceivedsupportforinternalunrestinRussia.AlthoughaRussiandecisiontoattackaNATOlliancetheriskiselevatedwhiletheconflictinUkraineisongo-entryintotheconflictisalsoanongoingrisk.AlthoughtheNovember2022incidentinvolvingaUkrainianairdefensemissilelandingonPolishterritorydidnotspiraloutofcontrolitdiddemonstratethatfightingcanunintention-allyspillovertotheterritoryofneighboringU.S.allies.AfuturetargetingerrorcouldsendaRussianmissileintoNATOterritory,potentiallysparkinganaction-reactioncyclethatcouldleadtoafull-scaleconflict.IfthewarinUkraineweretoend,thelikelihoodofadirectRussia-6NATOclash,whetherintentionalorinadvertent,woulddiminishsignificantly.ItisclearwhyMilleylistedavoidingaRussia-NATOwarasthetopU.S.priority:TheU.S.militarywouldimme-diatelybeinvolvedinahotwarwithacountrythathastheworld’slargestnucleararsenal.KeepingaRussia-NATOwarbelowthenuclearthresholdwouldbeextremelydiffi-cult,particularlygiventheweakenedstateofRussia’scon-ventionalmilitary.SomeanalystsaredoubtfulthatRussiawouldattackaNATOcountrysinceitisalreadylosinggroundtoUkrainianforcesandwouldfinditselfinawarwiththeworld’smostpowerfulalliance.19However,iftheKremlinconcludedthatthecountry’snationalsecuritywasseverelyimperiled,itmightwelldeliberatelyescalateforlackofbetteralternatives.TerritorialControlAsofDecember2022,Russiaoccupiednearly20percentofUkraine.Kyiv’stoppriorityisregainingcontroloverthisterritory.AndUkrainehasscoredsomeimpressivesuc-cesses,particularlyinKharkivandKherson.YettheareasRussiastillcontrolscontainimportanteconomicassets,suchastheZaporizhzhiaNuclearPowerPlant,whichprovidedupto20percentofUkraine’sprewarpowergen-erationcapacity,andUkraine’sentireAzovSeacoastline.PresidentVolodymyrZelenskyyiscommittedtoamilitarycampaigntoliberatetheentiretyofUkraine’sinternation-allyrecognizedterritory.Andhehasjustifiedthisobjectivewiththemoralimperativeofliberatinghiscountry’sciti-zensfrombrutalRussianoccupation.AwartrajectorythatallowsUkrainetocontrolmoreofitsinternationallyrecognizedterritorywouldbebenefi-cialfortheUnitedStates(Table1).TheUnitedStateshasaninterestinshowingthataggressiondoesnotpayandreinforcingtheterritorialintegritynormthatisenshrinedininternationallaw.20However,theimplicationsforthatinterestoffurtherUkrainianterritorialcontrolbeyondtheDecember2022linearenotclear-cut.Forexample,evenifUkrainetookcontroloveralloftheterritorythatRussiahadseizedsinceFebruary24,2022,Moscowwouldstillbeinviolationoftheterritorialintegritynorm.Putdifferently,itisnotclearthatatrajectorythatentailsRussiamaintain-ingtheDecember2022lineofcontrolwoulddomoreharmtotheinternationalorderthanonethatsawRussianforcespushedbacktotheFebruaryline.Inbothcases,RussiawouldcontrolsomeUkrainianterritoryinviolationoftheterritorialintegritynorm.AnendtothewarthatleavesUkraineinfullcontroloverallofitsinternationallyrecognizedterritorywouldrestoretheterritorialintegritynorm,butthatremainsahighlyunlikelyoutcome.Furthermore,theweakeningofthenormislessafunctionofthequantityoflandillegallyseizedthanitisaconsequenceoftheinternationalcommunity’sacceptanceoftheterritorialchange.TheUnitedStatesneednot(andalmostcertainlywouldnot)formallyrecognizeanyRus-sianoccupationofsovereignUkrainianterritoryregard-lessofwherethedefactolineofcontrolisdrawn.AsitdidwithCrimea,theUnitedStatescantakemeasurestoensureanyRussiangainssinceFebruary24,2022,aretreatedasillegitimateandillegalandthatRussiapaysasteeppriceforitsaggression.TheextentofKyiv’scontroloveritsterritorycouldaffectthelong-termeconomicviabilityofthecountryandthusitsneedsforU.S.assistance.Forexample,ifMoscow7TABLE1PotentialBenefitsofGreaterUkrainianTerritorialControlfortheUnitedStatesBenefitExplanationHighlysignificantbenefitsModeratelysignificantbenefitsLesssignificantbenefits???FewerUkrainianswouldbelivingunderRussianoccupation.Ukrainecouldbecomemoreeconomicallyviableandlessdependentonexternalassistance.Ukrainiancontrolofmoreofitssovereignlandmayreinforcetheterritorialintegritynorm.?TheUnitedStateshasahumanitarianinterestinexposingfewerUkrainianstoRussianoccupation.?AreasunderRussiancontrolasofDecember2022areunlikelytoprovehugelyeconomicallysignificant.?BarringfullUkrainianterritorialreconquest,Russiawillremaininviolationofthenorm.NOTEOurweightingdetailedinthetext,combinesanassessmentofconsequencesofanoutcometotheUnitedStatesandthelikelihoodofanoutcomeoccurring.tookoverUkraine’sentireBlackSeacoast,leavingUkraineunlikelygivenRussia’smilitaryperformancetodate.ThetheldonFebruaryalthoughdifficulttoicdependontheproductivitywiththerestofUkraineRegardlessUkraine’seconomypainfulthatadjustmentwouldbe.Additionally,givenRus-orialcontrolisnotstrikesoncriticalinfrastructure.AnongoingthreatofRussianattackscouldinhibitinvestmentandthereforeeconomicrecoverythroughoutUkraineregardlessofhowmuchterritoryMoscowcontrols.Insum,greaterUkrainianterritorialcontrolisimpor-tanttotheUnitedStatesforhumanitarianreasons,toreinforceinternationalnorms,andtofosterUkraine’sfutureeconomicgrowth.However,thesignificanceofthetwolatterbenefitsaredebatable.Russia’sviolationsofinternationalnormslongpredatethecurrentconflictandarelikelytopersistafterthefightingends.Moreover,theUnitedStatesanditsallieshaveimposedmanyothertypesofcostsonRussiaforitsaggression—coststhathavealreadysentasignaltootherwould-beaggressors.AndthelineofcontrolasofDecember2022doesnotdepriveKyivofeconomicallyvitalareasthatwoulddramaticallyaffectthecountry’sviability.Inadditiontothesebenefits,greaterUkrainianter-ritorialcontrolalsoposespotentialcostsandrisksforthe8UnitedStates(Table2).First,giventheslowingpaceofUkraine’scounteroffensivesinDecember2022,restor-ingthepre-February2022lineofcontrol—letalonethepre2014territorialstatusquo—willtakemonthsandperhapsyearstoachieve.Russiahasbuiltsubstantialdefensivefortificationsalongthelineofcontrol,anditsmilitarymobilizationhasrectifiedthemanpowerdeficitthatenabledUkraine’ssuccessintheKharkivcounterof-fensive.AlongwarislikelytobenecessarytoallowKyivthetimeitwouldneedtorestorecontroloversignifi-cantlymoreland.Aswedescribeinthefollowingsec-tion,alongwarcouldentailmajorcostsfortheUnitedStates.Furthermore,ifUkrainedoespushbeyondthepre-February2022lineofcontrolandmanagestoretakeareasthatRussiahasoccupiedsince2014(particularlyCrimea,wheretheRussianBlackSeaFleetisbased),therisksofescalation—eithernuclearuseoranattackonNATO—willspike.TheKremlinwouldlikelytreatthepotentiallossofCrimeaasamuchmoresignificantthreatbothtonationalsecurityandregimestability,giventheassetsdeployedthereandthepoliticalcapitalinvestedintheannexationofthepeninsula.DurationWedonotknowhowlongthiswarwilllast.Somehavesuggesteditcouldendinnegotiationsoverthewinterof2022–2023.21Othershaveargueditwillgoonforyears.22ManyintheUnitedStatesarereluctanttopushforanendtotheconflictatatimewhenUkrainehasmomentumonthebattlefieldandtheUkrainianpeopleseemwillingtoendurethecostsofalongwartoachievetheirgoals.AlthoughalongerwarmightenabletheUkrainianmilitarytoretakemoreterritory,thereareotherimplica-tionsofthewar’sdurationforU.S.interests.Aprotractedconflict,asperverseasitmightseem,hassomepotentialupsidesfortheUnitedStates(Table3).Whilethewarcontinues,RussianforceswillremainpreoccupiedwithUkraineandthusnothavethebandwidthtomenaceothers.AlongerwarwouldfurtherdegradetheRussianTABLE2PotentialCostsofGreaterUkrainianTerritorialControlfortheUnitedStatesCostExplanationHighlysignificantcostsModeratelysignificantcostsLesssignificantcosts??EnablinggreaterUkrainianterritorialcontrolincreasestheriskofalongwar.ThereisahigherriskofRussiannuclearweaponsuseoraNATO-RussiawarifUkrainepushespasttheFebruary24,2022,lineofcontrol.?AlongwarposessignificantchallengesforU.S.tsseeTable?AvoidingthesetwoformsofescalationistheparamountU.S.priority.NOTEOurweightingdetailedinthetext,combinesanassessmentofconsequencesofanoutcometotheUnitedStatesandthelikelihoodofanoutcomeoccurring.9TABLE3PotentialBenefitsofaLongWarfortheUnitedStatesBenefitExplanationHighlysignificantbenefitsModeratelysignificantbenefitsLesssignificantbenefits?Russiawillbefurtherweakened.?GreaterUkrainianterritorialcontrolispossible.?Russia’sabilitytomenaceothersislimitedwhilethewarisongoing.?AlliesmayfurtherreduceenergydependenceonRussiaandincreasespendingontheirowndefense.?Russiahasalreadybeensignificantlyweakenedbythewar,sotheUnitedStateswouldonlyseemoderatebenefitsfromfurtherweakeningitsadversary.?BenefitsofgreaterUkrainianterritorialcontrolaremoderatelyorlesssignificant(seeTable1).?Aslongasthefightingcontinues,theRussianmilitaryanditsleaderswillhavemuchlessbandwidthtointerveneelsewhere.?Thetrendsappeartobewellestablishedalready.NOTEOurweightingdetailedinthetext,combinesanassessmentofconsequencesofanoutcometotheUnitedStatesandthelikelihoodofanoutcomeitaryandweakentheRussianeconomy.ButthewarhasalreadybeensodevastatingtoRussianpowerthatfurtherincrementalweakeningisarguablynolongerassignificantabenefitforU.S.interestsasintheearlierphasesoftheconflict.Itwilltakeyears,perhapsevendecades,fortheRussianmilitaryandeconomytorecoverfromthedamagealreadyincurred.AlongwarwouldalsomaintainpressureonEuropeangovernmentstocontinuetoreduceenergydependenceonRussiaandspendmoreontheirdefense,possiblylessen-ingtheU.S.defenseburdeninEuropeoverthelongrun.Heretoo,however,itislikelythatEuropeancountrieswillmaintainthesepoliciesregardlessofhowmuchlongerthewarlasts.YettherearesignificantdownsidesofalongwarforU.S.interests(Table4).Alongerwarwillleadtofurtherlossoflife,displacement,andsufferingforUkrainiancivil-ians;minimizingthesehumanitarianconsequencesforUkraineisaU.S.interest.ContinuedconflictalsoleavesopenthepossibilitythatRussiawillreverseUkrainianbattlefieldgainsmadeinfall2022.Moscow’smobilizationmightstabilizethelinesasofDecember2022andallowRussiatolaunchoffensivesin2023.Theintensityofthemilitaryassistanceeffortcouldalsobecomeunsustainableafteracertainperiod.Already,EuropeanandsomeU.S.stocksofweaponsarereportedlyrunninglow.23ThereisthusreasontoquestionwhetheralongerwarwillleadtofurtherUkrainiangains—lossesarepossibletoo.ThecostsfortheUnitedStatesandtheEuropeanUnionofkeepingtheUkrainianstateeconomicallysolventwillmultiplyovertimeasconflictinhibitsinvestmentandproduction;Ukrainianrefugeesremainunabletoreturn;TABLE4PotentialCostsofaLongWarfortheUnitedStatesCostExplanationHighlysignificantcosts?TherewouldbeaprolongedelevatedriskofRussiannuclearuseandaNATO-Russiawar.?AvoidingthesetwoformsofescalationistheparamountU.S.priority.Moderatelysignificantcosts?Ukrainewouldhaveagreaterneedforexternaleconomicandmilitarysupportduringandafterthewar.?MoreUkrainiancivilianswoulddie,bedisplaced,orendurehardshipsstemmingfromthewar.?Therewouldbecontinuedupwardpressureonenergyandfoodprices,causinglossoflifeandsufferingglobally.?Globaleconomicgrowthwouldslow.?TheUnitedStateswouldbelessabletofocusonotherglobalpriorities.?AnongoingfreezeinU.S.-RussiarelationswouldposechallengestootherU.S.priorities.?ReturningUkrainetoeconomicsustainabilitywouldalleviatestrainonU.S.andalliedbudgetsandstockpiles.?TheUnitedStateshasahumanitarianinterestinreducingthesufferingoftheUkrainianpeople.?TheUnitedStateshasaninterestinstableenergymarketsandminimizingglobalfoodinsecurityandassociatedhumansuffering.?GlobaleconomictrendsaffecttheU.S.economy.?U.S.resources,forces,andsenior-leaderattentionarenotbeingdevotedtootherU.S.priorities.?BilateralormultilateralinteractionwithRussiaonkeyU.S.interestswillbehighlycontentiouswhilethewarisongoing.Lesssignificantcosts?ThereisapossibilityofRussianterritorialgains.?RussiandependenceonChinacouldincrease.?Russiaisnotlikelytomakesignificantterritorialgains.?RussiawillbemoredependentonChinathanitwasbeforethewarregardlessofitsduration.NOTEOurweightingdetailedinthetext,combinesanassessmentofconsequencesofanoutcometotheUnitedStatesandthelikelihoodofanoutcomeoccurring.and,asaresult,taxrevenueandeconomicactivitydropdramaticallylowerthanbeforethewar.Russia’scampaignofdestructionofUkrainiancriticalinfrastructurewillcreatemajorlong-termchallengesforsustainingthewareffortandforeconomicrecoveryandhasalsosubstantiallyincreasedKyiv’sprojectionsfortheeconomicsupportitwillneedfromtheUnitedStatesanditsallies.24GlobaleconomicdisruptionsstemmingfromthewarwillcontinueandpossiblymultiplyaslongastheconflictenergypricesthathasinturncontributedtoinflationgloballyThesetrendsarecreaseinenergyfoodinsecurityglobally.Ukraine’sexportsofgrainsandbetweenMarchandNovember2022,partlybecauseofRussia’snavalblockadeandattacksonenergyinfrastruc-ture.Russiahasal
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