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PlatformsAretheNew
OrganizationalParadigm
ROBERTD.ATKINSONANDAURELIENPORTUESE|MARCH2023
Justastherewasoppositiontothecorporateeconomyintheearly1900s,thereisoppositiontotheplatformeconomytoday.Butlimiting“platformization”wouldhaveconsiderablelong-lastingeconomiccostsforthenationandconsumers.
KEYTAKEAWAYS
1Corporateformevolvesinresponsetoexternalforces,particularlytechnology.ThelatestevolutionistheIT-enabledplatform,whichmaymakesenseinawidevarietyofindustriesandfunctions,includingbanking,travel,education,law,andmedicine.
1IT-basedplatformsnaturallytendtowardconcentration,withoneortwocompaniesholdingmostofthemarketshare.Throughthisscaleandefficiency,theyoftenprovidehigherqualityandlowercoststhanamoredispersedmarketwould.
1Aswiththelasttwomajortransitions—theriseofcorporationsintheearly1900s,then“managerialcorporations”afterWorldWarII—theriseoftheplatformeconomytodayisbeneficialfortheeconomyandsociety,butithasstirreddiscontent.
1Criticismfrom“muckrakers,”smallbusinesses,andpoliticiansintheearly1900sproducedtheShermanandClaytonantitrustacts.Butcourtsinthaterafocusedmostlyonabusivecorporatebehavior,includingtrusts,notmarketshareitself.
1Thepost-WWIIpolicyresponseto“managerialcorporations”causedfarmoreharm,leadingtothedeclineorextinctionofamanytechnologicallyadvancedU.S.firms.Today’soppositiontoplatformsalsoposesaseverechallengetoAmerica’sfuture.
1Antitrustmustrecognizethatbelow-costpricingcanbebeneficialtoconsumers,developnewrulestobetteraccountforplatformmarketdynamics,andanalyzeallegationsofanticompetitivebehaviorbasedonconductratherthansize.
INFORMATIONTECHNOLOGY&INNOVATIONFOUNDATION|MARCH2023PAGE2
CONTENTS
KeyTakeaways 1
Introduction 2
BusinessFormAftertheCivilWar 3
OppositiontotheIndustrialCorporation 4
OrganizationalFormAfterWorldWarII 7
OppositiontotheManagerialcorporation 9
TheRiseofthePlatformEconomy? 14
OppositiontothePlatformEconomy 16
AntitrustforthePlatformEconomy 18
IsOverallSocialWelfareHigherorLowerWithMoreCompetitors? 18
ThePotentialofSchumpeterianDisruption 19
TheNeedforEvidenceofAnyAnticompetitiveConduct 21
Conclusion 21
Endnotes 22
INTRODUCTION
Businessorganizationscantakemanyforms,fromfounder-ledtomultidivisionalmultinationalstoemergingIT-enabledplatforms.Theprevailingorganizationalforminbusinessisneithersetinstonenordecideduponbyfad.Itislargelyaresultofthetechnologicalandeconomicconditionsofthetime.TherewerenolargeU.S.corporationsbeforetheemergenceoftherailroadbecausetheproductionsystemneitherrequirednorenabledscale,whichcorporationsaredesignedtomanage.WhenrailandindustrialproductiontechnologiesevolvedaftertheCivilWar,largecorporationsbecamethenorm.JusticeLouisBrandeisandotheropponentsofthesenewcorporationssoughttosquelchthemintheirinfancy,preferringaprioreconomydominatedbyowner-led,smallandmid-sizedfirms.EvenwiththepassageoftheShermanAct,theiroppositionwaslargelystillborn;thebenefitsofthecorporationweresimplytoovast.However,hadtheBrandeisianssucceededintheirquesttoturnbacktimeAmericawouldnotbetheglobaleconomicleaderitistoday.
Wearepotentiallyatasimilartransformativepointinhistory,withdigitaltechnologiesenablingtheriseofanewkindofproductiveorganization:theplatform.Digitalplatforms,notjustintheinformationsector,havethepotentialtotransformmanyindustriesforthebetter:raisingproductivity,improvingqualityandconsumerchoice,andreducingprices.Butjustastherewassignificantoppositionagainstthetransitiontothecorporateeconomy,todaythereissignificantoppositiontotheplatformeconomy,althoughthistimenotamongthepopulacebutratheramongtheelites:activists,publicintellectualsandacademics,andelectedofficialsofbothparties.Iftheirattemptstorollbackthe“platformization”oftheU.S.economysucceed,theeconomiccoststothenationandtoconsumerswouldbeconsiderableandlong-lasting.
INFORMATIONTECHNOLOGY&INNOVATIONFOUNDATION|MARCH2023PAGE3
Thisreportassessesthepasttwomajorchangesincorporateform,andthepublicandgovernmentresponsestothem.Itthenexaminestheprospectandpotentialbenefitsofthe“platformization”oftheeconomy,aswellascurrentopposition.Finally,itdiscussesthevarietyofpolicyapproachesproposedtoaddressplatformgovernanceandwhymostwillleadtomoreharmthangood.
BUSINESSFORMAFTERTHECIVILWAR
Largecorporationsseemtobeaforceofnature.Infact,forthefirst100yearsoftheRepublic,theyplayedaminimalroleintheeconomy.Priortothe1880s–1890sindustrialrevolution,virtuallyallfirmsweresmall,local,orregional,andfamily-ownedandrun.Forexample,in1860,Pittsburghboasted17foundries,21rollingmills,76glassfactories,and47othermanufacturingestablishments,butnonewereincorporatedandalmostallweresmall.
1
BeforetheCivilWar,therewerefewmanufacturingplantswithmorethan500workers,asthecorporationhadnotyetbeenwidelyadoptedasthelegalformofbusiness.
Iftheirattemptstorollbackthe“platformization”oftheU.S.economysucceed,theeconomiccoststothenationandtoconsumerswouldbeconsiderableandlong-lasting.
Thereasonforthiswasthreefold.First,gettinggoodstomarketwasexpensive,soitmadelittlesenseforestablishmentstogetbiggerandproducelargequantities.Second,therewasextremelylimitedcommunication,whichmademanagingmulti-establishmententerprisesextremelydifficult.Finally,machinerywasquitelimited,makingithardtodomorethanonlylimitedcraftproduction.Withtheselimitations,thecorporateformwasnotneeded.
Withthedevelopmentofsteamenginesandcheaperandbetterironandsteel,thetelegraph(andthenthetelephone)andrailroadsemergedandbecauseofthecapitalcostsinvolvedandgeographicscaleneeded,becamethefirstlargecorporations.Railroadsthenenabledtheemergenceofbroaderregionalmarkets,lettingfewerandlargerfirmsgainscaleandexpandoutput.Asnewtechnologiesemerged,moreindustriesevolvedintomassproductionindustries(e.g.,ironandsteel,textiles,ceramics,agriculturalequipment,etc.)whichinturnenabledandrequiredlargerenterprisesthattookadvantageofeconomiesofscale.Atthesametime,theemergenceofnewindustriesbasedonnewtechnologies(chemicals,sewingmachines,electricalequipment,machinetools,autos,etc.)meantthatscalewastheorderoftheday.AllthismeansthattheU.S.economyledtheworldbecauseofitsembraceofthelargecorporation.
By1900,thecorporateform,especiallyintransportationandproduction,hadbecomedominant.Forexample,halftheworld’sglassandironandtwo-thirdsofthesteelcamefromPittsburgh’sfactories,mostofthemmedium-sizedtolargecorporations.Thelargestcompanyoftheday,USSteel,wasformedfromaplanhatchedbyJ.P.MorganandCarnegieSteel’spresidenttomergeCarnegieSteelwithMorgan’snumbertwo-sizedFederalSteeltomakeUSSteelthenation’sfirstbillion-dollarcompany.Duetotheunprecedentedsizeofthisnewcorporation,financiersonWallStreetgaveitthenickname“TheCorporation.”By1920,thereweremorethan10,000manufacturingplantswithmorethan500workers.
Firmsdidnotgetbiggerbecausetheirownersacquiredanewtasteforwealthandpower.Rather,thenewtechnologylet—infact,required—establishmentstogrowtohithertounprecedented
INFORMATIONTECHNOLOGY&INNOVATIONFOUNDATION|MARCH2023PAGE4
size.Thelargerthefactoryorthecorporation,themoreefficientitcouldbecomeandthemoreitcoulddrivedowncostsandgrowevenmore.Thecostreductionsresultingfromfactoryoperationsandgeographicconcentrationofproductionoverwhelmedmade-to-orderandsmall-volumeproductioninindustryafterindustry.
Untiltheemergenceofthefactoryeconomy,therewasnostraightforwardlegalformthatwasappropriatetosuchsize.Asthetechnologysystemmadeitpossibleforindustrytobecomelarger,companiesinitiallyturnedtotrustsasawaytobecomebig.Trustsweremadeupofstockholdersofindividualsmallerfirmsthatgavetheirstocktoacentralboardintrust.Thoughtrustsweresometimesusedtoengageinanticompetitivebehavior,theyneverthelessreflectedanunderlyingrealitythatefficientproductionrequiredincreasedsizeandcoordination.
However,lawcaughtuptotheeconomicsystem.Theenactmentin1889oftheNewJerseycorporationlawthatallowedcompaniestobuystockinothercorporations,alongwiththepassageoftheShermanActin1890thatoutlawedtrusts,gavewaytomergersbetweenseparatecorporations.By1904,oneortwogiantfirms,usuallyputtogetherbymerger,controlledatleasthalftheoutputin78differentindustries.In1896,therewerefewerthan12firmsworth$10million,butby1904thereweremorethan300.
Bythelate19thandearly20thcenturies,theadvantagesoflargecorporationswerewidelyrecognizedbyleadingAmericaneconomists.JohnBatesClarkobservedthatlargeindustrialcompanieswere:
theresultofanevolution,andthehappyoutcomeofacompetitionsoabnormalthatthecontinuanceofitwouldhavemeantwidespreadruin.Asuccessfulattempttosuppressthembylawwouldinvolvethereversionofindustrialsystemstoacast-offtype,therenewalofabusesfromwhichsocietyhasescapedbyastepindevelopment.
2
TheeconomistandleaderoftheprogressivemovementRichardT.Elyagreedthat“owingtodiscoveriesandinventions,especiallytheapplicationofsteamtoindustryandtransportation,itbecamenecessarytoprosecuteenterprisesofgreatmagnitude.”
3
Bythelate19thandearly20thcenturies,theadvantagesoflargecorporationswerewidelyrecognizedbyleadingAmericaneconomists.
OPPOSITIONTOTHEINDUSTRIALCORPORATION
WhilemanyAmericans,especiallyeconomists,recognizedtheenormousbenefitsoflargecorporationstothenation,especiallyintermsofraisingwagesandlivingstandards,changeishardandsomemuckrakers,interestgroups(mostlysmallbusinesses),andpoliticalfiguresdecriedtheriseofthecorporation.
MoreandmoreAmericansbegantodistrustthisnewandunprecedentedformofcorporateorganization.Indeed,indocumentingtheemergenceofthelargecorporation,AlfredChandlerarguesthatbefore1940,thesechangeswerealmostcertainlyopposedbyamajorityoftheAmericanpeople.
4
Inaddition,manysmallbusinessownerssawthecorporationasadistinctthreat.Asaresult,manyofthenewregulatoryinitiativesputinplacebetween1880and1920,
INFORMATIONTECHNOLOGY&INNOVATIONFOUNDATION|MARCH2023PAGE5
includingtheShermanandClaytonantitrustacts,werespurredbysmall-businessleadersresistingthechangesbroughtonbythefactoryrevolution.
5
Oneofthemostprominentcriticsoftheshifttoacorporate,industrialeconomywasthephilosopherandsocialcriticWilliamJames.Hestatedhiscaseagainsttheemergentneweconomy:
Asforme,mybedismade:Iamagainstbignessandgreatnessinallforms,andwiththeinvisiblemolecularmoralforcesthatworkfromindividualtoindividual,stealinginthroughthecranniesoftheworldlikesomanysoftrootlets,orlikethecapillaryoozingofwater,andyetrenderingthehardestmonumentsofman’spride,ifyougivethemtime.Thebiggertheunityoudealwith,thehollower,themorebrutal,themoremendaciousisthelifedisplayed.SoIamagainstallbigorganizationsassuch,nationalonesfirstandforemost;againstallbigsuccessesandbigresults;andinfavoroftheeternalforcesoftruthwhichalwaysworkintheindividualandimmediatelyunsuccessfulway,underdogsalways,tillhistorycomes,aftertheyarelongdeadandputsthemontop.
6
IdaTarbell’smuckrakingexposéofStandardOilmadeAmericansawareoftheruthlesspracticesofJohnD.Rockefelleranddocumentedhisuseoflegalandillegalmeanstocrushhiscompetitors,evenifoverallproductivitymighthaverisenasaresult.Theemergenceoftheselargetrustsdominatedtheimaginationoffriendsandfoesalike.Tarbellstatedthattherapidlychangingeconomiclandscapeandtheriseofmonopolistictrustswas“disturbingandconfusingpeople.”
7
Inthefaceofsuchconcerns,Congresswasarousedtopassantitrustlaws.Butfarfrombreakinguplargefirms,thelawsinsomewaysencouragedmergers.Whatwasoutlawedweretrusts.
Opponentsevenarguedthatnotonlydidtrustsandbigcorporationsunfairlydominatesmallbusinessandfarmers,buttheywereactuallynomoreefficientthanthesmallbusinessestheyputoutofbusiness.Beforehebecameasupremecourtjustice,LouisBrandiesarguedinafamousratecaseagainsttherailroadsthatbigrailroadswereeconomicallyinefficient.Infact,Brandiesarguedthatmedium-sizedcompaniesingeneralweremostefficient.
8
Heandhisalliesmadethisargumentbecausetheyknewthatthestrongestcasefortheindustrialcorporationwasthevastincreasesinefficiencytheyproduced.Indeed,Brandeiswenttogreatpainstotrytopaintsmallfirmsasbeingasefficientaslargeoneswere,declaringintestimonybeforetheU.S.Senatein1911,forexample,that“acorporationmaywellbetoolargetobethemostefficientinstrumentofproductionandofdistribution.”
9
Inaddition,heandothersarguedthatcorporationsonlygotbigbycheating.AstheeconomichistorianThomasK.McGrawwrote,“Earlyinhiscareer,Brandeisdecidedthatbigbusinesscouldbecomebigonlythroughillegitimatemeans.Byhisfrequentreferencestothe‘curseofbigness,’hemeantthatbignessitselfwasthemarkofCain,asignofpriorsinning.”
10
Inthefaceofsuchconcerns,Congresswasarousedtopassantitrustlaws.Butfarfrombreakinguplargefirms,thelawsinsomewaysencouragedmergers.Whatwasoutlawedweretrusts.Sincefirmscouldnolongergetthebenefitsofcoordinationfromtrusts,theysoughtthemoutthrough
INFORMATIONTECHNOLOGY&INNOVATIONFOUNDATION|MARCH2023PAGE6
mergers.In1896,therewerefewerthan12firmsworth$10million,butby1904,thereweremorethan300,mostcreatedthroughmergers.
UnlikeBrandeisandotherpopulists,manyAmericanpoliticalleaderssupportedlargefirmsandmergersbecausetheysawthemasthepathtoAmericangreatness.Forexample,today,TheodoreRooseveltisoftenrememberedonlyasatrustbuster.Butthisisadistortionofhistory,ashedistinguishedbetween“good”and“bad”trustsandpreferredfederallicensingandregulationofcorporationstotheadversarialmethodsofantitrustlitigation.Inhis1905AnnualMessagetoCongress,Rooseveltdeclared:
Iaminnosensehostiletocorporations.Thisisanageofcombination,andany
efforttopreventcombinationwillnotbeuseless,butintheendvicious,because
ofthecontemptforlawwhichthefailuretoenforcelawinevitablyproduces.We
should,moreover,recognizeincordialandamplefashiontheimmensegood
effectedbycorporateagenciesinacountrysuchasours,andthewealthof
intellect,energy,andfidelitydevotedtotheirservice,andthereforenormallyto
theserviceofthepublic,bytheirofficersanddirectors.Thecorporationhascome
tostay,justasthetradeunionhascometostay.Eachcanandhasdonegreat
good.Eachshouldbefavoredsolongasitdoesgood.Buteachshouldbesharply
checkedwhereitactsagainstlawandjustice.
11
Rooseveltinsistedthatbusiness“cannotbesuccessfullyconductedinaccordancewiththe
practicesandtheoriesofsixtyyearsagounlessweabolishsteam,electricity,bigcities,and,in
short,notonlyallmodernbusinessandmodernindustrialconditions,butallthemodern
conditionsofourcivilization.”
12
ThehistorianMartinJ.Skylarnotedthat“Roosevelt’spositionwasnotthatof‘Trust-Buster’but
of‘Trust-Muster’—hewouldmusterthetrustsintothenationalservice.”
13
AsthelegalscholarDanielA.Cranenoted,“By1912,Rooseveltwasstakingapositionagainst
anytrustbustingatall.Farfromhonoringhis‘trustbuster’moniker,Rooseveltarguedforjustthe
opposite—thelegalityoflargecombinationsofcapital,nonethelesssubjecttopervasive
governmentalregulation.”
14
Indeed,althoughhisadministrationhadbroughttheantitrustcaseagainstStandardOil,RooseveltprivatelyregrettedthedecisionoftheSupremeCourtin1911tobreakupthecompany:
IdonotmyselfseewhatgoodcancomefromdissolvingtheStandardOilCompanyintofortyseparatecompanies,allofwhichwillstillremainreallyunderthesamecontrol.Whatweshouldhaveisamuchstrictergovernmentalsupervisionofthesegreatcompanies,butaccompanyingthissupervisionshouldbearecognitionofthefactthatgreatcombinationshavecometostayandthatwemustdothemscrupulousjusticejustasweexactscrupulousjusticefromthem.
15
TheShermanAntitrustActof1890declaredthat“everycontract,combinationintheformoftrustorotherwise,orconspiracyinrestraintoftradeamongtheseveralstates...wasillegal.”
16
Asaresult,thefocuswasmoreonanticompetitiveconductthanitwasonstructure(e.g.,
INFORMATIONTECHNOLOGY&INNOVATIONFOUNDATION|MARCH2023PAGE7
breakingupfirms).WeseethisintheProgressivePartynationalplatformfrom1900whichstated:
WefavorstrengtheningtheShermanLawbyprohibitingagreementtodivideterritoryorlimitoutput;refusingtoselltocustomerswhobuyfrombusinessrivals;tosellbelowcostincertainareaswhilemaintaininghigherpricesinotherplaces;usingthepoweroftransportationtoaidorinjurespecialbusinessconcerns;andotherunfairtradepractices.
17
Andthecourtsdidfocusmostlyonabusivebehaviortoattainorretainmarketshare,notpossessionofsignificantmarketshareitself.AstheSupremeCourtwroteintheAlcoacaseof1945,“Thesuccessfulcompetitor,havingbeenurgedtocompete,mustnotbeturneduponwhenhewins.”
18
Indeed,asappliedbythecourts,antitrustlawenforcementintheearly20thcenturyfrequentlyfellheavilyonsmallbusinesses,manyofwhichwouldendupgettingchargedwithcollusion.
ORGANIZATIONALFORMAFTERWORLDWARII
Manyseetheriseofindustrial-eracompaniesasonedevelopmentfromthe1880stothepresent.Therealityisthatwhilethepost-CivilWarcorporationsrepresentedasignificantevolutionfromthemerchant-erafamilyenterprise,theywerestillafarcryfromthelargemanagerialcorporationsthatbecamethestandardafterWorldWarII.Startinginthe1930s,corporateformonceagainchangedwiththeriseofwhatChandlertermedthe“managerialcorporation.”
Pre-WWII,mostdecisionscontinuedtobemadeininformalways,withownersandtopmanagersactingontheirownintuitionandlimitedinformation.Strictandclearlinesofauthoritywerenotlaidout,anddecisionsdependedonpersonalprioritiesanddiscretion.Unlikethecorporationofthe1950s,withitslargemassesofmiddlemanagersandsupervisors,asmallgroupofmanagersoversawthousandsofworkers.Chandlernotedthat“theCarnegieCorporationdidlittletocoordinateitsvariousmining,shippingandmanufacturingunits,whichremainedseparatecompaniesunderindependentmanagement.”
19
Mostcorporationswereone-productcompaniesrunbytheirownersandasmallexecutivecadre.Itwasnotuntiltheemergenceofthepost-WWIIeconomythatthepracticeofmanagementbecamethestandard.Asaresult,by1948,thecorporatesectorheldalmost60percentofnationalincome-producingwealth,andthelargest200employersaccountedfor20percentofprivatenonagriculturalworkers.By1950,the200largestnonfinancialcorporationsaccountedfor40.3percentofvalueadded.In1901,onlyonecorporation,USSteel,hadover$1billioninassets.By1960,638corporationshadmorethan$1billioninassets(inconstantdollars).Bignesswastheorderoftheday.
20
Startinginthe1930s,corporateformonceagainchangedwiththeriseofwhatChandlertermedthe“managerialcorporation.”
Thereweretwootherkeychanges.First,corporateformbeforeWWIIwaslargelyinfinanceandmanufacturing.AfterWWII,itextendedtomanyothersectors,suchasretail,hospitality,construction,andbusinessservices.AshistorianRobertGriffithstated,“Bythemiddleofthetwentiethcentury,corporatereorganizationoftheeconomyhadtakenplace.”
21
INFORMATIONTECHNOLOGY&INNOVATIONFOUNDATION|MARCH2023PAGE8
Inthe1960s,Galbraithcapturedthechange:
Seventyyearsagothecorporationwasconfinedtothoseindustries—railroading,steamboating,steelmaking,petroleumrecoveryandrefining,somemining—where,itseemedproductionhadtobeonalargescale.Nowitalsosellsgroceries,millsgrain,publishesnewspapersandprovidespublicentertainment,allactivitiesthatwereoncetheprovinceoftheindividualproprietorortheinsignificantfirm.
22
Second,scientificandengineeringdiscoverybecamemoreimportantforcompetitiveadvantage,asmanycorporationsafterthe1920sdevelopeddedicatedresearchanddevelopment(R&D)labs.Thesourcesofinnovationchangedfrombeingbasedlargelyontechnicaltinkeringandtrialanderrorbymechanicsandinventorsworkingintheirgaragestoascience-basedoneincorporatelaboratorieswhereinnovationwasderivedfromamorefundamentalunderstandingofunderlyingprocesses.
23
AsJosephSchumpeterargued,“Technologicalprogressisincreasinglybecomingthebusinessofteamsoftrainedspecialistswhoturnoutwhatisrequiredandmakeitworkinpredictableways.”
24
Asaresult,R&Dexpendituresskyrocketedby400percentbetween1953and1964.Forexample,Dupont’sR&Dexpendituresincreasedfromaround$1millionperyearin1921toover$60millionbythemid-1950s.
25
R&Dlaboratoriesincreasedfromaround1,000in1927—withfewdoingbasicresearch—toalmost5,000in1956,withmany,suchasBellLabsconductingextensivebasicresearch.
26
Onereflectionofthisisthefactthatin1901therewere20,896patentsissuedtoindividuals,withonly4,650goingtocorporations.Thesebalancedoutbythe1930s,butbythemid-1950s,thecorporateratehadtakenoff.By1980,corporationshadobtainedaboutfivetimesmorepatentsthanindividuals.
Bythe1950s,bigcorporationshadbecomeawayoflifeandAmericanshadgrownusedtothem.Professionalmanagersnowrancorporations,somuchsothattheperiodbecameknownasthe“eraofmanagerialcapitalism.”Here,ownershipandmanagementbecameseparated,inlargepartbecause,ascompaniesbecamemuchlargerandmoretechnologicallysophisticated,therewasaneedforlargeranksofprofessionalmanagerstorunthem.Yet,ascorporationsgrew,becameevermorecomplex,andhadavastlyincreasedneedformanagementandadministration,theybecamecontrolledbyanewclassofprofessionalmanagers.
Thecompletionofthecontinentalrailsystem,telephony,airtravel,andtheinterstateenabledatrulyintegratednationalmarketthatinturnenabledscale.Atthesametime,awidearrayofnewprocesstechnologies(technologiesinvolvedinmakingproducts)enabledandrequiredlargerandmoresophisticatedcompanies.Finally,theriseofcomputing(initiallymainframes)andtelecommunicationsallowedcompaniestomuchmoreeasilymanagelargeamountsofcomplexdata.Indeed,thatpostwar“mixedeconomy”wassodifferentfromtheonethatprecededitthatanissueofFortunemagazineinOctober1955wasdevotedtothe“NewEconomy”anddealt
withthe“Americanbreakthrough”andthe“newmanagement.”
27
Finally,asChandlernoted:
Inthefirstdecadeofthetwentiethcentury,thecontrolofthelargecorporationwas,infact,theparamountpoliticalquestionoftheday.Theprotestagainstthenewtypeofbusinessenterprisewasledbymerchants,smallmanufacturers,andotherbusinessmen,includingcommercialfarmers,whofelttheireconomic
INFORMATIONTECHNOLOGY&INNOVATIONFOUNDATION|MARCH2023PAGE9
intereststhreatenedbythenewinstitu
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