虛假財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告的后果外文及翻譯

虛假財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告的后果1.欺詐和欺詐性財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告從廣義上講，欺詐可能被定義為故意以不正當(dāng)行為或非法手段獲得的增益以及優(yōu)勢(shì)。這可能包括：（魯賓G.A.，2007）財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告舞弊；挪用資產(chǎn)（在內(nèi)部或外部的系統(tǒng)中做出，如：貪污，工資欺詐和盜竊等行為）；獲得非法資產(chǎn)或進(jìn)行不道德的活動(dòng)（如：利用過(guò)度的客戶結(jié)算或欺詐性的銷售行為）；用于非法目的的費(fèi)用（商業(yè)和公共賄賂以及其他不正當(dāng)支付系統(tǒng)）；欺瞞獲得的收入或有意回避成本（在系統(tǒng)實(shí)體中對(duì)員工或第三方欺詐，或當(dāng)一個(gè)實(shí)體通過(guò)一定手段故意避免成本，如收入稅和銷售稅）；對(duì)公司的欺詐行為（例如假冒生產(chǎn)者故意侵犯知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)）?？梢酝ㄟ^(guò)對(duì)該部門(mén)機(jī)構(gòu)的制度的完整性的認(rèn)識(shí)來(lái)調(diào)查它的欺詐行為。它在調(diào)查了世界銀行集團(tuán)和銀行的融資項(xiàng)目后，指控了他們的欺詐和腐敗行為，認(rèn)定了哪些行為可以被認(rèn)為行為是在銀行系統(tǒng)中的欺詐或腐敗行為：（Banca銀行,蒙迪艾爾.2009）拍賣欺詐，在拍賣中理解所有的參與者，在合同執(zhí)行中的欺詐，避免對(duì)合同執(zhí)行的審計(jì)，做出不適當(dāng)?shù)膬r(jià)格和伙伴關(guān)系，讓審計(jì)人員誤判合同中的成本和工作，并對(duì)審計(jì)人員進(jìn)行賄賂，錯(cuò)誤地使用世界銀行的資金或自己的立場(chǎng)，這就是在運(yùn)動(dòng)，偷竊和欺騙的情況下的欺詐。雖然所有類別的欺詐都可以說(shuō)是主要的和值得辯論，但是只有財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告舞弊才是影響最大的和最值得研究的。（魯賓G.A.，2007）在財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告中欺詐行為的基礎(chǔ)是肇事者（董事，審計(jì)人員，員工等）錯(cuò)誤地提出了現(xiàn)實(shí)的自覺(jué)意圖。但錯(cuò)誤地提出現(xiàn)實(shí)的自覺(jué)意圖的原因可能是欺詐財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告中任何一項(xiàng)不當(dāng)資產(chǎn)的回收。因此，“欺詐性報(bào)告僅指故意歪曲，包括遺漏大量財(cái)務(wù)信息旨在誤導(dǎo)財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表的使用者”也可譯為（波帕一人，鋁。羅斯·，2009）：操縱，偽造，偽造或更改文件或證明文件，錯(cuò)誤或遺漏的事件、交易或信息，故意濫用會(huì)計(jì)原則與價(jià)值、分類、方式介紹或信息傳遞，虛擬條目記錄（年底）操縱結(jié)果或達(dá)到其他目標(biāo)，調(diào)整不正確的假設(shè)和判斷來(lái)估計(jì)帳戶余額，遺漏、發(fā)展或拖延承認(rèn)事件或交易發(fā)生在報(bào)告所述期間，隱瞞或保密的事實(shí)可能影響的數(shù)量記錄在財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表，在改變記錄或條件的重大交易中；進(jìn)行復(fù)雜的交易旨在歪曲實(shí)體的財(cái)務(wù)狀況或性能。關(guān)注不當(dāng)資產(chǎn)回收，反對(duì)虛假財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告包括（PopaI.,ManAl.RusA.,2009）：過(guò)去為收回收入（收入來(lái)自無(wú)擔(dān)保債權(quán)人）；盜竊實(shí)物資產(chǎn)或產(chǎn)權(quán)，用沒(méi)有進(jìn)入會(huì)計(jì)賬戶的商品或服務(wù)支付給虛擬供應(yīng)商；使用個(gè)人資產(chǎn)（包括個(gè)人貸款擔(dān)保），假記錄來(lái)彌補(bǔ)虧損。這些行為往往是次要的，通常是由員工雖然有時(shí)，經(jīng)理人自己參與此類活動(dòng)。侵占資產(chǎn)也可能包括的費(fèi)用用于非法目的，在形式上的賄賂，是判斷是否是為商業(yè)或公務(wù)目的。雖然不當(dāng)取得資產(chǎn)往往是不顯著的財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表，。它可能繼續(xù)造成組織的重大損失。（蘇丹灣，2008）2.提高財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告舞弊的因素根據(jù)國(guó)家委員會(huì)進(jìn)行的研究報(bào)告指出金融欺詐者（或特雷德韋委員會(huì)）的財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告舞弊的發(fā)生通常存在者某些環(huán)境和機(jī)遇，機(jī)構(gòu)或個(gè)人的力量。這些力量的消漲增加企業(yè)的財(cái)務(wù)壓力和擾亂了企業(yè)的獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)措施，鼓勵(lì)了個(gè)人和公司從事欺詐性財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告。當(dāng)正確的力量對(duì)比達(dá)成時(shí)，它已經(jīng)讓企業(yè)產(chǎn)生了虛假的財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告（虛假財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告全國(guó)委員會(huì)的報(bào)告，1987）。從1950起，教授唐納德·克雷西就開(kāi)始研究導(dǎo)致企業(yè)犯下欺詐行為的三因素。根據(jù)他的研究，他得出當(dāng)欺詐行為的發(fā)生，有三個(gè)因素共同行動(dòng)：意圖（預(yù)謀），機(jī)會(huì)和壓力，稱為欺詐三角的結(jié)論?！保ㄒ?jiàn)圖1）。雖然以上因素形成的“欺詐三角”，這些因素是足夠表達(dá)一個(gè)發(fā)生在任何時(shí)間的欺詐。但是這些因素卻并不能說(shuō)明他們對(duì)于欺詐行為的作用順序是怎樣的，從而達(dá)到了解欺詐行為的發(fā)生。（蘇丹灣，2008）機(jī)會(huì)或壓力是第一影響因素，個(gè)人發(fā)生欺詐行為是一般是因?yàn)檫^(guò)度的壓力，實(shí)現(xiàn)財(cái)務(wù)目標(biāo)的獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)的誘導(dǎo)下，為了實(shí)現(xiàn)財(cái)務(wù)目標(biāo)，把不切實(shí)際的樂(lè)觀消息發(fā)布在年度報(bào)告。此外，一個(gè)公司可能受到威脅和壓力，因?yàn)榧ち业母?jìng)爭(zhēng)，因?yàn)槭袌?chǎng)飽和或突然的變化，因?yàn)槠髽I(yè)的并購(gòu)（兼并），從而需要進(jìn)行融資或使得企業(yè)的現(xiàn)金流出現(xiàn)問(wèn)題。從而產(chǎn)生了甚至讓誠(chéng)實(shí)的人都會(huì)進(jìn)行詐騙的環(huán)境中。機(jī)會(huì)是指那些使得欺詐更加的容易發(fā)生，而且讓他做出欺詐的決定所面臨的困難更少（HooperJ.M.,ForneliC.M,2010）。因此，無(wú)效的控制或無(wú)控制主張欺詐意圖。這些因素可以直接相關(guān)的監(jiān)管不力的管理或無(wú)效的董事會(huì)和審計(jì)委員會(huì)監(jiān)督報(bào)告和內(nèi)部控制。態(tài)度或預(yù)謀是觸發(fā)欺詐行為的重要因素，它是指行為人必須具有一個(gè)將要進(jìn)行詐騙行為的心態(tài)。檢測(cè)危險(xiǎn)因素決定董事會(huì)成員，管理，員工傾向于這樣的意圖可能是相當(dāng)困難的。所以當(dāng)一個(gè)公司監(jiān)控和過(guò)程阻止和發(fā)現(xiàn)欺詐行為，它必須遵循三方面，因?yàn)槠墼p涉及獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)或壓力犯下欺詐行為，認(rèn)為這樣做的機(jī)會(huì)，和一些推理（蘇丹B.，2008）。3.是誰(shuí)編制的虛假財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告以及如何編制虛假財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告據(jù)報(bào)道美國(guó)國(guó)家委員會(huì)所研究的大多數(shù)的虛假財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告中，公司的管理者，如行政總裁，總裁和首席財(cái)務(wù)官，都是虛假財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告編制的參與者，都可以被稱為欺詐者。因?yàn)樵谝话闱闆r下，他們都能夠發(fā)現(xiàn)企業(yè)是否故意虛假披露會(huì)計(jì)文件和偽造的記錄。此外，委員會(huì)的研究還表明，雖然虛假財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告的作者在作虛假財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告時(shí)都采用了不同的方式，但是他們行動(dòng)的目的都總是為了夸大公司其資產(chǎn)或高估或平滑收益。此外，虛假財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告并不總是在一開(kāi)始就公開(kāi)扭曲財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表，并且能夠讓人一下辨認(rèn)出來(lái)。在許多情況下，財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告舞弊行為發(fā)生的峰值點(diǎn)都是在一些旨在解決經(jīng)營(yíng)困難的財(cái)務(wù)指標(biāo)上。最初，財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告在峰值點(diǎn)只是可能成為虛假財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告的問(wèn)題點(diǎn)，但他們讓可能成為虛假財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告的問(wèn)題點(diǎn)成為了現(xiàn)實(shí)，特別是在企業(yè)的管理當(dāng)局允許或鼓勵(lì)這種欺詐活動(dòng)時(shí)，這就使得欺詐性財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告產(chǎn)生了。因此，我們可以說(shuō)，參與欺詐性財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告潛在罪犯的人員基本上集中于高級(jí)管理層和員工之間的中層人員。在描述如何在犯下欺詐行為的虛假財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表的一本書(shū)中(ZabihollahR.,2005)）使用的一個(gè)專業(yè)術(shù)語(yǔ)。財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告舞弊特征或稱為”盈余管理”（阮光，2008）。然而“盈余管理”并不一定就指的是非法行動(dòng)。根據(jù)會(huì)計(jì)政策（美國(guó)公認(rèn)會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則）或其他會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則（國(guó)際財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告準(zhǔn)則）作出的關(guān)于如何區(qū)別合法和非法收益的相關(guān)規(guī)定。在他們的財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表中所提交的財(cái)務(wù)信息是真實(shí)的，并且其處理是按照適用的會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則所做的，我們就認(rèn)為企業(yè)從事的是合法的盈余管理。同時(shí)我們也可以說(shuō)，盈余管理是一個(gè)在虛假財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告中，“涉及不當(dāng)收益所產(chǎn)生的收入，資產(chǎn)高估或低估負(fù)債”（ZabihollahR.,2005）以達(dá)到操縱盈余的目的，管理人員使用不同的激進(jìn)會(huì)計(jì)技術(shù)，已經(jīng)成為影響人為地增加或減少的收入，利潤(rùn)，或每股盈余。他們使用這些策略，以應(yīng)付壓力，市場(chǎng)上。一般來(lái)說(shuō)，公司是最經(jīng)常所感到壓力中，其一是從事證券分析的人士期望他們公布盡可能多的財(cái)務(wù)信息，其二是股東的期望，期望根據(jù)企業(yè)的投資，能在在很短的時(shí)間內(nèi)為股東贏得更大的利潤(rùn)。如果投資者未能獲得預(yù)期的股息時(shí)，因此企業(yè)的每股收益可能會(huì)無(wú)法滿足投資者，從而導(dǎo)致公司的股票下跌。因此。盈余管理的動(dòng)機(jī)可能是來(lái)自企業(yè)的各種壓力以及投資者利益最大化的愿望。然而，管理者也不總是進(jìn)行以高估收益為手段的舞弊。他們也有可能會(huì)在相反的情況下，減少這些收益，其這樣做的目的是逃避支付費(fèi)用。一個(gè)涉嫌欺詐財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表實(shí)際案例中一種被叫做“時(shí)間化”的技術(shù)（亞力山大，2007）。這項(xiàng)技術(shù)是指管理人員通過(guò)一定的財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表編制方法，將業(yè)績(jī)不好的一段時(shí)間的財(cái)務(wù)信息隱藏起來(lái)。這種方法是通過(guò)操縱盈余，使得財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告顯示出企業(yè)的盈余有一個(gè)隨著時(shí)間的推移穩(wěn)步增加的趨勢(shì)。由于投資者對(duì)于企業(yè)盈利的降低會(huì)有消極的反應(yīng)，會(huì)讓他們認(rèn)為這樣的企業(yè)是不安全和危險(xiǎn)的。因此企業(yè)的財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告顯示企業(yè)盈余隨時(shí)間的推移穩(wěn)步增加的情況，才會(huì)讓投資者最終滿意，并讓企業(yè)股票保持在較高的價(jià)格上。另一種形式的欺詐行為被稱為“大坑”（HooperJ.M.,ForneliC.M,2010），就是在編制虛假財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告時(shí)，企業(yè)通過(guò)操縱損益，使得企業(yè)在國(guó)家形勢(shì)非常好的情況下，讓企業(yè)的收益顯得比實(shí)際情況要糟。使得投資者會(huì)認(rèn)為企業(yè)遭到了重大損失，他們就會(huì)認(rèn)為國(guó)家的大好形勢(shì)會(huì)提高企業(yè)的收益。由于這一造假，會(huì)使得企業(yè)財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告未來(lái)的成本降低和利潤(rùn)增加更加的自然。換句話說(shuō)，公司需要一個(gè)坑洞。“在一年就可以表明，未來(lái)利潤(rùn)必然是會(huì)增加的?！盳abihollahRezaee研究表明（2005）了最常見(jiàn)的欺詐性財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表編制所使用的方法，80%的財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表舞弊都是通過(guò)一定的方法造成資產(chǎn)的夸大收入，而剩下的20%則是由于低估了負(fù)債和費(fèi)用。4.欺詐性財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告的受害者財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表的編制至少一年一次的目的是滿足一些潛在用戶的共同的信息需求。對(duì)于許多的投資者來(lái)說(shuō)，財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表是作為企業(yè)財(cái)務(wù)信息的主要來(lái)源，因此對(duì)于投資者的決策具有極大的影響。（參見(jiàn)圖2）投資者當(dāng)然是虛假財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告第一個(gè)受害者。如果公司盈利被夸大了，使得投資者購(gòu)買該企業(yè)的股票，那就可以算是被欺詐了，如果公司的收益是被低估了，則投資者的利益就是被公司隱瞞而失去的。然而，他們并不是唯一被虛假財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告影響的。受害者還包括其他依賴公司的財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告信息的公司，如：銀行和其他提供資金給該公司的金融機(jī)構(gòu)，對(duì)于會(huì)因?yàn)楣緲I(yè)績(jī)影響的供應(yīng)商和客戶，合作伙伴，提供投資咨詢有關(guān)信息的金融分析師和證券發(fā)行人，律師和可能因?yàn)榘l(fā)布在保險(xiǎn)公司的索賠。為了避免因?yàn)槭芎φ叩匚坏亩沟檬芎φ呤艿教摷儇?cái)務(wù)報(bào)告的影響。任何用戶，無(wú)論是金融家，借款人，保險(xiǎn)公司，投資者或股東，都可以觀看企業(yè)的總的財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告讓大家可以仔細(xì)分析企業(yè)的財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告從而發(fā)現(xiàn)企業(yè)的財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告欺詐，或者確定下列可以被視為欺詐的情形（WeirJ.,2009）：公司報(bào)告利潤(rùn)卻不是很好，現(xiàn)金流量很大，毛利水平仍然很高，即使該公司面臨來(lái)自穩(wěn)定物價(jià)的市場(chǎng)壓力；債務(wù)水平上升，而銷售則是不變或下降；本公司是接近或違背銀行的協(xié)定；有一個(gè)明顯的年末調(diào)整；存在大量的對(duì)于高管的獎(jiǎng)金。結(jié)論雖然實(shí)現(xiàn)財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告所謂的“欺詐行為”是指短期成果“盈余”，但是通過(guò)他們作用我們可以得出以下后果：虛假財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告會(huì)破壞信譽(yù)，質(zhì)量，透明度和完整的財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告程序；危害審計(jì)職業(yè)特別是審計(jì)和審計(jì)事務(wù)所的完整性和客觀性；削弱了資本市場(chǎng)的信心，以及和財(cái)務(wù)信息的可靠性；降低了資本市場(chǎng)效率；不利影響經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)；產(chǎn)生了巨大的訴訟費(fèi)用；破壞人的職業(yè)參與欺詐財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表；他們因?yàn)槠飘a(chǎn)或重大經(jīng)濟(jì)損失涉及公司財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表欺詐；削弱了公眾的信心和信任，。THECONSEQUENCESOFFRAUDULENTFINANCIALREPORTINGLecturerPhD.MarianaVLADFacultyofEconomicsandPublicAdministration,.tefancelMare”UniversityofSuceava,AssociateProfessorPhD.MihaelaTULVINSCHIFacultyofEconomicsandPublicAdministration,.tefancelMare”UniversityofSuceava,AssistantPhD.StudentIrinaCHIRI..FacultyofEconomicsandPublicAdministration,.tefancelMare”UniversityofSuceava,1.FRAUDANDFRAUDULENTFINANCIALSTATEMENTSBroadlyspeaking,fraudmaybedefinedasanintentionalacttogainanadvantagebyanunfairorunlawfulgain.Itmayinclude:(RubinG.A.,2007)fraudulentfinancialreporting;misappropriationofassets(insideoroutsidethesystem,suchas:embezzlement,payrollfraudandtheft);revenueorassetsacquiredfromillegalorunethicalactivities(excessivecustomerbillingorfraudulentsalespractices);costsforillicitpurposes(commercialandpublicbriberyaswellasotherimproperpaymentsystems);incomereceivedfraudulentlyorintentionallyavoidedcosts(systemsinwhichanentitycommitsfraudagainstitsemployeesortothirdparties,orwhenanentityintentionallyavoidedcostssuchasincometaxesandsalestaxes);fraudagainstthecompany(e.g.counterfeitproducersknowinglyviolatesintellectualpropertyrights).TheDepartmentforInstitutionalIntegrity,whichinvestigatesallegationsoffraudandcorruptionwithintheWorldBankGroupandtheBank’sfinancedprojects,specifiestheactionsthatmightbeconsideredfraudorcorruptioninthebankingsystem:(BancaMondial.,2009)auctionfraud,understandingsamongparticipantsintheauction,fraudduringtheexecutionofthecontract,auditavoidance,settinginappropriatepricesandpartnerships,miscalculationofcostsandwork,acceptanceofgiftsorbribes,solicitingorreceivingbribes,incorrectlyusingtheWorldBankfundsoritspositions,fraudinthecaseofmovements,theftanddeception.Althoughallcategoriesoffraudaremajorandworthytobedebated,onlyfraudulentfinancialreportingishandledinthefollowingsections.(RubinG.A.,2007)Fraudinfinancialreportingisbasedonconsciousintentoftheperpetrator(directors,auditors,employees,etc.)towrongfullypresentthereality.Buttheintendedacttowrongfullypresentingtherealitymaybethecauseofeitherfraudulentfinancialreportingeitherofundueassetsreclaims.Therefore,“fraudulentreportingonlyreferstointentionalmisrepresentation,includingomissionsofamountsdesignedtomisleadtheusersofthefinancialstatements”canbetranslatedas(PopaI.,ManAl.RusA.,2009):manipulation,forgery,counterfeitoralterationofrecordsorsupportingdocumentation,misstatements/omissionsregardingevents/transactions/information,intentionalmisapplicationofaccountingprinciplesrelatedtovalues/classification/mannerofpresentation/deliveryofinformation,fictitiousentriesrecords(towardstheendoftheyear)tomanipulateoperatingresultsorachieveotherobjectives,improperadjustmentsoftheassumptionsandchanginginjudgmentsusedtoestimateaccountbalances,omissions/advances/delaysinrecognitionofevents/transactionsthatoccurredduringthereportingperiod,concealmentornondisclosureoffactsthatcouldaffecttheamountsrecordedinthefinancialstatements,engagingincomplextransactionsdesignedtodistorttheentity'sfinancialpositionorperformance;changingtherecordsorconditionsofsignificanttransactions.Opposedtofraudulentfinancialreporting,anundueassetreclaimsconcern(PopaI.,ManAl.RusA.,2009):revenuedilapidation(revenuecomingfromunwarrantedclaims/divertingincome),theftofphysicalassetsorintellectualproperty,paymentstofictitioussuppliers,withouttheentryofgoods/services,useofassetsinpersonalinterest(includingalsopersonalloanguarantees),falserecordstocoverthedeficit.Theseabusesareoftenminorandareusuallycommittedbyemployees,althoughsometimes,themanagersthemselvesareinvolvedinsuchactivities.Misappropriationofassetsmayalsoincludeexpensesincurredforillicitpurposes,intheformofbribery,whetherforcommercialorofficialpurposes.Althoughimproperlyacquiringassetsoftenisnotsignificantforfinancialstatements,.itmaycontinuetoresultinsubstantiallossesfortheorganization.(SoltaniB.,2008)2.FACTORSTHATENHANCEDFRAUDULENTFINANCIALREPORTINGAccordingtostudiesconductedbytheNationalCommissiononReportingFinancialFraudsterinAmerica(orTreadwayCommission)fraudulentfinancialreportingusuallyoccursasaresultofcertainenvironmentalforcesandopportunities,institutionalorindividual.Theseforcesandopportunitiesaddpressuresandincentivesthatencourageindividualsandcompaniestoengageinfraudulentfinancialreporting.Whentherightmixofforcesandopportunitiesisreached,itcanproducefraudulentfinancialreporting(ReportoftheNationalCommissiononFraudulentFinancialReporting,1987).Eversince1950,ProfessorDonaldR.Cressey,hasstudiedthefactorsthatleadtocommittingfraudulentacts.Accordingtohisstudies,heconcludedthatwhenfrauddoesoccur,therearethreefactorsthatacttogether:intent(premeditation),opportunityandpressure,knownasthe.fraudtriangle”(seeFigure1).Althoughthefactorsaboveareformingthe"fraudtriangle",it’ssufficientthatonetotakeplaceatatime,forfraudtooccur.Thesequencestepsinordertoexercisetheactoffraudarerecountedbelow(SoltaniB.,2008)Incentivesorpressuresarethefirstfactorsthatinfluenceindividualstocommitfraudanditreferstoexcessivepressuretoachievefinancialtargets,toinduceoptimisticandunrealisticmessagesinannualreports.Inaddition,afirmmaybethreatenedandpressuredalsobyintensecompetition,bymarketsaturationorsuddenchanges,acquisitions(mergers),thefinancingneedorcashflowproblems.Evenotherwisehonestindividualscancommitfraudinanenvironmentthatimposessuchthreats.Opportunityreferstothosefactorsthatenable"fraudtobemoreeasilycommittedanddetectionlessprobable(HooperJ.M.,ForneliC.M,2010).Therefore,ineffectivecontrolsorabsenceofcontrolfavorsfraudintentions.Thesefactorscanberelateddirectlytoinadequatemonitoringbymanagementortheineffectivenessoftheboardofdirectorsoroftheauditcommitteetooverseethereportingandtheinternalcontrol.Attitudeorpremeditationisthetriggerfactorofthefraudactandreferstothefactthattheperpetratormusthaveamindsetthatwouldjustifyorpremeditatetheactoffraud.Detectionofriskfactorsthatdetermineboardmembers,management,employeestobepredisposedtosuchintentmaybequitedifficult.Sowhenacompanymonitorspeopleandprocessestodiscourageanddetectfraud,itmustfollowthethreeaspects,becausefraudinvolvesincentivesorpressuretocommitafraudulentact,aperceivedopportunitytodoso,andsomereasoning.(SoltaniB.,2008)3.WHOANDHOWCOMMITSFRAUDULENTFINANCIALSTATEMENTSAccordingtotheReportoftheUSANationalCommissiononFraudsterFinancialReportinginthemajorityofthestudiedcases,thecompany’smanagement,suchaschiefexecutive,presidentandchieffinancialofficer,werethefraudulentperpetrators.Insomecases,itwasfoundthatthereweremadeintentionalfalsedisclosuresfromtheaccountantthroughoutfalsifieddocumentsandrecordsFurthermore,thecommitteestudieshaveshownthatwhiletheauthorsoffraudulentfinancialreportinghaveuseddifferentmeans,theeffectoftheiractionsisalmostalwaysconsistofoverestimatingorsmoothingearningsinordertoexaggeratethecompanyoritsassets.Inaddition,fraudulentfinancialreportingdoesnotalwaysbeginwithanopenlyrecognizableactofdistortionofthefinancialstatements.Inmanycases,fraudulentfinancialreportingisthepeakpointofanumberofactsintendedtoaddressoperationaldifficulties.Initially,theactivitiesmaynotbefraudulent,butintimetheymaybecomeprobable,especiallywhenthetonesetbymanagementpermitsorencouragessuchactivitiesinordertohavefraudulentfinancialreporting.Thus,wecansaythatpotentialcriminalsinvolvedinfraudulentfinancialreportingcanbebothinseniormanagementandamongmid-levelemployees,butwecanthinkalsoonorganizedcriminalorganizationsforthispurpose.Todescribewaysinwhichfraudiscommittedonthefinancialstatements,theliterature(ZabihollahR.,2005)usestheterm.fraudulentfinancialreportingschemes”or.earningsmanagement”(NguyenK.,2008).Howevertheterm“earningsmanagement"doesnotalwaysrefertoanillegitimateaction.Theaccountingpolicies(U.S.GAAP)orotheraccountingstandards(IFRS)makethedifferencebetweenlegitimateandillegitimategains.Whencompaniesengageinlegitimateadministrationofearningsmanagementwithintheirfinancialstatements,theyaresubmittedastrueandaretreatedinaccordancewithapplicableaccountingstandards.Wecansaythatearningsmanagementisafraudwhenit“involvesgainsarisingfromimproperrevenuerecognition,overstatingofassetsorundervaluationofliabilities”(ZabihollahR.,2005).Inordertomanipulatetheearnings,managersusedifferentaggressiveaccountingtechniques,whichhaveaseffecttheartificiallyincreaseordecreaseinrevenues,profits,orearningspershare.Theyusethesetactics,hopingtocopewiththepressuresthatareonthemarket.Ingeneral,companiesthataretradedmostoftenfeelthepressure,eitherfromsecuritiesanalystswhoexpectthemtodiscloseasmuchinformationaspossible,eitherfromshareholderswhoexpect,basedontheirinvestments,forcompaniestoobtainbiggerprofitsinashortperiodoftime.Failuretoobtainexpecteddividendsbyinvestorsandhenceearningspersharecancauseasignificantdeclineinthecapitalizationofacompany.Therefore.earningsmanagement”maybemotivatedbythepressureorthedesiretomaximizeperformancebasedpayments.However,managersdonotalwaysaimforthepurposeofoverestimatingmanagementearnings.Theyarealsointerestedintheoppositesituation,toreducethesegains,especiallywhentheintentionisthatofevadingthepaymentoffees.Apracticalcaseofcommittingfraudinfinancialstatementsis.timeuniformizationofrevenue”(AlexanderD.,2007).Thistechniqueisusedbymanagerstohidesomebadperiodsandinvolveamanipulationofearningstoshowthattherewasasteadyincreaseovertime,althoughnotstatedbyfacts.Giventhefactthatinvestorsreactnegativelytotheearningsofcompanieswhichtheyperceiveasunsafeandrisky,standardizationofrevenuefinallymeetsthesatisfactionofinvestorsandmaintainsahighpriceoftheshares.Anotherformoffraudknownas“bigbathbehavior”(HooperJ.M.,ForneliC.M,2010),occurswhencompaniesmanipulatetheprofitandlossaccount,tomaketheyearsinwhichthesituationhasbeenverygoodtoseemworsethanitreallyis.Therefore,takingintoaccountthesignificantlosses,theyhopetoconsolidateandtowipethemallatonce.Asaresultofthisaction,futurecostsarereducedandnaturalprofitsimplicitlyincreased.Inotherwords,thecompanytakesa.bigbath”inoneyearsoitcanshowthattheprofitwillbeincreasinginthefuture.Handlingcancauseeitheranincreaseinthepricesofstocksoranincreaseinperformancebonusesformanagement.4.VICTIMSOFFRAUDULENTREPORTINGFinancialstatementsarepreparedandpresentedatleastonceayearandaimtomeettheinformationneedscommontoanumberofpotentialusers.Manyvisitorstakethefinancialstatementspresentedasthemainsourceoffinancialinformationandthereforeamisrepresentationmayaffectdecisions.(Seefigure2)Investorsareofcoursethefirstvictimsoffraudulentfinancialreporting.Ifcompanyearningsareoverstated,investorswhobuyaredeceivedandifearningsareunderstated,thebuyersarethosewhowilllose.Howevertheyarenottheonlyonesthatbeartheimmediateandharmfuleffects.Thevictimlistincludesotherswhorelyoninformationfromthecompany'sfinancialreports:banksandotherfinancialinstitutionslendfundstothecompany,suppliers,customersseekingtomakeperformanceonthecompany’scontracts,part