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Oops!ItTurnsOutAggressiveAntitrustWouldIncreaseBusinessLobbying
HADIHOUALLA|JANUARY2023
Thecommonrefrainthatbigbusinesswieldsdisproportionatepoliticalpowerisoverblown.Lobbyingdataindicatesthatlargefirmsspendrelativelylessonlobbyingthandosmallerfirms.
KEYTAKEAWAYS
1FlawedresearchincorrectlyassertsthatbigbusinessesfunneladisproportionateamountofmoneyintoWashingtonandthatantitrustisnecessarytosafeguarddemocracy.
1AnalysisbytheInformationTechnologyandInnovationFoundation(ITIF)showsthatfirmswithmorerevenue,higherprofits,andgreatermarketvaluespendlessonlobbyingperdollarofrevenuethansmallerfirmsdo.
1ITIF’sanalysisalsoshowsthatmergersreducelobbyingexpenditures,whilecorporatespin-offsincreaselobbying,onaverage.
1Inshort,employingantitrustinanefforttosafeguarddemocracywouldincreasecorporatelobbying,notdecreaseit,whilealsoharmingconsumersandeconomicgrowth.
1Criticsalsooverlookthefactthatsmallbusinesseswieldsignificantpoliticalpowerthroughtradeassociationsandgeographicadvantages.
INFORMATIONTECHNOLOGY&INNOVATIONFOUNDATION|JANUARY2023PAGE2
CONTENTS
KeyTakeaways 1
Introduction 2
PreviousResearchExaminingthePoliticalInfluenceofCorporations 3
IndustrySelectionBias 4
MarketDefinitionProblems 4
OmittedVariableBias:IndustryGrowth 4
OmittedVariableBias:OverallTrendsinLobbying 5
FaultyRegressionAnalysis 6
ThePoliticalInfluenceofSmallBusinesses 7
ReassessingtheConnectionBetweenFirmSizeandLobbying 8
Methods 8
TheRelationshipBetweenFirmSizeandLobbying 9
TheRelationshipBetweenProfits,MarketValue,andLobbying 10
DoMergersIncreaseLobbying? 11
DoCorporateSpin-OffsDecreaseLobbying? 12
Conclusion 13
Endnotes 14
INTRODUCTION
Antitrustisbackwithavengeance,drivenbyasurgeofadvocacyhearkeningtothelegacyofSupremeCourtJusticeLouisBrandeis,theantimonopolistherooftheProgressiveErawhooftenbemoanedthe“curseofbigness,”whichheviewedasinherentlybad.
1
Neo-Brandeisiansarguenotjustthatlargecompanieshurttheeconomy,smallbusiness,andconsumers,butalsothat theyareapersethreattodemocracybecauseconcentratedeconomicpowerbegetsconcentratedpoliticalpower.Ergo,theyviewantitrustasbothapolicytoolandaphilosophicalunderpinningofdemocracyitself.
2
Manypoliticalleadersnowchannelthatviewintheircallsformoreaggressiveantitrustaction.PresidentBiden’s2021executiveorderoncompetitionwarnedthat“excessivemarketconcentrationthreatens…democraticaccountability.”
3
PresidentialadvisorTimWu,whohelpeddrafttheorder,previouslywarnedinaNewYorkTimescolumnthatweshould“BeAfraidofEconomic‘Bigness.’BeVeryAfraid,”becauseextremeconcentrationcreatesconditions“ripefordictatorship.”
4
(Nevermindthat,asITIFhasshown,U.S.marketsarenotreallybecomingmoreconcentrated.
5
)Meanwhile,theleadershipoftheU.S.DepartmentofJustice(DOJ)andtheFederalTradeCommission(FTC)haveeachreleasedstatementscommittingtouseantitrusttopreservedemocracy.
6
AndSenatorAmyKlobuchar’s(D-MN)recentbookdeclares,“IfAmericansaretorebalanceourdemocracy,wemustrecapturethespiritoftheantitrustmovement.”
7
INFORMATIONTECHNOLOGY&INNOVATIONFOUNDATION|JANUARY2023PAGE3
GivenAmericans’deepcommitmenttoademocraticrepublic,thislineofattackislikelytobemoreeffectiveforneo-Brandeisianthananeconomicone.Raisingthealarmthatbigbusinessesofallkinds,notjustselectonlineinformationplatforms,subvertthedemocraticwillofthepeopletouchesacorenerve.Soitcomesaslittlesurprisethatneo-Brandeisiansassertthatlargebusinessesspendalargerproportionoftheirrevenueonlobbyingthandosmallerbusinesses,andanAmericawithfarfewerlargebusinesseswouldbetterreflectthewillofthepeople.
8
Forthem,stricterantitrust—bothstrictermergerenforcementandbreakupsofexistingcompanies—isapowerfultooltorestorethehealthofAmericandemocracy.Butwhileseductive,thisviewisfactuallyincorrectforanumberofreasons.
ITIF’sanalysisrebutsthenotionthataneo-Brandeisianapproachtoantitrustbasedona“bigisbad”ethoswouldbeaneffectivetooltorestrictbusinesslobbying.Suchanapproachwouldlikelyinsteadincreaseoveralllobbyingexpenditures.
First,manyofthemostpowerfulplayersinWashingtonareassociationsofsmallcompanies,suchasrealtors,cardealers,insuranceagents,communitybanks,andsmallruralInternetserviceproviders.Andmoretothepoint,asthisreportdemonstrates,largefirmsspendlessonlobbyingperdollarofrevenuethandosmallerfirms.Inaddition,mergersareassociatedwithdecreasedlobbyingasaproportionofrevenue,andcorporatespin-offsareassociatedwithincreasedlobbying.Takentogether,ITIF’sanalysisrebutsthenotionthataneo-Brandeisianapproachtoantitrustbasedona“bigisbad”ethoswouldbeaneffectivetooltorestrictbusinesslobbying.Suchanapproachwouldlikelyinsteadincreaseoveralllobbyingexpenditures.
PREVIOUSRESEARCHEXAMININGTHEPOLITICALINFLUENCEOFCORPORATIONS
AmericanEconomicLibertiesProject(AEL)isaneo-Brandeisianactivistorganizationworking“tochallengemonopolies’dominanceovermarketsandsociety.”
9
Inits2021report“DemocracyforSale,”theorganizationclaimstoshowthatmoremarketpowerleadstomorelobbying.Thereportconcludesthat“notonlyisbigbusinessgoodatlobbying,butthatbiggerbusinessleadstomorelobbying.Thatmeansmonopolyisathreattorepresentativedemocracy—andthatprotectingourdemocracyrequireseffectiveantitrust.”
10
Tobeclear,itarguesthatonebigbusinesswithrevenueequaltotwomid-sizebusinessesspendsmoreonlobbyingthandothetwobusinesses.
TheauthorsreachedthisconclusionbycomparingchangesintheHerfindahl–Hirschmanindex(HHI)ofthreeindustries(Internetcompanies,pharmaceuticals,andoilandgasproduction)tochangesintheirtotallobbyingexpenditures.TheyfoundthatasHHIgrew,sotoodidtheindustries’totallobbyingexpenditure.ThestudyobservesthispositiverelationshipwhencomparingthelobbyingexpenditureofoneyearwiththeHHIoffouryearsearlier.Accordingtotheauthors,thislagresultsfromthe“processofturningconcentrationintoprofitsandthenspinningthoseprofitsintolobbyinginWashington.”
11
However,asdiscussedahead,thisstudyhasanumberofsignificantflawsthatdonotsupportthereport’sconclusions.
Notsurprisingly,thereportcallsforstricterantitrustbecause“[t]heconsumerwelfarestandardsimplydoesnotcapturethefullsuiteofharmsofconcentrationandcannotprovideafullsolution.”
12
Inotherwords,thereportarguesthat,eventhougheconomiesofscalecanlowerpricesandmakeconsumersbetteroff,thethreatoflargecorporationstodemocracyissufficient
INFORMATIONTECHNOLOGY&INNOVATIONFOUNDATION|JANUARY2023PAGE4
towarrantstrongerantitrust.Thisisthekey.Neo-Brandeisianshaveaslenderreedwhentheyargueagainstbigonthebasisofconsumerwelfare.Mostvotersinstinctivelyrealizethatlargecorporationsgotlargebyprovidingconsumerswithvalue.Sotheneo-Brandeisiansrelyonthepolitical-threatargument.
IndustrySelectionBias
ThefirstflawintheAELstudyisitoverlooksthatchangesintheindustries’regulatoryenvironmentsmightbeoccurringsimultaneouslytoincreasingconcentration.Internetcompanies,pharmaceuticalcompanies,andoil/gasproductionareallincreasinglyattheforefrontofAmericanregulatorydebates.Theseregulatorydebatesnaturallygeneratemorelobbyingexpenditures.Ampleevidenceshowsthatbecausepoorlydesignedregulationsharmfirms,threatsofregulationtendtoincreaselobbyingexpenditures.
13
Byfailingtocontrolforthisfactor,theauthorscouldbemisattributingsomeoftheeffectsofincreasingregulatoryscrutinytoincreasingconcentration.Thiswouldleadtheauthorstooverstatetheeffectofconcentrationonlobbying.Inaddition,theauthorscannotholdthesethreeindustriestoberepresentativeoftheentireeconomy.Amuchwidersampleoffirmsisnecessarytosupporttheauthors’conclusions.
MarketDefinitionProblems
Thestudyalsosuffersfrommarketdefinitionproblems.Forexample,itgroupsvastlydifferentcompanies,suchas“Internetjoblistingservices,auctionsandInternetretail,Internetpublishing,websearchportals,dataprocessingandhosting,electronicshopping,andmail-orderhouses”underasingle“Internetcompanies”category.
14
Thestudydoesnotsharethecompletelistofcompaniesitincludesineachindustrialclassification,butitcitesafewofthecompaniesthattheyclassifiedas“Internetcompanies.”TheseincludeAmazon,Google,Facebook,Microsoft,andOracle.
15
Forthemostpart,thesecompaniesarenotinthesamemarkets,sousingHHIismisleading.Oracle,forexample,doesnotcompetewithFacebookandAmazon,andOracleandAmazoncompeteoncloudofferingsbutnotontherestoftheirbusinessmodels.Thestudyalsooverlooksforeignsubstitutesandnonpubliclytradedcompaniesforallthreeindustriesitconsiders,thereforeoverstatingconcentration.
16
OmittedVariableBias:IndustryGrowth
Industriesthatseeincreasingtotalrevenuesandtheentryofnewfirmscouldseemorelobbyingovertimethatisunrelatedtoconcentration.Butiftheseindustriesaregrowingandbecomingmoreconcentratedatthesametime,thereportcouldbemisattributinglobbyingincreasesfromindustrygrowthtoconcentration.
Forexample,thereportpointsoutthatHHIgrowsintheInternetindustrybutdoesnotcontrolforthefactthattheindustryisgrowingatthesametime.
17
Figure1
chartsthegrowthinrevenueandlobbyingoffiveInternetcompaniesthereportincludesinitsanalysis.Aswewouldexpect,lobbyingexpendituresgrowassalesrevenuegrows.Butbecausethereportdoesnotcontrolforindustrygrowth,theauthorsmisattributedcausalitytoconcentrationwhen,inalllikelihood,atleastsomeofthelobbyingincreaseresultsfromthesheergrowthinthesizeoftheindustry.
INFORMATIONTECHNOLOGY&INNOVATIONFOUNDATION|JANUARY2023PAGE5
$4B
$3B
$2B
$1B
Figure1:InternetindustrylobbyingexpendituresandaggregaterevenueofAmazon,Google,Facebook,Microsoft,andOracle(indexed;2001=100%)
18
3,100%
2,600%
2,100%
1,600%
1,100%
600%
100%
20012003200520072009201120132015201720192021
GrowthofLobbyingGrowthofRevenue
OmittedVariableBias:OverallTrendsinLobbying
Wealsocomparedtotallobbyingtrendswiththesethreesectors’lobbyingtrends.As
figure2
illustrates,totallobbyingintheUnitedStatesincreasedfrom1998to2008andhasroughlystabilizedsince.
Figure2:TotallobbyingexpendituresintheUnitedStates
19
20012003200520072009201120132015201720192021
INFORMATIONTECHNOLOGY&INNOVATIONFOUNDATION|JANUARY2023PAGE6
Figure3
comparesthegrowthoflobbyingacrosstheseindustries.Wenoticethatpharmaceuticalsandoilandgascompanieshavelobbyingpatternsthatmostlymirrortheoveralltrendforbusinesses.Thissuggeststhatoveralltrendsinlobbyingmightexplainsomeoftheobservedchangesinlobbyingexpenditureovertime.Incontrast,Internetcompaniessawimmenselobbyinggrowthfrom2001to2021.ThedisproportionatelylargegrowthoftheInternetsectorduringthisperiodlikelyexplainswhythesectorsosharplydeviatesfromtheoveralltrendline.Butevenso,controllingforoveralltrendsinlobbyingduringthesampleperiodcouldimprovethereport’sestimates.
Figure3:Growthoflobbyingbyindustry(indexed;2001=100%)
20
1,900%1,700%1,500%1,300%1,100% 900% 700% 500%300%
100%
20012003200520072009201120132015201720192021
InternetPharma
Total
Oil&Gas
FaultyRegressionAnalysis
HHIvaluesarealsoremarkablylowforbothpharmaceuticalsandoil/gascompanies.Bothindustries’HHIspeaksignificantlybelow1,500,whichmeansbothindustrieshavelowmarketconcentrationaccordingtotheDOJ’sstandards.
21
TheInternetcompanies’HHIbarelyexceeds1,500,butevenso,theseconcentrationvaluesareoverstatedbecausetheauthorsimproperlydefinedthemarket.
22
Inotherwords,noneofthesethreeindustriesarehighlyconcentrated.
Theselectionofmodelsinthereportisalsoproblematic.TheauthorsbuiltseveralmodelswithdifferentHHIlagsandseemedtoarbitrarilypickthemodelwiththehighestR-squared.Forinstance,thecoefficientoftheircombinedmodelwithnolaghasanR-squaredofonly0.01,whichsuggestsnorelationship.
23
TheauthorswentontolagtheHHIsbyfouryearsforallindustriesbutultimatelysettledonamodelwithafour-yearHHIlagforInternetandoil/gasandathree-yearHHIlagforpharmaceuticalsbecausethiscombinationoflagsyieldsthehighestR-squaredamongallthemodelstheyassessedintheirreport.Theauthorsjustifiedwhatseemslikethearbitraryselectionofamodelbyclaimingthat“theremaybeaspecificsweetspotforhowlongittakesforconcentrationtomanifestanychangesinlobbying,”yettheyprovidednoevidencethattheprocessofturningmarketpowerintoprofitsandprofitsintopolitical
capitaltakes“threeorfouryears.”
24
Infact,someoftheevidenceinthereportdirectlysuggests
INFORMATIONTECHNOLOGY&INNOVATIONFOUNDATION|JANUARY2023PAGE7
thatthisrelationshipisunlikely.Forexample,thep-valueofthethree-yearlagmodelgoesfrom0.6,farfromsignificant,toahighlystatisticallysignificantvalueforafour-yearlag.
25
Ifthetruerelationshipistheonetheyweresuggesting,wewouldnotexpectsuchasudden,pronounceddropinstatisticalsignificancewhenthelagshiftsbyjustoneyear.Itseemsliketheauthorswerecherry-pickingthebest-fitmodelwithoutproperjustificationandusingittoadvancetheiranticorporateagenda.
Forallthesereasons,thisreportdoesnotprovideaconvincingargumentthatcorporateconcentrationincreaseslobbying.Infact,thereportitselfstates,“Whilethecorrelationisofasingleindustryandnotenoughtomakeasweepingclaimabouttherelationshipgenerally,itremainsnoteworthy.”
26
Iftheauthorsthemselvesadmittedthattheirfindingsareinsufficienttodrawsweepingclaims,itwouldbeunreasonableforthemtoframetheirresultsasanalarmingjustificationforsweepingantitrustenforcement.
THEPOLITICALINFLUENCEOFSMALLBUSINESSES
Literaturehighlightingtheinfluenceofbigbusinessoftenfailstorecognizethemechanismsthroughwhichsmallbusinessesinfluencepolicymakers.Becausetheyhavemoreresources,largebusinessesoftenhirein-houselobbyiststoadvocatefortheirinterestsinWashington.Smallbusinessescanindividuallyexertasimilarinfluenceonpolicymakersbutoftendosobypoolingresourcesintotradeassociations.Intable1,welistjustafewofthetradeassociationsrepresentingsmallbusinessesandtheirlobbyingexpenditurein2021:
Table1:Lobbyingexpendituresoftradeassociationsrepresentingsmallcompaniesin2021
TradeAssociation
LobbyingExpenditure
NationalAssociationofRealtors
$44.0million
America’sHealthInsurancePlans
$10.8million
NationalAutoDealersAssociation
$4.5million
IndependentCommunityBankersofAmerica
$4.2million
Cardealershipsprovideanexampleofthemassiveinfluencesmallbusinessescanachievebycomingtogetherthroughatradeassociation.TheNationalAutoDealersAssociationrepresentsmorethan16,000autodealersandspentover$4millioninlobbyingin2021.
27
CardealerassociationshavespearheadedlegislationatthestateandlocallevelsfordecadesintheUnitedStates.
28
A2014CatoInstitutereportoutlineshowdealershiplobbiessuccessfullypreventedTeslafromusingadirect-to-consumerdistributionmodelinseveralstatesbecausethismodelbypassestraditionalfranchiseddealernetworks.
29
Asthiscasedemonstrates,smallbusinessescanwieldlargepoliticalinfluencebyunitingundertradeassociations.
Moreover,lookingonlyatlobbyingdatalikelyexaggeratestheinfluenceoflargecompaniesanddownplaystheinfluenceofsmallbusinesses.InBigIsBeautiful,AtkinsonandLindshowedthatmuchoftheinfluenceofsmallbusinessarisesfromgeography:
INFORMATIONTECHNOLOGY&INNOVATIONFOUNDATION|JANUARY2023PAGE8
Ineverycongressionaldistrictandeverystatetherearefamilyfarmers,franchiseowners,automobiledealers,realtors,andotherswhosesupportpoliticianscannotignore.Incontrast,theheadquartersandproductionfacilitiesofmajornationalandglobalcorporationsarefoundinarelativelysmallnumberofplaces.EveryAmericanstatehasfamilyfarmersandrealtors;farfewerhaveautomobileoraerospacemanufacturers.
30
REASSESSINGTHECONNECTIONBETWEENFIRMSIZEANDLOBBYING
Methods
ITIFconducteditsownanalysistoassesstheinfluenceoffirmsizeonlobbying.
LobbyingExpenditureData
LiketheAELstudy,thisreportusesOpenSecretslobbyingexpendituredata.OpenSecretscompilesexpendituredatafromrequireddisclosuresfiledwiththeSecretaryoftheSenate’sOfficeofPublicRecordsundertheLobbyingDisclosureactof1995.
31
Thisdataissubjecttoseverallimitations:Thedisclosuresareroundedtothenearest$10,000foreachquarter,andlobbyingfirmsonlyneedtoreportcontributionsfromdonorswhospendmorethan$3,000inonequarter.A2018GovernmentAccountabilityOfficereportalsofindsthatasignificantnumberoflobbyistsincorrectlydisclosedtheirlobbyingincome.
32
FirmRevenueData
Fortheanalysisoffirmsizeandlobbying,dataonfirmrevenuecomesfromthe2021Fortune500list,whichrankspubliclytradedAmericancompaniesbytheirrevenue.
Fortheanalysisofmergersandcorporatespin-offs,wematchedcompanynamestorevenuedataintheCRSP/Compustatmergeddataset.CRSP/Compustatcompileshistoricalfirmperformancedata,includingrevenuedata,onfirmsthatareorwerepubliclytradedintheUnitedStates.
33
WhenrevenuefigureswereunavailablethroughCRSP/Compustat,weusedcompanies’annualdisclosurestocompleteourdataset.
Onelimitationofthisstudy’sdesignisitonlyconsiderspubliccompanies.BecauseprivatefirmsaccountforaslightmajorityofrevenueintheUnitedStates,thisreport’sfindingsmightnotgeneralizetotheentireU.S.economy.
34
Butitisunclearhowacompany’sstatusasapublicorprivatecompanywouldaffectitslobbyingactivity.Accordingly,itisunknownhowthislimitationbiasesourfindingsifitdoessoatall.
MergerandCorporateSpin-OffData
Themergerandcorporate–spin-offanalysescompiledataonthehighest-valuedealsforwhichwecouldfinddatafrom2000to2019.Thisportionofthestudylooksatcompanylobbyingasashareofaggregaterevenueoneyearbeforethemergerorspin-offandtwoyearsfollowingthemergerorspin-off.Weanalyzeddataon25mergersand15corporatespin-offs.
MeasurementIssues
Oneimportantcaveattoourfindingsistheyarenotcausal.Thereareafewexogenousreasonsthatcouldaffectbothrevenuesandshareofrevenuetolobbyingatthesametime.Forexample,companiesinnascent,innovativeindustriescouldseehighrevenuesbutalsoincreasingregulatoryscrutiny,whichwouldincentivizelobbying.Inthiscase,wemightoverestimatehow
INFORMATIONTECHNOLOGY&INNOVATIONFOUNDATION|JANUARY2023PAGE9
LobbyingExpenditures
muchrevenuesincreaselobbyingbecauseathirdfactor,industrygrowth,wouldbeaffectingbothfirmrevenueandlobbyingsimultaneously.
Thisreport’sfindingsonmergersandcorporatespin-offscouldalsohaveendogeneityproblems.Forexample,mergersandspin-offscansometimesaccompanycorporatestrategychangesthatalsoaffectlobbying.Insuchcases,ouranalysismightmisattributetheeffectsofcorporateleadershiponlobbyingtocorporatescale.Nonetheless,iftherelationshipbetweencorporatescaleandlobbyingisasstrongandpositiveassomepreviousresearcherssuggest,wewouldatleastexpecttoobserveapositivecorrelationbetweenscaleandlobbyingwhenlookingatmergersandspin-offs.
Finally,thisanalysispaintsonlyapartialpictureoftherelationshipbetweenfirmsizeandpoliticalinfluence.Companiescaninfluencepolicythroughroutesotherthanlobbying,includingcampaignfinanceandthinktankdonations.
35
TheRelationshipBetweenFirmSizeandLobbying
Wecollecteddataonthe200Americanfirmswiththehighestrevenuesforthe2021fiscalyeartoidentifythelinkbetweenfirmrevenueandtotallobbyingexpenditure.Wethenmanuallymatchedeachfirm’srevenuedatatoitslobbyingexpenditurein2021.
Basedonouranalysis,thecorrelationbetweenfirmrevenueandlobbyingexpenditurehasavalueof0.40,whichismoderateandpositive.Inotherwords,largefirmstendtohaveahighertotallobbyingexpenditurethandotheirsmallercompetitors.
Figure4:Relationshipbetweenfirms’revenuesandlobbyingexpendituresin2021
$30M
$25M
$20M
$15M
$10M
$5M
$200B
$300BRevenues
$100B
$400B
$500B
$600B
Atfirstglance,thisfindingseemslikeitwouldbolstertheAEL’sclaimthatheightenedantitrustcouldsuppresscorporateinfluenceinWashington:“Strongerantitrustpremisedonreducing
INFORMATIONTECHNOLOGY&INNOVATIONFOUNDATION|JANUARY2023PAGE10
LobbyingExpenditures
corporateconcentrationshouldbeunderstoodnotjustasamechanismtoaddressmarketpowerproblems,butasananti-corruptionmeasureinitself.”
36
Butthisreliesontheunprovenassumptionthatthetwosmallercompaniesoriginatingfromabreakupwouldspendasmallercombinedamountonlobbyingthanwouldtheoriginal,largefirm.
Splittingonelargefirmintotwosmalleronesthatspendthesameshareofrevenueonlobbyingasthelargefirmwouldnotchangetotallobbyingexpenditure,assumingthedaughterfirms’aggregaterevenueremainedunchanged.Totallobbyingcouldevenincreaseifthesmallercompaniesdevotedahighershareofrevenuetolobbying.
Accordingly,thenextportionofthisreportanalyzeswhetherlargefirmsspendmoreonlobbyingperdollarofrevenue.Usingdataonthe200highest-revenuefirmsin2021,wedeterminedthatthecorrelationbetweentotalrevenueandthepercentageofrevenuetolobbyingwasinfactnegative(-0.17).Inotherwords,contrarytotheneo-Brandeisianclaim,largerfirmsdevoteasmallershareofrevenuetolobbyingthandotheirsmallercounterparts.
Assuch,wedonothaveevidencethatbreakinguplargefirmswoulddoanythingtodecreaselobbying.Thesefindingsinsteadimplythatbreakingupalargercorporationintosmallerentitiescouldincreasethetotallobbyingexpenditureofaneconomy.
Figure5:Relationshipbetweenfirms’revenuesandthepercentagespentonlobbyingin2021
0.06%
0.05%
0.04%
0.03%
0.02%
0.01%
0.00%
$100B
$200B
$300BRevenues
$400B
$600B
$500B
TheRelationshipBetweenProfits,MarketValue,andLobbying
UsingtabulatedFortune500data,wenextcalculatedthecorrelationsbetweenprofitsandlobbyingaswellasmarketvalueandlobbyingforthe200highest-revenueAmericanfirmsin
2021.
INFORMATIONTECHNOLOGY&INNOVATIONFOUNDATION|JANUARY2023PAGE11
Resultsareconsistentwithouranalysisoffirmrevenues.Firmswithhigherprofitsormarketvaluehaveahighertotallobbyingexpenditure,withrespectivecorrelationsof0.35and0.34.Butwhen
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